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Abstract
This thesis is based on an ethnographic case study o f  a London building site. The 
social organisation o f building work and building workers was framed by the city, 
and cross-cut by class, race and gender, the structures and processes o f which are 
explored throughout.
The fieldwork site was characterised by racial divides between subcontracted 
trade groups, which were organised around informal networks within ethnic 
communities. Those communities, in their turn, were bounded by patterns o f gift- 
exchange, reciprocity and ensuing loyalties. Networked contacts, which were 
predominately ascribed by social, ethnic and regional origins, formed an aspect o f the 
perpetuation o f race and class structures.
Strong notions o f trust and loyalty fostered illegitimate activities because 
information concerning rule-breaking was kept within the communities and went 
undetected by agencies representing the formal law. Informal networks were also 
contrived and engineered by entrepreneurial subcontractors whose relationships with 
building contractors and consultants were characterised by gift-giving. This process 
shielded competition from rivals and closed down the competitiveness o f  the 
construction market. ‘Embedded’ economic relations excluded recent migrant groups 
and their subcontracted representatives by blocking access to jobs and contracts, 
despite the groups ’ ability to offer cheaper and harder-working labour.
Contractual arrangements were informal and sometimes illicit, and this 
erected barriers to legal and regulatory power. Coupled with short-term and 
ephemeral working practices, a social order partly supported by the threat o f violence 
was established. The masculinity expressed by builders was, in part, a consequence o f  
this display o f violence.
The building industry was virtually a ‘non-modern ’ organisation whose social 
relations were marked by network morality, nepotism, reciprocity, gift relations and 
the threat o f violence. Yet, violence underpinned forms o f social power, which 
manufactured the imbalance o f false reciprocities.
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Its inhabitants are, as the man once said, ‘whores, pimps, gamblers and sons of 
bitches,’ by which he meant Everybody. Had the man looked through another peep­
hole he might have said: ‘saints and angels and martyrs and holy men’, and he would 
have meant the same thing.
John Steinbeck, 1937: 1
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Introduction
Builders construct, repair and maintain the physical infrastructure of our societies. 
They work in the most private spaces of our homes and workplaces, and we rely on 
and trust their achievements in almost every moment of our lives. Despite this, we 
know very little about them because we take them for granted. Inevitably people have 
to build and maintain the buildings we live, work and play in, and it is their lives, 
cultures and actions that this thesis describes.
Originally, my aim was to tell a story about the lives of building workers 
through the tradition of the Chicago School of sociology so as to amplify builders’ 
voices and communicate their social world to a wider audience. I intended to 
participate in the social life of builders, discover their thoughts and feelings and, 
extract form and social order from their discrete but complex social world. I had 
worked as a builder for some years previously and saw that a thesis about builders 
could be used to describe a section of the ‘social mosaic’ (Becker, 1970). However, in 
trying to tell their story, I came to realise that it was inseparable from stories related to 
class, race and gender. These elements structured and impinged upon their lives, and 
were further shaped by London, the post-industrial city that formed the backdrop to 
the set in which the builders lived and performed their lives, and which provided a site 
for my research. The city was further situated as a node in the intense global capitalist 
economy, and, like building and builders, it has had a long history. I could not tell the 
builders’ story separate from these factors.
In chapter 1 the story begins with the history and structure of the building 
industry, which was almost pre-industrial, or non-modem, in its organisation. 
Although changes occurred across the period of modernity and industrialisation with 
the decline of the guilds and the emergence of general contracting companies, 
builders and the building industry revealed numerous continuities with the past. The 
building industry’s archaic nature meant that builders could not be seen as part of the 
industrial proletariat. Their history was older.
Chapter 2 describes my position as researcher on a State-commissioned 
building project, my methodological and epistemological assumptions, and the 
problems and nuances of ethnographic research.
Chapter 3 describes the particular build that I participated in, and the 
relationships between the State, its buildings and its builders, set against the backdrop
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of the hegemony of the free market and the marketisation of governance. I examine 
the complex organisational nature of the build and the problems encountered in 
reaching an agreement between all the parties involved, and I highlight how 
management theories, government legislation and bureaucratic regulatory measures 
were introduced (unsuccessfully) to redress and frame conflicts between the parties. I 
also describe how bureaucratic methods were underpinned by informal negotiations, 
and the formation and maintenance of informal alliances, alliances that functioned to 
skew formal organisational methods.
Chapter 4 examines the emergence, function and organisation of the 
subcontract system through which the manual workers were employed. The informal 
information networks that subcontractors utilised to recruit inexpensive and 
informally-controlled labour were related to the very tangible ethnic and geographical 
trade divisions present on the building site.
Chapter 5 addresses the diverse ways in which the builders became builders. 
They were found to interpret their life trajectories as contingent upon external social, 
political and economic circumstances. It is argued that their lives were indeed 
contingent upon these extraneous circumstances, which combined with the patterning 
of social networks and contributed to the reproduction of class, race and gender 
structures.
Chapter 6 analyses formal systems of work control and discovers an absence 
of formal managerial demands. Instead the builders possessed a high degree of 
autonomy and a ‘craft work ethic’, in which work conflict was kept to a minimum by 
informal reciprocal administration methods.
Chapter 7 examines workplace culture and the games played at work. This 
was related to the synthetic and imposed structure of time. The intensification of time 
was associated with modernity, and the relationship between time structure and ‘shop- 
floor’ behaviour and culture is explored. In both chapters 6 and 7, the creative and 
collusive nature of the builders’ culture is emphasised.
Chapter 8 focuses on the gendered nature of building site culture with an 
emphasis on the body as economic capital, interactive power and a wider source of 
discursive status. Corporal capital was a valuable commodity, and the symbolic power 
of bodies in relation to bellicose posturing were associated with the pre-industrial 
non-contractual, informal and ephemeral nature of the building industry. Shop-floor 
behaviour was framed by this somatic and archaic culture.
Chapter 9 tackles issues of reciprocity and trust in relation to social networks, 
employment and social control. An ethnic subcontracting dynamic operated which 
reproduced ethnic divisions and formed a backdrop to expressions of racism and 
discrimination. The relationships between subcontractors, contractors and consultants 
are analysed, and it is revealed that they were contrived by gift exchange mechanisms 
predicated on trust and long-term relationships which negated the possibility of a fully 
competitive market.
Chapter 10 describes the builders’ economic lives. Their incomes were not 
only made up of formal wages, but also of extra income acquired through informal 
means. It is argued that informal and formal ways of making a living were intimately 
tied to one another. Informal economic action did not necessarily secure direct and 
tangible forms of income, but acted to manufacture economic cushions and build 
network alliances which in turn patterned class, race and gender structures.
Chapter 11 brings the story to an end and draws together the preceding plot 
and subplots into a discussion of the builders’ lives, set against the backdrop of 
intense modernity and its concomitant social structures.
Throughout the thesis I have ordered the social world of the building site through the 
linguistic categories that the builders themselves used. In this sense, the term 
‘builders’ is a blanket term to describe all the actors involved in the collective product 
of building. This term is subdivided into trades and positions: management, quantity 
surveyors, labourers, and tradesmen; and these are further divided into particular 
trades, and further still into named individuals. All place, company and personal 
names have been changed, but I have tried to reproduce the flavour of the builders’ 
terms and colloquialisms. To this end I frequently use parochial argot and apply 
nicknames to some of the characters. I hope to have remained faithful to their social 
world.
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Chapter 1 
Making Buildings: 
History and Overview of the Construction Industry
Nature, Society and Buildings
Buildings are central to social life. In their most basic form they serve as protective 
structures to house bodies away from nature (c.f. Giddens, 1991). Within buildings, 
internal layouts are fashioned to create organised and predictable spaces in which to 
undertake social life. In these spaces, physical action becomes habitualised and taken 
for granted, resulting in physical and psychological security and economy. Buildings 
are, then, tools utilised for risk reduction and the creation and maintenance of 
security; machines designed to regulate nature.
Dwellings are physical areas that provide organisational arenas for ‘the 
social’. They protect individuals and families, but also provide the space and 
symbolism to anchor and enclose the institution of the family. Physical spaces bind 
social institutions because (until very recently) people must be bought together in 
space to perform institutional behaviour. Thus for example, churches and temples 
symbolise the power of gods and dramatise the sacred relics they contain. Castles and 
palaces symbolise monarchical power and exemplify corporal power by housing 
armies. Prisons symbolise the power of the State and, by containing the deviant, 
radiate disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977), and massive office blocks symbolise, 
embody and contain the power of capital. Buildings are physical manifestations of the 
subjective world, arenas whereby the virtual-social becomes real and objective. In this 
sense, a building is part of what reifies the social, that is, a built structure works back 
upon social action by distributing bodies in space and providing a symbolic backdrop 
for social performances. In dramaturgical terms, buildings provide the set against 
which actors perform their show (c.f. Goffinan, 1959).
Social Convention and Building
Buildings are designed for different uses. This is reflected in their internal structures, 
and these have altered substantially through history. Most of us no longer sleep, eat, 
work and have sex in a single space shared with our extended family as we did in the 
past. As Foucault argues, during the late 17th century the ‘tolerant familiarity with the 
illicit’ (1976: 3) became subject to disciplinary regulation. Consequently, throughout
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the 18th and 19th centuries, sexuality became governed and segregated into specific 
areas in the home, brothel or mental institution. Associated with the rise of 
conventions of sexuality and the sacredness of the body, the internal space of 
buildings became divided and bounded. Modem family houses for example, are very 
similar in their stmcture (until very recently) because modem discourses, conventions, 
and monetary economy frame their stmcture.
The majority of European houses are based upon the Georgian plan, which 
created semi-public and private space within which to undertake conventional family 
routines. Bounded to provide specific sets for specific actions, social performance 
became ritualised in even the most private spaces: the bedroom for sleeping, dressing, 
being naked and having sex; the water closet for washing and ridding the body of 
waste matter; the kitchen for eating and preparing food. External spaces surrounding 
buildings also became bounded. With the rise of private ownership, fences and 
borders were erected as symbolic barriers to demarcate private property. The 
intensification of trade bought boundary roads between buildings and social centres, 
and boundaries channelled the movement of bodies in space, organising and speeding 
communication and interdependency. The intensification of modernity demanded that 
water and fuel were bought into dwellings, and structures were built and planned into 
buildings to deliver these materials.
Buildings and interlinking stmctures, such as roads and paths, routinise and 
regulate social and bodily movements by safeguarding and shielding against nature’s 
hazards. As the modernist architect LeCorbusier wrote: ‘The regulating line is an 
assurance against capriciousness... it is one of the vital operations of architecture’ 
(1923: 75). It follows, then, that any space external to what has been built or doctored 
by human agency will be the converse of routine organisation. It will lie within the 
sphere of nature, the realm of multi-contingent complexity, unpredictability, danger 
and the resulting physical and subjective insecurity. It is in this realm that builders 
work. In constructing the physical manifestation of the social world, builders spend 
much of their time outside that world, on the margins of modernity1.
Buildings are large, immobile and built into their place of consumption. If all 
parts of a building were pre-fabricated in a factory, someone would still have to 
assemble them at their final site of function. In manufacturing industry, where
1 North American literature focussing on builders tacitly reflects this. Reimer (1979) and Applebaum (1981) 
present builders in the image o f  heroic frontiersmen almost akin to the Cowboy.
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production is commonly organised by Fordist assembly-line principles, products are 
divided into small units and moved on a conveyor belt to a stationary worker. In the 
factory therefore, workers can be observed and tightly governed. A building however, 
cannot be subdivided into small units and moved to the worker. Builders must move 
around a structure taking the parts with them. Furthermore, because buildings make 
space private, builders work in private space. This makes observation problematic, 
and, observation is control. Foucault (1977) suggested that architecture assisted and 
conveyed disciplinary control: the school, prison and the factory relayed discipline 
through an architecture of possible observation.
It is builders that erect the architectures that provide the infrastructure of 
control. Consequently there can be little architecture to control builders. In this sense, 
they have quite an unrivalled freedom compared to other manual occupations; 
freedom of movement, culture, self-presentation, work task, and of who and who not 
to work for. Furthermore, in erecting a building, the workspace will be in constant 
transition because new parts will be added to the structure each day. The product is, in 
Reimer’s (1979) terms, ‘emergent’, which can make for a hazardous work 
environment because the workspace changes shape from moment to moment. For 
example, a mason may move boards from parts of a scaffold to work on the masonry 
behind them. The mason may then vacate this space to fetch extra materials, leaving a 
large and hazardous hole in the scaffold. Builders must then be careful in 
habitualising and routinising their behaviour on the fringes of modernity because it 
will be packed with unpredictable risks.
Gheradi and Nicoloni (2002) describe how builders learn to negotiate 
unpredictable workspaces. They show how working knowledge largely consists of 
skills that can only be learnt in practice and not prescribed beforehand because of the 
unpredictability of builders’ workspaces. Builders learnt to avoid risks by seeing and 
imitating, following injunctions such as ‘look’ and ‘be careful’, which were enforced 
by phrases such as ‘you must’, or ‘never’. The injunctions protect the immediate work 
group by producing on-going cognitive changes in their awareness. Gheradi and 
Nicoloni term these processes ‘the tacitalisation of danger’, ‘in which feeling, 
knowing and understanding are intermeshed’ (2002: 213). This is what builders call 
‘common sense’ or ‘being aware’. They must be constantly aware, and this awareness 
must be communicated to and by the work group (see also Haas, 1977).
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The work world of builders is almost the converse of the security that is 
maintained by buildings. It is particularly insecure, physically demanding, risky, dirty 
and dangerous. Between the advent of the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act and 
2000, three thousand building workers died in building site accidents in Britain 
(Higgins, 2000). As a percentage of total workers, building is second only to 
agriculture in its number of workplace fatalities, and 4 times higher than industry as a 
whole (Health and Safety Executive, 2003).
Making Society
George Orwell (1932) reasoned that the poorly paid and little respected coal-miner
was the backbone of industrialisation. Without his hard labour, industrial society
would be unable to function. The same could be said of builders, because, without
their labour, recognisable social life would cease. There are other parallels between
builders and miners in terms of their culture and work organisation (see chapter 6).
Like the miner, in creating the physical structure of society, the builder occupies a
workspace somewhere between nature and society. For example, builders’ work lives
are contingent upon weather patterns and the seasons. This was eloquently noted by
Mike Cherry, steel erector and writer:
The most obvious, relentless, whimsically malevolent enemy of the man who works 
outdoors is the weather. He is more aware of the state of the weather than of that of the 
nation’s economic health. The weather is more immediate. Construction slows in a 
recession and stops in a depression, but these conditions develop through longish 
blocks of time, and a man has an opportunity to make adjustments and seek solutions. 
But if the rent is due on Friday and he is rained out on Wednesday and Thursday, his 
problem is in the here and now... Still, financial vagaries aren’t the worse problem. The 
worst thing is sheer physical discomfort. Hell, call it pain. Some people can take it 
better than others, but none of us is happy about it. (1974: 77-78)
Building tradesmen must be aware of weather patterns even from moment to moment. 
To plaster a wall for example, the plasterer must utilise a kind of informal, tacit and 
heuristic knowledge of the interactions between his materials and the natural 
environment. Plaster will ‘go o ff  (dry) at different speeds depending upon the 
amount of heat and moisture in the surrounding area. The plasterer must be aware of 
these conditions when mixing up and adding the various coats that are combined to 
construct closed and level surfaces.
Building requires manual dexterity and heuristic handicraft skills to be applied 
directly and locally onto the product. In association with problematic observation, this
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is why building is difficult to control at a distance; builders require freedom of 
movement and thought in their tasks. Bob Reckman, carpenter and writer, aptly 
highlighted this: ‘The working carpenter must decide a thousand times a day what is 
good enough -  where to place himself and his work among the almost infinite 
possibilities of perfection or compromise’ (1979: 76). ‘Infinite possibilities’ negate 
the prospect of a managerial monopolisation of task knowledge and shield building 
work from bureaucratic control. The building industry has thus been quite immune to 
the dynamic outlined in Braverman’s (1974) thesis of the increasing control of work 
tasks (see chapter 6). Scientific management systems have not and cannot monopolise 
building knowledge because this knowledge must be mobile, localised and heuristic. 
Builders are therefore relatively autonomous, and this is exacerbated by the 
immobility of buildings, forcing builders to travel to different areas in search of work. 
They cannot live and work in homogenous occupational communities like the 
historical miner or factory worker because they travel to where building work is, and 
when the building is completed they must move to another job, another building, in 
another geographical area.
Continuity and Change
I tell you this tale, which is strictly true,
Just by way of convincing you,
How very little, since things were made,
Things have altered in the building trade.
(Kipling, quoted in Lynd and Lynd, 1929: 106)
The basic physical structure of buildings has remained much unchanged for millennia. 
LeCorbusier (1923) suggests that almost all built structures are based upon 5 basic 
geometric shapes combined in various ways. Thus a medieval house is recognisable 
as a house, and large office blocks and religious buildings may reflect the castles and 
temples of the past. Physical structures dictate how building work is done, and 
because basic structures have altered little across history, builders work lives bear 
strong continuities with their trade forebears almost since the very beginnings of the 
divisions of building labour.
The Beginnings
There are a large number of historical accounts of builders’ lives because their work 
survives their death, and documentation of church and state work survives in the
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present. Historical documents suggest that the formalisation of builder’s skills began 
in England around the 13th century with the establishment of guild groups 
(Woodwood, 1995). The master craftsmen who formed the groups were tightly knit, 
paternalistic and nepotistic. They monopolised building knowledge, controlling their 
own wages, work hours and recruitment patterns. Theirs was a high status occupation, 
and some guildsmen rose to elevated standings in their towns, taking roles such as 
jurors, bridge-keepers, churchwardens and mayors. Since the medieval period the 
social status of builders has declined profoundly and is one of the fundamental 
changes to have occurred in the building industry during and after industrialisation. 
Labourers by contrast have always been awarded low social status. In medieval times 
they were a casual, unorganised, reserve army of labour. However, Woodwood (1995) 
reports that few labourers were solely labourers. Many were also agricultural workers, 
soldiers, and prisoners securing additional and vital casual income. Also, there are 
documented cases of women and children labouring on large constructions, and 
women are reported to have primarily specialised in collecting and applying moss to 
dam walls.
Building guildsmen’s wills show great variations in wealth, much like the 
builders of today (see below and chapter 10). Some were able to bequeath property 
and excess capital, others only their clothes, tools and chamber pots. Medieval 
builders may be better conceptualised as entrepreneurs than wage labourers because 
they made additional income from by-employments including farming, spinning, 
brewing, opening their houses to the public and, selling and supplying materials and 
labour (Woodwood, 1981). Masters charged daily rates for their labourers, 
apprentices and journeymen, and it can be assumed they took a percentage of these 
payments, much like the modern-day building subcontractor (see chapter 4). In this 
sense, builders were simultaneously part of a household economy, a wage economy 
and an entrepreneurial business economy; economic characteristics that are still 
common for contemporary builders (see chapter 10).
According to Satoh (1995), the English guild groups remained relatively 
unchanged up until the late 18th century, but the intensification of capitalism and the 
industrial revolution led to a decline in guild power, usurped by the newly emerging 
armies of building professionals, general contractors, and speculative house builders. 
Kidder (1985) suggests that in North America, it was not until the mid-19th century j
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that the master carpenter lost control of the planning and design of buildings to the 
new professions of architect, engineer, speculator and general contractor.
The reasons for the decline of guild power remains rather a mystery in the 
published history of builders. Satoh (1995) suggests that guild price regulation began 
to be undermined by a switch from ‘measure and value’ work (where guildsmen 
would be awarded a payment for the measure of amount of work done, the rates for 
which were set by the guilds groups themselves), to work lin grosso’ (lump-sum 
pricing). Alternatively, Higgin and Jessop (1965) argue that guilds came under 
pressure following the mass rebuilding of London after the Great Fire of 1666, 
because their 7 year apprenticeship system could not provide sufficient labour for the 
rebuilding. Sir Christopher Wren, who designed much of post 1666 London, was 
himself an honourable grand master mason. Wren’s emergence as an early planner 
and architect, but one which was incorporated into guilds organisation, marks the 
beginnings of the ascendancy of building professionals.
The decline of the building guilds is also associated with the emergence of 
general contractors. In England at the beginning of the 19th century, contractors were 
employed to provide the large-scale barrack buildings necessary to train and 
discipline men to fight in the Napoleonic wars. Cooney (1955) cites evidence from the 
Fourth Report o f  the Commissioners o f Military Enquiry in 1807 that revealed the 
State’s concerns about inefficiencies in building processes, and which led to 
legislation to place each job under the jurisdiction of a single responsible building 
contractor. Previous to this, large building works were overseen and organised by 
government and church clerks in consultation with master masons and carpenters. The 
masters organised large works more akin to work co-operatives than capitalist 
enterprises (Knoop and Jones, 1933). Higgin and Jessop argue that in the ‘slow 
tempo’ of the guild system, design was not separate from construction as: ‘The master 
artisans worked it out amongst themselves and with the client as they went along’ 
(1965: 39). Masters would hand out work to other small groups of guild-organised 
men rather than competing and undercutting one another through the competitive 
practices characteristic of the modem general contractor.
From 1800 onwards, competitive tendering grew, resulting in an explosion of 
general contracting companies. By the 1850s massive building contractors, such as 
William Cubitt in the Isle of Dogs in East London, were buying raw materials direct 
from the docks and pre-fashioning them in factories for the immense building projects
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of the industrial revolution. Carpenters no longer grew and worked materials in their 
own (or common) woods and workshops, unable to compete with the new cheaper 
methods of mass production. In the 19th century, the centralised State replaced church 
and monarch as the major employer of building workers, and industry followed close 
behind demanding masses of building labour. Even today, public sector related work 
constitutes almost 60 percent of all building projects (DTI, 2001). Contemporary 
work for the State is the modem incarnation of the large church and monarchical 
works of the past. The difference between the modem and pre-modem State however, 
was the speed of constructions, churches and cathedrals were constmcted in God’s 
time, not man’s (see chapter 7). The intensification of capitalism also changed the 
nature of building organisation. Cooney (1955) points to the doctrines of Smithian 
competition and Benthamite rational administration that were pervading the 
organisation of the state across this period. The ascendancy of these ideas were related 
to the subsequent reorganisation of the building industry.
Capitalism and State-commissioned building required an increasing number of ever 
larger physical structures, including factories, barracks, schools, workhouses, 
hospitals and prisons. The guild system of master, journeyman and apprentice began 
to disintegrate under the pressure of high labour demand. Professional knowledge 
brokers such as architects, quantity surveyors and building project managers invaded 
the traditional expertise of the master craftsmen and, began, in conjunction with 
entrepreneurial general contractors, to take control of the building industry. Master 
masons gave way to, and became, architects, and clerks of work transformed into the
1 • thpresent day surveyor. The invention of the printing press in the 16 century and the 
ensuing wide circulation of literature might also have played a role in the decline of 
the guilds - eroding their scientific secrets and knowledge monopolies, thereby 
reducing their power. Furthermore, with the march of capitalism, time becomes 
money (Thompson, 1967), and guild organised building was quite a leisurely and 
sometimes drunken affair. For example, a 15th century bricklayer would lay 300 I 
bricks in one 12-hour day, part of his wage being paid in beer (Woodwood, 1995).
tV i •The early 20 century bricklayer was expected to lay 750 bricks per day (Price, 
1980). While today, bricklayers lay on average 350 bricks per 8.5-hour day2, and no
2 Thanks to Andy ‘Plug’ Thiel, a long-time bricklayer, for this information.
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longer receive beer as part of their wage. It can be assumed that the medieval 
guildsmen ‘took their time’ (see chapter 7).
In the 18th century, building masters took advantage of the intensification of 
capitalism, and many became affluent through subcontracting labour. By 1824, 
‘nearly all’ Glasgow master masons employed between 70 and 170 journeymen each 
(Postgate, 1923), a number far in excess of the one or two journeymen employed in 
the medieval era. Some masters accumulated large wealth but ceded their traditional 
control over the building industry. However, the organisational system of master, 
journeyman and apprentice never completely disappeared. Even in 2000, almost 30 
percent of officially recognised building firms were composed of two to three 
tradesmen (calculated from DTI, 2001). The Guild of Master Craftsmen still survives, 
‘City and Guilds’ remain the standard formal qualification for builders, and the 
Masons endure as the secretive and nepotistic organisation it always was, although it 
may no longer consist of actual masons. It might be assumed that the masters who did 
not become subcontractors, moved into small private business. Chaikin (1974) 
suggests that many became speculative house builders in the 18 century, mixing this 
work with small-scale contract and repair work. Again, there are multitudes of 
builders who today operate similar small-scale enterprises.
It is poignant to note that the transition from guild control to professional and 
managerial control was associated with the emergence of strikes on large building
tVisites in London in mid 18 century. Postgate (1923) describes how the building trades 
unions grew from the trade-based Friendly Societies which were originally formed by 
journeymen as informal self-help groups and that acted as labour exchanges. The 
Societies sought to prevent encroachments into their work by other trades, ‘blacks’ 
(the non-apprenticed) and ‘foreigners’ (guildsmen from out of town). Price (1980) 
suggests that competition between general contractors forced down profits, resulting 
in the ‘sweating’ of workers, who, growing from the Friendly Societies, became 
unionised. Tressell’s ([1914] 1965) graphic description of the lives of housepainters at
tVithe beginning of the 20 century illustrates that they did indeed work under austere 
conditions in a position of almost absolute poverty. Tressell wrote, bemoaning the 
competitive contracting system, and the tendency of the men who accepted its 
dominance, that: ‘The men who become managers and foremen are selected not 
because of their ability as craftsmen, but because they are good slave drivers andI 
useful producers of profit for their employers’ (1914: 488). In medieval Britain,'
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becoming a master or grandmaster had its basis in building expertise and skill, yet, 
becoming a contractor or subcontractor in intense capitalism required business 
acumen and entrepreneurial skill (see chapter 4). Methods of success had altered.
By the early 20th century, the power and logic of the market partly replaced 
medieval notions of quality, honour and duty. Price (1980) argues that the impersonal 
economic ties of employee and employer on large building sites succeeded the 
personal and indentured ties of master, journeyman and apprentice. The changes in 
power relationships between subordinates and superiors facilitated tensions over work 
control, which were eventually institutionalised into the building unions. However, 
contemporary subcontractor-employee relations continue to be based on personal ties
i j .
(see chapter 4), and the question remains as to who the new, early 20 century, 
proletarian builders working on large building sites were? Guild training restricted 
numbers of apprentices such that the new mass of building workers could not have 
emerged through the guild system. Were they a new kind of builder unrelated to the 
guild system, perhaps new migrants or the labourers, sawyers, brick makers, tile 
makers, stone polishers and plaster mixers whom had been superseded by machinery? 
Tressell notes the conflict between apprenticed housepainters and the informally 
trained ‘brush hands’ whom were undercutting wage levels, and Swanson (1988) 
argues that late medieval guilds were not as monopolistic and rigid as traditionally 
imagined. Groups such as plasterers and tillers tended to encroach on one another’s 
spheres of work, and, informal roots into learning building skills existed, just as they 
do today (see chapter 5). Furthermore, in the Builders Weekly Reporter of 1877 it was 
said to the striking builders that: ‘between 400 and 500 men are now on their way to 
this country (from Italy and the USA)’ (Price, 1980: 138). Many of the newly 
unionised builders of the late 19 century might not have been guildsmen at all, 
especially given that the majority of the original successful general contractors set up 
business in Lambeth and East London (Satoh, 1995) where guilds’ power was 
negligible. This facilitated informal employment practices and would have by-passed 
guild regulation (see also Booth, 1895).
Although trade unionism had its genesis in the building trades, trade unionism and 
strikes by builders as a proportion of the total proletariat has historically been 
relatively low. Austrin (1980) points out that a closed shop has never operated in the 
building industry, and, he argues that small firms (which are, and have been, the
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majority of building employers, see below) never paid much attention to the 
centralised bargaining machinery of the unions, employing casual labour and 
renegotiating wage contracts at the start of each job. Furthermore, most building 
trades were not impoverished by new industrial technology, in fact, masters profited 
from the building boom associated with industrialisation. It was this that prompted 
Engels to argue that builders: ‘form an aristocracy among the working-class; they 
have succeeded in enforcing for themselves a relatively comfortable position, and 
they accept it as final’ ([1892] 1969: 31).
Industrialisation, Prefabrication and New Technology
As regards machinery little need be said, for the building trade is not an industry that is 
being revolutionised by the introduction of mechanical appliances, nor is it likely that 
this will ever be the case. (Booth, 1895: 134)
Although industrialisation led to intensified mechanisation of the production of 
building materials, mechanisation began long before the advent of the steam engine. 
Water powered machinery was designed and put to work making bricks, sawing wood 
and cutting and polishing stone early in the 18th century. Previous to this, horses were 
used as the motor for machinery, and the ancient Greeks used human powered 
treadmills to drive cranes and pulley systems. However, the steam engine increased 
the efficiency of the production of pre-fashioned materials, and, by 1810, steam- 
powered saw mills and joinery machines were in common usage (Satoh, 1995). In the 
1860s, portable steam engines were employed on construction sites to move earth, 
pull heavy objects and pump water. It is no coincidence that early steam earthmovers 
were called ‘steam navvies’ in North America where human labour was scarce 
(Coleman, 1965).
Machines reduced the number of ‘bodies’ required to do what had previously 
been very labour intensive work using wooden cranes, buckets, horses and people. 
Conversely, the development and application of new technologies also created new- 
work roles such as the electrician and machine operator, and massively expanded the 
numbers of trades such as plumbers. The invention of Portland cement in 1824 
radically transformed building processes, speeding efficiency, and, whilst this reduced 
the numbers of bricklayers and mixers, with it came new trades and new experts in the 
form of concrete workers and engineers.
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Fig. 1.0: Brickmaking Machine, 1825.
(Lyne and Stinford, 1825. From Satoh, 1995: 163)
Moving the preparation of materials from the hands of craftsmen, to the control, 
efficiency and predictability of machines, substantially altered building work 
organisation. Evidence from North America illustrates that one third of new 
residential house building is prefabricated (Bosch and Philips, 2003). In 21st Century 
London, even the small quantities of cement required to lay bricks were delivered to 
most building sites ready mixed and packaged. This freed the bricklayer’s labourer 
from the task of ‘mixing up’, and ironed out human inconsistency from the mix. Yet, 
despite the changes outlined above, actual building work, in Britain at least, bears 
striking continuities with the past. The bricklayer still spreads cement to the surface of 
a course o f bricks with a trowel and places every brick by hand; the ancient Egyptian 
plasterer performed almost identical tasks with similar tools to the contemporary 
plasterer (Postgate, 1923); and the tools, materials and work processes used by 
colonial and 1970s carpenters were very similar (Reckman, 1979). Since the 1960s, 
many handicraft tasks have been mechanised by the invention of electric hand tools, 
but this, along with innovations in the design of building materials, sped up building 
processes, but, did not alter the fundamental tasks required to build something.
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Pre-fabrication facilitated increased control of some kinds of building work, primarily 
through the application of piecework (‘price-work’). On large building developments, 
‘new-build’ constructions (making a new building from scratch) can be 
organisationally divided into smaller standardised sections. The building of each 
section mirrors the next, and because of this, the work can be rationally organised and 
accounted for. Trade-specific work to each section is estimated at a standard cost by 
quantity surveyors, and the tradesman paid a set price for their work. ‘Price-work’ 
represents an ultimate form of work-rate control, enslaving the body through 
economic mechanisms where money mediates between worker and his work (c.f. 
Simmel, 1896). Price-work cannot however control minds; the builder remains 
outside of possible observation because of the sequential and emergent nature of 
building processes (see chapter 6). Furthermore, ‘new work’ accounts for less than 
fifty percent of total building work (DTI, 2001), and a large proportion of new work is 
specialist, ‘one-off work, which for the most part cannot be sub-divided and 
standardised (Bresnan, 1990).
Contemporary Construction
The size and type of contemporary building companies vary substantially. In the third 
quarter of 2000, 95.9 percent of all registered building firms employed only between 
1 and 13 people, and, just 0.5 percent employed over 80 (calculated from DTI, 2001). 
In this sense, large building firms look to be the exception rather than the norm. 
However, the statistics hide the reality of what Harvey (2001) terms ‘false self- 
employment’, meaning that builders are the only self-employed group in Britain to 
have tax deducted by their employer. Thus, the companies reported to employ over 80 
people actually subcontract most of their manual workers who do not appear in the 
companies’ employment statistics. The 80-strong workforce represented by the 
statistics are predominately office staff, managers, general foremen and quantity 
surveyors, not tradesmen and labourers.
Harvey (2003) puts the numbers of self-employed builders in 1995 at over 60 
percent of the total construction workforce. This accounts for 70.5 percent of all 
manual building workers. However, Moralee (1998) indicates that the 1995 Survey of 
Personal Incomes showed 240,000 more self-employed builders than the Labour 
Force Survey. The statistics are therefore quite misleading, and further obscured by
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the substantial amount of building work that resides in the informal economy (see
Pahl, 1984, and chapter 10). In my own anecdotal experience, working for large
contractor companies is the norm, although this is frequently mixed with private client
work, speculation, and subcontracting (see chapter 2). Technically however, builders
own their own businesses and employ themselves. Because of this, contractors or
subcontractors have no formal responsibility to their workers. Contemporary British
builders are almost completely ‘casualised’ (paid by the day or by the job); they
receive no sick or holiday pay, and have no rights to company pensions or liability
schemes (with the exception of surveyors and site management who are directly
employed). The lack of formal working rights and the problems associated with this
are exacerbated by (and perhaps a function of) building work being highly seasonal
and closely tied to economic fluctuations. The carpentry and general foreman at my
research site, Jamin, vividly expressed the problems of casualisation:
Apart from in that office you look at everyone else yeah... all the labourers, my 
chippies, what security have they got? What security have they fuckin’ got? When you 
were working here as a labourer, what security did you have? They could have told you 
at three o’clock, ‘you’re down the road mate’ [laid-off]. And while you were working 
here, what if you broke your foot and you was at home for three weeks, whose gonna 
pay you? Nobody’s gonna pay, no fucker’s gonna pay. They don’t give you any notice 
[of leave], there’s no security, no pension, no holiday, no fuck-all. Why is that? Why 
when everybody else gets it... I suppose this is with other industries as well, but the 
wages go up and down. I mean it’s not to bad at the moment, but I tell you what it’s not 
looking good for the future, wages will go back down.
The uncertainty of building work is perennial, stretching deep into history. 
Woodwood (1995) states in his analysis of medieval tradesmen that their working 
lives were: ‘casual and intermittent... it was an uncertain world in which weeks or 
months of regular employment could be followed by a bout of prolonged idleness’ 
(1995: 116). Tressell presents a similar picture of the early 20th century builder: ‘It 
was over a month now since he had finished up for his last employer. It had been a 
very slow summer altogether. Sometimes a fortnight for one firm, then perhaps a 
week doing nothing; then three weeks or a month for another firm, then out again and 
so on’ (1914: 35). Bosch and Philips aptly sum up the relationship between building 
and economic cycles: ‘In most cases, when the economy gets a cold, construction gets 
the flu’ (2003: 5). Economic cycles have an impact upon casualised builders directly 
and detrimentally, partly because buildings cannot be made to be stored, and 
consequently, when demand is low, buildings are not made, and builders find 
themselves out of work.
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Adhocracies
Building projects represent a very uncertain product environment, particularly in 
repair and renovation ‘old work’. Building project management will be explored in 
detail in chapter 3, but it should be noted that large contractor companies must 
necessarily localise their management. Bresnan’s (1990) analysis of building project 
management utilises the term ‘adhocracy’ (from Mintzburg) to describe how 
management power is parcelled out to small semi-autonomous localised units because 
of the impossibility of standardised control from a distance. Bresnan describes how 
higher management cannot dictate or standardise most construction jobs because they 
tend to be large one-off projects characterised by uncertainty, complexity and the 
interdependence of many agencies.
Related to complexity and interdependence, building work is characterised by 
‘sequentialism’. For example, a carpenter must build a roof frame before a roofer lays 
the tiles on top. Each trade builds on the previous trade so that, for instance, 
carpenters are not required at the site whilst the bricklayers erect the walls. Sequential 
building methods increase complexity, and make organisation problematic through 
producing knock-on effects between the separate trades. If, for instance, a concrete 
pour is held up by inclement weather for two weeks, the steel erectors will not be able 
to do their job at the time originally specified. They may then go onto another job and 
not return to erect the steel for six weeks. This could form a knock-on effect to all the 
following trades ad infinitum. Illustrative of this are Graves et al (2000) case studies 
of civil engineering firms which reveal that small problems in the build process that 
tend to go unnoticed, accumulate to produce amplified knock-on effects that create 
big problems.
Mobilities
New technologies and organisational methods have not contained the builder’s skill 
and working-life because the nature of building work lies on the fringes of society. 
Builders own their means of production, their tools, and related to this, they are 
geographically mobile. They must necessarily be mobile, and essentially they are able 
to live in any geographic area because they will always have to travel to different 
workplaces. Furthermore, the building worker population, in London at least, is 
culturally and racially heterogeneous (see chapter 4). Ephemeralism and cultural
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heterogeneity have an impact upon social relations between builders, and facilitate 
particular forms of interaction and cultures that will be discussed in detail throughout 
the thesis.
Builders are only required on a building site for short periods of the project, 
and employment practices are thus casual, and construction working life ephemeral. 
Builders move frequently from one work site and employer to another in pursuit of 
work. Harvey (2003) cites evidence from the Disparities survey showing that on 
average, a self-employed builder works for a single firm for only 1.2 years. Booth 
(1895) made a similar observation over 100 years previous.
Sequentialism, ephemeralism, casualisation, and its flip-side, autonomy, can be 
viewed as antecedent to building work organisation, and thus to builders’ working 
lives. Buildings perform the functions they have always performed - the regulation of 
nature. Thus the antecedents of building work organisation have remained unchanged 
for millennia. In this sense, contemporary builders’ work-lives may be termed ‘pre- 
industrial’ or ‘non-modem’. Such a terminology can only be analytical shorthand 
because old forms in a new world become new forms through their interaction with 
that world. However, the work lives of builders appear quite analogous to their 
historical forebears.
20th Century Nation Building
Despite relatively insignificant changes in actual building work, there were shifts in
t V ibuilding work organisation throughout the 20 century. This occurred in particular in 
the organisation of State-commissioned building work, and the State was, and is, the 
largest employer of building work. The focus of my following case study itself was a 
State-commissioned building project.
The State promoted the development of general contracting following the 
Napoleonic wars. Yet it was also the State that began to notice the problems of private
thgeneral contracting, and at the close of the 19 century concerns were raised at the 
poor quality of private contractors’ work for the state. Competitive tendering for 
government contracts was beginning to be seen as non-competitive, and the 
intellectual wing of the direct labour unions, The Direct Labour Collective, stated 
that: ‘the [general contracting] tender system was a farce, and on many occasions 
municipalities received identical tenders -  clearly fixed by agreement -  from a
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number of different [contracting] firms’ (1978: 10). The perennial problem of
thcorruption in the building industry (see chapter 9) inspired the newly-formed late 19 
century local governments to set up their own direct labour organisations (DLOs). 
The London County Council was the first to employ direct labour in 1892, which was 
a radical idea for the times. John Bums, an early advocate of Fabainism, said of it: 
‘The new department has completely revolutionised the old corrupt order of things’ 
(in Langford, 1982: 2).
DLOs worked mostly on ‘old work’ (the repair, maintenance and 
refurbishment of pre-existing stmctures), which was less appealing to private 
contractors because of its complexity and smaller profit margins. DLOs did however, 
undertake some new builds. Battersea Power Station remains a testament to their skill, 
as do the ‘homes fit for heroes’ constructed (particularly in the north of England) 
following the First World War. DLOs constructed public housing new-builds at a 
significantly smaller cost and to a higher standard than private contractors (Direct 
Labour Collective, 1978; Langford, 1982). As a result, and in association with the 
growing numbers of physical structures of the welfare state, the numbers of direct 
labour workers increased steadily throughout the 1940s, 50s and 60s. DLOs worked to 
maintain and refurbish the mass of public owned houses, hospitals and schools that 
were part of the post war reconstmction. They reached a peak of 200,000 workers in 
1967, representing 15 percent of the total constmction workforce, and, the 1960s saw, 
for the first time, stable, non-casual employment for State-builders. However, this was 
not to last. The creeping intensity of globalisation, resultant industrial restructuring, 
and ensuing industrial unrest, signalled changes for the organisation of State- 
commissioned building.
Since their inception, and in periods of economic slow down, DLOs came under 
attack from private contractors and Tory politicians. Contractors wanted to undertake 
less profitable State-commissioned work in economic slow-downs because private 
building ground to a halt at these times. Further, during periods of economic boom, 
the DLOs lost skilled workers to private contractors through workers chasing the 
larger wages that private companies could offer. By the late 1950s, intense 
marketisation began to infiltrate DLO organisations, and the Prime Minister, Harold 
Macmillan, passed a bill stipulating they competitively bid for every third contract. 
By the 1970s, DLOs were to bid for all contracts, and the instabilities of the market
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began to reduce their numbers. In addition, union control in the building industry was 
declining by the early 1970s, crumbling under the pressure of higher wage-packets 
paid by non-unionised private contractors (Austrin, 1980). However, those employed 
direct by the State, of whom 85 percent were unionised (Langford, 1982), clung onto 
their jobs until new market-led government policies began to take hold.
Marketisation
In 1979 Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party were elected to Parliament. It 
was a period of global economic slow-down following the 1973 oil crisis, and the 
British manufacturing industry was crumbling irrevocably. The Conservatives felt that 
Britain was ‘diseased’ by strikes and low productivity, and that under the Labour 
government of 1977-9, the Treasury had fallen into unsustainable debt. The world was 
changing and the Conservatives came to government promising radical economic and 
political solutions.
Thatcher attempted to untangle the powers of local government and remedy 
the flagging economy by selling off what were defined as burdensome nationalised 
industries. British Leyland, British Steel, British Gas and local authority housing were 
sold, and instant cash raised for the Treasury (Feigenbaum et al, 1999). Thatcher 
smashed much of the power that labour unions and local governments held over 
industry and the State, and she laid the foundations for a more privatised and 
individualised society based on owner occupation and consumption. She began the 
implementation of a new market driven governance of Britain (Rhodes, 1997), and 
one which had a direct effect on State-commissioned building.
By 1981, Thatcher abandoned deflationary monetarism because it became 
associated with growing unemployment and high public sector borrowing. The 
Conservatives were under electoral pressure to look toward more radical solutions to 
the country’s economic problems. Mass privatisation of State assets would, in the 
short-term at least, obviate the need for such high borrowing. The Conservatives 
formulated an underlying neo-liberal ideology based upon the ideas of Freidman and 
others before him, the touchstone of which were the concepts of individual 
responsibility and market solutions. They aimed to free the economy of burdensome 
taxes and the tangling web of state intervention so that Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ 
could reign free to guide economic organisation and wealth distribution. The nation
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would be organised through self-help, the market, and enterprising private companies 
encouraged to step into the shoes of the archaic, over bureaucratised, welfare systems.
By the late 1980s the Conservatives had sold off almost all the remaining 
national industries such as gas, telecommunications and electricity, and their 
relatively affluent electoral base were able to buy shares in these industries and 
become more affluent (Hutton, 1996). It was argued that private companies would be 
characterised by high efficiency, less bureaucracy and better standards of service 
delivery. Yet, despite increased centralisation, the conservatives inadvertently began 
to cede power to non-state and quasi-state bodies. Rhodes (1997) argues that political 
power became embedded in a number of institutions resulting in a bureaucratic 
‘policy mess’ which fragmented State power. Centralisation, Rhodes argues, 
represented the centralisation of finance but not control.
By the early 1990s, the Conservatives continued their unflinching commitment 
to the ideologies of individualism, privatisation and competition, and, in 1992, the 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was introduced. Services in State departments would 
be ‘contracted-out’ to private bidders, and quasi-markets were introduced into the 
running of public services including schools and the NHS. In the NHS for instance, 
competitive tendering was introduced for ‘hotel’ services such as cleaning and 
catering, as was the construction and maintenance of hospital buildings (Drakeford, 
2000). Private competition, the Conservatives argued, would guard against corruption 
and procrastination, lead to cost effective service delivery, and remove the financial 
risks of projects and contracts from the public purse. Citizens, the users of the 
services, were to be transformed into ‘customers’ participating in a welfare ‘market’.
Through the PFI, private building contractors once again moved into public service 
works via the competitive tender, and directly employed builders were made 
redundant. Conservative rhetoric vehemently argued that the competitive system 
would be more cost effective than direct labour systems, despite the original reasons 
for initiating DLOs i.e. that contractors were corrupt and undertook work to a poor 
standard.
Altered Ideology?
After 18 years of Conservative rule, Tony Blair and New Labour were elected to 
government in 1997. They inherited the dismantled and marketised welfare state, and
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adopted a ‘new’ ideology towards governance. Influenced by developments in centre- 
left politics in Australia and North America, and the writings of Giddens (1994), they 
rejected ‘old’ Labour’s traditional Keynesian philosophies and adopted what was 
called a Third Way towards governance. In one sense, New Labour had little choice 
but to adopt such a tactic as State power had been markedly reduced since their last 
term of office in the 1970s. Intensive globalisation ‘hollowed out’ states and ‘policy 
networks’ dragged central state power out further and further into the social body 
(Rhodes, 1997).
New Labour promised modernisation, high standards of service delivery, and 
promoted active citizenship, or what might be termed ‘ self-governance’ (see Rose, 
[1989] 1999). Citizens would remain consumers, and market mechanisms, with their 
associated techno-bureaucracy, accountants, managers and performance tables, would 
continue to guide the administration of public services. Thatcher's PFI was left intact, 
and the administration of schools, hospitals, prisons, and public transport was put out 
for competitive tender. The State retained ownership of many schools, prisons and 
hospitals, but private companies would build, administer and maintain them under 
long(ish) term contracts. Some PFI projects, such as ‘hotel services’ in the NHS, were 
discontinued by New Labour, but, the construction and maintenance of buildings by 
private companies was continued, and the PFI was retained for State-commissioned 
building.
Building Conflict
Since the establishment of general contractors and building professionals (managers, 
architects, engineers, surveyors and consultants), building work has historically been 
plagued by conflicts of interests which have serious ramifications for building owners 
and users. The complexity and emergent nature of building knowledge, and fierce 
competition between contractors, result in a situation where contractors and 
subcontractors frequently undercut one another to such an extent that works are 
commonly undertaken at zero profit. Even when works run at a profit it is usual to 
cost-in only 1 to 2 percent profit margins on most construction jobs (Bresnan, 1990). 
Such low margins are exceptionally risky because of the unforeseen problems that 
inevitably occur during the course of a build. For example, a contractor may not 
predict how much plaster will fall from a wall when the lining paper is removed. To 
rectify the problem the contractor would have to call in a plastering subcontractor to
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repair the damage with the resultant unforeseen costs incurred. Construction is also a 
risky and uncertain business in which many builds over-run specified completion 
dates, and numerous contractors go bankrupt every year. In 2002 for example, almost 
1500 registered building companies were declared insolvent in England (Contract 
Journal, 08/01/2003). This represented 2.5 percent of all registered building firms.
Paying subcontractors to do extra works that were not originally estimated, 
seriously undermines contractors’ small profit margins. To counteract this, contractors 
necessarily have to claw back profits on other parts of the work. One traditional way 
of doing this has been to skimp on materials because structural deficiencies can be 
easily hidden under finishing plasters and paints, and, another method is to over­
charge on other sections of the work (see Foster, 1969, and below)
It is not only unforeseen problems that contractors must negotiate. Clients 
commonly lack knowledge about building processes, and often change their minds 
about what they want during the course of the build (see Higgin and Jessop, 1965). 
Part of this problem is the vague specifications contained in original tender outlines. 
Detailed specifications cost money, and potential clients tend to develop these with 
contractors after the contract has been won, rather than outlining them in full detail 
beforehand (Bresnan, 1990). Building structures also diverge from their original two- 
dimensional drawings and plans, particularly because of the sequential nature of 
building work and the resultant ripple effects. Also, architects are not trained or 
skilled to cost-in or control for mechanical and electrical services, these are designed 
by service engineers.
t l iSince the mid-19 century, architects have been employed to deal with 
building specifications, but they are not involved in all constructions. There was no 
architect involvement at my research site for example, because the architecture was 
already constructed. Also, in the past 20 years, Design and Build contracts have 
emerged, where contractor and client work together to draw up building plans without 
involving an architect (see chapter 3).
Market Problems
In his report to the government and the construction industry in 1994, Sir John 
Latham identified the State as the biggest client of the building industry, but, due to 
its supposed decentralisation under Thatcher, it became fragmented into over 90 
separate government procurement bodies. To counteract this, he advocated
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employment of experienced consultants and more standardised contracts (echoing the 
advice of Higgin and Jessop 29 years earlier). He also suggested that competitive 
tender was a fragile way to build the nation’s infrastructure because the resultant 
under-cutting led to low quality buildings (echoing the advise of the advocates of 
direct labour, 100 years earlier). Latham proposed a form of team-working where all 
the parties involved in a build would benefit in the long-term. This would be 
manufactured by the use of ‘partnering agreements’ which had been successfully 
utilised in the Japanese automobile industry (Bennett, 2000).
Partnering agreements were perhaps the anti thesis of marketised State- 
commissioned building. The implicit long-termism and associated anti­
competitiveness of in-house building arrangements that the Conservatives had worked 
so hard to dissolve, were re-introduced under the Conservatives albeit in a slightly 
different incarnation as the partnering system. This may seem paradoxical, but as 
Feigenbaum et al (1999) argue, one of the results of free-market government 
philosophy was mass state regulation. Furthermore, as Rhodes’ (1997) argues, the 
centralisation of British governance was never particularly centralising because policy 
networks usurped control over public services and became powerful actors in the 
governance of the nation. Partnering was however championed as a more cost 
effective, reliable, higher quality method to construct buildings.
Competitive tendering was based upon driving down prices through market 
competition. However, competition implies adversaries, and, in 1997, Sir John Egan 
was appointed by the New Labour government to take another look at the building 
industry. He argued that an adversarial culture was deeply embedded and resulted in a 
mass of litigation disputes that were both expensive and restrictive. Egan (1998) also 
found the British building industry to be characterised by over-running completion 
dates and inflated costs. In short, it was inefficient and unproductive. He followed 
Latham and advocated the proposals of Bennett and Jayes (1995 and 1998), whose 
research suggested that Japanese-style management systems should be applied to the 
British construction industry.
During the 1980’s, Japan’s economy flourished, leaving its North American 
and European counterparts behind. Academics, industrialists and managers 
consequently looked toward Japanese management practices, and masses of these 
practices were implemented in Western businesses, particularly in the manufacturing
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industry in the form of quality circles and total quality management (See White and 
Trevor, 1983; Hill, 1991; Graham, 1995). Bennett and Jayes argued that Japanese 
success was the product of long-term relationships between contractors, clients, 
subcontractors and suppliers. Because relationships were long-term, the separate 
parties saw and sustained a reciprocal type of ‘win-win’ situation. They ceased to 
compete, and came to trust and co-operate in the interests of shared long-term goals.
One construction project will commonly run into another project, or the 
existing client may have future constructions planned. Bennett and Jayes (1995 and
1998) argued that with long-term relationships, productivity and profitability could be 
enhanced by up to 30 percent if it were coupled with co-operation and openness (see 
Bennett, 2000)3. The various building parties would come together to discuss how the 
job was to be organised within a free forum for discussion and a continual concern for 
quality, improvement, and the resultant ‘lean production’. An open book would exist 
between the parties whereby clients could view the breakdown of the works and 
subcontractor costs. Importantly, the teams would be ready to solve the inevitable 
problems thrown up during complex constructions and not blame each other for 
mistakes, thereby reducing litigation disputes. A ‘blame culture’ was seen as 
unnecessary because both clients and contractors were interdependent and held the 
mutual objective of completing the construction and profiting from it.
In a partnering agreement the teams would have a shared interest in works and 
relationships in the long-term. Contractors would be more open, and build better in 
order to secure follow-on work, and, clients would work with rather than against 
contractors to ensure that structures were built to the required specifications. On 
completion of the project(s) the parties would agree to share costs or profits that were 
above or below the original tender price. If the parties trusted each other they would 
all be winners in the long term (c.f. Axelrod, 1984).
It was these historical foundations that I stepped into in my fieldwork case study of a 
NHS building project organised under the auspices of a partnering agreement. The 
general details of building work organisation and their relationships with the cultures 
and actions of builders will be illuminated throughout the following thesis, but firstly,
3 Barlow et al (1997) describe, from a series o f case studies, that partnering did increase profit margins but only by 
3-12 percent. They also point out that this may have been due to new technologies and not because o f partnering at 
all.
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I turn to the practical and methodological problems encountered during my fieldwork 
at the ‘Keyworker House’ build.
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Chapter 2 
Research in Construction
In this chapter I present the biography of my research project. I outline why I 
researched the building industry, how I gained access to the research site, and the 
problems encountered throughout the fieldwork. I then present the underlying 
theoretical and methodological assumptions that guided my research.
The Beginnings
In 1995, after graduating from university, I found myself making a living from a 
mixture of state benefits and occasional casual work. After a number of months, I 
began to think I should apply for a job. I applied for many but had no success. Lusting 
for a more substantial income, I decided to try to get a building job. I had sporadically 
done building work since I was a teenager, and it was a familiar world to me, so, I 
purchased the London Evening Standard newspaper every Wednesday, Thursday and 
Friday to look for one of the building jobs that it advertised. In what seemed to be 
endless mornings of telephone calls to builders and building agencies, I eventually 
began work as a labourer.
During my career as bricklayers’ labourer and a concrete-repair man, I soon 
realised painters had what seemed a much better work deal than labourers; they 
earned more money for less sweat. I had done some painting work when I was 
younger, so I bought the necessary tools and uniform and went about ‘chancing’ my 
arm as a tradesman. To begin with, I worked mostly for the various building agencies 
that supply ephemeral labour to contractors and subcontractors who cannot find 
labour via other sources, and, I was sacked only once for my lack of skill. I ventured 
into some other exploits, but painting and decorating became my most reliable source 
of income; my ‘bread and butter’.
After a few years, I became skilled at my job, and it paid for much of my 
Masters degree. Throughout these years I, like many other British builders, worked on 
building sites abroad, including 3 months in Israel and a few days in France, and, 
similar to almost all tradesmen, I worked for small building companies, large 
multinational contractors, on small projects, and massive projects, in private 
construction, and for the State. I worked for myself undertaking private- work, and on
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one occasion as a subcontractor. I did ‘old work’ and ‘new work’, and found myself 
in work and out of work. Sometimes I earned a good income, and other times only a 
small one. The longest I stayed with a single company was 9 months, and I worked all 
over London. The informal nature of the building industry suited my life-style. I could 
study, go out in the evenings, and still earn just enough money to live on. When I 
completed my Masters degree, I once again found my academic qualifications in 
small demand. Unable to get a job out of the building industry, I decided to apply to 
do a PhD.
While studying criminology I became interested in the close relationship 
between being male and ending up in prison, so, I arranged to meet Paul Rock at the 
London School of Economics, to discuss a way of researching this, and he suggested I 
turn my gaze onto my current work world. The building industry was an area that I 
had an insider’s knowledge of, could get ready access to, where I could earn money to 
pay for a PhD, and, was little researched. I had thought about this in the past but could 
see little of interest upon which to base a thesis. I decided however to keep my eyes 
open, to try to write something about my work, and think about it some more. After 
breaking through my own taken-for-granted assumptions, I began to find and focus 
upon workplace conflict, deviation, and the informal economy. Poignantly, my own 
tactics of normalisation were so mystifying that during the initial phases of 
observation, I would, whilst riding home on the tube and taking notes about the 
working day, sometimes report I had seen or heard nothing notable that day. But I 
also discovered when I arrived home that I had myself stolen a bunch of building 
materials and hidden them in my bag during the day. I was doing this as a supposed 
criminological observer, without noticing its salience at all.
I was accepted onto a PhD course and began to read all sorts of literature, 
some relating to the building trade, some not. However, I had become concerned with 
how criminology seemed to stigmatise and construct the subject of its analysis. Crime 
appeared integral to everyday social life, and studying it divorced from that life 
seemed myopic. I decided I would look at builders’ lives in as much of a totality as I 
could, and to this end, I would return to the field with a broad gaze, adopt the role of 
an overt researcher, and wait to see ‘what came up’ via the conventions of inductive 
methodology and grounded theory. I began to try to gain access to a research site.
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Ethnography
Getting In
In my previous work in the building industry I had never been a star employee. I was 
often late, malingering, and rather resistant to bosses’ demands. I had been sacked or 
walked away from a number of jobs. Furthermore, on these jobs I always kept it to 
myself that I was a graduate and later a post-graduate, and consequently there was not 
a suitable building company that I worked for in the past where I could return to 
conduct my research. Fortunately, Janet Foster put me in contact with an architect 
who worked at the university, and it was thanks to her that I obtained the telephone 
number of a ‘client’s contracts director’, ‘Mr Singh’, at a large multinational building 
company ‘Global Construction Limited’.
Mr Singh was nearing the top of the hierarchical pyramid at Global 
Construction. After I had spoken to him I was passed from department to department 
within Global Construction for the next 6 weeks, where each office would tell me to 
talk to someone in the next office. It felt as though I was stuck in a hybrid version of 
Escher’s impossible staircase and a Kafkaesque bureaucracy, continually going 
nowhere and constantly being addressed as Daniel. Eventually Mr Singh informed me 
that he had tried to provide me with a work placement, but ‘regrettably it’s not that 
kind of company’. I never asked him what he meant by this, but he did give me the 
telephone number of a ‘projects director’ at ‘Topbuild Pic’, who were at that time 
contracting their services to Global Construction. I telephoned a projects director at 
Topbuild who gave me the telephone number of Mr Drear, the contracts manager on 
some of Topbuild’s construction jobs.
Mr Drear was very cordial. Apparently in his mind I was a friend of an 
important business contact, Mr Singh. It was agreed that I meet Mr Drear at a building 
site office the following week. After nervously circling the building three times chain­
smoking cigarettes, I eventually went in to meet him. We had a very informal meeting 
in which I explained that I would like to begin my research by working as a labourer 
so I could move around the building site and get a general impression of what was 
going on. He explained a little about the project and company structure, half offered 
me a position at Topbuild to be trained as a site manager, and told me to come to the 
site the following Monday with safety boots and without a shirt and tie. I would be 
paid half a labourer’s wages, was informed ‘not to hold up production’, and that my
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position would be reviewed in time. With a handshake I left the site office wondering 
what on earth I was getting myself into. I never saw Mr Drear again.
Getting on
Working as a labourer was a tactic of getting into Topbuild, and a way just to ‘be 
around’, get to know people, gain some acceptance and familiarise myself with the 
nature of the building project. The project was what is known in the building industry 
as ‘old work’ i.e. the repair and refurbishment of pre-existing structures.
Topbuild were to carry out the refurbishment and renovation of 3 large 
buildings of varying sizes in central London. The structures in this case will be termed 
‘Keyworker House’ 1, 2 and 3. Fully functional, they housed 776 National Health 
Service (NHS) workers, mostly nurses, and a small number of government services 
including a creche, a counselling service, a library, and a leisure facility (gym, 
swimming pool, squash courts, bar and night-club). In addition, Keyworker House 2 
housed a collection of hospital kitchens and a chemotherapy unit. The 776 key­
workers each resided in his or her own room or, less commonly, a flat, and shared a 
number of kitchens, communal areas, bath and shower rooms. During the 
refurbishment, all the key workers and staff of the government services were to 
remain in and using the building, and this created many organisational problems for 
the contractor (see chapter 3).
For the sake of clarity, ‘Keyworker House’ is used as an umbrella term to 
cover all three of the buildings that were renovated by Topbuild. Although the 
buildings were situated in different areas of London, and of different sizes, the 
process of the build was much the same for all. Furthermore, I shall present the main 
characters at Keyworker House as if they were continually involved in the build 
whereas in actuality most were not. New workers arrived, older workers left, some 
workers left and then returned. It was only a small number of the site management 
and foremen that worked on the build for the full duration of the field research. 
Additionally, there were shifts in the site management hierarchy with dismissals, 
promotions and demotions, but for clarity I have fixed their job titles unless stated 
otherwise.
The building contract was part of a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) whereby a 
housing association had obtained the running, rents and maintenance of the buildings 
from a NHS Trust. ‘Opportune Housing’ was to refurbish and administrate the
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dwellings for the next 30 years, at which time their contract would be reviewed. 
Opportune Housing employed a building consultancy, ‘Assured Consultants’, to act as 
representatives and over-seers of the work. Assured Consultants were the primary 
party who would on a day-to-day basis deal with the building contractor, Topbuild.
I began my participant observation by working as a labourer for a period of 3 months, 
5 days a week. During this time I attracted only small attention as a ‘researcher’, but 
there were occasional jokes when people saw me taking a notepad out of my pocket 
and scribbling things down. I was told by more than one of the builders that, ‘this isn’t 
a proper building site this is a holiday camp. They’re gonna change the sign at the 
front to ‘Butlin’s’ next week’ (see chapter 6). Otherwise I was just another bloke on a 
building site; a student who had little money and needed a few extra pounds.
I guess I blended into the daily goings-on because, after a few weeks, most of 
the builders ceased to ask me why I was working there (c.f. Becker, 1970), and I was 
treated and ordered around as labourers are. I also felt as though I ‘fitted in’ to some 
extent because I felt psychically comfortable with the other labourers, joining in with 
their banter and joking around. I experienced little ‘cultural shock’ upon entering the 
field because I had worked in this type of environment many times before. However, I 
was ascribed the quite overwhelming master status of ‘student’, and people interacted 
with me accordingly. Students were seen as young, over-sexed, middle-class, lazy, 
bohemian people, with little ‘common sense’. Despite my attempts to show that I 
unfortunately bore little relation to these categories, it was difficult to break with the 
label during the initial phases of the fieldwork. Nobody really knew what a PhD was; 
it was seen as the title of something a student does, and, at the time, I really didn’t 
have much conception of what it was either. I was the youngest labourer amongst 
mostly seasoned old Irish men, and, reflecting the statuses of age and of labourer in 
the building industry (see chapter 6), I was treated as ‘the boy’, the very bottom of the 
pecking order and told what to do by almost everybody. I was essentially powerless to 
do anything about being the young student at the bottom of the hierarchy. I did not 
want to conflict with or upset people, and I really wanted to get on and become an 
unthreatening part of the day-to-day scenery. My powerlessness however, struck me a 
source of insight because it illustrated to some extent why people will accept ill- 
treatment in the workplace. It was clear that they have little choice but to accept it.
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I came largely to conform to the role bestowed upon me. Being a ‘student’ in 
the builders’ thinking meant that I was much younger and naive than perhaps I was. I 
did find this frustrating because I had served my time as ‘a boy’ on building sites, and 
considered myself a good tradesman, albeit in one of the lowest status trades. The 
majority of the builders never believed that I was a decorator until I actually did some 
decorating work at the very end of the research period, approximately 9 months later. 
Such is the power of categorisation.
For the next few months I drifted though the fieldwork rather like a 
somnambulist, just doing the work in hand, trying to be as friendly as I could, and 
tucking myself away in comers and toilets to take notes. I also went out on numerous 
Friday night ‘drink-ups’ with the site management and labourers, where I got very 
drunk and occasionally said some very stupid things, after which many sleepless 
nights ensued. Although I never asked, I received three pay rises over the first three 
months. I was not employed directly by Topbuild, because in common with other 
contracting companies, they were a management company that did not immediately 
employ actual labour. I was employed by the labouring subcontractor, Paddy 
McMurray, who never asked for my tax details, or Construction Industry Scheme 
(CIS) card, and paid me in crisp 50 pound notes every week. Legally, everyone 
employed on a building site in England must hold a CIS card. It contains a photograph 
of the holder, and his or her National Insurance number. It is a regulatory measure to 
prevent illegal workers and tax evasion, but is quite ineffective (see chapters 9 and 
10). Everyone was in disbelief when they discovered I was not getting paid in full for 
my labour. No one could ever really understand why I was doing it.
Whilst my role as student attracted some attention in the form of generalised j 
jokes and ‘piss-taking’, the role of researcher initially aroused very little interest. / 
However, 10 weeks into the fieldwork I began to ask if I could interview people after 
work. All of a sudden I was the subject of a barrage of accusations that I was from the 
tax office, the Child Support Agency, a time and motion man, a spy from the client I 
group, or higher management, and/or an agent of rival subcontractors. Most of the 
comments were said in jocular tone but a certain amount of suspicion must have 
fuelled them. I was after all, an outsider in a very real sense because I was one of the 
few workers who had not entered the site through networked relations (see chapters 4 
and 5). I therefore, had to earn trust rather than be ascribed it. Despite this, as time 
went on, some of the builders agreed to be interviewed; some just liked to talk and
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others felt they were helping me on my way through life. It was however, often 
difficult to actually pin people down for the interviews. Many of the men had never 
been interviewed before, and the term ‘interview’ appeared to signify a degree of 
formality that they were quite suspicious of. Consequently I had many cancellations 
and found myself continually chasing people up.
During the period of labouring I came to realise the extent to which the 
different trades were segregated from one another. I was only really interacting with 
other labourers, a few painters, plasterers, and the foremen and site managers directly 
above me in the organisational hierarchy. Interaction with the carpenters, masons, 
mechanical and electrical, scaffolders, roofers, management, surveyors and other 
groups were fleeting: they were people whom I merely said ‘alright’ to when moving 
around the site1.1 also had an overwhelming feeling that the site management did not 
appreciate my being around. I thought this could have been the result of my own 
paranoia, but as William Burroughs once said, ‘a paranoid is someone that knows at 
least something about what’s going on’. This was becoming worrying, and I realised I 
needed to think about a game plan. Naively, all I had thought about previously was 
trying to gain ‘trust’ from the tradesmen and labourers because I did not wish to be 
seen as a management stooge. In addition, being a labourer right at the bottom of the 
trade hierarchy, I could see little of how the work was organised as a whole; I had 
little idea in the larger scheme of things why I was digging holes or pulling roofs 
down. I eventually asked if it would be possible to spend some time participating in 
the site office so that I could see what went on in there and how the work as a whole 
was organised, and, with this request, the project manager’s ill-ease towards me 
softened. I originally said I was not interested in the management of the site, but 
simply in the ‘shop-floor’ culture of the tradesmen and labourers. My initial ignorance 
and lack of recognition of the managers’ work had not pleased the hard working 
project manager. He began his career as a carpenter, and consequently was aware that 
those working ‘on the tools’ (i.e. on the shop-floor, but there is no shop and often no 
floor on building sites) often viewed site management as lazy and unproductive (see 
chapter 6). He did not want a researcher to draw the same conclusions.
After a week away from the site to rest and recover my thoughts, I began my 
research in the site office, which altered my status substantially. By being in ‘the
1 ‘Alright’ and ‘alright mate’ are common forms o f perfunctory greeting on London building sites.
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office’, the perception of those working on the tools changed, and, I became one o f 
the office. Instantly nobody was telling me what to do, and I often had to search 
around for tasks in my inactivity and boredom. I remained rather withdrawn from the 
social world of the office, but I became jokingly known there as ‘the office spy’. Yet, 
as Becker (1970) observed, respondents come to ignore the presence of researchers, 
and, although my presence was surrounded by some suspicion, the site management 
soon became caught up in the exigencies of enacting their own social worlds. This 
was manifest when a senior surveyor, who spent much of his time working in the 
office, turned to me and said, ‘well if you actually are a spy, we’re fucked now’.
As it was with the peripheral trade groups out on site, so the many people that 
came in and out of the office were unaware I was a researcher, most thought I was a 
trainee site manager, part of the normal scenery. I was however ejected from a site 
meeting that took place between the site managers and Assured Consultants. The 
junior surveyor of Assured bellowed at me in a condescending manner that if I was 
not involved in the decision-making I could not be involved in the meetings. Worried 
about my continuing position on the project, I bit my tongue, left the room, wrote a 
letter to the consultants explaining who I was and what I was doing, and never 
attended another site meeting. I always found it peculiar that I was treated with such 
suspicion and seen as a possible source of trouble because this only made me more 
determined to find out what they wanted to hide. There were, not to my surprise, 
slightly corrupt relationships between the various parties involved in the build, and 
frequent practices that could be deemed illicit. For my participation in the site office I 
was again offered wages but I declined, thinking that being paid was putting pressure 
on me to be doing building work, such is the work ethic built into many of us. Being 
unpaid relieved my tension considerably, but elicited disbelief amongst the builders, a 
disbelief transformed into jokes. Despite my telling everyone I received a scholarship 
for the research, they found it difficult to comprehend why I refused wages when I 
must have been a poor student who continued to come into work every morning.
As relations with Steve, the project manager, improved, I asked if it would be 
possible to pay Topbuild for taking the workers out from work an hour early so I 
could interview them. Steve agreed, and I began to drum up much more interest for 
interviews through trading an hour off from work in the pub with beers paid for by 
me. Informal news about the interviews circulated the site. In one of the rumours I 
was offering 20 pounds for people’s time and would reputedly put another 20 on the
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table, saying that the interview would finish when the money was drank. Despite this, 
nobody ever allowed me to buy all the drinks in any of the interview sessions, and 
Topbuild never asked me to pay for the workers’ time. Again however, my actions 
aroused some suspicion. Paddy McMurray, the labour subcontractor, came into the 
site office one day in rather a panic wondering why I was interviewing ‘his blokes’. 
He had been in touch with Mr Drear, the contracts director, and he said they would 
want to read anything I wrote about the project. Paddy’s reaction was much to the 
merriment of everybody, and jokes abounded about me being from the Inland 
Revenue. I had asked Paddy if I could speak with him about his work, but whenever 
our paths crossed he would move very speedily for a man of his age, rapidly getting 
out of my way.
It was not only Paddy who was reluctant to speak with me. All the first 
generation Irish labourers were similarly suspicious. I repeatedly badgered some of 
them to be interviewed and two eventually agreed, but they were never particularly 
lucid during the interviews. I got along well with them in work and in the pub, and 
some enjoyed talking about the ‘old days’ back in Ireland and their early days in 
London. Perhaps ‘informal’ interviews were too formal. Alternatively, their lack of 
lucidity might have been the result of racial and network differences between us, and 
a resultant lack of trust. Yet, I never encountered the same problems with the Indian 
carpenters, nor with any of the Scottish tradesmen. I discuss race and trust throughout 
the thesis, but Anglo-Irish relations, particularly in the context of the British building 
industry, have never been particularly rosy, fraught by racism and structural 
disadvantage.
I spent two months participating in the office. Although I asked to be given a 
role, I was never offered very much to do, and, on occasion, found it quite difficult to 
keep awake. This might have been because there was very little work at this point in 
time as the first phase of the build was drawing to an end. However, I spent my time 
looking through the many files that instructed and accounted the work. Often I was 
not interested in the content of the files but was taking notes about the talk and goings 
on in the office. I asked lots of questions and spent as much time out on the site 
helping the labourers and ‘having the crack’ with them and the painters, as I spent in 
the office. I somehow felt more comfortable with the manual workers than I did with 
most of the managers, probably due to my past life as a manual worker.
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This period was a peculiar time in the life of the build because Christmas was 
impending, and the first, ‘Year 1*, phase of the works was almost complete. The 
impending ‘Year 2’ was surrounded by confusion and rumour, and the date of 
commencement kept shifting forward. Most of the tradesmen and labourers were laid- 
off, and the numbers of people on the site reduced to a bare minimum of 
approximately 15 workers (see fig. 2.0), predominately managers and foremen. 
Following Christmas I went back to the office for two weeks, and, decided to return to 
the site when Year 2 began, when there would be more people and goings-on. For 15 
weeks I sporadically went onto the site, interviewing those that were willing to meet 
after work, and interviewing site management and foremen during the day because 
they were able to organise their time to do this. During this period, one of the two 
general foremen said more than once: ‘It’s funny, you come in and out the site and 
nobody takes any notice anymore. Might not see you all week and then you come in 
one morning and it’s just like, ‘oh Darren’s here’. It’s just normal for you to be here 
now’. It appeared that after almost 6 months I eventually became a normal part of the 
day-to-day scenery.
Fig. 2.0: Numbers of workers on site during Year 1
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Following my sporadic part-time participation, I worked in the site office full-time for 
another two weeks during a busier period, in which time the majority of work shifted 
to Year 2 and moved over to Keyworker House 2. I took some more time off, 
occasionally going on to the site to maintain the relationships that were forged, and to 
conduct more recorded interviews. At this time I approached the painting 
subcontractor, Ernie Coat, to ask if I could work with ‘his blokes’ at Keyworker 
House 2. He told me he had no work for me to do, despite my offer that I was ‘very 
cheap’. As I by now had come to expect, Ernie Coat was quite suspicious of me, and 
totally disbelieving that I could decorate. Eventually Paul, one of the site managers, 
spoke to Ernie on my behalf, and told him that I was integral to ‘the team’, and the 
work I was doing was ‘very important’. He said that Ernie’s employing me would be 
a ‘big favour’ to Topbuild and would be much appreciated. Ernie instantly employed 
me and agreed to pay me half of the wages of a poorly paid painter.
I spent the next seven weeks working full-time with the painting group and my 
social position shifted again. I had moved from sitting around in the office and 
wandering about the site in my clean clothes, to being a painter dressed in painters’ 
whites and carrying around brushes, steps and materials all day long. The move 
‘breached’ daily reality to an extent because building site officers are not usually 
demoted to being painters. The builders would laugh or look at me with raised 
eyebrows and surprised expressions when seeing me in my new uniform which they 
associated with my demoted position. To repair the breach I would try to make a joke 
of it (c.f. Garfinkel, 1967).
Due to the trade based divisions on the site I became wrapped up in the social 
and work world of the painters, seeing very little of the other trades, and rarely 
coming into contact with the management at all. This was the final phase of the 
research and I felt much more relaxed. It might be argued that I had anthropologically 
‘gone native’, but, in this position I actually was native. I could do my job well and 
was quickly accepted by the painters as a tradesman. Having done this job for some 
years, I fast slipped into their social world and spent a number of memorable evenings 
out and about with three of my colleagues.
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Getting Out
After 7 weeks working with the painters I exited Keyworker House. For the next 8 
weeks I went onto the site to organise and conduct a few stray interviews, and spent 
some more nights out with the painters. In total I spent 51 weeks as a participant 
observer. This included 12 weeks full-time labouring, 10 weeks full-time in the site 
office, and, 7 weeks full-time painting and decorating. I also spent a number of Friday 
nights getting drunk and high with many of the builders. There was a period of 15 
weeks, from the end of January until the beginning of May 2003, where I conducted 
most of the interviews and was at the site part-time in no particular role. I undertook 
31 recorded unstructured interviews, totalling 39.5 hours of recorded talk (only one 
participant did not allow me to record the interview). The shortest interview was 36 
minutes, the longest 212 minutes. However, many were done in pubs and often went 
on past the length of recording, late into the night, after which I would try to note the 
next morning what had been said through a foggy and stale memory. David Downes 
commented that I probably did not know whether to ‘write up or throw up’. I did both. 
The mean recorded interview length was 86 minutes.
Many of the builders never agreed to be interviewed but I filled 27 pocket- 
sized notepads with observational data and conversations that I heard and had with 
people, and I accumulated a mass of loose notes and ideas. For those who refused to 
be interviewed, but, liked to talk at work, I had to rely on memory and note-taking to 
capture their biographical information and attitudes. The divisions and transient 
nature of many of the trades on the site meant that the research predominately 
focussed on six main groups who were more or less permanently involved in the 
build: consultants, officers (management and surveyors), carpenters, painters, 
mechanical and electrical (plumbers and electricians), and labourers (two of whom 
were maintenance men).
Methodological Problems
I adopted a theoretical and methodological approach that grew most directly from 
Robert Park and the Chicago School of sociology in the 1920s. I applied an inductive 
method whereby the data emerged from detailed observations, or, what Geertz (1975) 
termed, ‘thick description’. The descriptions displayed order and patterning in the 
fluid social reality of the building site, and the thesis presents and analyses these 
patterns. In this sense, the thesis is a caricatured copy of social reality, and no
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monograph can do justice to the complex, contingent and emergent nature of social 
life. However, following Simmel, I grapple with the forms and interpretations that 
individuals themselves place upon social reality, and, from this I draw and construct 
theories concerning the nature of the social world (see Rock, 1979). This pursuit was 
in some respects, simply ‘constructs of constructs’ (Schutz, 1962: 6), but constructs 
can act as a form of communication between social groups, in this case, between the 
builders, myself and the section of the academic world that reads these words.
An inductive method was applied to a singular case study. This was a research 
tactic that ushered vast uncertainty but I placed faith in Paul Rock’s advice that 
‘something will come up, it always does’. I chose the case study method out of 
practicality, and because of a pre-existing interest in informal relations. Informal 
relations are commonly taken-for-granted or hidden from outsiders. Consequently, a 
useful way to uncover these is through the detail of long-term in-depth observation. 
Participation within the social world also gave me a personal ‘feel’ for that world, 
assisting what Weber termed an ‘emphatic understanding’ of subjectivity, although it 
would take an entire lifetime working on a building site to completely emphatically 
understand builders.
Ethnographic reproduction of form has been criticised by some ‘radical’ 
theorists (c.f. Wacquant, 20023) for being merely liberal and reproducing reality rather 
tackling social essence. However, quite what an ‘essence’ is, might be impossible to 
establish. Furthermore, I did not casually adopt a methodological stance formulated 
almost 100 years ago in Chicago from a combination of social philosophy and 
journalism. My theoretical position was the result of my own intellectual journeys 
through the tragedy of the fall of Marxism, and out through the impossibility of post­
modernism. In light of my own theoretical travels and the critique of ethnographic 
reproduction, I did, however, attempt to get ‘into and under’ representations of reality 
by adopting a ‘multi-sited’ ethnographic strategy (Marcus, 1998, from Duneier,
1999), and I hope to have avoided critiques such as those raised by Wacquant.
Multiple Sites
Duneier (1999) uses the term ‘multi-sited ethnography’ to describe the method 
whereby fieldworkers endeavour to uncover social factors that are wider and more
3 Wacquant makes a useful but scathing, polemical, sometimes inaccurate, and occasionally ridiculous critique o f  
Anderson (1999), Duneier (1999) and Newman (1999). See their replies in the same volume.
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distant than the specific case-study fieldwork site, but which have an impact upon that 
site. Duneier adopts this strategy partly to avoid what he calls the ‘ethnographic 
fallacy’ (Steinberg, 1997) whereby actor’s accounts are taken at surface value as 
indicative of social reality (see also Edwards and Scullion, 1982). Although I 
reproduce the words and actions of the builders, I too wanted to avoid the 
ethnographic fallacy in taking their accounts at face value. Yet, since the genesis of 
the research project I continually wondered as to who I was to assume underlying 
historical or structural processes aside from the builders’ own representations. My 
only justification for this can be that I was in a position to tell the story when the 
builders were not. I was also able to step into and stand back from the social world, 
and, to look out from it into more distant interrelations, simply because I had the time 
and resources to do this.
Being able to ‘stand back’ enabled me at least to draw out the mundane
occurrences that the subjects took for granted (c.f. Becker and Geer, 1969). To
uncover wider structures, motivations and interdependent factors, I took inferential
leaps into history and broader social processes and structures. This method can be
problematic, as Duneier argues:
The scholar who wishes to avoid the ethnographic fallacy must sometimes ask the 
reader to make a leap of faith. On the one hand, the ethnographer makes a great effort 
to document and verify vast numbers of details, and in the process to tell how a social 
world works in everyday life. On the other hand, when it comes to the connection 
between these details and constraints and opportunities, his or her claims can seem 
quite skimpy by contrast. (1999: 343)
The validity of any case study will essentially depend upon the reader’s ‘leap of faith’ 
in interpreting the cogency of the logical inferences contained within it, and, subjects, 
researcher and readers all bring conceptual structures to the written case study (Stake,
2000). I did find however, that relating micro-social and secondary macro-statistical 
representations with historical studies, was a useful tool in forming theoretical links 
and logical consistencies concerning the problematic relationship between 
motivations and accounts, individuals and societies. Despite this, the thesis’ final 
validity is up to the reader.
Quantities and Qualities
Quantitative numerical data, while useful for providing general descriptions of large 
populations, can distort, construct and become social reality. Consequently,
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quantitative data cannot be viewed as ‘hard’ objective science any more than 
qualitative data. As Hammersley (1992) argues, quantitative and qualitative methods 
are not mutually exclusive. Case studies provide numerous detail and little 
generalisability, whereas statistical data provides more generalisability but less detail. 
Ethnographies, including this one, are engulfed by terms such as ‘some’, ‘many’, 
‘less’, ‘more’, and ‘most’. These terms represent quantities, and are statistical 
descriptions in vague-miniature. Throughout the research I found myself conducting 
‘mental quasi-statistics’ (Becker, 1970) in which patterns and interrelations contained 
in the data were implicitly observed and counted, during and after fieldwork. 
Qualitative data are, then, influenced by quantities. This is because both quantitative 
and qualitative methods are part of the same ethnomethodology of doing science, but 
they do it in slightly different ways, with slightly different outcomes.
Almost all the argument of the entire subsequent thesis was not assumed 
before entering the field. Many of my original ideas and deductions were challenged 
by my fieldwork, during the data analysis, and the writing-up process. In this sense, 
my research was as inductive as possible. It would have been useful to supplement the 
data with a statistical survey to reveal broader patterns, but temporal and pecuniary 
factors prevented this. Furthermore, statistical measures might reveal correlations but 
cannot demonstrate human action, relations and processes. To infer how action and 
correlations arise, theories must be formed to grapple with deeper causes and 
processes, and qualitative induction is one such method of theory construction.
I do not consider the results from my case study to be conventionally 
‘scientific’, but the research on which this thesis is based was empirical (c.f. Berger 
and Luckman, [1966] 1991), and glued to observational reality. Further, as Znaniecki 
(1934, cited in Becker and Geer, 1969) argues, most ‘hard’ science typically studies 
small numbers. Thus analytic induction in a single case study could be considered 
science par excellence. However, social worlds do not readily lend themselves to 
straightforward causal explanations. Even pushing causal methodology into the arena 
of complex multifaceted interrelation cannot solve the methodological problems of 
reliability and consistency. Much of what impinges upon human action is social, and 
thereby, subjective and virtual. A fleeting human thought, or a taken-for-granted habit 
accessible only to the sub-conscious, cannot be drawn out, isolated and subjected to 
rigorous scientific testing. As a result, no claim can be made to the generalisability of 
the results and subsequent story contained in this thesis. But it can be said that what I
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observed during the fieldwork, in terms of the organisation of State-commissioned 
building projects, was similar to what I had seen in the past on other building projects. 
Furthermore, ‘people are people’, and despite people possessing and expressing their 
own very individual characters and idiosyncrasies, amalgamations of distinct 
personalities become entwined in enacting social processes and social forms. These 
forms and processes operate throughout the social world, and perhaps, not simply in 
my case study.
In recorded interview sessions I also applied an open and inductive 
methodology where there were no fixed sets of questions or interview structure, but I 
simply attempted to sustain people’s talk about their lives and concerns. An open 
research tactic however, does not mould objectivity. When analysing the data, my 
subjectivity selected salience, and that salience was contingent upon my subjectivity. 
Even what my daily perception was drawn to was socially constructed. Social life 
presents multiple truths, relevances and realities, and what the researcher draws from 
these will always be driven by some kind of theory or idea. No claims can, therefore, 
be made for my seeing being objective because there can be no methodological 
escape from the problematic nature of social reality; there can be no real realism. For 
this reason the epistemology underlying social science can at best be a pragmatic 
realism. I use this term in opposition to Hammersley’s (1992) ‘subtle realism’, as, no 
matter how subtle epistemological realism is, it can never be real. Pragmatic realism 
implies that we can only do our reflexive best to illustrate and think about social 
reality, and ethnographic research is one method in which to do this. The resultant 
social theory can be stimulating, and perhaps useful, but never ‘real’.
In focussing partly on informal actions, things that are by their very nature 
uncategorised, I could be accused in a Foucauldian sense of dragging power out into 
the social body; exposing and constructing the unexposed ‘other’. However, I take 
refuge in the view that that social life is so complex, fluid and ever changing, and, 
humanity so continually playful and creative, that social life may evade categorisation 
at every turn. Furthermore, if my thesis is viewed as a story, the theoretical tradition 
that I continue is as old as humanity itself. Theory is a game of stories, and game-play 
is a form of human adaptation, and, a means through which structure, fun and play 
can be manufactured (c.f. Huizinga, [1938] 1970). Yet, like the game play that occurs 
in schools and workplaces (see chapter 7), theoretical game-play can have the 
unintended consequence of constructing its subject. Again, there can be little escape
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from these problems, such is the impossibility of post-modernism, and is the reason 
why I adopt the stance of a pragmatic realist. My position as author of the story can be 
seen as a relay of micro-history, and analogous to every human subject, I was 
simultaneously vessel and creator of that micro-history. However, at the close of the 
thesis I attempt to reconcile myself by deconstructing modem nomenclature so as to 
turn social science back upon itself. I do not believe the whole world to be a series of 
free-flowing signifiers; empirical realities exist. Job and housing markets, political 
rule, bodies and buildings, and other technologies, all pattern social life mediated via 
human subjectivity. And, if objects exist as reality to actors, they are thus reality.
I cannot however, provide a completely satisfying answer to my own doubts. 
This thesis may benefit me much more so than any of the builders. This haunted my 
dreams throughout the fieldwork (c.f. Cohen, 1988), and I could only find solace in 
Paul Rock’s words that this was my job and I was essentially in the position of a 
beggar. Ethically I did the builders no direct harm. I did not take anyone’s job or get 
anyone in trouble, as far as I knew, and many of the builders enjoyed the attention 
they received. One interviewee told me he felt like a ‘famous footballer or something, 
telling you all about my life’. At best I amplified their voices, and I hope to have 
represented them honestly and accurately.
In justifying my research strategy I have philosophically and quasi-scientifically 
argued my standpoint. However, during the fieldwork process, I felt a long distance 
from the nuances of methodological debates and textbooks. To a large extent I, Like 
many other ethnographers before me, simply ‘muddled through’ (see Plummer, 1983). 
Mid-way through the fieldwork I considered changing my focus to the sociology of a 
building as opposed to a sociology of builders. There were so many distinct parties, 
work-groups and users of Keyworker House, that the actual building work was only a 
part of the social processes involved. However, as outlined above, my presence as 
researcher aroused rather a lot of suspicion. This was exacerbated by a small media 
panic concerning the large profits and inefficiency of PFI projects4 of which 
Keyworker House was part. I felt as though I was walking on eggshells, and thought it 
unwise to attempt to speak to all the parties embroiled in the life of the building. I 
figured that the building work and the men doing it were complex enough. However,
4 ‘Brown calls down union wrath after standing by PFI’, The Guardian 20/09/02.
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it would have been myopic to completely disregard the ‘life’ of the building since it 
had a salient impact upon the organisation of the build, and therefore, upon the 
builders’ lives which are the subject of this thesis. Firstly therefore, I present the life 
of Keyworker House and the organisation of its refurbishment. I describe the roles 
and relationships of the various interdependent parties involved in managing the 
build, and consider the effectiveness of privatised State-commissioned building.
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Chapter 3 
Managing to Build
In this chapter I describe the specificities of the Keyworker House build, and the 
various parties involved in building it. I look at the roles and relationships between 
quantity surveys, site managers and building consultants, and their relationships to the 
bureaucratic and managerial measures employed to guide and regulate the build. I go 
on to question the effectiveness of privatised State-commissioned building.
Dilapidation
Keyworker House was approximately one hundred years old. Through years of poor 
maintenance, intensive usage, and the onslaught of the weather and gravity, it had 
fallen into a dilapidated state. Water leaked through the corroded roofs and seeped 
into the top floor rooms, saturating the plaster and pulling it from the walls and 
ceilings. Roof gutters and external piping had become loose, blocked and rusting, 
exacerbating water damage to the brickwork and roofs. Where water seeped into the 
brickwork, it had rusted the internal steel skeleton of the building, causing it to 
expand, forcing large cracks down the external masonry walls. The wood in the 
external windows had also expanded and crumbled, making it impossible to open and 
shut many of the windows, thereby permitting rain and wind to enter the dwelling 
through its sides in addition its roofs. The archaic plumbing system ceased to function 
properly because of poor maintenance and extreme day-to-day use. There were 
continual floods, sinks and toilets frequently became blocked, and the flow of both 
hot and cold water was unreliable. The carpets, interior walls and internal woodwork 
were worn by use and water damage, making the rooms and communal areas look 
drab, asymmetrical and unappealing.
Insufficient maintenance was the result of economic and political 
manoeuvrings that occurred during Keyworker House’s life-span, and was 
exacerbated in the early 1990s with the onset of the PFI, when building maintenance 
was contracted-out to private tender. Private contractors were less knowledgeable 
with the building’s functioning than the previously directly employed maintenance 
team who lived and worked there. Contracted-in services had a tendency to ‘paper
52
over the cracks’ of building problems, rather than rectify the source1. Keeping the 
building ticking over until the finish of their contract was what the market demanded.
The cost effectiveness of marketisation was recognised by some of the 
Topbuild’s older tradesmen. Bill, the mechanical and electrical foreman, was one of 
these:
For maintenance there used to be blokes that looked after it. It’s like the problems 
we’ve got here, all the pipe-work, all the shit pipes, all the rainwater pipes, everything’s 
bunged up. Years ago in boiler houses, you’d have the boiler-house man and that was 
his job, he was resident boiler-house man. He’d clean all the taps, clean all the brass, 
clean the floors. But now to save money they’ve done away with all the boiler-house 
men, and they’ve done away with all the maintenance on the plumbing, on down-pipes, 
sewer pipes and God knows what else. And what’s happened? All it’s done is created a 
massive great bill for whoever takes over. Now in here the boiler house has got to be 
renewed because it’s not been maintained. All the down-pipes, all the electrics, 
everything. Everything’s gone wrong because it’s not been maintained properly. So 
they’ve stuck us in here and we’ve got all the faults, and you just can’t clear the faults. 
You’ve got to renew it all, so it’s costing. It’s government money being wasted.
The administrative staff at Keyworker House were under pressure from the key 
workers’ union concerning the building’s dilapidated state. Yet because Keyworker 
House was run on a tight budget by the regional Health Trust, the administration did 
not have the fiscal power necessary to contract builders to repair it. This was costly 
for the housing administration because the dilapidated roof was letting water into top 
floor rooms which they could no longer rent out, and they needed to house health 
service staff to sustain an income from their rents. Keyworker House urgently 
required attention if it was to continue to house health service workers.
Charitable housing associations were invited to tender for a 30-year contract to repair, 
maintain and administer the building. They put forward bids, calculating the costs of 
repair, aesthetic improvement, and general maintenance, in relation to the income that 
could be accrued from the key workers’ rents. In 2001 Opportune Housing won the 
contract. Opportune was the umbrella organisation and administrative wing of two 
other housing associations. One was a charitable trust that would put all its profits 
back into housing key workers and the needy, and the other was a housing 
management company that was not charitable but privately owned. Anything that the 
charitable body was involved in would be automatically run and administered by the
1 New Labour and Network Rail have recently reintroduced ‘in-house’ maintenance o f railway infrastructure 
because o f  the negligence associated with contracted-in private maintenance teams that led to the Hatfield and 
Potters Bar train crashes in 2000 and 2002 respectively (The Guardian 24/10/03).
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management company, at a profit for its directors and shareholders. The 
organisational structure of Opportune Housing ‘blurred the boundaries’ between 
public, private and voluntary agencies evident in the marketisation of governance 
(Rhodes, 1997), where public becomes private which becomes profit.
Topbuild were contracted by Opportune Housing to repair the dilapidations, 
and modernise and refurbish the building’s interior as to make it a safer, more 
aesthetic and comfortable living and working environment. The major works and 
costs of the works undertaken by Topbuild to Keyworker House 1 are outlined below. 
These are the actual prices for the work that was carried out in central London in 
2002/3, and are taken from the original bill of quantities drawn up by the Topbuild’s 
quantity surveyors and estimators.
A. Dilapidations and Wants o f Repair
Scaffold total building, wash down and repair roof, gutters and cornices (£267K) 
Remove pigeon detritus, add spikes and netting (£5K)
Identification of pipes containing asbestos (£?)
Repair and replace lightening conductors (£34K)
Replace gutters and repair brick ledges (£2IK)
Repair roof railings (£5K)
Repair balconies and railings (£3K)
Brick cleaning and repointing (£554K)
Repair all wooden windows (£91.5K)
Repair and replace metal windows (£18K)
Replace broken glass (£6K)
Overhaul doors (£7K)
Redecorate all externals (£32.5K)
Mastic all external door and windows (£8K)
Overhaul roof leadwork and slates on roof slopes (£2IK)
B. Internal Works
Emergency lighting to all public areas (£43K)
Rewire all faulty light fittings (£205K)
Fit smoke detectors (£187K)
Repair cracked plaster in stairwells (£25K)
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Decorate all common areas (£180K)
Repair steps (£5K)
Repair wooden floors (£16K)
Repair compartment firewalls (£25K)
Repair ceiling damage to top floor rooms (£10K)
Fit new carpets (£5K)
Upgrade and test electric’s (£45K)
The specifications in the bill of quantities were quite sparse and ambiguous. For 
instance, the work of asbestos removal was not costed, as it was not known how much 
asbestos existed in the pipes until a mechanical and electrical team had carefully 
inspected them. Also, works to be carried out to the masonry were unclear because it 
was not possible to view the full extent of weather damage until the building was 
scaffolded. The original specification was, then, subject to emerging knowledge as the 
work progressed, and the costs indicated were only guides to the price of the work and 
subject to ongoing negotiation. The original works were valued at 3.75 million pounds 
for Keyworker House 1, but eventually totalled 4.6 million pounds. Some works such 
as the replacement of the metal (‘Crittal’) windows were never undertaken, but many 
extra works were discovered, forcing the final cost up.
Most of the external work resulted from the effects of the impact of natural 
forces, including lightning, pests, and roof, window and brick repair through 
weathering. Work to identify and safeguard against asbestos in the pipes was enforced 
as a regulatory measure to protect workers and users of the building. The majority of 
internal works were also forced by regulatory necessity. The fitting and upgrading of 
smoke alarms, fire doors and emergency lighting were specified by environmental 
health and safety legislation aimed at decreasing risks to users. The remaining internal 
works were related to wear and tear through use (redecorating, new carpets), and 
internal weather damage (cracked plaster and ceilings). The extra works that were 
commissioned during the build were predominantly cosmetic, such as the decoration 
and fitting of new vanity units and cupboards in the bed-sit rooms, and the 
construction of new shower rooms to replace the old original bathrooms. These works 
were non-essential in terms of danger, security and regulation, but were driven by the 
economic necessity of getting people to live in Keyworker House, and to justify rent 
rises.
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The job specifications for Keyworker House 2 and 3 followed much the same 
pattern as above. Although the buildings were of different sizes and internal shapes, 
the dilapidation problems and regulatory measures were generally much the same for 
each edifice because each had followed a similar ‘career’. Consequently, the build 
processes were also similar.
Building Parties
In a small building project such as the decoration of a single local authority house, 
there are often many parties involved in the project: the local authority, the tenant(s), 
the contractor, the subcontractor, the tradesman, the material suppliers, and the 
impending threat of visiting health and safety officers. Each of these parties has a 
different interest in the work and how it is done, but doing the work is contingent 
upon their agreement. This can make for a very problematic and complex situation. 
For the tradesman making the required product, it might be difficult to do the actual 
work whilst trying to balance and maintain agreement between the separate parties, 
but, in larger scale building works, the parties and associated problems can be 
amplified considerably. Keyworker House was the equivalent of working on 776 local 
authority houses, and reaching an agreement becomes problematic with increased 
numbers of parties and interests. Large built structures are built upon the balance of 
these agreements, negotiations, associated conflict, power play, and the sweat of 
labourers and tradesmen (c.f. Higgin and Jessop, 1965; Kidder, 1985).
Keyworker House Parties
To administer the refurbishment of Keyworker House, Opportune Housing employed 
the services of Assured Consultants, which followed best practice laid out in both the 
Latham and Egan reports. Assured Consultants and Opportune Housing had entered 
into a partnering agreement with Topbuild on a previous ‘new build’ job, and the 
build at Keyworker House was therefore part of a continuing long-term arrangement. 
A contingency fund was set up to absorb any of the extra costs that might occur 
through unforeseen problems and expenses. Alternatively, if savings were made, the 
fund would be shared between Topbuild and Assured.
As Keyworker House had already contracted-out building services before 
Opportune Housing took on the PFI contract, the administrators of the building were 
tied in to a contractual relationship with another contractor, ‘Trans-hand’. Trans­
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hand’s contract for general maintenance was terminated with the onset of the new 
agreement, but cleaning, refuse collection and lift maintenance contracts all remained 
under their control. This complicated the already complex organisation of the build, 
and matters became yet further complicated because Assured Consultants employed 
their own mechanical and electrical subcontractor, ‘Spark’s Electro-Mechanical’. 
Topbuild’s managers disliked this arrangement because they wished to contract their 
own mechanical and electrical subcontractors, and the arrangement interfered with the 
flow of information between Topbuild and Assured Consultants, and, contributed 
towards what was a problematic relationship between the building parties.
Fig. 3.0: R epresentation  o f  C om m u n ica tion s b etw een  th e  Parties In v o lv e d  in the B uild
NH S TRUST
- a
T E N N A N T
K E Y T O R K E B S
H O U SIN G
ADM  INISTRATO RS
O PP O R T U N E  H O U SIN G  ASSOCIATION
ASSURED BUILDING  
CO NSULTANTS
SUBCONTRACTORS
T O P B U IL D  PLC
Bennett and Jayes (1998) argued that for effective partnering there must be openness,
maturity, freedom to express ideas, a desire for continuous improvement, and free
flowing information between the contractor and client. At Keyworker House there
was little openness or freedom of expression. In fact there were lengthy negotiations,
sharp arguments, and frequent breakdowns in communication. Steve, the project
manager, contrasted his experience at Keyworker House with the previous new-build,
a Design and Build, in which the same parties were involved:
Well that was a design and build job and it was down to us to do what we priced to do, 
with a little bit o f encouragement and approval from Assured. They were just 
approving systems and products that we were going to use for the building systems,
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how we were going to go about doing things and arranging them, and then the final 
snagging and hand-over really. They were on site there as well, they were above us in a 
house, but they just didn’t have as much input. We had drawings, we had an engineer...
So the difference is, that was design and build, and this [Keyworker House] is a 
partnering contract. We’re supposed to have open book policy so everyone gets to see 
everything what’s going on, but, you know, they do have a lot more say over here [at 
Keyworker House]. I mean there was an original brief and specs [for the build] but it 
changed so much. So initially yes, they were relying on us to do dilapidation items, but 
then as things gradually changed, and you’re trying to work out fresh prices, that’s 
where it all got a bit messy, and it still is.
For the Design and Build, the client laid down requirements and Topbuild drew up the
specifications that were agreed upon. The structure was built to the specifications with
only minor modifications during the process, and, because the construction was new,
there were few deliberations as to the quality of the finishing work; it should simply
be new, closed, symmetrical and shiny. Thus during the design and build, the parties
collaborated with only minor conflicts. Illustrative of this was the site ‘drink-ups’ that
took place at the end of some working weeks. Most of the mechanical and electrical,
building consultants and Topbuild officers, would go out on a Friday and drink
together, but at Keyworker House these relationships slowly broke down and drink-
ups became a divided affair. Bill, the mechanical and electrical foreman, described
some of the reason for the problems:
Topbuild have all their site managers, site agents, quantity surveyors, and whatever, 
and we’re [mechanical and electrical] not part of them so to speak. It’s this situation 
where it’s a bit of, you know, helping the client out, and working together as a team 
and everything. But Mr Jaggers comes to us and says can we give him a price for say 
putting all new lighting out in the courtyard, which he’s not allowed to. But he’s the 
fuckin’ client and you don’t wanna upset him. So he says, ‘what do you recommend’? 
And I say, oh ten spotlights, a couple of tree-lights, whatever, rough guess, I’m not 
pricing it but at a rough guess, 5 grand. ‘Okay’, he says, ‘can you do it’? And I say, no, 
you’ve got to go to Topbuild. He knows he’s gotta go to Topbuild, but now I might 
have just put me foot in it because we’ve give him a price to do it for 5 grand and by 
the time it goes through Topbuild he’s got a price more like 10 grand. Then there’s 20 
percent commission and all of a sudden he goes fuckin’ ape shit.
The relationship between Spark’s and Assured Consultants was a problematic one for
Topbuild, particularly because Topbuild attempted to inflate their prices. The
relationship also facilitated organisational problems. Steve, expressed these from
Topbuild’s point of view:
Fuckin’ Spark’s, they go behind my back and sort everything out with Assured, then 
Mr Jaggers comes in having a pop at me ‘cos the chippies haven’t finished the framing 
in the shower rooms ‘cos I’d put them on the fire doors. How the fuck am I supposed to 
know Spark’s were gonna wire-up the showers this week if they don’t fuckin’ tell me? 
(Fieldnotes)
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Despite what was sometimes a heated atmosphere, the build progressed and Assured 
Consultants saw Steve as a good project manager who was both flexible and 
knowledgeable. However, these views did not prevent raised voices and emotive 
atmospheres between the parties. Yet, a site office can be unlike other office 
situations because interaction is very informal and masculinised.
The Office
As part of the procurement of the build, Topbuild charged costs for their ‘prelims’. 
These were added on top of the expenses for the actual building work which was 
predominately carried out by the subcontractor groups (see chapter 4). ‘Prelims’ 
included costs of ‘hardware’, such as desks, computers, faxes, photocopiers, 
stationery and storage facilities, and, management services to cover the wages of site 
managers and surveyors. ‘Prelims’ also included ‘house keeping’, which was the 
wages of 6 labourers2. The cost of the ‘prelims’ was approximately £8000 per week 
for all three Keyworker Houses. It was essentially a cost for administration of the 
works; payment for knowledge as opposed to production.
The main site office was situated on the ground floor of Keyworker House 1. I was 
told many times what a luxury the office was. It was not situated in a muddy field 
inside a portakabin, which was usually the case, but was warm, relatively spacious 
and clean. There was a main desk for the project manager, and another for James, one 
of the site managers. Two desks were tucked away at the rear for Kevin, the quantity 
surveyor, and Bobby, his assistant trainee, and another was shared between the two 
general foremen and a visiting maintenance surveyor. The general foremen shared the 
space because they moved in and out of the office in their role of go-between (see 
chapter 6), and the quantity surveyors would regularly visit other sites that were under 
Topbuild’s administration.
It was for the most part a very busy room: noisy with faxes, phones, 
photocopiers and two-way radios constantly buzzing and bleeping. There was also an 
almost continual round of people coming in and out of the office: subcontractors 
looking for payment and instructions; foremen asking for orders; labourers in search
2 ‘House-keeping’ labourers were the backbone o f the build (see chapters 6 and 7) but they were not in this case, 
seen as actually building anything, but rather seen as service workers. Or, in other words, Topbuild made a profit 
from their wages.
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of keys and materials; materials salesmen peddling their wares; housing management 
coming with tenants’ problems; couriers delivering packages; and sometimes any or 
all of these groups just wanting a chat and/or joke. It was at times rather a manic 
space, so much so that Kevin, the quantity surveyor, would frequently wear earplugs 
so he could concentrate on his surveying duties.
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Office interaction was very informal. Rarely did anyone knock on the door before 
entering, and talk was characterised by voluble joking, swearing and ‘piss-taking’ (see 
chapters 7 and 8). Because interaction was so informal, it would be difficult (without 
prior knowledge) to assume who was situated where in the management hierarchy. 
For example, Jamin, the general and carpentry foreman, would shout to his direct 
boss, Steve, to do something, or they would argue over the best way to construct 
something. The encounters were often terminated with a jocular ‘fuck you, you cunt’. 
Similarly, I once witnessed Kevin athletically jump towards a visiting projects 
director from Topbuild head office, spin around, face backwards to him, and loudly 
break wind. The usual adornment of lewd calendars to the site office walls was 
forbidden by Mr Jaggers, the consultant, in the interests of public relations, and was 
instead hidden inside the inner doors of the mass of filing cabinets that subsumed the 
office. In their place, the walls were ornamented by month planners, first aid
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certificates, pictures of the office staffs children and motorbikes, and a few humorous 
photographs that had been taken with the site camera.
Across the corridor, opposite the site office, was the comparatively dry and 
sober office of Assured Consultants. The close proximity allowed Mr Jaggers and his 
underling, Herbert, to go in and out of the site office frequently. Mr Jaggers bought 
with him straight talk and an air of authority and respect. He was a formidable client’s 
representative, partly because he was trained in the law as a building ‘claims 
consultant’ to deal with contractor-client litigation disputes. The office atmosphere 
always became more sober upon his presence. Conversely, Herbert tended to generate 
a feeling of animosity amongst the Topbuild managers. He was shouted and sworn at 
without any semblance of jocular intent, at which he would turn bright red and shout 
back through his constantly cold-sore encrusted lips. Herbert’s general demeanour 
and condescending attitude towards everybody but Mr Jaggers facilitated the 
development of a general asperity towards him. It was considered stigmatising to be 
associated with Herbert, and insults centred around suggestions of an alleged 
friendship with him, or worse still, being addressed by his name. Because Herbert was 
part of the consultant team, he held a certain amount of power over the Topbuild 
managers, and, due to his perceived lack of knowledge he was seen as undeserving of 
his position. The sometimes-tense atmosphere between the site managers and Herbert 
did little to assist the co-operative ethos of the partnering agreement.
Herbert was considered to have negligible knowledge of building work, and he
was inconsistent in dealing with building workers of all levels. He tended to tell
people what to do rather than ask them, which conflicted with the builders and
managers’ values of independence (see chapter 6). Each occasion that highlighted his
ignorance was talked and joked about, and therefore accumulated in the managers’
collective memory. The site managers’ attitudes towards Herbert were remarkably
similar to the anti-police subculture of the juvenile groups studied by Matza (1964). In
this context, any kind of moral bind to Herbert’s authority had been neutralised. As
Paul, one of the site managers, told me:
What pisses me off about building is people in high positions who don’t know 
anything. People like Herbert, I fucking hate them to death... He’s got a degree, he 
speaks very well, but fuck me, he does not know the first thing about the construction 
industry. And that’s very scary, because let’s not pretend for a minute that’s by pure 
chance that I managed to bump into the most foolish person involved in building at a 
high level, no chance, they’re everywhere. And there comes a point where you can’t no 
longer be angry or resentful about the system, you’ve just got to accept that’s the way it
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is, make your money and go with it. Because you’re never going to stop it, are you?... It 
is amazing, he knows absolutely nothing; it’s scary really. I find it difficult when 
you’ve got to bow your head to people like him, it’s very annoying. I’d like to see 
people at high level more closely vetted, that you could look up to, not laugh at, 
because he’s a laughing stock at Topbuild isn’t he? I mean he’s not a bad fellow don’t 
get me wrong, but on a professional level... He’s ringing up for the most basic 
conversations sometimes. I dread it because I know that he’s going to mention 
something totally obscure and irrelevant, and we’re going to end up having a falling out 
or another issue over it.
Kevin, the quantity surveyor, concurred:
I hate the likes of Herbert who, to be blunt, can’t understand the principles of 
surveying. He just doesn’t get it. Agreeing final accounts with Quality Assured is a 
pain in the arse.
The strains that occurred between the building parties, and directed towards Herbert
in particular, eroded the ethos of partnering. Mr Jaggers talked, slightly in the
abstract, about why this was so problematic:
Unfortunately the construction industry is very much about relationships. It is about the 
relationships and the mutual respect between parties. And what tends to happen is 
because the person doesn’t have respect for an individual, that relationship isn’t going 
to work. And the higher up the chain you get, the worse it becomes.
Barlow et al (1997) concluded from their analysis of a number of case studies of 
building partnering, that trust is of the utmost importance for successful partnering 
but, was in turn, contingent upon individual managers’ personalities. The solution to 
this, they argue, is for clients to change managers who do not co-operate. However, 
Barlow et al neglect the personalities of clients and consultants that cannot be 
changed. At Keyworker House, Herbert’s lack of practical knowledge of building 
culture and processes obscured the relationships between the parties. He and Mr 
Jaggers held power over the contractor, and Topbuild had little choice but to continue 
to work with Herbert. However, Herbert was not the only reason for strained 
relationships.
Roles and Relationships: Managing and Money
The work of Topbuild’s site management can be usefully divided into two parts. On 
the one hand were the site management and organisation of the work, on the other 
were the quantity surveyors and the costing of the work. Mr Jaggers summarised these 
roles:
When you talk to surveyors, surveyors are very much in tune with money. Site 
managers are in tune with performance and standards. Directors are a combination of 
both to be fair to them. So when you’re speaking with surveyors, what you’re trying to
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do is to make sure you get a fair and reasonable representation of costs for the works. 
With the project managers what you are expecting is performance and quality.
Quantity Surveyors and ‘Getting one over ’
The work of quantity surveyors’ is both technical and legal. Technically they measure 
the volumes of work to be carried out, and prepare accounts and estimations of costs 
and profits of materials and labour via these measures, and legally they deal with the 
contractual arrangements of building jobs. Higgin and Jessop (1965) argue that 
quantity surveyors were originally employed by clients as a tactical manoeuvre to 
prevent being duped and mystified by contractors over the extent of works. 
Contractors often exaggerated building measures by, for example, reporting they used 
more bricks and bricklayers than were necessary for a particular job. To counteract 
the tactical move of clients, contractors, fearing that they might be mystified, 
employed their own quantity surveyors.
The contemporary quantity surveyor works in the site office with a calculator
and spread-sheet, continually adding and subtracting works done and about to be
done, wading through documented works and instructions, issuing payments to
subcontractors, and demanding payments from clients. Kevin described his role:
I spend a lot of the time here just trying to forecast the profit and loss on a job which 
means forecasting what we’re gonna get in the way of variations and extras, getting 
paid, and, what we’re paying out to the subbies [subcontractors] to do it. It’s just the 
balance of that, at the moment it’s just balancing it. With the Year 2 works we’re gonna 
get 3 million pound paid, so now I’m just working out exactly how much that is going 
to cost us. I’ve got the quotes and done it all, and I know what the margin is I think I’m 
gonna make. That’s how it works, it’s just monitoring it every month and every week, I 
mean we’ve had nearly £400,000 worth of variations here [at Keyworker House 1]. I’m 
a glorified accountant really.
Quantity surveyors juggled numbers, they were not particularly concerned with the 
quality or process of construction because that was the concern of the project and site 
managers. Quantity surveyors also form much of the higher management in the 
building industry and can be seen as its commissioned officers; the lieutenants and 
generals who command and dictate the rules of a build. Almost all Topbuild’s higher 
management, with whom I had fleeting contact, were quantity surveyors. They had 
left the world of numbers and contracts and, were directing from above the many 
projects under their jurisdiction.
Quantity surveyors performed an accounting juggling act whereby losses on 
one part of a job were transferred over to profits made on another part and vice versa.
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For example, Topbuild underestimated the measure for new asphalt to be laid and
moulded to the roofs for which they would have to pay the unforeseen costs. To
balance the losses, Kevin priced the fitting of internal fire doors at 50 pounds each
when a single carpenter could hang ten doors each day (at a cost of approximately
£150), thereby clawing back lost money. In relation to this, a battle of paper ensued
between Kevin and the two consultants, Mr Jaggers and Herbert (who were also
trained as quantity surveyors). They were engaged in pushing costs, losses and
estimates backward and forward at one another, negotiating and arguing. Mr Jaggers
was aware of the game:
They think they can get one over on me but I tell you that they can’t. I’ve been on both 
sides of the fence [working for contractors and clients], I know what they are trying to 
do, they can’t pull the wool over my eyes. (Fieldnotes)
Quantity surveyors were the ‘officer class’ of the building industry amongst the tough
manual workers and site management. However, because they worked on site, and
were the people who sanctioned payment, they all adopted an aggressive bellicose
interactive style (see chapter 8). In this sense, quantity surveyors may be characterised
as tough middle class. As both Bobby and Kevin illustrated:
It’s very aggressive in the building actually. You have to be very firm. Sometimes I 
like sort of being polite to people, but I like being aggressive as well. I enjoy that part 
to a certain extent but sometimes it gets a bit frustrating... I’ve got to have respect here 
so I’ve got to be professional, sometimes I want to just hit them but I’ve got to be 
professional. (Bobby)
I hate subbies [subcontractors] that whinge for the sake of whinging. I mean we’re all 
trying to make money but there’s a point where they’re just trying to screw you, and 
they end up taking the piss and I hate that. It’s part of the job but after all this time I 
just hate it. I like having a good row, but I also hate having a row because I always lose 
my rag and they always get silly so I tend not to these days. (Kevin)
I interviewed all 4 quantity surveyors at Keyworker House. They said they became
surveyors because they liked to be out amongst the hustle and bustle of the social
world of the building site where they enjoyed its tough and Tadish’ environment. As
Bobby, Topbuild’s trainee quantity surveyor, said:
I got on a course in building surveying at university, blindly, I had no construction 
experience what so ever. I needed experience so I applied to different companies during 
my second year of university, and I got accepted to work for ‘Global Construction’ for 
three months on a big project. I worked there and I thought site life is fantastic... I 
thought I really enjoy it because the crack on site is brilliant. So I enquired about 
building surveying and whether building surveyors go onto site like that, and no they 
don’t. So I changed onto quantity surveying.
64
As mentioned above by Mr Jaggers, quantity surveyors’ concerns were numbers and 
legality, rather than quality or organisation, and thus issues of costs and quality tend 
to diverge detrimentally from one another during a build (see below). There were also 
problems apart from the division of roles, particularly in relation to the partnering 
ethos, and this was the work-culture of the quantity surveyors outlined above. Like 
the culture of builders in general, the quantity surveyors did not like to be pushed 
around or told what to do (see chapters 6 and 8), and 3 out of 4 of them told me that 
part of what they enjoyed about the job was ‘getting one over’ on the opposing 
parties:
There’s a sense of fulfilment involved. I know it’s a bit stupid, very childish, but 
sometimes when you’ve got one over on like, say on Herbert or whatever, and you 
know and you have to keep your mouth shut. You lead them to believe that they’re the 
big boys but really you know the background. When you know the value is not as great 
as what they’re actually estimating it, so your not only getting a few quid [pounds] 
extra on what you’re saving, but you’re also getting overheads and profits on top of that 
as well, so it’s competing like that. (Bobby)
It’s good fun arguing even if you don’t know what you’re arguing about. Just the fact, 
just trying to beat them down, probably like Herbert does to a point with us, but he 
doesn’t know what he’s doing. But it’s good fun agreeing an account when you know 
you’ve screwed someone, but as long both parties are happy, then great. (Kevin)
‘Screwing someone’ or ‘getting one over’ did not sit comfortably with a partnering 
ethos. Bennett (2000), arguing about the effectiveness of partnering, adopts the 
conceptual model of Axelrod’s (1984) ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, illustrating that even if a 
single party competes and everyone else co-operates, the net gains of co-operation 
break down. In these situations, only the competing party gains and then only in the 
short-term. For all parties to benefit, co-operation is crucial, otherwise the whole 
system breaks down. ‘Getting one over’ was embedded in the culture of the 
surveyors, thereby disintegrating the effectiveness of partnering. The quantity 
surveyors also actively concealed information from the client parties rather than 
working in a climate of openness where information could flow freely. Bobby for 
example, would be on the lookout for the impending entry of Mr Jaggers or Herbert 
into the office. Upon their entry he would quickly close the account spreadsheets on 
his computer. In addition, when the project manager allowed me to look through the 
pricing schedules, I was strictly instructed to keep the documents under close guard, 
out of sight of the consultants.
Barlow et al argue that for partnering to be effective ‘each party has to have a 
genuine belief in the integrity of the other side’ (1997: 13), and, be ‘required to
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acknowledge their mistakes and readily take responsibility’ (1997: 14). The actions of 
both Topbuild and the consultants did little to promote belief in one another’s 
integrity or demonstrate a willingness to acknowledge their mistakes.
In addition to being the ‘money-men’, quantity surveyors also functioned as the eyes 
of those further up the management hierarchy; as a link in the ‘adhocracy’. 
Information concerning the build was accounted for by a mass of form filling carried 
out by the site managers, but, Kevin regularly met with Mr Drear, Topbuild’s 
contract’s director, to discuss the economic performance of the works under his 
jurisdiction. Kevin’s gaze, then, supplemented the paper accounting methods that 
monitored goings-on on the site (see below). This was important because paper 
accounting methods could always be fabricated. Woodward and Woodward (2001) 
reveal Kevin’s importance in this respect, in their own case study of the underhand 
practices of a project manager. The manager fixed the accounting and shielded his 
incompetence from higher management for many months, resulting in project failure 
and profit loss. At Keyworker House, the salience of Kevin’s observational role was 
also reflected in the many comments of the builders that, ‘Kevin is never off duty, 
even in the pub he don’t stop work’.
Site Managers and ‘Arse-Covering'
Site managers predominately rise through the ranks of tradesmen, most commonly 
carpenters. Carpenters are particularly suited to construction management because 
they traditionally work on all phases of a build from inception to completion. This is 
known as first and second fixing and finishing work. Steve, the project manager, was 
formerly a carpenter, and his position at Topbuild could be viewed as one similar to 
that of a regimental sergeant major, and his site managers as warrant officers. 
Tradesmen climb to these ranks but rarely rise above them into the ‘commissioned’ 
middle-class world of surveyors.
Site managers were the non-commissioned officers at the forefront of the build 
and their concern was work organisation. For example, health and safety had to be 
accounted for, and Topbuild employed a visiting health and safety officer, Mr Smith. 
Out on site, all the tradesmen and labourers would know of his impending arrival 
because the foremen would come onto the site, hand out hard hats, and make sure that 
everyone was wearing safety boots. Mr Smith rarely inspected the actual building site
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itself, preferring to visit the site office to make sure the project manager had
performed the necessary health and safety accounting duties. Steve once joked that he
would put a cork on the end of Mr Smith’s fork for his own safety at the Topbuild
management Christmas meal (see also fig. 8.1)
Health and safety duties included inducting workers to the formal site
regulations and putting up notices of risks in the workers’ canteens, such as where the
first aid was kept, or to be beware of rodents and repetitive strain injury. They also
necessitated regular scaffold and plant inspections, and Mr Smith generally oversaw
the project manager’s brief in relation to the mass of new health and safety regulations
that regularly flooded in. Health and safety requirements had to be documented so that
if a serious accident occurred (which fortunately did not happen during the time of my
participation) Topbuild would be covered against prosecution. This kind of
accounting was termed ‘arse-covering’ by the project and site managers, and
bureaucratic ‘arse-covering’ subsumed their working days. This was reflected by the
multitude of paper and filing cabinets that enveloped the site office.
Not all arse-covering concerned health and safety regulations. Much of the
managers’ files and paper concerned ‘requests for information’ (RFI’s) to specify the
finer detail of how the client wanted parts of the work to be carried out. For instance,
they specified the type, colour and number of coats of paint that were to be applied to
interior walls. Often the consultants were unsure about the exact way they wanted the
walls painted, and would debate and argue this with the contractor, who further
debated the matter with the subcontractors because building work can always be done
using different methods. An example was an informal meeting that ignited in the
doorway of the site office:
The mechanical and electrical consultant and foreman were debating with Mr Jaggers 
which would be the optimum type of light to fit into the shower rooms. Bill, the 
mechanical and electrical foreman, wanted one type because these did not draw too 
much power from the fragile main electricity supply, but Mr Jaggers was concerned 
about the quality of the light emitted from them. Steve, the project manager, was saying 
that the brighter lights were too expensive, but Norman, the mechanical and electrical 
consultant, said that bulbs for the weaker light would need to be replaced more 
frequently. Steve went off to get a sample of one of the light types, to see how the bulbs 
were to be replaced. He then called the maintenance man, Mike Fixit, to show him how 
to replace the bulbs. Mike said that these would be very time consuming to replace, and 
argued for another type to be used. The debate continued in this vein for more than two 
hours. (Field-notes)
The changing of a light bulb is proverbially simple. Much of the build was more 
complex than this, and thus agreement increasingly difficult. The informal meeting
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illustrated that the different parties did come together to discuss and negotiate 
problems, as is suggested by partnering principles. This has probably always occurred 
in building; a site manager could never have wide enough knowledge of all the 
separate trades’ skills because they are too vast, disparate and complex for a single 
person to comprehend (see chapter 4).
Project and site managers are forced to consult with subcontractors and 
foremen through their own lack of knowledge arising from the complex division of 
labour between the building trades. The subsequent solutions to building complexities 
were the outcome of varied interests and power play. However, it was Mr Jaggers 
who held ultimate power because he was the client’s representative and it was the 
client who paid. Nevertheless, even after negotiation and solution, tradesmen had the 
organisational space in which to go out and do the work the way that they wanted (see 
below and chapter 6).
The files also concerned ‘conformation of instructions’ (COI’s). COI’s 
confirmed how the consultant wanted something done so that the project manager 
would be covered against future claims that he had not orchestrated the work as 
instructed. It was a common occurrence for Mr Jaggers or Herbert to barge into the 
site office to say that a particular piece of work had not been carried out as agreed. 
The project manager would then try to counteract such claims by pulling the files out 
and searching for the RFI’s and COI’s.
The exact specifications of the works were quite foggy and altered by the
client during the process. Consequently, instructions for the works were continually
altered. In a partnership, alteration of instructions would simply need to be agreed
upon and carried out, but because of the lack of trust between the parties, all new
instructions required agreement in writing. If this did not occur, arguments over
payments proliferated and, when negotiations over new and altered instructions
transpired, the warring parties would hunt down written instructions to substantiate
their case. Paul, one o f the site mangers, spoke about his ‘arse-covering’ duties:
It seems to be over-complicated, and it needs to be over-complicated because of the 
incompetences of the people that are involved in it. All day I find myself putting paper 
into files. It gives me the opportunity of each time when something hasn’t happened or 
somebody bollocks [reprimands] me, I just get the thing out the file and say well the 
reason I didn’t do it is that fucking wanker didn’t do it. And that’s what I do all the 
time, you’ve got to do that. Not to be negative about it, but covering your own arse, it 
saves that embarrassment... I try to make it as specific as I possibly can, and you know, 
if it goes pear-shaped and they’re looking for somebody’s head to put on the block, you 
just gotta try to make sure it’s not yours. So it’s arse-covering to a certain extent
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John, the junior site manager at Keyworker House 3, echoed this:
There’s so much paper it’s like a rain forest in here... It’s all to do with money at the 
end of the day. If something goes wrong, if someone comes back and says ‘what’s 
happening with this’, open the file up, there it is, this is what happened, this is where it 
happened, this is how it happened. It’s all arse covering really.
Bureaucracy and Efficiency
Gouldner (1954) argued that bureaucracy is not applied to organisations merely to 
improve efficiency as Weber maintained, but to regulate conflicts of interest. 
Gouldner found that where it was difficult to get people to do things in the interests of 
the organisation, bureaucratic methods were implemented if  all parties could see their 
benefits, or alternatively, if one party had little power to resist the imposition. RFIs 
and COIs followed this pattern: both client and contractor saw the benefits of formal 
bureaucratic process because it protected both parties through a tight specification of 
tasks. However, Gouldner also showed that bureaucracy had a tendency to extract 
only the smallest amount of effort from its incumbents and no more: ‘the rules were 
serviceable because they created something that could be given up as well as given 
use’ (1954: 174. Italics original). This was the case with COIs and RFIs, whereby the 
contractor undertook the works only to the minimum specification outlined in the 
instructions and no more; a kind of bureaucratic work to rule. ‘Enabling bureaucracy’ 
therefore, did not increase efficiency as Weber, or later advocates Adler and Borys 
(1996), maintain3. In fact it severely hindered the principles of lean production, 
blameless culture and pursuit of quality.
The alteration of instructions was not always due to lack of knowledge or
foresight, but was thrown up by outside parties - third parties - frequently as a result
of government legislation. It was what Mr. Jaggers described as ‘fire-fighting’:
On a scheme like this in a number of ways it’s fire-fighting because we have to respond 
to situations. So to give you an example, if we take the showers. The existing baths that 
were here were in an appalling state, and in fact, in my view they were environmentally 
unsafe. So that if an Environmental Health officer came along and if he looked at the 
bathrooms, his reaction would be they are not to be used and you are to replace them 
all. So that’s one side of the issue, and the other side of the issue is that when you 
canvass tenants to their views, on what they want. Because ultimately that’s here, we’re 
providing a service to the tenants, they’re the end users, they’re paying for it. And they
3 Adler and Borys (1996), in critique o f Gouldner, term these types o f formalisation ‘enabling bureaucracy’. They 
view these methods positively because they enable innovation whilst at the same time monitoring it. However it 
was seen in practice at Keyworker House that the parties used formal methods to do work only to the minimum 
requirement. In this specific case therefore, enabling bureaucracy cannot be viewed as having the positive 
outcomes that Adler and Borys maintain.
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don’t want baths, they want showers. So we say right, what we’ll do is we’ll put 
showers in. Then Environmental Health come back and say, ‘well hang about a 
moment, we got standards you got to work to, and it doesn’t allow you to put showers 
in’. So we say hang on a moment, everyone wants showers, and they say ‘I’ll tell you 
what’, after a long period of discussion and negotiation, ‘we’ll do a deal with you. You 
can have 50 percent baths and 50 percent showers’. Now, we have to respond to that, 
that’s fire-fighting because then we go back to Topbuild and say look, we thought you 
were gonna do 100 percent showers but you’re not, you’re gonna do 50 percent 
showers. And it’s very difficult to legislate, yes, knowing what they are doing. Now, 
that’s how we have to respond. It’s third party intervention that affects that 
relationship. And it’s maybe the case that Topbuild think every time we change 
something that we’re doing it for the sake of it, but it’s not, in the majority of cases it’s 
responding to events.
To confound regulatory problems and endemic arse-covering, there were also many 
residents of Keyworker House who continued to use and live in the building 
throughout the works. In this sense, the product of an old build is specifically 
problematic because it is being produced and consumed simultaneously.
The key workers and other users had to live and work on a building site for 65 
weeks. Their privacy was invaded by electricians and plumbers entering their rooms, 
and carpenters and by painters walking around the scaffold outside the windows of 
their bedrooms, bathrooms and toilets. In effect, they were surrounded by builders and 
building work both inside and out. The difficulties were further amplified because the 
key workers worked shifts, and consequently would be trying to sleep during the day 
when the builders were working. And, building work is often very noisy. Out on the 
scaffold the hum of masons’ generators, labourers’ pneumatics, and carpenters’ drills, 
saws and hammers, echoed through the building and, in this noise, the builders had to 
shout to find and communicate with one another. In addition, the vast majority of key 
workers were also women. There were numerous complaints about the language and 
actions of the builders that management had to deal with.
Most of the conflicts manifest in the site office rarely filtered down to those j
who were actually making the product, the tradesmen and labourers. Notices were I
f
placed on the scaffold specifying: ‘No shouting, No smoking, No mobile phones, No /
swearing’. This was as much as the tradesmen and labourers saw of the intricate I .
negotiations between the parties, and nobody took much notice of the rules and orders 
anyway (see chapters 6 and 7). To a builder, the scaffold is his workplace, and it was 
exceptionally difficult to view it as attached to someone’s home. It was even more 
difficult not to swear if  one trapped his fingers in a poorly weighted old sash window, 
got a splinter in his hand, or banged his knee on a scaffold bolt. Many such actions
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were distasteful to some key workers, and only a very small percentage needed to 
complain to make it seem like all were against the builders. This could and did 
occasionally generate negative attitudes and conflict between the builders and some 
key workers.
The builders’ lack of adherence to the managers’ rules reflected in part the 
lack of control that managers had over tradesmen (the situation of labourers was 
slightly different, see chapter 6). The site-manager’s job in relation to the workers was 
not really one of control therefore, but of orchestration. Project and site managers 
organised bodies in space and time; they did not organise the movements of those 
bodies. Managers organised the flow of the work in time because of construction’s 
sequential and interdependent nature, but they did not control the build or the builders 
(see chapters 6 and 7).
Friends or Strangers?
In a quality circle, such as in a Japanese car plant, all workers are provided with the 
opportunity to discuss problems in the production sequence, and enabled to rectify 
any faults before they begin to occur in future production. At Keyworker House, the 
spatial, cultural, and interest divisions between the separate trades and parties were so 
vast that one trade never really knew what another was doing or where they were 
situated in space. The mere existence of a management hierarchy actually confounded 
problems of co-ordination. If there was no hierarchy, the trades would be forced to 
communicate with one another to ascertain where each other’s work was leading in 
the sequence. However, in working for a general contractor, it was seen as the 
contractor’s responsibility to co-ordinate the build, and, consequently, the site 
managers were relied upon to do this. Management hierarchies can therefore prevent 
co-ordination, no matter what kind of organisational logic they are operating under. 
The trades remained independent, divided and sometimes with conflicting aims.
There were mixed responses from the site management and consultants as to 
whether or not the partnering agreement had been successful. Illustrative of the 
problems, Mr Jaggers said, ‘I think if this job had been run on a traditional basis we’d 
probably end up in court. That’s how bad it is [in the building industry]’. It was telling 
all the parties termed the agreement a partnering ‘contract’, but the essence of a 
partnering agreement is that there is no contract. Its whole ethos was lost to some
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extent. To the parties it meant an open(ish) book, a long run of work, and a 
contingency fund. It did not mean being partners on a quest for lean production.
It makes sense to integrate separate parties and trades into the organisation of a build 
and there is ample evidence to verify its effectiveness (See Bennett, 2000). Foster 
(1969) utilised trade integration with some success in his small building firm in the 
late 1950s. He termed his method ‘circular management’, which was the forerunner of 
Japanese style quality circles, total quality management, and partnering systems. 
Foster however, directly employed his foremen and tradesmen, and consequently, did 
not face the same trade divisions as those at Keyworker House.
At Keyworker House it was the long-term nature of the agreement that had 
been effective. The work moved from one building to the next and became 
increasingly predictable to undertake. The contractor and subcontractors had a better 
knowledge of what the follow-on works would involve when they finished each phase 
of the work. This was also the case for the tradesmen, whose knowledge evolved as 
each part of their work was completed. For instance, as a painter, my work to the sash 
windows became faster and faster with each phase of the decoration process; once a 
course of windows was completed I could see how to get around the problems that 
emerged when I worked on the next course (see chapter 7). It tends to make sense 
therefore to contract workers and parties who are long-term and, long-termism can 
also prevent price under-cutting and the related poor quality work. Long-termism was 
implicit in the setting up of DLOs of the past, where there could be no conflict of 
interests because the contractor and client were the same party.
State-Work Paradox
A paradox has arisen in the organisation of State-commissioned building work. To 
make works cheaper, more efficient, less risky, and less corrupt than existing direct 
labour systems, the Thatcher government introduced competitive tendering and 
contracting-out. A decade after its introduction, the Conservatives and their task 
forces concluded the new arrangement had led to an adversarial and litigious culture 
with poor quality work and time over-runs. Research suggested that the way around 
the problems was to decrease competition and introduce longer-term relationships. 
Competitive free markets were essentially transformed back to non-competitive 
cartel-type organisations (see chapter 9), and a new variant of direct labour evolved in
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the form of partnering agreements. This was not analogous to direct labour because 
the workers (excluding the site management and surveyors) would all be technically 
self-employed, and therefore, receive almost no working rights at all. Furthermore, an 
expensive and essentially non-productive layer of bureaucrats and middlemen 
(consultants, higher contractor management and subcontractors) was introduced into 
construction organisation. And, the manual workers, although remaining self- 
employed, became long-term.
Many of the manual workers at Keyworker House had worked for the same 
subcontractors for a very long duration, for up to 25 years, and the subcontractors 
worked with Topbuild for similar lengths of time. This type of organisation was 
comparable to Eccles’ (1981b) ‘quasifirm’ which he claimed was almost universal in 
the building industry (see chapter 9). Furthermore, because building workers were 
relatively independent of management control, they possessed an autonomous 
workplace power that enabled them to disregard managerial directions. It was this that 
partly supplied the negative image of direct employment as unproductive in the first 
place, but it was the same worker power that re-emerged on site at Keyworker House, 
and explained why the build was described by the workers as a ‘holiday camp’ (see 
chapter 6). It appeared that Government policies had turned almost full circle.
Despite the lack of trust and co-operation between Assured Consultants and Topbuild, 
the partnering agreement had borne benefits to some of the parties. Opportune 
Housing, Assured Consultants and Topbuild were all profiting from the arrangement. 
The second phase of the build was not put out to tender because the works formed a 
continuation of the partnering agreement. Steve told me that Topbuild would have 
never procured the second phase in a competitive tender because they now knew 
many of the hidden costs involved in the build. Their accumulated knowledge and 
experience meant that the second phase would be done more quickly, effectively, and 
for a larger profit for Topbuild. Kevin priced the next ‘Year 2’ works with a 15-20 
percent profit margin, significantly higher than the usual 1-2 percent on most large 
building projects (Bresnan, 1990). Assured Consultants also benefited because they 
would continue to consult throughout the Year 2 works. However, the arrangement 
bore negative benefits for the key workers because the PFI and the partnering 
agreement was accompanied by layers and layers of management and middlemen who 
extracted a percentage of their rent money, which was of course, public taxation.
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Similarly, the tradesmen and labourers lost out because they forfeited almost all of 
their employment rights through the subcontract system.
In the next chapter I focus on subcontractors and their relationships with their manual 
worker employees. These relationships had a significant impact on the build, on the 
builders’ lives, and were central to the ethnically bound trade divisions present at the 
Keyworker House build.
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Chapter 4
Subcontracting and Trade Enclaves
Chapter 3 described the relationships and organisation of the interdependent but 
disparate parties involved in the build. This chapter extends that analysis by focusing 
on the emergence and composition of the subcontract system. The tradesmen and 
labourers who physically constructed the build were not employed directly by 
Topbuild, but via their subcontract trade representatives, which had a salient impact 
on employment patterns present at Keyworker House.
The ‘Subby’
Topbuild was a knowledge broker. Akin to other general contractors they did not 
directly build anything nor own any means of production. They provided the 
management resources, co-ordination and regulatory knowledge to construct 
buildings. They owned computers, methods of administration and managers, they did 
not own men or machinery. Topbuild were a ‘hollowed out’ contracting company 
(Harvey, 2003) where machinery, human skill and labour were contracted-in by trade 
specific subcontractors.
Emergence and Function
General contractors compete and undercut one another to win contracts. This results 
in shrinking profit margins, which are an inherently risky enterprise because of the 
uncertainties involved in building work (see chapter 1). To reduce risks, contractors 
hand out smaller trade-specific parts of the works to subcontractors. Subcontractors, 
who originally evolved from the ranks of entrepreneurial master craftsmen, bid for 
their sections of the works, thereby taking on part of the risk of the total costs of the 
construction. To reduce their own risks, subcontractors commonly undertake work for 
more than one building company, and charge approximately 50 percent extra on top 
of their total wage costs1. Eccles (1981a) argues that widespread subcontracting in the 
building industry is a response to inherent uncertainty, and, the more complex the 
build, the more contractors rely on subcontractors.
11 Calculated by comparing subcontractor invoices for daily wage rates to the actual wages paid to the builders. I 
did not have the necessary skills to calculate subcontractors’ profits on lump sum works.
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Trade specialisation and divisions of building labour disperse construction
knowledge into many separate trade groups. As a result, general contractors require
trade-based subcontractors to conduct the specialist and disparate parts of the build for
them. Shane, the project manager, reflected on this:
You have to deal with I don’t know how many different trades, and you either know a 
little bit about all the trades or a lot about a few of them. So you rely on them 
[tradesmen and subcontractors] to do their jobs properly, which is the uncertain, the 
unknown, which I don’t like. Not that I could ever know every single trade inside out 
so that I knew when I was getting the wool pulled over, or it wasn’t being done 
correctly... If you could get a good knowledge in every trade then I would be quite 
happy, but you can’t, you have to rely on people. That’s the one thing I don’t like about 
my job. Some people expect you, being the site manager, to know what the fuck you’re 
talking about, but you can’t personally know everything. But I suppose having the 
carpentry background helps, that’s a general knowledge, a lot of everything [in 
building] stems from it.
Subcontractors also form links between contractor and worker. They band together 
tradesmen or labour for the contractor and find work for tradesman. They require a 
thorough understanding of their trade so they are able to estimate the costs of works, 
and competitively tender for them, and, in this sense, they are also knowledge 
brokers. The business acumen subcontractors must possess differs from the skill of 
the archaic guild-masters whose positions and standings were predicated on building 
ability rather than entrepreneurship (see chapter 1).
Proliferation and Specialisation
Although subcontractors grew from the building guilds, there are today many more 
trade specialisations than existed in the past. New technologies and building services 
necessitated the development of new trades, for example, the electrician or the steel 
erector. Also, increasing complexity and specialisation fractured building tasks. For 
instance, the development of new roofing technologies and materials drove part of the 
plumbers’ work of keeping water out of a built structure to the roofer, and plumbers 
came to specialise in fitting and fixing piping. Regulatory measures also facilitated 
the development of new trades, such as asbestos removal experts, water purification 
contractors, or fire alarm specialists. In addition, building often requires the use of 
large or expensive machinery, such as earthmovers and diggers, motor-powered 
cranes or scaffolding. Contractors require this equipment infrequently and thus 
subcontractors specialise in supplying it.
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At Keyworker House there were 29 different subcontractors employed on 
various parts of the build, more than double the number of medieval building guilds. 
Topbuild employed specialist subcontractors for every aspect of the works: drilling, 
brick cleaning, pest prevention, roofing, tree cutting, vinyl-floor and carpet laying, 
mastic application, fire alarm installation, water purification, drainage, and lift 
maintenance. They also subcontracted the more traditional specialisations: tiling, 
plumbing, electrics, carpentry, joinery, masonry, ground-work, labouring, painting, 
plastering, scaffolding, iron mongery, welding, and glazing. A different subcontractor 
represented each separate specialisation. In some cases there were long chains of 
subcontractors between the working tradesman and the organising contractor. For 
example, the ‘sand-blaster-brick-cleaner-man’ (‘Blaster bloke’) was subcontracted by 
his boss/work mate, who in turn subcontracted to a steam-cleaning company, that 
subcontracted to the main masonry subcontractor, that subcontracted to Topbuild, that 
contracted to the housing association, that were contracted to the government 
department. Only 2 men did the brick cleaning, but 5 layers of middlemen ‘managed’ 
their work. It can be no wonder that builders often try their hand at entrepreneurial 
subcontracting in order to cut-out the long lines of middlemen that stand between 
them and their wages.
Becoming a subcontractor, employing others and supplying labour, was
contingent upon having or creating sufficient networks to find labour, possessing the
capital to pay that labour, having the business acumen and skills to estimate and plan
works, and upon finding the necessary knowledge concerning potential contracts to
tender for. Subcontracting is a risky business. The unpredictability of building work
hinders the formation of accurate estimations of the costs of works, and when building
contractors go bankrupt, it is unlikely that their subcontractors will be paid. The
biography of Coat’s Decoration highlighted the risky and entrepreneurial nature of
subcontracting, as Ernie Coat explained:
When I started decorating I worked on the tools for about 7 years. I thought to myself, 
well, you know, because I’ve been a person, always had a business of my own 
[previous to being a building subcontractor, Emie owned a motor mechanics garage].
So I decided this is not the right thing to be doing. I should be picking up the work 
myself. So I started doing small jobs, basically advertising in the local paper and going 
from there. Then I got into contractual work, as I now still do. Now I do no private 
work at all, I only do large contract work because people wanting their houses done 
want them done to a high standard but they’re not prepared to pay the money. So I 
thought to myself, this is not the way to go, we’ll go elsewhere, different way from the 
rest. I went into this and I’m still here.
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DT: How did you make the step into working with big contractors?
Basically because I done a job for a contracts manager, unknowingly he was a contracts 
manager at that time, and, he just offered me would I price a job up for the company he 
was working with, and in actual fact it was Topbuild. I priced the job up for them and I 
won it. So it was a matter of being in the right place at the right time... It was a lump­
sum price so it didn’t cause me a problem about pricing it. But once I got into it I found 
that I needed to sort of get the surveying side of it so that the contractor’s surveyors 
wouldn’t be able to pull the wool over my eyes. So then I went into that. I didn’t get 
any qualifications for it, I just went to night school and picked it up, really it’s self- 
explanatory in any case, measuring the work. Once you know the remit, what to 
measure, and the way to measure, it’s basic common sense... I’ve been working with 
Topbuild I suppose 30 years. I’ve done a lot of work for them, some good, some bad. 
You always get a job that you’re going to lose money on, because you either make a 
mistake on the lump-sum price or things have just gone wrong. That’s just what I term 
as a swings and roundabouts situation. Somewhere along the line you’re going to make 
a mistake on pricing the job. You’ve just got to grin and bear it, and think to yourself 
well, I won’t do that again. You learn by your mistakes basically, and I think all 
companies are the same. I should imagine even Topbuild will make a mistake in 
pricing, in fact I know they do because I’ve been on some of the jobs where they have 
made mistakes on prices. But yes, I do a lot of work for Topbuild, plus other companies 
obviously, I do a lot of work for [3 other construction companies], but I don’t work for 
other companies who are no longer in business, they’ve just wound up.
DT: Have you ever had any problems like that in the sense that they go bust and don’t 
pay you?
Oh yes. I’ve had 4 companies go broke on me, McBuild being the worst. He done me 
for £75,000. But again you’ve either got to bury your head in the sand or just pick 
yourself up and get on with it. Because obviously it wiped out a lot of my money, 
basically that’s a lot of money. But again it’s a lesson I learned, and I will not allow a 
company to go too far in debt to me. I’ll only let a certain time pass and then I’ll start 
shouting. If nothing comes through, then I stop the work. But I pride myself with the 
fact that I’ve never ever not paid any of my blokes [employees]. The site I was on when 
McBuild went broke, the blokes all got paid. There’s no reason why they should lose, 
they were working for me and I paid them, I was the one who suffered... Several 
people [subcontractors] I know have gone broke through companies going bust on 
them, and it’s left them in such a situation where they can’t pay [their employees] 
because they haven’t got the money. One close friend of mine, he lost everything he 
had through a company going broke on him... It was so much pity. And this is why 
some of the laws are wrong in this country. McBuild who went broke on me, it didn’t 
harm him Mr McBuild himself. He still lives in a massive great big house in Maida 
Vale, he’s still driving about in a big flash car, and he’s got £75,000 of my money! 
They should be responsible for their debts, but they’re not, because they’re a limited 
company they’re not responsible... No, I didn’t even get a penny in the pound.
DT: Does that worry you in your day-to-day life that it’s possible you could go under?
Well no, I never put myself, hopefully, touching wood, saying it, I don’t put myself in 
the position where if a company went broke on me I wouldn’t be able to fund that 
break. I got caught very badly with McBuild and I would never allow any payments to 
go up that high again. I won’t do that now. I mean with Topbuild, I will not allow 
payments all to be at the same time. And if they won’t accept that, then I don’t do the
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job. Payments will be when I want the payments to be, not when they want them to 
be...
Flexibility and Specialisation
Piore and Sabel (1984) argued that a new form of industrialisation was emerging in 
intense capitalist societies in the early 1980s, associated with the decline of mass- 
markets and the rise of individualised consumption. In response to changing 
markets, small adaptable companies were emerging, organised to be flexible 
enough to cope with the demands of heterogeneous product markets. Piore and 
Sabel viewed this as a positive process that would break down monopolies and 
enrich work tasks. Workers would be re-skilled, undertaking varied tasks in small 
‘high-tech’ cottage industries such as Silicon Valley or ‘Third Italy’, in North 
America and Europe respectively.
Debates circulated in the sociology of work as to whether an era of ‘post- 
Fordism’ had arrived, and if it had, whether or not it would enrich the labour 
process. Portes et al (1989) argued that flexible market demands were met by a 
global expansion in small-batch subcontracting. The subcontract system provided 
flexibility to main contractors because individual workers, mostly under the control 
of piecework, could alter small parts of the task under little instruction or 
reorganisation from employers. The labour force had become flexible because 
workers in the subcontract system possessed few working rites and were easily 
disposable (See also Hyman and Streek, 1989).
t V »  tSince their inception in the late 18 century (Cooney, 1955) building 
contractors were ‘flexible specialists’. All built structures have similar but different 
physical configurations. They are a variation on a theme (LeCorbusier, [1923] 
1987), much like the plethora of products made for mass consumption (Adomo and 
Horkheimer, 1972; Pollert, 1991; Ritzer, 1996). Building contractors tend to 
concentrate on specific types of building works, like infrastructure or housing. In 
this sense, they specialise, but they must also maintain flexibility because of the 
variable, or ‘one-off, character of their product (Bresnan, 1990). As a result, 
general contractors utilised the services of subcontractors. Subcontracting provides 
contractors with large numbers of labour at short notice and, because subcontracted 
building employees are almost completely casualised and posses very few 
employment rights, labour can be dismissed instantly when the work is completed.
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The extreme competition and market volatility characteristic of the building 
industry facilitates reliance upon subcontracting. If a building contractor is unable to 
procure new projects they can instantly ‘down-size’ or ‘up-size’ because they possess 
little machinery, industrial space or directly employed workers to pay for. 
Subcontracting provides large numbers of labour at short notice, and because there are 
few employment rights granted to subcontracted employees, labour can be dismissed 
instantly when the work is completed. However, whilst subcontracting may be a type 
of work organisation adapted to deal with variable product markets, it is not the only 
organisational type suitable. The guilds, and the countless other artisans in the 
medieval period, produced ‘one-off products for hundreds of years. In this sense, 
subcontracting and ‘post-Fordism’ are pre-Fordist; a reaction of employers to volatile 
markets and labour movement power. As Hyman and Streek (1988) maintain, sub­
contracting and peripheralism is the norm in the service sector, another casual, non­
unionised industry where workers posses little collective power, similar in this sense, 
to the building industry.
Subcontracting and Ethnic Diversity
The building industry has a long history of migrant labour. This is illustrated by the 
Old French origins of the contemporary English names for many building tools and 
techniques. Terms including: bucket, mallet, trowel, mitre, scaffold, pulley, fitch, 
emery and chisel, emanated from Norman tradesmen who lived and worked in many 
of Britain’s major cities from the 12th century onwards. They originally worked on 
the prestigious buildings of the conquering aristocracy but their influence spread into 
British guilds and building trades in general. 350 years later, Coleman (1965) 
describes how the crews of navvies who built the Paris railways in the 1840’s, 
between them spoke 13 different European languages, and they were reported to have 
developed a lingua franca that was spoken on railway works throughout Europe. 
When they built the British railways, the navvies would necessarily ‘pitch-in’ 
together, but they were also fiercely internally divided by region and religion, where 
Irish Catholics were subjected to quite severe ill-treatment (Coleman, 1965).
At Keyworker House, the different trade groups were also divided by religion 
and race. An extraordinarily diverse group of men worked on the build. Their ages 
ranged from 16 to 69; their religious affiliations included various denominations of 
Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity. I met men from Albania, the Seychelles, the
Caribbean; various parts of India, Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Russia, Hungary, 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Spain, Southern and Northern Ireland, Scotland and various areas of 
England. London has a long migrant history (see Holmes, 1988; Hobbs, 1988; 
Bowling, 1999), and consequently so do its builders. The building industry, in 
London is multicultural, and has long been a first stopping point for migrant groups. It 
is the physical body that is the essential ingredient to build something, not culture, 
personality or language (see chapter 5). From my own anecdotal experience working 
on building sites in London I find it extraordinary that official statistics show ethnic 
groups representing only 2.3 percent of total construction workforce in England and 
Wales (CITB, 2000)2. At Keyworker House, white English tradesmen were a 
minority, albeit a large one.
Geography, Division and Ethnicity
Sequentialism and trade specialisation necessitates building work divisions because 
the different trades do not and cannot work side by side (see chapter 1). At Keyworker 
House, physical and organisational work divisions were reinforced by and interlaced 
with cultural and racial divisions.
Interaction on building sites is commonly quite perfunctory and superficial, 
following the conventions of masculine-saturated talk, humorous comment or football 
team jibe (see chapters 7 and 8). The separate trades rarely stopped work to discuss 
religious, political or emotional matters because such discussions could be risky, 
facilitating conflict and piss-taking between the plural cultures and races (see chapters 
8 and 9). Friendships were drawn from within the trades and not between them: the 
carpenters were friends with the carpenters, the painters with the painters, the 
labourers with the labourers etc. Although the 5 main groups worked on the site for 
the majority of the build’s duration, and men of different trades were familiar with 
one another from transient and fleeting contact over the years, they were socially and 
physically divided. Their work took place in separate spaces, as did their rest breaks 
and out of work socialising. Many had worked for the same subcontractors for many 
years, consequently members of the separate trades were familiar with one another
2 1 was unable to find ethic minority statistics for London’s building industry but in consideration that the 2001 
Census showed that 29.9 percent o f all Londoners were non-English, it can be assumed they form a higher 
percentage o f London’s builders than national statistics indicate.
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but did not associate to a very large extent, although there was a certain amount of 
integration between the site management and the labourers (see chapter 6).
Fig. 4.0: Map to Illustrate Geographic Distribution of Trade Neighbourhoods3
Decorators (Irish &  English) 
Carpenters (Indian Hindu) 
Management (English Protestant) 
Labourers (Irish Catholic) 
Keyworker House
Subcontract Trade Groups
Fig. 2:1 illustrates how each of the trades, with the exception of mechanical and 
electrical, represented culturally and geographically divided and enclaved groups. At 
first sight this appeared unusual but similar patters have been found in other 
workplaces (particularly in North America, see Franklin, 1936; Zaretsky, 1984). The 
socio-geographical patterns were the result of what Jamin, the carpentry and general 
foreman, described as ‘everyone getting their mate’s jobs’, and reflected sociologists’ 
descriptions of the patterning of informal social networks (c.f. Granovetter, 1974). I 
will discuss social networks more fully below, but first I provide a concise description 
of the composition of each of the main subcontract groups.
3 The numbers o f points on the map are deliberately ambiguous. This is because I was unsure how many men each 
subcontractor employed. I overheard talk about various employees whom the builders had seen in their local pubs, 
streets and homes concerning those that had worked for Topbuild’s subcontractors and those that were retired or 
sick.
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McMurray’s Labour
The labour subcontractor, Paddy McMurray, was in his late 60s and had, with 
masses of other Irishmen and women, migrated from the rural south of his country 
during the severe downturn in the Irish economy in the 1950s. The majority of 
McMurray’s employees followed a similar path; migrating from impoverished 
rural Ireland to industrial England in a time of the large rebuilding projects in 
English cities following World War Two. The 1961 Census revealed almost 1 
million Irish living in Great Britain (Homes, 1988). Some had left Ireland through 
lack of employment resulting from the mechanisation of farming, others through 
over-population and rent rises on their family smallholdings, others because of 
complicated patterns of inheritance, and others to escape religious conservatism.
tViThey followed a migratory trend that had begun in the early 19 century when 
large numbers4 of Irish labourers settled in industrialising English and Scottish 
cities to labour manually on the canals, railways, factories, docks, and the building 
projects of the industrial revolution (Davis, 2000). The 1951 Census indicates that 
one third of all Irish migrants in England and Wales had settled in London.
Jokes abounded at Topbuild that Paddy McMurray did not employ men under 
65 years of age. The jokes only partly reflected reality because he also employed a 
second wave of late 20th century migrants who had left Ireland during the 1980 
recession. Over 50 percent of Irish migrant men find themselves working in the 
building industry (Haplin, 2000). The bodily labour involved in working in 
agriculture in Ireland was easily transferable to semi-skilled building work in urban 
areas in Britain. The Irish are famed in British discourse for their physical strength. 
However, they were both historically and contemporarily subject to derogatory racism 
concerning their mental skills, and many experienced very tough working lives.
In addition to the Irish migrants employed by McMurray’s there were a 
number of second generation Irish. All except one had links to Paddy McMurray 
through their fathers whom had worked as ground-workers. Aidan was one such 
example. His father grew up in the same village as Paddy McMurray and had later 
worked for him as a ‘tea boy’ until he was 71 years old. This reflected 
MacAmhlaigh’s (1961) labouring experiences, who suggests that during the 1950s
4 In the 1841 Census there were almost 300,000 Irish recorded as living in England and Wales, 1.8 percent o f  the 
total population (Holmes, 1988). Yet because o f the open boarders between Ireland and England there were 
probably many more Irish in England but not registered in census data.
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Irish builders were internally divided by local region: men from County Cork worked 
with men from County Cork, men from County Kerry worked with men from County 
Kerry, etc5. At Keyworker House these divisions had broken down, apparently 
because of dwindling numbers of Irish migrant labour (see below).
Only one of the labourers was not subcontracted by McMurray’s. Mickey T
subcontracted himself and 3 men to other Topbuild jobs. He was the ‘tea boy’ at
Keyworker House, which meant he made and fetched the tea, and washed and tidied
up. When he completed his ‘domestic duties’ for the day, he worked with the other
labourers drilling holes, concreting, filling skips, carrying plant and materials, and
sweeping up. Mickey T retired during my field-work aged 67:
What would you want to interview me for? What you see me doing here today I’ve 
done all my life [he is standing with a shovel in his hand]. If you speak to one of us 
you’ll know the life of all of us (laughs) ... I left Ireland in 1952 at the age of 15, and 
since then I’ve done pretty much every kind of job in the building apart from brick­
work. .. Back home my parents had a few acres, smallholding like. We had 5 cows and 
2 pigs. In the summer we’d harvest the sea: sea grass, shellfish, mackerels and salmon. 
We’d sell the salmon and salt-up the mackerel and herring and two pigs for the winter.
I had 14 brothers and sisters see, and only two rooms in the house, one for the parents 
and the other for the kids who slept 7 to a bed, top to tail. And it was half a mile to the 
nearest well. So when I got to 15 I felt I should get out (laughs)... There were a million 
Irish in England at that time, all sending £2 a week back home, that was a rake [a lot] 
of money for Ireland. People slag-off England but it’s one of the only countries in the 
world that look after you when you’re sick... I’ve been cold and I’ve been wet, but I’ve 
never been hungry since I’ve been in England. (Field notes)
All the older labourers were skilled ground-workers. They had served their time 
working on roads, tunnels, sewers and foundation works. For them, working for 
Topbuild was semi-retirement, earning a small but regular wage, shielded from the 
weather and only sporadically highly physical (see chapter 6). Mickey T could still 
work harder and faster than I could, despite my being quite fit and 36 years his junior. 
The labourers were, with the exception of Mickey T, all South London Irish, living in 
and around Southwark, one of many Irish enclaves in London6, and were all Catholic 
and believers in its doctrine.
5 Anecdotally I have evidence that Irish regional divisions in London still exist on large and lucrative tunnelling 
jobs, in particular on the building o f the channel tunnel. Thanks to Janies Ward for this information.
6 Irish enclaves in London are becoming increasingly indistinct. Second generation Irish tend to assimilate into 
English culture and many older Irish have returned to Ireland (Malcolm, 1996). Danny, the labour foreman, 
bemoaned the fall o f the Irish community in a recorded interview. The traditional Irish pub, the centre o f the 
community in London was, he said, fast becoming a thing o f the past
84
Turner’s Carpentry7
All of the carpenters were members of the diaspora from Kutch, a rural area of 
Gujarat in Northern India (excluding Jamin who was bom in mid-Gujarat and an old 
school-ffiend of one of Turner’s subcontractors). They were all Hindus, albeit to 
varying degrees of dedication and belief. Their forefathers left Kutch at the end of the 
19th century to build the railway from Mombassa to Nairobi for the British East 
African Company where 5 Asian labourers (Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims) were killed 
for every mile of track they laid (Patel, 1979). When that railway was completed, 
many remained in East Africa to administer the empire for the British, and many 
Kutchis (and Ramgharia Sikhs, see Bhachu, 1985) formed their own building 
companies to constmct and maintain the British Empire’s infrastructure. Just as the 
Irish had built much of modem Britain’s physical infrastructure, the Kutchis had built 
much of the British Empire in Africa.
Most Asians left Kenya and Uganda during the xenophobic phases of African
nationalism in the late 1960s. Fearing the worst, they had come to Britain as subjects
of the British crown, but those who remained in Uganda had been terrorised by Idi
Amin’s despotic rule, and in 1972 were ordered to leave the country within only 90
days. One of the carpenters, Naz, summarised part of the Kutchis’ recent history:
I came here 1969. I was about 11 and a half. My parents came in 2 years earlier. My 
mum’s father, he was in Africa, Mombassa, British used to rule. So he become a 
British citizen, and that automatically brings my mum British. So she got married, my 
father was in Africa, they moved back to India, Gujarat, and in ‘66 Harold Wilson 
bring out the law, British ladies can bring their husband [to Britain]... One of my 
grandfather’s friend was educated. He lent my father money. He says ‘it’ll cost you 
10,000 or 15,000 rupees to get to London’. He said ‘I’ll give you the money and when 
you get there then you pay me back’... So his son sent two tickets, or money 
equivalent, to India and my parents paid him in 3 months time or 4 months time 
whenever they’ve got the money. So that’s how they came over...
We are, us, we are Kutchi Patels. We are known as the Kutchi Patels. We are 
known as farmers or builders, we speak farmer and builder language in Gujarat. We 
never had any other trades; we never had any industries in Kutch, no big industry 
where you can employ like 10 000 people, nothing like that, so either you are a builder 
or a farmer. It is known as the desert of Kutch.
The carpenters were toughened twice migrants from urban areas of East Africa, or of 
a second generation who grew up and went to school in Harlesden, West London. 
Harlesden was the geographic centre for the all of the carpenters, (except one who
7 I have used an Anglicised company name for the Asian carpenters because the actual company name was 
Anglicised.
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lived in a less affluent East London Asian enclave), but some of the older men had 
moved out to a more affluent suburban neighbouring area (c.f. Park et al, 1925).
There were three ‘bosses’ of Turner’s Carpentry, each of them also agnate 
Kutchi Carpenters. They had been in their subcontract position for 5 years, and 
because of this, were still fighting to ingrain their business relationships with 
Topbuild. To maintain and build these relationships they charged a low rate for their 
carpenters’ labour, and were inclined to act with generosity towards Topbuild’s 
management (see chapter 9).
Coat’s Decoration
Ernie Coat’s employees were a mixed collection of first and second generation 
Northern and Southern Irish, some Scottish, but mostly English tradesmen. All of 
them were white-skinned, which in my experience is rare amongst this occupational 
group in London. Many had worked for Coat’s for a number of years (up to 35) ‘on 
and o ff, and, similar to the labourers and carpenters, they knew each other in and out 
of work for many years. The vast majority lived in Edmonton in North London, their 
network member groups revolving around 5 public houses in Enfield Town, which 
acted as informal recruitment centres (see chapter 5). A clique of three younger 
painters lived in King’s Cross, also in North London. They were linked to Coat’s by 
one of their fathers who had moved out to Enfield. Similar to the carpenters who 
moved from Harlesden to a more affluent surrounding area, some of the Enfield 
painters originally grew up in King’s Cross, but had left for the slightly more affluent 
and culturally homogenous Enfield.
Topbuild Managers
Topbuild’s managers were not a subcontract group but they did form a distinct 
cultural group, which is why I include them here. The managers were all white 
Protestant English who lived in the rural towns of Kent in Southern England. 3 of the 
5 managers rode in from Kent every morning on their motor bikes, as did 1 of the 2 
quantity surveyors (one of whom also lived in Kent). Unlike to the subcontract 
groups, the managers were all quite young (aged between 23 to 40), which reflected 
Topbuild’s project director’s purposeful tactic of recruiting and training young site 
managers before they were seasoned by informal culture through long periods of time 
working ‘on the tools’ (see chapter 5).
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The managers were all careerist builders in that they were willing and eager to 
ascend the hierarchy of command (to an extent -  see chapter 6). Three of them 
entered formal apprenticeships upon leaving school and two of them had university 
qualifications. I will term them ‘new working class’ because they were enveloped in a 
career structure, had embraced meritocratic ideals and consumerism, and performed 
the related body and personality work, quite unlike the tradesmen and labourers (see 
chapters 5 and 8).
Spark’s M and E
Spark’s was a ‘family firm’ that employed both plumbers and electricians. In this 
sense, I refer to mechanical and electrical as a singular group rather than separately as 
plumbers and electricians. In contemporary service technology, plumbers and 
electricians must essentially do both of these trades because machines that regulate 
the flow of materials through pipes tend also to operate electronically. Plumbers and 
electricians also group and work together, which enables them to learn one another’s 
skills. Spark’s were not the subcontractor of Topbuild’s choice because they had 
come ‘ready packaged’ with Assured Consultants, and this created problems for 
Topbuild’s managers (see chapter 3 and 9).
Spark’s were the only subcontract group that displayed geographically-
dispersed and culturally-plural employment patterns. They employed men from the
Caribbean, Scotland, second generation Irish, white English, and on occasion, Eastern
Europe. This variation was a result of regulatory legislation and the related shortage
of mechanical and electrical skills at the time of my research. As Bill, the mechanical
and electrical foreman, explained:
The building [industry] is desperate for plumbers. You can’t get plumbers for love nor 
money now. I mean we had plumbers, good plumbers, and I know some very, very 
good plumbers but we can’t employ them because they’re not Corgi [Council of 
Registered Gas Installers] registered. So the thing is, anything you install now, if you 
haven’t got that certificate or that Corgi registration, it doesn’t matter what plumber 
puts it in, if he hasn’t got it then the contractor’s in trouble. So we can’t employ them, 
so we can’t get a decent plumber. A lot of the kids have all gone into the computer side 
of it, and the ‘sparks’ [electricians] have all pulled out because there’s easy money in 
data cabling, data wiring, fire alarms... This one guy Stan, he’s about 55, an electrician 
for 40 years. He’s got more experience in his little finger than most of the sparks today 
and yet he can’t get a job because they want qualifications and he hasn’t got none. He 
just leamt, he came through the trade, and you know he just can’t get a job. Unless 
you’ve got that piece of paper you can’t work in this trade.8
8 Bill was talking in general terms. Not all o f Spark’s employees possessed formal skill certificates, see the 
biography o f Trick, chapter 5.
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From the quick descriptions above (which do little justice to the complexity of the 
groups but will be expanded on throughout the thesis) it is evident that ‘birds of a 
feather flock together’, but only where there are plentiful skills in the network groups. 
Working for Topbuild was considered ‘cushy’. The rate of work was slow and it 
provided regular employment on relatively small building sites that were not the 
large, cold, impersonal and dangerous places that larger building sites tend to be. The 
majority of Topbuild’s work was for the State, and consequently it was not affected 
(to such a degree) by fluctuations in economic markets. Much of the work was also 
‘old work’, and therefore, it mostly took place inside, shielded from the weather, and 
on projects that did not run to over £15 million (Topbuild’s father company, 
‘Bigbuild’ did all works valued over £15 million).
Routes into employment at Topbuild were therefore blocked to others by the 
existing workforce being reluctant to leave. By contrast, the shortage of mechanical 
and electrical tradesmen forced Spark’s to advertise in the press and use the assistance 
of building agencies to find skilled labour. Some of their labour shortage problems 
were also the result of the poor transferability of these skills across different countries. 
For example, an electrician from Russia may take some time learning to use British 
equipment and adapt to regulatory specifications. To be employed by a large 
contractor he would have also to pass formal examinations (or possess the necessary 
contacts), which would be almost impossible for a non-English speaker. Bill reflected 
on this:
You get a fucking Jamaican turn up and I say to him you gotta do it this way and then 
he says, ‘no, we don’t do it like that, we do it like this’, I says, no, you gotta do it this 
way, it’s different over here, ‘Oh all right’. So the next one’s South African and he 
don’t know either, you know, because there’s so many different laws and different 
ways and regulations.
To a smaller extent, labour shortage was also operating in the labouring group. Paddy 
McMurray’s network groups were retiring, moving back to Ireland, or dying. He had 
some difficulty obtaining labour by informal means and had on occasion to employ 
anyone he could find, and, at Keyworker House, this was a Russian and a Spaniard. 
However, McMurray’s non-Irish labour were the first to be dismissed when work 
slowed and men were squeezed off site. In respect of this, all of McMurray’s regular 
workers remained South London Irish. Ethnic labour shortage processes were also at 
work for the Plastering subcontractor, Luke Screed. Luke was native to the
88
Seychelles, as were most of his workers, or they were the second generation. But due 
to the small numbers of the Seychelles diaspora in Britain9 he had to rely upon what 
was mostly Eastern European labour. Again, these were first to be laid off when work 
became scarce.
Social Networks and Ethnic Enclaves
Basic relationships in the [building] industry are for the most part informal and 
unstandardized... Perhaps more than workers in any other industry, the building 
workers function as independent units, each worker pursuing employment and making 
arrangements to apply his skills according to personal contacts, personal preference, 
and a personal schedule (Myers, 1946: 1)
Myers’ ideas concerning builder preference and independence in North America were 
based upon an earlier text by C. L. Franklin (1936) who described how particular 
building trade foremen would employ men of their own race and culture to work with 
them: Jewish foremen employed Jewish tradesmen, Irish foremen employed Irish 
tradesmen etc. Myers argued this was the result of the corporal nature of trade 
foremen’s work; they spent the majority of their workday side by side with those they 
recruited, and they preferred to work alongside people of their own ethnic affiliation. 
Whilst it does appear that ‘people like people like themselves’ (Newcomb, 1961; 
Rubin, 1973), Myers failed to recognise that informal recruitment methods and ethnic 
network divides would block access to information about jobs to those that were not 
members of foremen’s ethnic networks.10.
Constructing Recruitment
Granovetter (1974) has suggested that employment opportunity, and thus a 
substantial aspect of social structure, was to a large extent the result of an 
individual’s contact networks. Social networks can be ‘earned’ and manipulated to 
a degree (Boissevain, 1974), but are also largely ascribed and contingent. 
Individuals are bom into a network group predominantly centred around a family 
and, during the course of their life-trajectories individuals become increasingly
9 The numbers were so small that the Seychellians do not appear in minority ethnic statistics as a distinct group.
10 Racial divisions in the unionised sector o f the North American building industry are today almost monopolised 
by particular ingrained ethnic groups. This is quite unlike the situation in Britain because there has never been the 
strong union controls over the industry that existed in North America, yet Union power in the North American 
building industry rapidly declined since 1955, according to Thieblot (2001). This had mixed effects for more 
recent migrants. Sassen-Koob, (1989) describes how Mexican migrants obtained a foothold in New York’s 
building industry in the non-union ‘old build’ sector, but they were not granted the formal working rights that 
unionised builders expect. Arguably however, any job is better than no job at all.
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bound up in these groups (Becker, 1963). In other words, our future contacts and 
social trajectories are contingent upon our past contacts. Educational qualifications 
and money capital may negate the necessity of ascribed contacts (to a degree). 
However, the majority of the builders bypassed formal education, and recent 
migrants found that their education was worthless in England’s host economy. For 
the builders, their bodily skills and social contacts were their sole social capital.
Granovetter’s research on middle-class workers showed that 56 percent 
obtained their current job through personal contacts. In my own research, out of the 
permanent groups on site, only a very small percentage obtained their jobs through 
formal mechanisms (the majority of these were mechanical and electrical workers). 
90 percent of the total workforce had obtained their jobs through social networks, 
mostly family and to a lesser extent, neighbourhood friends (see also Hill, 1976; 
Grieko, 1987, and chapter 5). This factor, noted by Jamin above, clearly explains the 
patterns presented in fig 2.1. Furthermore, as Granovetter argues, it is not that all jobs 
are obtained through network information, but good jobs, and, as I have already 
argued, Topbuild’s jobs were considered good jobs.
Recruitment and Trust
In an article focussing on mains-gas pipeline construction workers, Graves (1970)
discovered that 100 percent of pipeline workers were recruited through informal
social networks. Many of the ‘bunches’ of gang workers were family groups: fathers
and sons, brothers and brother in-laws. He argued:
Exchange arrangements, in the form of work related favours, seem to be the principal 
kind of mechanism that organises the seasonal movement of the pipeline labour force... 
Crews are formed, and workers find work through personal contacts rather than 
through formal means. (1970: 73)
Graves viewed the nepotistic nature of pipeline employment as a result of the extreme 
ephemerality of pipeline construction work. Pipelines must necessarily be built across 
large geographic areas and their builders must move across space with them. 
Furthermore, parts of pipeline construction only take short periods of time to build. 
Pipeline builders, then, work only for short durations, usually for between one and 
two weeks, and then have to find more work. Pipeline contractors by extension, 
require semi-skilled and skilled labour in short periods of time. They also need to be 
able to ‘trust’ that labour because of the problems of monitoring the work across such
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vast distances, and informal networks ensure skilled and trusted pipeline gangs can be 
found quickly (see also Graves, 1958).
The ephemeral nature of pipeline construction is similar to that of building 
industry organisational patterns in general, albeit to a more extreme level. In 
ephemeral work organisation, social networks become especially effective because 
large numbers of workers must be disbanded and formed in short and irregular 
periods of time. In addition, the problems of monitoring a mobile workforce across 
large distances, require that labour must be ‘trusted’ to carry out the work at an 
efficient speed and to a required standard (see chapter 6).
Whilst informal networks recruit labour at almost zero cost, they also find a
particular type of labour. Grieko (1987) argues that employers prefer to utilise
networked labour because it reduces recruitment costs, screens and informally trains
potential labour, and provides a certain amount of control over new recruits thorough
the favour-giving and receiving mechanism. As Ernie Coat mentioned:
Basically it’s people who know people. If I’m looking for painters I might say to the 
lads, I’m looking to take more lads on, if there’s anybody you know? And of course in 
the building trade you’ll find a lot of people know a lot of people. So, somebody might 
have said to them the week before, ‘look I’ve been laid off, I’ve got no work’. So they 
ring them, they ring me, and that’s how it comes that so many people know each other, 
word of mouth.
DT. And do you prefer that, in that your painters are coming with a kind of 
recommendation ?
Well yes. I had an incident last week where I took 2 lads on. Although they were 
recommended by somebody else, a site agent [manager], but they were bloody useless. 
But normally if one of the lads said, ‘my mate’s a painter’, they normally are. It does 
work out better through that way than advertising, as with advertising you don’t know 
what your gonna get. We had to advertise when we was down at Lampet Street a 
couple of years ago because the job all of a sudden got pushed forward and they wanted 
everything done, so I had to get more blokes. And we advertised in the Standard 
[London-based Newspaper]. We took on 12, 4 of them were no good at all but 8 of 
them were good and they stayed for the duration of the job. You’re always going to get 
the odd one when you advertise that’s going to be no bloody good. That’s part of the 
building trade.
Through tapping into family and neighbourhood networks, Ernie was afforded a 
modicum of certainty as to the skill and character of his employees. Thus social 
networks not only relayed information, but the quality of that information are 
perceived as reliable and was thus trusted. Trust mechanisms functioned beneficially 
for potential workers, existing work groups and subcontractors. New recruits could 
rely on the ‘intensive information’ they received through their network which may
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indicate that Ernie Coat always pays wages on time, in cash, gives regular ‘subs’,
tends to have long durations of work, and does not always ask for a CIS card (see
chapter 10). Work groups inherit a colleague who is ‘like them’, with whom they can
get along and who is already integrated into a known network. In this sense, the
existing work group will usually know something about the new worker, or at least
they will know others that know something about him. And, subcontractors receive
workers whose skill levels can be predicted, or who will be informally instructed by
the work group. Again, Ernie Coat said:
We do give some of them a chance. If you can see they might be all right if they get 
into the right rhythm then, you know, we will tolerate it for a week or so. But if they’re 
no good at all then it’s normally a day, if they haven’t picked themselves up, then that’s 
it, gone. It’s the only way to do it.
Ernie’s words were sterner than in practice. Those that were ‘all right’ were tolerated 
for much longer periods than one week, especially if they were linked into the 
workgroup. This was because the workgroup would informally train ‘friends of 
friends’ and/or if they became popular characters (see Grieko, 1987, and chapters 5 
and 6).
Informal networks provided information concerning work and workers, and projected 
an element of social control onto networked employees. In this sense, networks 
provided cheap recruitment and training of labour. Furthermore, in finding 
employment for friends of friends, the network reinforced itself because members 
became bound to one another through the elasticity of the favour mechanisms that 
ordered their networks (see chapter 9). This, in part, explained the geographic and 
racial patterns evident at Keyworker House.
I will expand upon issues of reciprocity, trust, social networks and racial 
dynamics in chapter 9. Firstly, in the next chapter, I describe the detailed processes 
that led the builders to becoming builders, the informal processes that framed their 
trajectories, how they retrospectively constructed their life narratives, and, the effects 
these elements had upon their cultures and work-life trajectories.
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Fig. 4X1: Subcontracting: The Main Characters
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Chapter 5 
Becoming a Builder
The previous chapter described how the informal nature of employment and 
recruitment practices in the building subcontract system were related to the ethnic, 
geographic and social patterns evident at Keyworker House. In this chapter I examine 
the broader long-term processes that guided the builders into their careers, their 
personal biographies and social backgrounds, and how they retrospectively 
constructed and narrated those biographies.
Types o f Builder
I present four ‘types’ of trajectories in becoming a builder. The types were not applied 
by the builders themselves, but were superimposed by me in my analysis of their life 
stories. At work the builders categorised themselves and one another primarily by 
trade, and secondarily by ethnicity and geographic neighbourhood. Collective forms 
of working-class masculinity tended to subsume the builders’ individuality in some 
contexts, making it almost impossible to distinguish between the builders with respect 
to their varied routes into becoming builders (see chapters 7 and 8). I have applied 
types simply to carve some order and meaning out of the builders’ very individual 
lives and experiences. The types are not therefore exhaustive, but were amongst the 
most common paths followed into the building industry. They are included because 
the culture of a building site does not arise entirely at the site of workplace interaction 
itself. It is framed and influenced by the social and cultural backdrops that the men 
carried with them to the workplace.
The Death o f Class?
Commentators on the macro-social structure of developed nations, such as Bell 
(1974), and Lash and Urry (1987), argue that productive infrastructures in intense 
capitalism have shifted to a post-industrial form. Post-industrial economies were 
based upon knowledge, service and consumption, resulting in a growing and affluent 
consumer middle-class, and a shrinking productive working-class. Whilst this does 
appear to be the case, the ‘old’ industrial class system continues to have an impact on 
people’s lives in the form of social background, upbringing and the social networks
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individuals experience and create in the early, formative years of their lives. As 
Cannadine (1999) argues, class is a state of mind; a discursive category that the 
British use to define themselves and one another within the context of a hierarchical 
social system. Class is real because people think it is real. However, class is more than 
a reified mental category because it continues to impinge upon people’s life-chances. 
Willis (1977) for example, convincingly argued that the British education system 
underpins class continuation through functioning as a kind of sorting-mechanism that 
maintains the old class divides. Willis’ study is quite dated, but evidence for the 
continuing validity of his thesis can be seen in Fig. 5.0, which although a rather crude 
measure of class and social mobility, speaks volumes (see also, Crompton, 1998).
Fig. 5.0: Percentage of 21-30 year olds by social class origin who have higher
educational qualifications as their highest level of attainment. 2000
SOCIAL C LA SS PER C EN TAG E W ITH  HIGHER E D U C A T IO N  
Q U A LIFICA TIO N S
I PRO FESSIO NA L 87.2
II INTERM EDIATE 57.1
III SKILLED N O N -M A N U A L 23.6
III SKILLED M A N U A L 8.4
IV  PA R T LY  SKILLED 10.7
V  U N SK ILLED 6.1
(Quarterly Labour Force Survey. From  Gilchrist e t a l, 2003)
Class structures continue to influence people’s lives in intense modernity. Society’s 
physical infrastructure must be built, cleaned, maintained and repaired, and somebody 
must do it manually and somatically. In this sense, not only did the builders stem from 
manual working-class backgrounds, they still did manual work; they were specifically 
working-class and thought themselves to be so.
Not all the builders were educated or had grown up in British class society. 
Many came from agrarian economies where the furtherance of patriarchal work 
traditions or labour in the rural economy was paramount to their early work careers. 
However, all of them had experienced life at the lower end of class and income
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structures. Even the traditionally caste-bound carpenters adopted Anglicised class
categories to interpret their social position. Naz highlighted this, and the reasons why:
[In the past] we used to go on the caste culture, now we don’t do that, well, it’s 
changed a lot... I’m a working-class, yeah. I mean we have a caste for barbers, we have 
a caste for shoemakers, we have a caste for every cunt. But it’s changed... [my son-in- 
law] he’s from the barbers, he’s got 4 brothers and none of them are fucking barbers 
anyway... I mean his father wasn’t a barber either.
Even the white-collar site management saw themselves as working-class. As Paul,
one of the site managers, told me:
I’m working-class yes. Quantity surveyors consider themselves middle-class don’t 
they? Because I think it’s a professional qualification QS, but it’s bullshit isn’t it? All it 
means that the chief honchos sit in big leather chairs like Wing Commanders... No I 
don’t see myself as being middle-class, not in the least. Definitely working-class, 
wouldn’t even cross my mind until you asked the question. I’ve got a degree but would 
you say that a lot of people who’ve got a degree would consider themselves to be 
middle-class... [Site management] is a desk job to a certain extent but I wouldn’t say it 
puts you alongside dentists or doctors, but it’s, it sounds quite impressive doesn’t it, 
‘building site manager’, you know, it sounds something more than it actually is.
Diverse Roots
Collectively the builders followed no concrete or formalised route into the building 
industry. A small minority chose to enter ‘the building’ from leaving school and had 
worked in it for most of their lives. Many however, simply found themselves in ‘the 
trade’ having tried a diverse range of other occupations. The overriding majority 
drifted in to the building trade under the impact of social changes and economic 
necessity, and via the patterning of their social networks.
Formal Apprentices
Norman, the mechanical and electrical consultant, was the son of a printer. He grew
up in East Anglia in relative affluence, and at the close of his primary schooling he
passed his 11+ examinations:
I went to a grammar school and absolutely hated it. All my friends went to the local 
secondary modem, and so they were getting home at 4 o’clock and I was getting home 
at half past 5, doing loads of homework all night, I really did detest it. When I went to 
school you left at 15 normally, but at grammar school we had to stay until we was 16 
and take O’ levels. I couldn’t stand it but they wouldn’t let me leave because although I 
was certainly no brilliant scholar, I wasn’t any real trouble to them. I wanted a job that 
kept me outside as well, I didn’t want to be stuck in a factory or anything like that. So I 
went and got myself an apprenticeship at British Gas, or as it was known then, the Gas 
Board, which was a nationalised industry. The school told me that if I got a trade 
apprenticeship I could go to college for 6 months to start with. So they let me leave.
In those days the apprenticeship was 5 years. We were fast tracked as well, so I 
actually got my City & Guilds [formal trade qualification] first and second-class by the
96
time I was 18. Then while I was an apprentice I went on to do gas utilisation and get 
my Institute of Gas Engineers qualification and all that. I then worked most extensively 
on gas-fired boilers, the new generation, on the maintenance and electrics of them. 
Then North Sea gas came, which changed it again. Being young and being quite good 
on electrics I was whipped off to go round a special project going all over the Eastern 
region, sorting out a lot of the major faults and everything. It was the dawning of a new 
era because gas boilers were coming in and electrics were starting to go onto gas. So 
the industry was changing rapidly and they wanted to train people that could adapt and 
know it from the start. And we was in the unusual situation of about being 22 or 23, 
knowing a lot more about the new parts of the industry than the older boys. Central 
heating and that they knew virtually nothing about, a bit like today with all you lot 
knowing computers inside out while we struggle like mad with them.
I must have left there when I was about 26 I suppose. Then I went to work for 
myself, and I did that for about another 10 years. I built up quite a large company but I 
didn’t like the pressure of it so I got out of that. I had 14 fitters eventually and about 3 
part-time office staff. But I got to a situation where British Gas always owed me a 100 
grand, and I’m talking of a long while ago, it was a lot of money... I had quite a nice 
life, nice house, a brand new BMW and everything, but I thought well this is not what I 
want from life. You lie in bed at night being owed thousands of pounds and wondering 
how you’re gonna pay people.
DT: And so you went back and worked for somebody else after that?
Yeah, well I had a lot of friends in the industry, so I went and worked for some friends 
as a contracts manager and I run some big jobs for them. I decided I didn’t really like 
working for people after being my own boss for so long, so I went freelance, and I did 
that up until the time I came to work for Spark’s. I just work as a contracts manager 
and consultant for them now.
Technological change in building services placed Norman in a strong work position 
early on in his career, and he eventually started his own business. However, the 
pressure of being a businessman, and the perennial problem of getting paid by 
contractors, led him back into being an employee, although a high ranking and well 
paid one. Ascent through the building career structure was common for formally 
trained builders like Norman. They began training in the industry straight from school 
and tended to rise through the lower ‘non-commissioned officer’ ranks. Norman also 
highlighted that the contacts, or ‘friends’, that he made in the industry eased his 
transition back to being an employee. This eventually took him to working for Spark’s 
at Keyworker House.
Steve, the project manager, was also formally trained, and he exhibited and
explained a similar career trajectory:
I left school, I actually, I wasn’t the brightest, I was sort of just above normal if you 
like, or above average, with regards to education. I went to a local secondary school 
and I arsed about for the first few years like you do, but then I realised that maybe I 
should be putting a bit more effort in. So I got moved up a class and things become 
easier. I just did the standard qualifications at the time, O levels and CSEs. I did a shit 
load of exams and my schedule was topsy-turvy but I stayed and my mum paid for
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extra lessons in maths and English and that, and I tried to get as much as I could. For 
what reason I don’t know.
I just went for everything and I ended up with six O levels and I backed them all 
up with CSEs. So I ended up with loads and loads of certificates. Then I left school, 
and I’d been working in a cycle shop with my mate, putting bikes together, selling 
bikes to customers, and I was sort of earning about £70, £80, sometimes £100 a week, 
depending how many bikes we sold. I was waiting for my exam results to come 
through and I didn’t really know what I was going to do. I thought that [the bike shop] 
was good enough, I was earning a bit of cash so it was all right. But you know what 
they do at school where they try and forecast what job you should do when you leave, 
they put in your typical likes and don’t likes, and your skills, and then they come up 
with what they think you might do. I did that and eventually got a letter through from 
Surrey College of Technology saying, ‘we got an open evening seminar, would you 
like to bring your son along, we’ve selected him because of the particular qualifications 
he received’. The qualifications were quite handy as it were, CDT [Craft, Design and 
Technology], pottery, and those handy sort of things like that. And I just sort of went 
with the flow then. So we went to a seminar, which was I think orientated round 
carpentry and joinery. Next thing you know I was signed up. One of the teachers there 
was in with Topbuild, knew the director. And then what they did, they used to sponsor 
you. So there’s this YTS [Youth Training Scheme], it’s £27.50 a week and you get 
your travel on top of that. Well I thought, fuck it, everyone saying you should get an 
apprenticeship and be on the tools, you’re handy and all that, you’ll never be out of 
work, so I thought that’s fair enough. I’ve always been inquisitive and fucked around 
with stuff, being the man about the house with mum being divorced, always handy, so, 
fuck it, go for that.
I did a release to site, 6-month college, 6-month doing a day release and evenings, 
and after 4 years training I got me Institute of Carpenters and Institute of Carpenters 
Advanced [qualifications] and then I was out on site full time. It didn’t take long then I 
suppose, for people when I first went to the interview at the construction offices for the 
construction director to say, ‘do you really want to do this, you know, you’re over 
qualified’ and all that. So they obviously saw there was potential and they just used 
that. And I proved myself of being willing to be guided, because I don’t actually strive 
for anything, I just get guided. I’ve never said, I want to be a site manager or I want to 
be a general foreman, it’s just gradually come on board. If they were to say, you will be 
a manager I’d probably shit myself. As it comes on board you kind of take things on 
and deal with it. I’ve pretty much specialised in second fixing and finishing, but along 
the way telling them I want to do a bit more on the ground. I never saw the job starting 
so I said I want bit more seeing jobs through, right the way through. First job I ever 
went to was actually groundwork, shuttering concrete. I got there and thought, well, 
I’ve been at college hanging doors and door frames and there’s this fucking Paddy 
[Irishman] standing up to his knees in concrete saying, ‘pass me a rip of ply’. What? 
What the fuck’s that? That was a bit of a culture shock. But I done a lot of shuttering 
which sharpened me up a bit, then I was back on second fixing and finishing.
So that’s basically how I’ve ended up where I am now. I’ve worked with all the 
site managers Topbuild ever had... I’ve seen the way they do things, sort of adapted 
with the different skills that I had, and hopefully grabbed a little bit from each of them.
As I say, I just sort of come through on the guidance of those people, and just got on 
with it basically.
For young working-class men, ‘getting a trade’ is commonly viewed as one of the 
very best career options: ‘you should get an apprenticeship and be on the tools... 
you’ll never be out of work’ is a statement heard time and time again. Even in 
economic recession when building work slows and jobs become hard to come by, a
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good tradesman could be confident that he would at least scrape a living undertaking 
small private works within his own network groups (see chapter 10). Steve also hinted 
at the ‘culture shock’ of having to adapt his formal training to the reality of working 
on site. Formal apprentices engage in informal learning of building site culture, and it 
is here that past cultures are, to an extent, ironed out and adapted to informal 
workgroup culture (see chapter 7). Building site masculinity also contributes to this 
process by casting overarching shadow over building site interaction (see chapter 8).
Norman and Steve both took formal apprenticeship routes into the building industry, a
process that they accurately saw as waning today1. Bill, the mechanical and electrical
foreman, another formal apprentice, told a similar story:
I had no intentions of coming into the building trade. I left school and we had a careers 
officer and I just went up the office and he said ‘what do you wanna be’? I said, I want 
to go in the Post Office, telecommunications or on the telephones. So they sent me to a 
place in Wimbledon where I sat the exam and then two weeks later I got a letter 
through saying, ‘you’ve passed the exam but unfortunately you’re only 15’, because 
you were allowed to leave school at 15 then, they said, ‘unfortunately you’ll have to 
wait a year before we can enlist you’. So I went back to the old careers officer, told him 
and he said, ‘well anything else’? I said, what about electricians? I didn’t even know 
what an electrician was really, it was just that you heard about electricians so I said 
electrician. So they sent me down to a firm and they enrolled me. You had to sign 
indentures then and they sent you off to a college. I then spent 5 years on day-release at 
Brixton College. I mean it was a different way of life then because all the big firms had 
apprentices, not like now, I mean we ain’t go none on this firm [Topbuild], When they 
took me on they must have taken on about 15 trade apprentices, so you all grew up 
together. That was 1971, when I left school.
Formal indentured apprentices were in a minority at Keyworker House but they 
formed a majority of the ‘non-commissioned’ managerial positions. They also had 
little real aspiration to become a builder, but were directed into the trade by their 
school careers officers, and/or simply through a desire to leave school early. Most of 
the builders however, had undertaken rather more archaic informal/formal 
apprenticeships whilst they were still at school.
Part-time-job Apprentices
Like their formal apprentice colleagues, the part-time-job apprentices showed little 
desire to be builders. Bristles, a painter, was illustrative of this:
1 The numbers o f  apprentices registered with the CITB in 1985 was 8,700. In 1994 the figure was 2,500 (Harvey 
2003), and it can be assumed that the numbers began to drop off long before 1985. The present New Labour 
government is currently creating a number o f new apprenticeship schemes and conducting an advertising offensive 
to redress the highly publicised building trade skill shortages.
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My old man was a carpenter, and his father before him, and his father before him. But I 
tend to do things different to whatever my family do, always have done, always will do.
So I was at school, 15, and I was already doing odd jobs then for a Jewish man. He was 
teaching me bits and pieces. He gave me a paintbrush and told me how to hold it, how 
to hold a paint kettle, certain ways to paint a door, to paint a window, everything. He 
was a friend of the family and it was like a Saturday job type of thing, everybody had a 
Saturday job then. There weren’t that much money around so you done that and got a 
couple bob [shillings]. That’s normally how you got into trades then, because the kids 
that had Saturday jobs washing cars for the mechanics became mechanics; the one’s 
that helped out on the fruit and veg became fruit and veg men. That’s how most people 
got their trades, just by doing their little Saturday jobs.
Bristles left his Saturday job to go to work as an advertising clerk in Fleet Street. But
after 5 years he was ‘stabbed in the back’ by one of his managers, and forced to fall
back on his local networks and what he was familiar with, so he could make a living:
It’s quite a hard thing to get stabbed in the back. You’re getting offered a good 
position, you have a day off and come back and you’ve been made redundant. You 
can’t fight against that. Now the office work, that finished, that was a part of my life, 
but I always tend to look at the good sides. I earned loads of money, I had a great time, 
and saw things I’ll never, ever see on the buildings. But having said that, now we came 
onto this section of labouring. Now that was hard but at least you had a laugh...
So, my brother, who went on to be a bricklayer, he got me a job labouring on his 
site. Them days there was no machines at all. When they used to shout, ‘oi, there’s 
5000 bricks coming’, there was 5000 bricks that had to be off-loaded by hand2. They 
were put on by hand and taken off by hand. One man used to stand up there and just 
throw four bricks every time. It was gruelling. I thought oh well, I’d better get out of 
this, even as a young lad, oh it was hard work. Anyway so, we finished unloading 
bricks and I thought, this is too hard for me and went back to the Jewish man who had 
by then become very old all of a sudden to me. He was always quite a nice man to me. 
When I first worked for him when I was 14 and 15 he used to pay me something in the 
region of 10 -  15 shillings for the day. It weren’t bad money, he’d also give me some 
steak or a piece of beef or something for my mum to cook, always, that was my wages 
on a Saturday. Dread to think what the mechanics got, 15 Shillings and a gallon of oil? 
That’ll put hairs on your chest; that’ll put hairs on the inside of your arse to be honest!
So I’d already started decorating when I was 14. Now I had to get back into it. Mr 
Cohen was a true decorator. He went to work, suit, collar and tie. He used to get his 
overalls out, but not the overalls that we wear now, they used to be like carpenter’s 
overalls. They had a little pocket in the front, most people wear them for woodwork 
lessons, like the ones Fast Tom [a semi-retired decorator who worked for Coat’s] wears 
now, he used to wear those. They’d be brilliant white and I don’t know how but at the 
end of the day they used to go back even whiter! Nothing was on them, no paint, no 
dust, no nothing. Well, he said to me, ‘you stay with me and you can have all my 
customers when I’m gone’. I knew most of them but bearing in mind he’d had a load of 
new customers in the 6 years that I’d left him. So he said I can have these customers, 
and then he died. Just old age really, he just died. I never, ever found out how much 
money he had, he was one of these men that you knew had money. But true to his 
word, the list and everything like that was given to me, all his customers.
I did manage to keep hold of some of the old customers that I knew from 6 years 
ago, I managed to get my foothold in there. But the work they were asking me to do
2 Bricks and other heavy materials are still commonly transported manually. I can testify to this having worked as 
a labourer. It is a slight exaggeration to say that there was no machinery in the 1960’s. Cranes for example, were 
used at least since the medieval period (see chapter 1).
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was above and beyond normal decorating, it was like painting gold roses around the 
ceilings and stuff like that. I hadn’t done it before properly. I had been shown by this 
man but it was something, I suppose, I was mostly self-taught... Yeah so 99 percent of 
his customers were Jewish, it was all word of mouth, everything was done by word of 
mouth or in a pub... But by then I suppose, three quarters of them [customers] I had 
never, ever met, and not being of the best Jewish nature. I’d knock on their door and 
say, oh I used to work with Mr Cohen, but a lot of them had never saw me before. I 
mean, you’re not in someone’s house everyday of the week. When you paint the inside 
of a house it should last for 5 years. When you paint the outside of a house it should 
last for 3 years. So it was a turnover type thing, you couldn’t just survive on a few 
people. I suppose under your belt you need about 60 people, and though you don’t see 
them everyday they do tend to like, if a wedding or Christmas is coming, they might 
spruce the front room up. That’s a great time 2 weeks before Christmas. So, I managed 
to get my foothold in there. I earned a fair few shillings but not enough really and I 
eventually moved out of London to Milton Keynes where the overflow from London 
was going. Out there they were building thousands of houses. Plenty of money to be 
earned, plenty of money.
Whilst still at school Bristle’s part-time work served as an informal/formal
apprenticeship. However, his break from Mr Cohen for 6 years, and his not being
Jewish, had essentially lost what could have been a lucrative business. He then
followed his work out to one of the new industrial overflow towns that were being
built and engineered by the State to accommodate London’s slum dwellers and
provide inexpensive labour for factory work.
Like Bristles, not all of the part-time-job apprentices finished their informal
training. Aidan, a labourer, was one of these:
At school I was sort of, sort of, in a way encouraged to leave (laughs), because my 
work wasn’t up to standard, in the wild days, sort of hopping school and taking chances 
you know what I mean? So they asked me to leave but I had to tell me parents 
something else. What it was, I was working part-time at a garage. I was filling up cars 
with petrol, was the days when you used to have petrol pump attendants and that. And 
then they used to use me as a grease monkey, greasing up cars, putting oils in cars, 
minor work. Standard cars, not like the technology cars you’ve got today. Simple 
things like changing spark plugs, fan belts, putting starter motors on. Just the easy sort 
of thing. I used to work from 7 o’clock in the morning till 5 in the evening. I was 
getting a weekly wage of £12.50 take-home, but I was getting a bit cheesed off because 
all my mates started doing other different jobs, getting a lot more money than me, in 
the twenties and thirty pounds a week. So I got round me dad [who was a first 
generation Irish labourer] in the end and he says to come on labouring with him. What I 
done was, I went with him and my first week’s wages was £50 on 5 days. From 12 
pounds to 50 pounds! So you can imagine then, bloody hell, how much money have I 
got now! It was like 5 weeks money, good money. I had a girl friend at the time, the 
one I was to marry later on in life, and I just treated her for the next few weeks...
I remember going there and I was, not a tea boy, because we had a canteen there, I 
used to sweep up, clean all the mess rooms, clean the toilets out, all the sort of shit jobs 
you know what I mean? Then I would go in on the site, sort of later on, me and a 
cousin of mine, we was working together. We would go in on the site, sweeping up, 
general clearing up, moving this from there to there.
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Aidan left the building industry after working as a labourer for 7 years. He took a job
as a van driver in his brother-in-law’s packaging firm, in which he later became a
shareholder. With the expanding business he became the warehouse manager, but the
firm encountered financial problems:
We all took loans out for these new premises and to this day I’m still paying for it 
(laughs). So that’s when I started working for my brother doing groundwork. But when 
me brother had no work for me I asked Paddy McMurray if I could work for him. My 
dad was the tea boy for Paddy in his later years [until he was 71], semi-retirement like, 
and Paddy and me brother are good friends. This was last year, and Paddy took me on 
until me brother got some more work. That’s why I’m struggling a bit you know, that’s 
why I’ll work 7 days [a week] if I get it because it’s really tight.
Aidan left his part-time-job apprenticeship, lured by the bigger wage packet that 
labouring with his father could offer. This was a common story: the men entered the 
building industry when they were young, drawn by the attraction of a large wage 
packet. The building industry is one of the few occupations where one can earn more 
money at the beginning of their career than he can at the end of it: younger, healthier 
men can work at a faster rate and thus earn more money than older, less fit men. 
However, money was not the only factor making the building trade attractive to them, 
most mentioned that they also enjoyed ‘the crack’ that was integral to the culture of 
the building site (see chapters 6 and 7). This was expressed by Bristles in, ‘it was hard 
but at least we had a laugh’. Bristle’s words also illustrated that he was drawn along 
by the attraction of money when he moved to Milton Keynes because there was 
‘plenty of money to be earned out there, plenty of money’.
Adaptation to Social Change
Not everyone was attracted to the building trade by large wage packets. For many, 
like Aidan falling back into building after his family business went bankrupt, ‘the 
buildings’ were the only wage packet they could get. Pushed into the building trade 
by social change and guided by shifts in the economy, many had few choices but to 
take a job as a builder when the opportunity arose. Trick was one such individual. I 
have chosen to include his story here because Trick was a plumber and electrician 
who learnt his trade informally. It might be assumed that to do such a complex and
3 The term ‘crack’ (or, ‘craic’) originates from Ireland and its frequent usage by the builders highlights the 
influence the Irish have had over London’s building site culture.
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dangerous job4, one must first undertake a formal apprenticeship, but Trick was given
‘a chance’ to learn much of his trade informally as he ‘went on’:
I got into the building game because I was unemployed for 3 years at the end of the 
eighties. I mean I used to work for myself for 15 years. I was refurbing and 
reconditioning washing machines and vacuum cleaners, that kind of stuff. We used to 
buy the old ones that people part-exchanged. We’d do them up and sell them back as 
trade. So at the end of the eighties that all went tits up with Maggie Thatcher, thank you 
very much. I was unemployed for a good couple of years because I’d cracked 40 and I 
was wrong side of 35 let alone anything else. Every time I went down the Job Centre, 
you’d look on the boards and there’d be nothing, or they’d want paperwork or 
certificates.
Now, when I left school, the quick version is, I left school at 14 and a half with 
nothing [no qualifications] but I got straight into a job, I actually left in the Easter and I 
should have left in the summer. If you had a job to go to you could leave. So I went 
straight into a car factory. I was there for about a year and that was all. The factory you 
see, you were working for 5 years and there would be strikes for 5 years, so I thought 
I’d get out of that. I actually went from that to doing temporary electrics. I did that for a 
while but I didn’t have any transport at the time so I went to another firm making 
electrical re-winders in Cricklewood. It was amazing then [in the 1960s] because you 
could look in the local paper and get whatever job you wanted, whereas now you 
wouldn’t get your foot in the door unless you had a piece of paper [qualification] from 
a college or something. I wished I’d stayed there now, it was an interesting job.
So that went on for a couple of years and then the Japanese started sending over 
their bloody cheap versions of motors, armatures and windings. So that’s how I got into 
the sort of domestic side. I met a guy at Cricklewood who was doing his own refurbing 
on the old washing machines, so I went in with him and built up quite a nice little 
business. It was a great little life, great little life you know...
So all that time it was like going from one job to another without any 
qualifications, which was great. But then after I worked for myself for 15 years there 
was nothing. Because of the late 80s, early 90s, when all that went down the pan, it was 
like bloody hell, where do I go now? What do I do? To be honest I was gutted because 
I thought washing machines and vacuum cleaners, that domestic side of it, would see 
me out. I thought I can do this for another 20 years, but of course I didn’t. I should have 
seen the writing on the wall because years ago you’d have taken a kettle to be repaired, 
you’d have taken an iron, a hairdryer, toaster, all those little small appliances you 
would have taken to be repaired. But of course over the years the little things, the 
kettles, the irons and the toasters, all drop away because the price is getting cheaper. 
The next thing up the ladder was the vacuum cleaner and the washing machine. It’s like 
now a washing machine even I wouldn’t bother to get it fixed unless it’s something like 
a pump or the rubber gasket. I mean they don’t even part exchange them now do they? 
You just throw it away...
So I was looking on the board in the old Job Centre and it was like you gotta get a 
certificate or some sort of qualification. So I decided after 6 months on the dole I think 
it is, you can go training. I went down to South London, the Training Factory of all 
places it’s called! And I decided to go for air conditioning. I thought by doing that 
you’re doing some plumbing work and you’re doing electrical stuff and control work 
and all that nonsense. That was like a permanent thing for 6 months, for City and 
Guilds. That was all right, come out of that, got all me certificates and whatever, but of 
course it’s nothing like a proper 5-year or 3-year apprenticeship. I mean it’s really a 
government thing. They’re giving you a chance and getting you in the door, have a go 
at that, do that, there’s your certificate, out you go, get to it. It gives you the bit of paper
4 In recorded interviews I asked all the mechanical and electrical tradesmen if  they had ever been injured at work. 
Every one o f them proceeded to show me substantial scars on their bodies inflicted by electric shocks.
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to show. I mean to me it doesn’t make you an air conditioning engineer or anything. As 
far as I was concerned it showed a boss that I was willing to learn, have a go and 
knuckle down.
I’m 53 now, so I would have been about 46 at the time. I mean I was gutted. At that 
time they were saying at the Job Centre, ‘don’t apply if you’re over 35’ and all that you 
know. I thought bloody hell, 35, that was 10 years ago! Then you start hearing things 
like, like the family over in Ireland for example, the guys that were 35, 40, they were 
saying, ‘they’re putting us on permanent unemployment because they got so many 
youngsters coming through, they haven’t got time to sort us out’. I mean I was really 
fucking trying because I’d worked all my life. I must have written 3, 4 hundred [job 
application] letters. Half of ‘em you didn’t even get a reply. Never got anywhere. So 
where did I get my job? I got my job out of the pub. I do all this paperwork, all this 
City and Guilds, and my brother-in-law, he‘s chatting to a guy in the pub who works 
for Rank Xerox and the guy’s saying, ‘I’m losing the air conditioning man, he’s 
buggering off to France or something’. My brother-in-law just happened to say, ‘well 
Trick’s just done his City and Guilds, he’s got no basic work knowledge, he just done 
the bloody course’. The guy said, ‘that’s all right, bring him in’.
I literally phoned him on Friday night and I went to Uxbridge 8 o’clock on 
Monday morning. The man didn’t give an interview or nothing, I just started from 
there. After a couple of weeks I turned round to the guy and I said to him I’m gonna 
have to jack it in, I’m out of my depth here. I’ve just done a poxy course and you 
obviously want someone who can come in here and get on with it so you can leave 
them alone but you’re having to show me a lot of things, but he was very good, ‘no 
that’s all right’. So from there it just sort of went on. That’s where I met Bill and 
eventually come on to this firm. When they lost that contract, my governor said to me, 
‘well I know you’re doing air conditioning, do you fancy coming out onto the sites, but 
you’d be doing the plumbing side of it only’? I said, yeah I’d give it a go, I’ll see 
whether I don’t like it or you don’t think I’m up to it, but either way we’ll give it a go 
for 6 months and see how we go on. And that was it really, I just kind of learned as I 
went on. So I sort of come into the building game in the back door, not expecting it, the 
last place I expected to be to be honest. But I quite enjoy it actually, I quite enjoy the 
work.
Trick, like countless other British working-class men (and women5) was affected by 
social and economic changes, and became outmoded by economic restructuring and 
the influx of inexpensive consumer goods into the country. He had little control over 
global economic changes but fortunately he found his way into a ‘chance’ in the 
building industry through his brother-in-law and the pub.
The Pub
The pub was mentioned many times as a place where building work opportunities 
could be found, and it was also included in the life stories of both Bristles and Trick.
5 Working-class women have always been a peripheral and flexible workforce, the first to be laid-off in times o f  
economic restructuring. However, working-class women might have experienced a smoother transition to 
knowledge economies than working-class men. Many would have remained in bottom-end service jobs that they 
have always done, and those pushed out o f factory work absorbed by the increasing numbers o f service jobs. Also, 
more recently, many working-class women moved into proleterianised white-collar work, something which 
working-class men might find emasculating and therefore a poor option (see chapter 8).
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The pub forms a central part of British life, and as Reimer (1979) argues with respect 
to North American builders, it is institutionalised in building site culture.
A clue to why the pub holds such a central place in Anglo working-class 
cultures can be found in the past. Tressell (1914) highlights the lives of builders at the 
turn of the 19th century. Many lived in cold, sparsely heated houses where large 
extended families, over-worked women and illness were almost constant and normal 
parts of daily life. It can be no wonder that working men desired to frequent warm, 
bright, public houses and engage in the little leisure that they could, or could not, 
afford.
In the 1830s ‘gin palaces’ were specifically marketed towards the poor as an
escape from the desolation of the slum, and by the 1850s, there were 5000 gin palaces
in London alone6. As Dickens wrote:
Gin-drinking is a great vice in England, but wretchedness and dirt are greater; and until 
you improve the homes of the poor, or persuade a half-famished wretch not to seek 
relief in the temporary oblivion of his own misery, with the pittance which, divided 
among his family, would furnish a morsel of bread, gin-shops will increase in number 
and splendour. If Temperance societies would suggest an antidote against hunger, filth, 
and foul air, or could establish dispensaries for the gratuitous distribution of bottles of 
Lethe-water, gin-palaces would be remembered among the things that were. (1836: 
106)
Further back in time, during the medieval period, Woodwood (1995) writes that some
of the perquisites that builders expected in their wages usually took the form of beer.
Brewing sterilised drinking water against life threatening bacteria such as typhus, and
as a result, beer became a staple part of the diet of the medieval British. In the 1950s
the pub had a similar function to that of Tressell’s house painters and the gin palace.
As Mickey T explained:
When I come over in 1952 I’d earn £7.50 a week, would pay £2 for me digs, send £2 
home and still have enough money to go out and get pissed [drunk] (laughs). 
Everybody always says about the Irish being big drinkers but it weren’t like that back 
home. I never been much of a drinker like, but in those days we didn’t have much of a 
choice. We was forced to drink because we had to live in digs that were dark and cold, 
sharing with strangers, all sorts of fucking people (laughs)... In some pubs in the 
winter they’d put on a fire and soup for the workers... Cos we was all in there, that’s 
where the gangerman would come to find his blokes. (Field-notes)
Building work since its inception, took place away from the home in the public work- 
world. Builders always travelled to places of work, and, like the experiences of 
Mickey T, they sometimes trekked large distances. Having to live in temporary
6 The Gin and Vodka Association (www.ginvodka.org)
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makeshift and shared accommodation, builders in particular would have always spent 
much of their time in public houses7. Postgate (1923) writes that the early building 
trade friendly societies would meet in pubs, and that these later functioned as an early 
form of labour exchange. Builders had to meet in pubs because they did not share a 
common workplace in which to gather.
The pub has become inscribed into British working life through its relationship with 
poor pay, polluted drinking water, inadequate housing and a cold climate. It has 
become a natural recruitment centre for those that need labour, and, by extension, 
becomes a place where one must go to offer labour. It is this circular process that 
institutionalised the pub and its close relation, beer, into British working life, and, 
particularly into the builder’s life.
Social Change and Chain Migration
Whilst drinking and the pub were a central feature to many of the men’s lives, this 
was not so for everyone, in particular the carpenters. The carpenters were embedded 
in a cultural network emanating from a hot climate and which frowned upon the use 
of alcohol. However, all the older carpenters told me they had been drawn into the 
Western vices of drinking, smoking, gambling and eating meat at some point in their 
lives but, most had, after a few years, moved back into more traditional family- 
centred lives.
The first generation Kutchis told a story of their life choices being highly 
structured. Political factors had pushed them into the British building industry, and 
rather than the typically Irish story of going from rags to rags, the Kutchis had gone 
from rags to riches and back to rags. As Bapu explained:
My grandmother and grandfather left Gujarat about 100 years ago. At that time it was 
very hard to work in India, that’s why we go to Africa - Uganda, and split up the 
family. Then work, work, work, send for family to come over. All my family, my 
father, brother, sister all grow up in Uganda, everybody was over there...
My father was a builder in Africa. He did very well, own company, own business, 
everything all right, and suddenly the big Idi Amin Dada was the problem. All the 
English and Indian was the guilt of the problem but they all coming to this country, all 
settle here now8. I came in 1972/73, I was young, 24, 25. My father teach me on 
everything of the trades in Africa: make the chair, make all the joinery work, furniture.
7 See Coleman’s (1965) description o f the ‘truck’; temporary villages that the railway navvies lived in.
8 Not all the Ugandan Indians came to Britain. Patel (1979) writes that at the time o f expulsion o f the Ugandan 
Asians, the British government would not accept them into its country and many went to North America, Italy and 
Canada. Eventually the British government let a certain amount o f those they had originally displaced, enter 
Britain (see also Bowling, 1999).
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You see my father was builder, my grandfather was joinery and builder. We are 2 
trades in the family. My father has 5 brothers, all work as builder. My own brother as 
well, he is a builder.. .The work here is easy for me, its simple, the door is ready, 
everything is ready. In India and Africa we have to make everything by hand from 
timber that was coming by the rough. We have to put it in our lathe machine and do all 
the mouldings, do everything by our self.
‘Work, work, work, send for family to come over’. Chain migration processes both 
supply and restrict choices though the shape of network patterns. Migrant groups were 
not free to migrate anywhere they chose because historical, social, political and 
economic factors directed their movements. The Kutchis migrated across the globe, 
but in a pattern tied to British colonialism. In this sense, their movements were not 
global but international, framed by specific colonial nodal points.
The choices of migrant men who came to Britain after school leaving age were
usually very restricted, and the building industry was perceived as their sole option.
As one of the labourers, Michael, told me:
When I first got in the building trade? It’s so long ago I don’t know (laughs). Must be,
20 year ago I started on it. When I left school I was in a caravan factory, back home, 
mobile homes and all that. Next thing I joined the army, I went there for 3 years. Then I 
worked in the forestry for a while, at home, done that for a couple of years. That was 
the hardest job I ever done I tell ya. Then, worked in the building over here, and that’s 
where it started, doing a bit of groundwork, labouring, that’s it... I’ve not a lot of 
choice have I, hmm? But I quite like it sometimes, no pressure. Labouring you do what 
you’re told and that’s it, end of story.
DT: Why did you come over here in the first place?
Because all the family moved over here, so, they’re all over here, the whole lot of them 
except the father, he used to work for a farmer years ago, farm labourer, he done that 
for about 50 years. I been coming over here on and off for the last 20 years.
Michael moved to England simply because all his family were here. He always 
seemed a reluctant emigre, yearning for the quiet village life in which he had grown 
up. Many of the other labourers, like Mickey T, had migrated for economic reasons 
(see chapter 4), beginning the chain of migration that someone like Michael was 
diffidently pulled along on the end of. I heard similar stories concerning ‘not a lot of 
choice’ from many of the labourers. Work options in England for those from rural 
backgrounds in Ireland would have been limited. To work as a labourer, or modem 
day navvy, took a simple transfer of bodily strength from a rural to an industrial 
environment.
It should be noted that those who agreed to be interviewed, tended in the main, 
to be the more permanent workers at Keyworker House. Consequently, many of the
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more ephemeral characters were not interviewed (although I did talk to many of them 
at work), and thus my data might be skewed to a degree. These types of individual, 
like Dave the alcoholic plasterer or Dan the drug-dealing decorator, may have had 
different past and present lives than the core groups. However, this was not to say that 
the core groups had less deviant pasts than anyone else (see chapters 8 and 10). Some 
experienced very ‘rough and tough’ neighbourhoods under quite adverse family 
environments. These I term the ‘bad boys’.
Bad Boys
A substantial number of the builders grew up the sons of artisans, or for the Irish, the
sons of farmers and farm labourers. For some, like Bapu, being a builder was almost
in their blood; they did formal or informal apprenticeships, were the descendants of
long lines of tradesmen, and become tradesmen themselves. For the bad boys, things
were different. They carried chequered pasts and had ‘chanced’ their way into the
building industry by firstly working as labourers and gradually learning the skills to
become a tradesman of some sort. Aidan’s comment above that, ‘at school I was sort
of, in a way, encouraged to leave... in the wild days’, was something many of the
men shared. Stew, a painter, was one of these:
I grew up in a fuckin’ mad house. It was like before I was even 10 I fed meself and 
clothed meself. I done most of everything for meself. I mean it wasn’t bad or anything 
but to say, ‘did you have a childhood’, I didn’t, no. All this comfort, security, 
prospects, I didn’t have none of it. I just rarely get it now. My dad was in a 
rehabilitation centre when I was a kid, we lived in squats and he used to beat me mum 
up. That was due to the fact that he was fuckin’ wired you know, he was totally stoked.
I look at that and think, fuck me, sitting around and jacking up [injecting drugs], 
fuckin’ up most of your life. I watched many of my friends getting hooked, my mate’s 
mum and dad both died of AIDS through using needles, it’s a fucked up world...
The first thing I ever done was smoke a joint [cannabis cigarette] when I was 12. 
When I got to 13 I had mushrooms and then I started munching loads of microdots, 
blotters, loads of acid [LSD]. That’s fuckin’ done me great that. When I stopped taking 
them I was trippin’ for about a year and a half. In the end I thought, right I’ve gotta get 
off of this, but then one of my friends introduced me to ecstasy. Whack! I landed up on 
them. It was a totally different kettle of fish all together, I mean the shuttle didn’t land 
until about 4 years after. I was a complete space cadet. I mean, the only reason why I 
done what I done was, which is a lame excuse, I’m not making excuses, but all the crap 
I was having to deal with at home with a violent father, my mum being terrorised by 
him all the time. The only way I could get away from it was: ‘come on holiday Stew, 
come with us, all the crap makes no difference, it’s all there, all in the head, you can’t 
get away from it’. So I took bloody drugs. Obviously, I was flying, I was buzzing out 
me nut, loved every minute. But soon as you come off that, amplifies the situation, its 
ten-fold worse than it was to start with, so take more... Then there was one day when I 
was about 19, near on 20, and I was looking in the mirror and I thought, I’m fuckin’
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gone mad. So then I thought, snap out of it, and I did. That’s when I stepped in to doing 
what I started to do.
DT: How did you manage to pay for all your acid and E ’s and that when you were a 
kid?
Like I say I would go out and lash car windows, nick the stereos. That was the main 
thing I used to do at the time. As I was growing up I started to get sick and tired of me 
dad spending all his money on drugs. We were lucky to eat let alone have clothes on 
me back, so at the time, I was like 9 or 10,1 was out there smashing cars. I was going 
behind market stalls and grabbing fruit, and clothes and that. I was proper thief but I 
had to fend for myself. I’ll never go short of a few bob that’s for sure, I had a lot of 
savvy for a thief, I was like a little business man. But I started to think I might get 
nicked so leave it alone, go and get yourself a job. Mind you saying that, when I was 14 
I had more money than I do now. I wouldn’t walk round with less than 400 quid in me 
pocket. Now I’m lucky to earn that much in a fuckin’ week. But I feel better for it, 
peace of mind, its not all about money. Materialism, you can shove that up your arse, 
I’m not into it...
It got to the point where a lot of things I’d do and get away with but I was quite, I 
always, I get a guilty conscience. I’d smash a window, nick something, then I’d go 
home and analyse it and I’d think what if it was a lady with a kid and she doesn’t have 
much money. I’d feel really guilty about it. There was a couple of occasions where I 
went back, took what I’d stolen and put it back. No joke. In the end I just felt so guilty 
at what I was doing but I had to fend for myself, I needed clothes, I needed to eat, so I 
done it you know. But as I got older I started juggling [selling drugs]. I’d buy a bag of 
70 E’s, I’d eat 30 and sell the other 40. Within 4 days I’d just munch the lot. But in the 
end I just thought this is violently impractical, I’m getting nowhere. But like I say, for 
every amount of drugs that I’ve taken I’d be a rich man. Me and millions of others...
I miss those times of taking the piss and going out and earning good money for 
things that you shouldn’t be doing. I know now it’s violently not a good idea. Me being 
banged up in the cells is not gonna do me or me family any favours. So I have to strain 
me greens everyday, earn tuppence and try and live as good as I can...
So, basically, when I was a kid, well I say a kid but when I was about 19,1 was a 
tearaway and I just needed to do something to occupy my mind, so I did a City and 
Guilds in painting and decorating. Got my Guilds in that, then I left it for about a year, 
and after a while a couple of friends got me on a labouring job. So I done a bit of 
labouring, working for a plasterer. Doing that I was watching a few of the tradesmen, 
watching how they were doing things. After a while I went off working in a tyre place. 
Don’t take much to do that, fit a tyre. I stuck it out for a while, nearly 2 years. It was 
just the fact that I was only earning £130 a week. I just thought I can’t deal with that. 
So I started labouring for this bloke and then one day I was talking to the governor and 
I just turned round and said, look, I went to college and I’m a painter and decorator, 
and he said, ‘I gotta bit of work like, I’ll give you a start’. So he pulled me off the 
labouring and got me in to this little place called Marsden Villas. From there it just 
picked up. I’ve not looked back since, but I’ve always worked on and off like. 
Sometimes you just think fuck it, I don’t give a shit, but the next thing you know 
you’re back in trouble9. Like I say with this job, I don’t want to mess up any more than 
I have too. I mean with Ernie Coat, I’ve worked for him on 3 occasions, this is the 
longest I’ve ever been with him. The first couple of times I worked for him it was only 
a trial basis so there was none of that being on the cards or tax, he just wanted to see 
how I would get on with the job.
6 See Duneier (1999) for an analysis o f the ‘fuck it’ mentality, its relation to releasing people from moral binds, 
and the consequences o f this.
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Stew was one of a clique of three younger painters (late 20s-early 30s) who all grew
up in a small area of Kings Cross in central London; an area that has been and still is
residualised and stigmatised by its image as a deviant service centre. Bristles also
grew-up in this part of London, and he told me how as a child he worked as a runner
for some of the local prostitutes, fetching alcohol and cigarettes for them. The Cally
Road clique: Stew, Frank and Wayne, still lived in the area, unable to move away
even if they wanted to because of the low wages most painters earn (see chapter 10).
Frank described how he entered the building trade:
I first got into the trade though my Uncle. When I was at school I used to work with 
him weekends for some extra pocket money. When I left school he set me on as a 
labourer. Crap money and I had to do more work than anybody else because, relatives, 
family, you know what I mean? Then from there I went to dispatch to do van driving, 
then I went back to labouring on the building sites. Then, what was it, then my brother 
was working for a painter. He wanted a painter just for the one night so he asked me to 
come in and I was there 4 years. One nights work, 4 years! This was, must be going 
back about 10 years ago now. Then, well he sold up the firm, and after that I did more 
building site work, talked to Freddie and [his son] Wayne.
DT: How'dyou know Freddie?
Through Wayne. We grew up together me and Wayne, his mum and dad used to look 
after us when my mum was out working, used to baby sit for us, and they brought us up 
basically. My fuckin’ dad was always pissed-up [drunk] you know. Yeah so, Freddie 
always looks out for me. He always has, he always says if there’s any work coming up 
and I’m not working he’ll give me a bell [phone him up]. And then like, spoke to 
Freddie one day and he said, ‘there’s a job going with Ernie Coat’s at Hammersmith’.
So I’ve been with them ever since. I bought Stew over, got him the job, basically it’s, 
you know what I mean, it’s just like getting in contact with people innit.
Frank’s friendship with Freddie had got both Frank and Stew their jobs with Ernie 
Coat. Again and again, people’s family and friendship networks enabled them to find 
work. For people like Frank and Stew, whose fathers spent much of their lives 
intoxicated and out of work, individuals such as Freddie who ‘always look out for 
me’, provided a vital informal link into work. Freddie was analogous to the ‘old 
heads’ whom performed similar functions in North American low-income black 
neighbourhoods (see Wilson, 1987). Informal routes into work were particularly 
important for Frank because he perceived he could not afford to pay income tax on his 
wages (see chapter 10) and only an informal and trusted link with Ernie Coat enabled 
him to work in this way. Informal recruitment methods also permitted the Cally Road 
clique to work within their own friendship group. They lived and worked in an 
exceptionally insecure world and their clique provided a protective layer of security.
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However, it also created problems because they were almost continually falling-out
for various reasons (see chapter 10).
Stew’s story highlighted that he left his entrepreneurial work in the informal
economy because of his feelings of guilt and shame concerning his unorthodox
occupation (c.f. Braithwaite, 1989). He also became head of his own family, for
whom he felt a great responsibility. The strong associations between the family and
mainstream conformity were something that many of the builders experienced (see
chapter 8). In relation to this, I describe the biography of another bad boy, Jamin, the
carpentry and general foreman. Jamin’s story illustrates how job networks and
families were powerful sources of social control:
I was doing A levels: maths, computer science and physics, yeah-serious boy! I was 
well on my way, but women and wine, and that was the end of college. My dad was 
very strict, right up until I was about 23, 24. And it was my own fault in a way, I can’t 
really blame him. I was going to college and I took the freedom for granted you know?
I used to bunk off college and go drinking and fucking and all that shit. My dad just got 
pissed off and he said, ‘right that’s it, if you don’t want to go to college tell them you’re 
not coming in and come to work with me’. About 8 months I worked with my dad in 
the factory when he hauled me out of college. He tried to train me up [as a goldsmith] 
but he just wanted me to keep out of trouble basically. I was getting into all kinds of 
fuckin’ trouble. I would have ended up in jail man.
DT: What kind of stuff were you doing?
Stupid stuff. Fucking puffing [smoking cannabis] and I had mates who did robberies 
and that, went in jail. I must have visited every jail in fucking London: Rochester, 
Feltham, Henley on Thames, fucking Isle of Sheppey. Sheppy’s the most depressing 
place. Yeah, I was lucky to escape from going to prison man. It’s a phase you go 
through isn’t it? You just want to be out with the lads don’t you? And your dad’s 
telling you, ‘don’t go out, don’t go out’, and you’re thinking, why can’t I go out and 
have fun? Looking back on it he was fucking 100 percent right. Yeah, but it’s one of 
them things, as I say everybody goes through a funny patch and a phase. Luckily I 
escaped from it without too much damage. And as you get older you settle down more 
and more don’t you? Get into the work mode. I was always good at work, I never ever 
had days off, right up to today, right from day one. Never late for work, regular as 
clockwork, still am actually, which is something I’m proud of man...
So I was with the wrong crowd, that didn’t help, I fucked it up. I left study and I 
didn’t really want to go back. It’s funny though, I wouldn’t mind going back now, do a 
few courses here and there, but time and money you know what I mean? So I left 
college, worked with my dad, then did nothing for about 6 months, started getting little 
jobs here and little jobs there, furniture store and all that sort of rubbish. My mate was 
in the building game and he was boasting like, ‘I’ve been at work and I’ve dug a hole a 
metre deep and that long’. I said, ‘so fucking what’? He said, ‘I bet you couldn’t do it’.
So I thought, ‘all right let’s go mate’. And I went there, and that was it, here I am 
today...
I started off labouring, proper labouring; digging holes, cement mixing and 
concreting, proper building you know. At that time [in the early 1980s] building was 
booming, you could just literally walk on and get a job. My mate was working in this 
place, a little firm it was and they were doing council [local authority] houses up. So he
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took me along. We were earning about £18 a day, and I was a good grafter man by 
anybody’s standards. And I just carried on from there, labouring, labouring, watching, 
labouring. I don’t really like moving round so much but I went where the money was 
and did that for about 2 years I think it was, slowly got my tools together, and then sort 
of became a chippy.
DT: In the sense that you were labouring, how did you learn chippying?
Well when I was labouring, there was a lot of chippies on site, as there is here. I was 
watching them, giving them a hand, working with them, talking to them, mucking in a 
little bit, seeing how they do it. Eventually I got the confidence, got me tools together, 
phoned up the agency and said, I’m a chippy. No one ever really found out that I’m not 
a chippy as such, I did quite well, did quite well. Never ever got thrown off a job, 
never. And that’s how I got into the building thing really...
I did quite a long time with the agencies, must have done about 2 years with them, 
floating round here and there. And then I got onto a firm, Hillpark Builders. They were 
like a subby, they weren’t an agency, a proper firm you know, got in with them. And I 
did about a year and half with them and then moved on to another company. The 
recession came in 1990/91, no work about. So I did a bit of cabbing for a while, about 3 
months, 6 months, and then slowly got back into chippying when the work picked up. 
Never looked back since, no, never had time out man, never had time out since then. 
Cabbing, that was quite fucking enjoyable. It’s too dangerous now. When I did it, I’m 
going back to when there was a recession, it was fucking dangerous then. And I also 
did it before that, just to sort of like earn extra money in the evenings, which was like 
1986/87. And a fucking good time I had doing that man; the women, freedom, going to 
parties and that, it was good.
Informal routes to becoming a tradesman were a common story, as can be seen from 
the stories of Frank, Stew, Trick, Jamin and myself (chapter 2), and, building agencies 
are a useful route to learning a skill because agency jobs are often quite unsupervised, 
and ‘agency blokes’ are commonly expected to be low skilled, or lazy (see chapter 6). 
Agencies are, then, useful areas in which to test and improve one’s skills.
In common with Frank and Stew, Jamin had moved into the building industry 
from being a bad boy. I wonder what would have happened to these, and the many 
other men like them that had similar teenage experiences, if they had not found 
themselves in the building industry? If all building workers were required to train as 
trade apprentices at colleges that (crazily) often demand formal educational 
qualifications, there would be very few tradesmen indeed. The numbers of formal or 
part-time-job apprentices would be too small to fill the void. As indicated in Fig. 5.0 
many working-class men tend not to learn the formal educational curriculum at 
school, what they learn how to ‘piss around’ and be a Tad’, or in Willis’ (1977) terms, 
they Team to labour’.
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Restructuring the economy left Britain without the mass of industrial work 
opportunities into which the ‘lads’ culture melds so well. Building sites, car 
mechanics and cab driving are perhaps the few remaining legitimate career options 
left open to ‘lads’ in contemporary Britain. The ‘no questions asked’ policy, 
workplace freedom, ephemeral career structure and heavily macho environment of the 
building site, provides a relatively comfortable and familiar way to make a living for 
many such men. The bad boy background of a substantial number of builders also 
formed a structural backdrop that impinged on building site culture in general (see 
chapter 8). ‘Ear’oles’ that come to work on building sites must also learn to labour, as 
Steve indicated above.
Formal and informal apprentices, those pushed by social change, and the bad 
boys, were all relatively culturally indistinguishable from one another on the building 
site itself. Their ensuing life trajectories were contingent upon their pasts; most 
notably upon the direction of careers officers and social networks. In the following 
chapters I examine the what and how of builders’ culture, and argue that the 
masculine edge by which it was framed made the building trade a home for the bad 
boy and for those from traditional working-class backgrounds. And of course, bad 
boys cannot be quite so bad if they are at work for most of their everyday life. 
Intelligent, energetic young men need an income and something to do. Consequently, 
the informal and unregulated nature of the building industry is part of how it recruits 
and trains building workers, and, essentially keeps them, for the most part, out of 
trouble.
Selves, Bodies and Class Cultures
Work and Personality
The informal and corporal nature of building employment practices also facilitates a 
drift into the industry by another type of person: the poor communicator. C Wright 
Mills (1951) wrote that knowledge and service work required and necessitated 
employees to perform a specific kind of personality work, and, since the majority of 
work in intensely developed nations is service based, the majority of workers must 
prostitute their personalities and be a corporate individual (see McDowell, 1995; 
Tyler and Abbott, 1998; McKinley, 2002). However, one’s personality is almost 
irrelevant to do building work. In this sense, individuals who are unable or unwilling 
to communicate or to present themselves in a corporate service manner, can at least
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work ‘on the tools’ in the building industry. This may explain why and how many of
the men were regular drug users, and how others literally never said more than a few
words to me or anyone else throughout the fieldwork period.
Frequent drug use was facilitated by the nature of building work and may provide
another ingredient as to why alcohol use is institutionalised in the building industry.
Put simply, one can do manual work with a hangover and/or under the influence of
narcotics (see also chapter 7). Aidan illustrated this in comparing his labouring work
to his previous job as a warehouse manager:
With the packaging firm it’s shirt and tie and all this business, all that hassle. Got to 
make sure your shirt’s ironed for the next day, gotta wear a different tie, what over­
jacket you gotta wear and all things like that you know. Least you can come here and 
just chuck anything on, ain’t gotta shave every day, come in smelling of beer and all 
that. Just come in do your job and that’s it.
These factors cast light on why early sociological studies of working-class men and 
boys associated drug use with ‘short run hedonism’ (Cohen, 1955; Miller, 1958). Put 
simply, the working-classes may be hedonistic simply because they are able to be so. 
Language and personality are unimportant in terms of getting a job done, although 
one must get along with his work mates or face the consequences (see Chapters 6 and 
7), and simultaneous work and drug use are possible. The non-service aspect of 
building work was further reflected in the terminology used by management and 
subcontractors who frequently referred to building workers as ‘bodies’.
Effected Bodies
A Foucauldian style of reference to the worker as a ‘body’ also reflected the builders’ 
own concerns. Their body was their capital because corporal ability was ultimately 
translatable into money (see chapter 8). Furthermore, as evidenced from the 
testimonies above, all the builders apart from Norman, the mechanical and electrical 
consultant, saw their lives as contingent upon external effects. Norman attended a 
grammar school, and this was perhaps why his narrative reflected a certain amount of 
personal choice. The narratives constructed by the quantity surveyors in chapter 3 also 
projected stories of life and career choices, and, the quantity surveyors were the only 
building group who considered themselves middle-class. Perhaps thinking of one’s 
self as middle-class also entails thinking about one’s life as guided by personal 
choices. However, it appears illusory to view one’s life as the outcome of pure 
freedom of choice because life trajectories are embedded in and contingent upon
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historical foundations and the actions of every body else. Those who possess formal 
qualifications may have some choice to at least follow the career that their 
qualifications delineate, or to choose work that requires no formal qualifications if 
they possess suitable social networks. The working-classes however, do not have such 
a wide range of choices and they know it.
The builders’ ability to negotiate formal social structure was limited by a lack 
of formal qualifications, money, high-capital networks, and other’s reactions to their 
ethnicities and cultures. They were reliant on parochial informal social networks to 
get jobs (and housing, services and goods, see chapters 9 and 10), and these networks 
were fraught by the disadvantages of their class and ethnicity. Early sociological 
research classified structural-effect narratives as ‘fatalism’ (c.f. Miller, 1958). 
However, fatalism was a realistic interpretation of lives at the bottom end of the class 
structure. The effects of poor schooling (Aidan), negligible parenting (Stew), career 
officers (Bill), technological change (Trick), and political uprising (Bapu), are largely 
out of one’s personal control.
Class-Consciousness
The builders’ political outlooks were varied, inconsistent and context-bound. Bill, for 
instance, saw himself as a socialist, but did not agree with the existence of unions. 
Mike Fixit was incredibly right wing for the most part, but supported gay marriage 
and adoption (much to the disdain of everyone else). Mickey T was a practising and 
pious Catholic, but entertained the idea that Jesus was black, and his attitudes were in 
general as liberal as my own. I could continue these examples but what I want to 
illustrate is that I found no sense of any kind of coherent or collective class-culture 
amongst the geographically dispersed and ethnically plural builders. Homogenous 
class-culture was fractured by gender and race divides, competition over jobs, and 
even distinction between the trades. For example, when I left the site office to 
participate as a painter, Steve said to me, ‘what do you want to work with them for? 
Painters are the scum of the earth’.
What the builders’ shared was the perception of their lives as being largely out of 
their control. They were lives of adaptation and reaction to distant social, economic 
and political events, and they clearly saw that. This section of the working-class 
therefore, possessed a ‘penetrative’ culture of sorts; a realism that life choices were
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structured and contingent. This did not mean they passively accepted these conditions. 
In their own ways they fought against imposing parochial powers and utilised cultural 
methods to shield against insecurities and to make life more comfortable for 
themselves. Collectively constructing reciprocal social networks was one method, 
another was their ‘on the tools’ informal culture. In the following two chapters I 
describe the methods of control and organisation of the builders working ‘on the 
tools’, their culture and their careers, and the relationships between social control and 
the builders’ informal culture.
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Chapter 6 
Indulgent Control
‘I’m digging the hole because of my workmen’
‘Your army? I thought you were the general! ’
‘Sometimes the army does the leading’
‘That’s a poor sort of general... ’
(William Golding, 1964: 39)
In this chapter I examine ‘internal’ work control. By internal, I mean the procedures 
utilised within workplaces to encourage worker acquiescence with the formal 
instrumental demands of the work process. ‘External’ work control by contrast, are 
seen as factors facilitating workplace conformity but which lie outside the workplace, 
for example, monetary provision for the family unit or a cultural work ethic. External 
work controls regulate workers but do not stem from within the workplace itself (see 
chapters 7 and 8).
Control and Deviation
Writers including Marx (1889), Weber (1930), Marcuse (1941), Braverman (1974), 
and more recently, Ritzer (1996), argue that work in capitalist societies takes on a 
dynamic that increasingly controls and structures work tasks. Commonly, the 
metaphor of the panapticopic assembly line is used to illustrate these dynamics. 
However, a number of workplace studies reveal that workers do not passively submit 
to formal control processes (see Goodrich, 1920; Mayo, 1933; Roy, 1952; Gouldner, 
1954; Dalton, 1959; Taylor and Walton, 1971; Beynon, 1973; Burawoy, 1979; 
Cavendish, 1982; Collinson, 1992; Graham, 1995). Work groups resist formal control 
and control itself is often seen to manufacture that resistance. Yet, as Hodson (2001) 
discovers, unilateral management control is not related to increased workplace 
conflict, rather that conflict is concomitant with disorganised workplaces because of 
the arbitrary nature of their control (see also, Edwards and Scullion, 1982).
Building sites are often, almost by definition, disorganised workplaces that are 
associated with worker dissatisfaction and conflict. However, this was not found to be 
the case at Keyworker House. Topbuild and their subcontractors employed many 
workers on a long-term basis, which suggested that the builders could not be totally 
dissatisfied with their workplace. Working ‘on the tools’ at Keyworker House was 
better described as an ill-organised, rather than a disorganised, workplace. Yet, I
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observed many informal work activities at Keyworker House, that is, events that took 
place during the workday but which were not associated with doing any actual work. 
These non-productive activities could be interpreted as acts of worker 
resistance/deviance but, because most of the builders derived satisfaction from their 
work (see below), the nature of their resistance was seen to be predominately related 
to structures of ‘time’ and ‘energy’, rather than the result of formal managerial control 
or workplace disorganisation.
In this chapter I describe how the builders were controlled by management and 
formal work processes, and the degree to which they conformed to, or resisted, those 
controls. I begin with the various forms of control present at Keyworker House.
Management Control
Ouchi (1980) conceptualises work as a transaction between workers and bosses. He 
suggests that three types of relations regulate work transactions: market, bureaucratic, 
and clan relations. Markets regulate employment through payment for performance of 
work tasks; bureaucracies regulate conformity through legitimate monitoring and 
prescription of work tasks; and clans regulate work tasks through normative 
processes. Ouchi maintains that clan relations exist where work tasks are ambiguous 
and cannot be closely monitored or scientifically managed. In a clan relation, 
‘transaction costs’ are reduced where formal methods of control would be difficult or 
expensive to implement, and workers possess their own ethic whereby they control 
themselves and one another through taken for granted normative formulas.
From a Marxian perspective, Etzioni (1961) also conceptualises three forms of 
managerial power which correspond closely to Ouchi’s categories: normative (clan), 
coercive (bureaucratic) and remunerative (market). From a variety of perspectives, 
then, work control can be viewed through the screen of these three main types. 
However, Ouchi’s ideas are based upon the theory of transactional exchange and he 
neglects work as a source of intrinsic satisfaction or play, and, he neglects too the 
possibility that part of the power of clan control extends from these non-transactional 
aspects of working. The oppositional bifurcation of work/play concepts is a false 
dichotomy in many contexts (see Huizinga, [1938] 1970; and chapter 7).
At Keyworker House, clan relations, or what might be termed ‘craft 
mentality’, were the most salient form of work control but all 3 types of relation 
existed simultaneously. The various trade groups differed in the type of work
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relations/controls present, but all types existed side by side within a single work team 
(c.f. Edwards and Scullion, 1982).
Control o f Management
Topbuild’s site management were quite independent of higher contractor management 
control and monitoring, but bureaucratic accounting methods and formal time 
schedules propelled their workday. They were also overseen by Mr Jaggers, the 
consultant, who, in association with Opportune Housing, held tangible and direct 
power over the site managers. This was manifest in the ‘removal’ of one of the 
managers, James, upon the request of Mr Jaggers. James was disliked because of his 
lack of enthusiasm and attention to detail. Steve, the project manager, commented on 
this arrangement:
Obviously if there’s a problem they’ll [the consultants] tell them at head office. So all 
the time it’s going all right, they fucking stay away, it’s as simple as that. And if it ain’t 
blinking working like it wasn’t with a certain person [James], they’ll ship them out, and 
that’s the way this client is. Sometimes clients are like that, if they don’t want someone 
there they’ll fucking tell you. And the attitude of our company is, which is quite right, 
we’d rather lose that member of staff than we would the business. So Topbuild either 
lose them or just put them somewhere else.
In the time preceding James’ removal it appeared that it was only he who had no idea 
he would be expelled from the job. The management knew what was going to happen, 
and as I was observing the office at this time, although not being told outright, I too 
could sense from the whispered tones and derogatory speak that James was soon to be 
dismissed. Mr Jaggers was not happy with his work, and with little or no argument 
from Topbuild’s higher management, or James’ colleagues, James was moved to 
another job1. Mr Jaggers held ultimate and final power over the administration of the 
build:
James didn’t tend to spend so much time over-seeing the works. And he trusted, using 
that operative word, the subcontractor to do the works. And on occasion the 
subcontractors let him down and that may not have happened if he was more 
conscientious. ... He didn’t do the chasing as he needed to, his credibility went down 
because the work did not make the programme, so obviously everyone’s opinion of 
him, and he may be a first class individual, went down, and that’s human nature... Now 
it may be that James is better than [another site manager] on another job, but I don’t 
want to take that risk because I can trust [the other site manager] whereas I don’t trust 
James’ performance. (Mr Jaggers)
1 The move was short lived. Topbuild did not sack James, but instead forced his resignation by ill treatment at his 
new site. James soon left Topbuild for another building company.
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Mr Jaggers' power was a very direct form of work control; it was the power of 
dismissal. This filtered down the hierarchy to the builders on the tools because they 
were self-employed and could be dismissed instantly with no notice.
Burawoy (1985) argued that work control in developed capitalism is 
characterised by hegemonic consent. However, he neglects to discuss how the ‘whip’ 
of the market still, and perhaps increasingly, anchors consent in developed 
capitalism2. Whilst workers may be controlled by clan-style work ethics, consent to 
capitalism and/or bureaucratic career discipline, it is the market that ultimately 
supports these mechanisms through the violence of dismissal; an instance of what 
Newton termed, ‘good old fashioned coercive possibilities’ (1996: 143).
Management Control o f Workers
My eldest Brother works at the car plant [in Cowley]. You watch them go into that 
factory, they go in there like they’re like robots. All go in on the hooter, all come out 
on the hooter. All clock in at the same time, all clock out at the same time. I couldn’t 
handle that. No fresh air, same place everyday, all those rules, that’s not for me.
(Mike Fixit, maintenance man)
The site management did not overtly control the actions of the builders on the tools. 
There could be little formal engineering of control, and thus it was problematic to 
observe the builders throughout their workday. In this sense, the builders had to be 
trusted to a large extent to do the work on their own initiative. Management organised 
the placement of bodies in time and space, but once they had been so placed, the 
nature of building work necessitated that the trades were free to move around their 
product applying local, heuristic knowledge onto that product (see chapter 1). 
Consequently, the builders were quite autonomous, controlling their own work tasks. 
Essentially, site management did not control the majority of the trade groups at all, 
but they were indirectly monitored and controlled by the management via their 
foremen and trade specific subcontractors.
Trade specific parts of the work were handed out to subcontractors on a fixed 
sum ‘price’. In this case, the subcontractor was controlled by market mechanisms, and
2 Burawoy maintains that the whip o f the market is characteristic o f developed capitalism. In contemporary 
advanced capitalism he argues that welfare systems and state regulation protect workers from the whip o f markets 
which assists capitalist hegemony by appearing just. However, as I have shown, builders were little protected by 
state regulations, and welfare benefits are so low as to force claimants into relative poverty. Furthermore, work is 
associated with masculinity, normality and morality. Claiming welfare benefits is therefore economically, morally 
and symbolically violent (see chapter 8). In this sense, I define violence as any act intended to cause substantial 
discomfort to another.
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therefore, he possessed an interest in getting his tradesmen to work. The subcontractor 
organised the work and workers via his trade foremen, and the foremen were 
integrated into their subcontractor’s goals through reciprocal notions of loyalty and 
wage payments (see chapter 9).
It was only the labourers and carpenters who were employed on a direct ‘day 
work’ basis. That is, Topbuild paid a fixed daily sum to the subcontractor for each 
man contracted to work at Keyworker House. Consequently, in this case, the site 
management held an interest in directly controlling the actions of the labourers and 
carpenters. Yet because of task ambiguity, the labourers and carpenters could not be 
managed directly. I will term the type of organisational control applied to the 
carpenters and labourers the ‘indulgency pattern’ (Gouldner, 1954): for the clan to 
work they would need to be ‘indulged’ in their rituals.
The Indulgency Pattern
In Patterns o f Industrial Bureaucracy, Gouldner (1954) compared the management of 
‘subsurface’ miners with ‘surface’ factory workers at a gypsum plant in North 
America. The factory workers were controlled by formal bureaucratic methods and 
clear lines of authority that tightly dictated their movements and work tasks, which 
were intended to iron out the impact of the informal shop-floor work cultures present 
in the factory. By contrast, the miners were indulged in their informal work culture. 
Indulgence took the form of managers and foremen turning a ‘blind eye’ to 
absenteeism, pilfering, and general group control over the working day. Gouldner 
argued this was the result of the miners working side-by-side, which, coupled with 
unpredictable danger, necessitated a strong informal and collective culture.
Miners risked their lives everyday, and consequently their informal whims had 
to be indulged by management. The miners’ tightly collective mode of working 
framed a culture that embraced risk and physical hardship, and, their work-group clan 
mentality, rather than formal managerial power, prompted them to work in such 
adverse conditions (see also Wicks, 2002). The culture and methods of control of the 
builders were remarkably similar to those of the miners described by Gouldner. Lines 
of authority were often confused and always negotiable, and like the miners, the 
builders expressed grievances, ‘immediately, in a face-to-face way, using unadorned, 
direct language... in forceful and eloquent detail’ (Gouldner, 1954: 111-112).
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Whilst building work can also be very dangerous, and builders must 
sometimes be encouraged to carry out risky and unpleasant tasks, I did not view this 
as the major reason for management indulgence, although the other parallels between 
these types of workers are strong. In common with the miners, builders often worked 
side by side, lived in close physical proximity to one another (although not in tight 
occupational communities in the rigid sense of the term), and they worked outside a 
career structure. A career hierarchy was closed to most of the tradesmen and labourers 
and, the career offers a powerful mechanism to promote worker conformity (see Grey, 
1995; McKinlay, 2002). The dearth of such career opportunities substantially reduced 
the coercive effects of formal work control.
Again, in common with the mines, building sites are immobile and maze-like 
areas which make observation problematic and disable modem bureaucratic power. 
As a result, the builders tended to have substantial power over formal authority rather 
than vice versa. Management and workers had thus settled upon a ‘truce’ over the 
battle for work control and the effort bargain, and the indulgency pattern was an 
outcome of that truce.
‘Butlin’s ’
The chippies for instance, they just baffle me because to me they’re just so slow. It’s 
the first time I’ve ever worked on a building site where that sort of 4.30 mentality, go 
home at 4.30, I never had that before [on my old company doing ‘new work’]. I miss 
the sort of buzz of being on a site where there’s a lot going on, you feel like there’s a 
lot of energy, things are going on and the building’s going up. Here it just seems so 
lethargic half the time. (James, site manager)
The indulgency pattern resulted in the builders describing the job as a ‘holiday camp’
or ‘Butlin’s’. The pace of work was quite slow. It was rare to see men running,
mshing or sweating like builders on large ‘new work’ jobs where almost everyone is
tightly controlled by the market, or ‘price-work’, mechanism. The multi-contingent,
uncertain, and emergent nature of ‘old work’ makes it problematic to proscriptively
cost, and consequently difficult to set specific prices for individual tradesmen’s work.
Furthermore, rushing and running on building sites are not recommended because of
the many hazards that litter the workplace, but ‘time is money’ in ‘price-work’, and
accidents and fatalities are an outcome. As Bristles, a painter, pointed out:
There’s two ways for this: health and safety will really bother you if you’re not on a 
price. If you’re working on a price you won’t even notice it. At the end of the day all 
you are looking at is the big bucks, that’s all you want. You’ll only be sensible when
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you’re on day work. When you’re on price work you think you can like twizzle like a 
ballerina and extend the length of your arms or something.
The site management were forced by regulatory bureaucracy to pay serious attention 
to health and safety issues. This, coupled with the majority of workers being paid on a 
daily rate, may be part of the reason why I never witnessed a serious accident at 
Keyworker House. Day work for most meant ‘taking their time’. In the early stages of 
fieldwork I conceptualised taking time and slow pace as a ‘natural rhythm’. However, 
I later changed my view through the nuances of field data (see chapter 7).
An extreme example of slow pace of work provided in the following 
fieldnotes:
In the afternoon [while participating with the labourers] I was sent from Keyworker 
House 1 to clean up some flats that had recently been refurbished at Keyworker House 
3. James, a site manager, escorted Aidan, Seamus and I to Keyworker House 3. We 
arrived there after a slow walk through central London across a distance of 
approximately one kilometre. James purchased some soft drinks and snacks for us all 
and instructed us to get the flats clean and tidy, and work around Bristles and an 
electrician, who were finishing the final stages of the refurbishment. I guessed that 
James was attempting to buy a little slice of loyalty because he would not be staying to 
monitor our work that afternoon and no foreman was present. James left, saying he 
would return in two hours.
We were soon joined by the two maintenance men, Mike Fixit and Will. We 
began to chat and clean the carpets, kitchen and bathroom surfaces in a leisurely 
manner. I entered one of the rooms to vacuum the floor and found the electrician asleep 
on a sofa, the Sun newspaper balanced upon his head to shield the light from his eyes. 
Aidan tapped me on the shoulder and jocularly whispered to me to try to be quiet as not 
to wake the electrician. I said ‘sorry mate, didn’t mean to disturb you’, and left the 
room. We all began to joke about this, finding it quite hilarious. Comments such as, 
‘Darren wants to see how building jobs are managed hey’, ‘this is a proper Topbuild 
job this one’, ‘he’s doing a tidy job on those electrics in there’, became the focus of our 
talk. The labourers began to tell extraordinary stories about other Topbuild jobs where 
they had skived, or witnessed others skiving work.
We all went into the ‘electrician’s room’ to sit down, smoke cigarettes, continue 
‘the crack’, and devour the remaining drinks and snacks that James left for us. We 
whispered, still messing around. The electrician woke up, saying, ‘Can’t a man get a 
decent sleep around here’? And jokes were exchanged. Will began to read volubly from 
advertisements in the Daily Sport for free sex from middle-aged women and swinging 
couples. Pat continued to vacuum, occasionally peering around the door and winking. 
Mike Fixit proceeded to ‘wind up’ Will, saying he should find himself a ‘real woman’ 
and see what sex was really like. It took two to have sex he said, it wasn’t something 
you did alone in your bedroom.
Bristles informed us he was going to the shop to buy some cigarettes. We never 
saw him again that day, and we all began to speculate whether James would really 
return to the job. We thought he probably would not but could not be sure. Will argued 
that James always played squash on Wednesdays, so he wouldn’t be back at all. We 
began to talk about ‘getting off early, and Seamus said, ‘fuck it, I’m going down the 
pub’. Will and Mike Fixit said they would take a very slow walk back to Keyworker 
House 1, and I said I would join them. We walked leisurely through central London,
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looking in the shops and at the passing women. Will told me about his sexual conquests 
and prowess, whilst verbally harassing women on the street. (Adapted from fieldnotes)
This was an extreme example of slow work-pace and time banditry which took place 
in the afternoon when the trades generally did little work, but similar things occurred 
all over Keyworker House. The housing management reported one of the electricians, 
Jimmy J, to the site management, for being found asleep at work on more than one 
occasion. Jimmy J was not sacked but warned by Bill, the mechanical and electrical 
foremen, to sleep somewhere more secret if he was going to sleep at work at all. 
Butlin’s it was not, but there were solid reasons for the builders using such a 
metaphor.
Attitudes and Managers
Steve, the project manager, talking about the labourers, illustrated how the indulgency 
pattern operated:
You can soon read people and how they’re going to perform for you if they’re on day 
work and, you know, and obviously, labourers. I know they do a bit of hanging around, 
a bit of swinging the lead every now and then, but I try and keep men I trust around me. 
And then when I want that little bit of extra, in fact I know I’m going to get it, and they 
ain’t going to grumble or complain. Because it’s an awkward one again, you know, 
labour in general. I’ve been on jobs that aren’t mine, just been there to help out and 
[labourers] they’re wandering around, standing leaning on the shovel and having the 
crack. You know, and I know you know, Pat and Patrick over there, James had to have 
the pits dug out and I know there was an element of that game. It’s frustrating because 
Kevin [quantity surveyor] sees it and gets the hump. But I say, what am I fucking 
supposed to do, hold their hands? You’ve got to try and give people a bit of trust. And 
they don’t do it twice to me generally, they just won’t work for me again, you know, 
it’s as simple as that. Not in a confrontational way, but I just don’t want them near me 
if they’re not going to tow the line. I put a good effort in, why the fuck shouldn’t 
everyone else? I’m not on price work but I put my bollocks into the job so I expect, not 
that everyone puts 200 percent in, but at least 95 percent... I think they do it generally, 
but that I think is resulted in me, I don’t mind having a laugh and a crack and having a 
wind up and a joke, but when it’s work it’s work. And they’re not dealing with a Hitler, 
but even so said, someone that’s quite light hearted, I don’t mind talking about the 
family and kids, but we do want some work done...
You have to strike relationships up here. People say, ‘oh you got to distance 
yourself, wear a tie’ and fucking all that, ‘you’re the boss and they’re not’. But people 
resent that and they don’t, they fucking won’t work for you. And they think ‘he’s a cunt 
he is, he can’t talk, he’s always fucking saying put your [hard] hat on, no standing 
around’, you know. I don’t know quite what the word is, but it’s mixing it really. I 
think that works. A lot of people say it doesn’t, but in my history it works. You treat 
people with respect, they treat you with respect, that’s mutual. And then you do get the 
job done, and if you don’t, you just have a jolly up [drink up] with them, and they 
know if they’ve upset you, and they think ‘oh fuck I shouldn’t have done that, I’ve 
upset him, I didn’t want that, he’s all right’.
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Steve knew the labourers did not work ‘flat-out’ all day long, and he was reluctant to 
become authoritarian towards them. But, by indulging their informal clan mentality he 
maintained a workforce that was loyal and reciprocal, or ‘mutual’, when he really 
needed them to be3. He saw it would be unprofitable to apply unilateral pressure 
because they would not continue to work for him. Furthermore, putting pressure on 
them was difficult because it was problematic to observe them; Steve could not ‘hold 
their hand all day’. Even if he could observe and place pressure on them, because of 
open access to most building jobs, they would be able to leave the site and go to 
another job if labour was in demand. It was co-operation that the management 
demanded, not control.
Aidan explained part of how the mutual indulgency system worked from his
perspective as a labourer:
This is how I like it, people we’re working with you see, like the management team talk 
to us on first name terms. Because you can go on other sites and what they do is look 
down through their noses at you, you know what I mean? Cos there's a lot of snobbery 
in the building game you know. They sort of think, ‘labourer you’re a shit’ and all this 
business. But not with Steve and James and Pete, they muck in with us, have a joke and 
a laugh you know. There’s a lot of people in the building that sort of, they think they 
are above you, which there’s no need for it... What you gotta acknowledge, I find sort 
of, if someone’s passing you in the corridor, ‘morning, alright’, acknowledge someone 
you know... Its like young Bobby [trainee quantity surveyor], I got to know him over at 
the Hackney job. First day I met him he says ‘you see all that rubbish over there, I’m 
not trying to tell you what to do but is there any possibility of moving it out the way?’ I 
says, ‘yeah no problem’, and then gradually I got to know him, then we became sort of 
buddies you know. That’s what I like to be like, that’s like a relationship. Then you get 
in to banter and all this business. You know how to take Steve now, sort of being 
friendly, leam the ropes you know.
Aidan disliked what he perceived as snobbery, and to being told, as opposed to being
asked, what to do. If management did not conform to these expectations, conflict
could arise, and, on building sites, conflict cannot be contained by bureaucratic or
despotic methods. Furthermore, as Sennett and Cobb (1972) point out, social class
may entail symbolic injuries; no one wants to be seen as ‘a shit’ by virtue of their
manual job. As Mike Fixit explained:
Steve and James, they’re not bad people to work for are they? It’s not like ‘I’m a site 
manager and you’re a labourer’ is it? It’s like you’re all friends. You take the piss out 
of them, they take the piss out of you... They get more [work] done on these jobs for
3 In my experience it would be rare to find such ‘indulgent’ management in the building industry. However, on 
building sites where management and their foremen attempted to control their workers without respect for them 
(usually control by aggression and threat), the builders would collude to do substantially less work than the 
workers at Topbuild. In addition, I only observed one act of industrial sabotage at Topbuild, whereas sabotage was 
common on other building sites where there was little respect and reciprocation.
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the simple reason it’s the way they treat everyone. There’s none of this them and us. If 
you’ve got somebody that’s, I mean if you ask anybody that’s worked in the building 
game say 20 -  30 years ago, you used to get the gangerman [foreman] would sneak 
round comers and watch what you were doing, make sure you’re not stopping and 
talking. They’d be patrolling the building site trying to catch you out. And in those 
days if you were caught talking and having a cigarette, that’s it, you were gone. 
Whereas on these sites if they see you standing and talking, 9 times out of 10 they’ll 
come and join in the conversation. I think they’re, I mean, all the Topbuild jobs I’ve 
been on, they’ve been no different, you think nothing [work] is being done but they 
must be doing something right because they keep getting more work. I think they get 
more out of the men because they show the men real respect and if you got their respect 
they’ll give you it in return... It’s like Steve and James, they say can you do this for 
them. They ask you to do something almost as a favour, but you get some people and 
they are ordering you to do it, do this, do that. That don’t wash with me.
If the boss is being an arsehole I’ll start looking for another job, simple as that... 
sod him. I’m here to do a day’s work and if I can’t get to do my day’s work without 
him standing behind me watching me or chasing me up every five minutes... I give 
them what I’m paid for. I’m not working harder for my money, I’m not working less 
for my money. They pay me X amount of money for the day and I give them that 
amount of work. That’s the way I look at it anyway. I don’t rush around because I’m 
not paid to rush around... Everybody could do with more money, but no, I’m quite 
happy with what I get. I give them just enough to cover the money they pay me. If they 
want me to do more then they have to pay me more, simple as that.
Mike espoused a ‘fair day’s work for a fair day’s wages’. He possessed his own quasi- 
calculable work ethic that echoed Ouchi’s conceptualisation of work as a transaction. 
He also commented that the management would ask the men to do things rather than 
tell them, ‘sort of as a favour’, and, because he was treated with respect he was 
willing to do an amount of work which he considered to be in line with his wages. In 
this sense, market control, whilst being coercive through the violence of dismissal, 
was also constructive through its being framed by a ‘fair day’s work for a fair day’s 
pay’. However, Mike also said he enjoyed his work, and therefore, his work was not 
solely a pecuniary transaction but one possessing intrinsic value (see chapter 7).
The labourers accepted the right of the managers to manage if they were indulged in 
their informal culture and awarded what they saw as ‘respect’. As Burawoy (1979) 
points out, it is not hierarchy per se that frames worker conflict but, the way in which 
it is administered (see also Edwards and Scullion, 1982; Hodson, 1992). In this 
respect, management hierarchy is hegemonic in intensively modem societies - its 
existence unquestioned. If managers managed in a way in which enabled workers to 
feel respected for their labour, status injuries did not surface and conflict remained 
dormant. However, if management did not adhere to the mles of the indulgency 
pattern, conflict surfaced, as Bill, the mechanical and electrical foreman, told me:
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Then you get someone like John [junior site manager], now I don’t know how you get 
on with him, he’s probably, well I don’t really know him, but he’s a right bombastic 
little bastard. And I get on with anyone normally, but him? It’s just when people turn 
round and say, ‘I want it done now’. Normally I’d do it, I’d say all right, yeah I’ll do it. 
But when you get people saying, ‘I want it done now’, you won’t do it. I won’t follow 
his orders, I’ll try anything just to get up his nose, but it’s just the way he is. It’s why 
people like that, whether they get on or not in life, they won’t get on in the buildings.
Bill was referring to the junior site manager who administered the small job at 
Keyworker House 3. By being ordered to do something, Bill’s stubborn independence 
surfaced, and he would ‘try to do anything just to get up his nose’. If management 
administered orders without respect for workgroup culture, their hegemony broke 
down.
All of the labourers acquiesced in the legitimacy of management hierarchy. 
However, the tradesmen’s situation was slightly different because they were almost 
completely autonomous, and site management were virtually invisible to them. Such 
invisibility either made management a non-issue or engendered some negative 
attitudes. This negativity was apparently due to a lack of understanding concerning 
the work the management actually did, and it centred most frequently around the 
imposition of formalised bureaucratic rules onto the tradesmen’s work-day.
Formalised managerial impositions had particularly strained the relationships
between management and the mechanical and electrical workers. This was partly the
result of the organisational alliances that occurred between the various building
parties whereby Assured Consultants and Sparks M and E shared a network relation
(see chapters 3 and 9). Trick expressed this strain:
There seems so many office bods, and everybody you get in an office it seems that 
they’ve all got to establish some sort of paperwork routine. The reason that is, at the 
end of the day, when you get to the bottom line, is that they’ve got to make themselves 
indispensable. Now if they start some little scheme off where they say, ‘Trick, 
everyday I want you to write in what you did there and then go and put it over there’, I 
mean they’re gonna stamp it and put into a file, and they’ve started this little chain 
going haven’t they... Everybody likes to get a bit of paper stamped and cleared, 
nobody bothers to look at the bit of paper to think, all this is, is did he clean the toilet 
out. What the fuck does it matter? Do you know what I mean? A lot of it is just 
nonsense... I don’t have to see office side of things, I mean I’d love to see sometimes. I 
think I’d love to see what’s on these bits of paper and how important they are. I don’t 
say it’s all their fault because I suppose they’re being asked by the customer who wants 
a price for this and a price for that and a schedule for it all. And then the client don’t 
like the price or they don’t like the schedule and then it’s ‘oh, can you redo it’. So 
there’s that side of it for them. It’s not do it once and the customer likes it, they’ve 
probably got to do it three or four times. But bits of paper ain’t building the bloody 
thing is it.
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Trick conceded that the ‘paper chase’ might not have been ‘all their fault’, but he 
could not understand why so many management were on site who were essentially 
unproductive in building something. This was particularly apparent towards the 
completion of the first year of the works where there were literally ‘more chiefs than 
Indians’ on site.
Only one of the builders, Bristles, expressed an entirely anti-management 
attitude:
I am a firm believer in this and I will stand by it 100 percent: it’s always been them 
and us. And this most probably goes back to when I was stabbed in the back at Fleet 
Street, where I would never trust anyone in a tie. In the office, them and us, always. 
I’ve always said this, I wouldn’t trust them. Steve, I would not trust him, I would not 
trust that man with nothing. I wouldn’t trust him with my time keeping if I had a half a 
day off, I wouldn’t trust him not to tell Emie Coat that I took a bit of paint home. I 
wouldn’t trust that man, that is a career Topbuild man.
DT: But then Jamin works in the office and he comes walking in the canteen when 
you ’re skiving and you just mess about with him?
Jamin ain’t got a shirt and tie on has he? No, no, no, he’s not one of those, he never will 
be. I think deep down he’d like to be but I don’t think he ever will be. Because, well in 
that office he wouldn’t be, cos I think they’re erm, they’re too far up their own arse and 
they are racist... Like they are the bullies of the playground, especially when Steve and 
Kevin get together. Who the fuck do they think they are? I really do treat people as I 
find them. He could be a one-legged China man with dirty dark skin but if he’s all 
right, he’s all right by me.
Bristles expressed disdain for ‘anyone in a tie’, consequently he would not trust Steve 
to indulge him in time banditry and pilfering because he saw Steve as embroiled in a 
career. However, Bristles’ concerns were unfounded because Steve did indulge the 
workgroups in many of their informal desires, and he had no appetite to ascend the 
building career ladder any further than he already had done. Steve considered himself 
to be ‘site’ with an aversion to working in Topbuild’s ‘dead and stuffy’ head office. 
Furthermore, the indulgency pattern became more pronounced as one ascended the 
building ranks where relationships between the various parties were characterised by 
long-term personal ties, informal favours, and closed information networks (see 
chapter 9). Bristles’ disdain was, then, embedded (reflexively) in his own prejudices, 
and not in the actuality of relations on the site itself. It would seem that Bristles’ past 
experiences and, I would argue, the invisibility of the managers to his autonomous 
work as a painter, had framed his attitude. Steve was not unaware of this lacuna in 
understanding, and it agitated him:
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It’s a very, very complicated job you know. I don’t think a lot of people realise what’s 
involved in what I do. There’s a lot of things going on here [in the office], and to 
actually co-ordinate it, even down to the labour, where the bloody labour goes, you 
know... There’s men out on site and you think ‘fuck I must go and see them’, and you 
don’t. But they’re thinking, ‘he don’t give a fuck about what’s happening out here, he’s 
probably sitting in there swanning it up’. There is an element of that, but there is a lot 
of work going on you know, and sometimes you can’t get out [on site]. That’s where 
the building industries fucked, site managers stuck in the office and the general 
foreman runs the job.
Direct Day-Works
Labourers
I quite like it sometimes, no pressure. Labouring you do what you’re told and that’s it, 
end of story... I do enjoy it for the crack. We have a good crack don’t we? (Michael)
So, labourers, all right they don’t earn the money they should earn, but then again in 
my mind, you can turn it off [tape recorder] now, they are too fucking stupid anyway. 
Yeah but we [painters] don’t work, you know what I mean, we do fuck all, labourers 
really have to work.
Let me explain myself to you. They work, they take the shit, all right say the 
painters. A painter is one above the food chain right, and labourers are one below him.
A painter can tell a labourer what to do. Now these men are not stupid in their minds, 
some of them are very intelligent people, and I mean very intelligent, but they just can’t 
handle the pressure. A labourer just plods along. In the mind it’s not academically 
taxing or anything like that, but they have got the brain and they can do it. I mean, you 
see labourers doing bloody Times crosswords. It’s that they just can’t handle, maybe 
deadlines, a labourer don’t have any deadlines; two bags of sand this week, I might do 
one; need to sweep up, I’ll do it next week. I mean you’ve got on our site, what have 
you got, Michael, Aidan and Danny for instance. All right, I don’t know much about 
Michael, I haven’t worked with him. I spoke to him a couple of times, but this is 
nothing to do with personality or anything, I think he is a nice bloke I really do. Erm 
Aidan, see I don’t know Aidan at all, but to me I think he could do a lot more than be a 
labourer... he just don’t want to, he just wants to plod along. Danny was bom to be a 
gangerman. The midwife when she picked him up and slapped him, he most probably 
slapped her back and said ‘get back to work, a bit more production please’. (Bristles)
The labourers worked longer hours than the tradesmen, and the sheer physical nature 
of their work meant they also worked harder. Their position of being under orders, as 
opposed to in control of their own work tasks, meant they were regularly tied into a 
web of command issuing from foremen and management. This was manifest in the 
positioning of the labourers’ tea-room next to the site office in both Keyworker House 
1 and 2. From this position, management could closely monitor the labourers working 
and break hours. However, even under such close observation, the labourers did not 
work for formally specified work times. Starting work slightly late, drawing out 
breaks, and finishing slightly early was a kind of formal/informal rule.
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On my first day of labouring, Aidan verbally instructed me on the unofficial
working hours. Time-talk of this kind is common amongst builders, and discovering
the unofficial work times is part of the first-day-on-the-job banter. I do not remember
ever working on a day-work building site where full official hours were worked.
Aidan described how knowledge of informal work hours was elicited and transmitted:
When I first started I like to suss things out. I’ll say, what time do you go to tea and all 
this business yeah. I roughly know what it’s like, but you don’t really know. Like I’d 
never met Danny before. I’m thinking, does he let us in before 10 [for tea break], or 
does he let us in here just after 10 you know. Sort of, the proper time’s half 7 till half 
past 4, but then you find out the crack and say, what sort of time do you get away? It’s 
like the first week I was here, I’d been paid yeah, I’d started on the Monday and started 
sussing it out. So I wanted to go to the bank and I hadn’t seen Patrick [a fellow 
labourer] for a couple of months, so we were going for a drink. What I done was I left 
about twenty to 10, went around the bank and err, paid me money in, went to Benjy’s 
[sandwich shop] as well. Then I come back, back before 10. Come in, sat there, 
where’s the nearest bank I says (laughs), and everyone’s telling me ‘it’s up there’ and 
all this business. And that Phil I fell out with, one of those fellows yeah, he said to me 
‘I’ll show you’, and I says, I just wanted to know where it was, when I’d already been 
you know. I didn’t want him to know I’d been. Then me and Patrick got a few pints in 
at lunchtime. Danny don’t mind, he goes for a drink himself.
The labourers, including Danny, the labour foreman, would begin work at 7.45/50 
rather than the official 7.30. They would leave to ‘go to the shop’ at least 15 minutes 
before each break time, and finish their breaks 15 minutes late. They would also begin 
to ‘get ready’ to go home almost half an hour before they were officially supposed to 
leave, and they almost always left 15 minutes early. Site management were aware of 
this but they indulged them, handed out concessions to manufacture a reciprocal and 
thus consenting relationship. Also, all of the trades were ‘well away’ by four o’clock, 
having shorter work hours than the labourers. For the labourers, then, time 
concessions seemed ‘only fair’. In a similar vein, Danny tolerated lateness. One of the 
labourers, Patrick, was regularly late and hungover. Danny would simply tell him, in 
his avuncular manner (despite being much younger than Patrick), to try to be on time 
tomorrow, ‘because Steve will start to say something’. Patrick was also found asleep 
on one occasion. Aidan told me that he had a ‘big one’ the night before.
To facilitate management control of the labourers, Danny was issued with a 
two-way radio through which he received orders from site management and general 
foremen. This functioned to deal with some of the difficulties occasioned by the 
nebulous physical space of the building that blocked lines of command. Danny spent 
much of his day moving around the building, monitoring where his labourers were 
and what they were doing. He seemed to have a peculiar talent of appearing
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seemingly from nowhere saying, ‘please, please, let’s have some production’ in his 
distinctive Donegal accent, when the labourers were ‘leaning on shovels’ and ‘having 
the crack’. Often we would hear his radio or spot him before he spotted us and we 
would jump to performing our work (see chapter 7). Of course Danny could not 
always find us. Keyworker House contained numerous areas in which to hide, and the 
labourers possessed an armoury of excuses to justify their disappearance or inactivity: 
‘I had to go to the bank’, or, ‘I had to go to the shop to get some fags’, being almost 
institutionalised in builder-speak to mean almost anything but having been to the bank 
or shop. Alternatively, ‘I couldn’t find a barrow’, or, ‘we hit loads of rocks digging 
this out’, as excuses for having done little work. Even the fact the builders were 
informally allowed to leave work and go to the shop or bank revealed they were 
afforded a certain amount of autonomy.
Danny could not be continually present to monitor the labourers. When he was 
present, it was often to ‘muck in’ and ‘do a bit’ with ‘his lads’. In this respect, 
foremen were subject to most of the same work pressures as the troops, and more (see 
below). However, when Danny was not alongside the labourers they would work at 
their own rate; if holes were to be dug and debris transported to the skip, they would 
‘take their time’ (see chapter 7).
The labourers’ work was not always slow-paced, sometimes there was a large 
element of what was termed ‘hurry up’ (see again chapter 7). A hole would need to be 
dug ‘now’, because for instance, the screeder would be arriving that afternoon to fill 
the hole. Or a ‘waiting load’ skip would have to be filled as fast as possible because 
the skip was specified and paid for only for a short duration. During these times, the 
labourers worked fast and hard, and, as Steve said above, ‘when I need them to do 
something for me, they do it’. The labourers informally knew this was the protocol 
and were implicitly aware they could lose their concessions if they failed to observe 
the rules of the game. As Aidan already quoted above explained, ‘You know how to 
take Steve now, sort of being friendly, learn the ropes you know’.
Hard-paced work could turn into masculinity contests. Each man would try to 
outwork the next or at least keep-up with the group. The contests were maintained by 
piss-takes; slights that somebody or another was not ‘pulling his weight’. Even the 
older men performed their strength in these contexts, and masculinity was, in this 
sense, a form of work control, albeit an informal and group imposed one that was 
external to the work process itself (see chapters 7 and 8).
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Although it was problematic to directly control the labourers, they did 
experience the coercive effects of the possibilities of observation (c.f. Foucault, 
1977). When Steve was not on site, the perceived pressure of his authority was 
positively reduced and the labourers would become more relaxed in their work. This 
did not mean they became undisciplined when authority was absent. For example, 
during my participation as a labourer, Danny went on holiday to Ireland for two 
weeks. Our effort and hours of work remained the same during his absence: we just 
worked in a more relaxed manner. This was an effect of the labourers’ reciprocal 
clan-type work transactions; we really could be trusted to carry out the work 
unsupervised.
Carpenters
The carpenters and joiners are the top-hats of the building trade... the elite among
operative builders (Booth, 1895:72. Italics original)
Akin to labouring work, much of the carpentry was almost impossible to plan 
prospectively. It was difficult to estimate a lump-sum cost for the work and the 
carpenters were therefore paid directly by the day by their subcontractors but 
remained answerable to Topbuild’s site management on a daily basis. Their work 
varied from the labourers in that they were more autonomous and not continually 
under orders. For example, they would be instructed which doors to fit or windows to 
replace, and they would undertake this work in their own time and under their own 
control. They were overseen by the general foreman who spent perhaps half his time 
working in the site office and the other half instructing ‘his chippies’ and overseeing 
all the other trades. In this sense, the general foreman extended the power of 
management to the carpenters and others, but in doing so, he simultaneously defused 
some of that power. The general foreman was a member of the same ethnic group as 
the carpenters, and had known many of them throughout his life. He was entwined in 
the social pressures and loyalties of a close-knit ethnic network and thus held a strong 
allegiance to the carpenters (see chapter 9).
Jokes concerning the carpenters’ slow pace of work were common. It was an 
image that enraged one of the site managers, who was also very racist. During the 
move to Keyworker House 2, the carpenters were consequently instructed to take their 
breaks in the labourers’ canteen that adjoined the site office. The racist site manager 
wanted to check their work times, and he began to enforce formal working times. All
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this occurred near to the time of my leaving Keyworker House, but it was evident that 
it was already beginning to promote dissent amongst the carpenters. Arguments 
occurred, and one of the carpenters informed me that he was now looking for another 
job because of the actions of the ‘fuckin’ bastard’ site manager.
The site manager refused to indulge the carpenters’ informal culture and a 
backlash was beginning to form over the location of the frontier of work control 
(Goodrich, 1920). Conflict ensued and the carpenters began to slow down their work- 
rate further, defaulting on the effort bargain. In response, the site manager employed 
two agency carpenters to ‘prove’ the Kutchis were slow. This, much to the enjoyment 
of the Kutchis, backfired because the ‘agency blokes’ worked at an even slower rate. I 
commented to Jamin that I thought one of the ‘agency blokes’ had died whilst 
repairing one of windows because I had not seen him move for thirty minutes. Jamin 
said, ‘that’s the best fuckin’ thing that fat cunt’s [racist site manager] done since he’s 
been here, getting those agency blokes in’. It looked liked the Kutchis were winning 
the battle just as I left the field.
This story illustrated a number of factors. Firstly, to take away workers’ 
informal concessions was counterproductive; it only functioned to slow them down 
even more. Builders possess a high degree of autonomy due to the problematic nature 
of observation and because they feel that they can always get another job somewhere 
else (especially at the time of the fieldwork when a building ‘boom’ was occurring). 
Secondly, administering indulgence is contingent upon the political views of the 
administrator i.e. if a manager has antipathy towards an employee or group of 
employees, he is unlikely to indulge them. And thirdly, building workers paid by the 
day must be trusted and reciprocated for their work. ‘Agency blokes’ are widely 
known in the building trade for being slow, unskilled and lazy. This is partly because 
they owe no allegiance to anyone; they are employed short-term, on a low(er) wage 
rate, and thus are not pulled by loyalty towards any kind of reciprocal clan relation 
with a core work group, subcontractor or site manager (see chapter 9).
Indirect Day-works
All of the other trades, except the carpenters and labourers, were employed by their 
subcontractor on a fixed price. This did not mean that the subcontracted employees 
were working on a fixed price themselves because their subcontractor paid most by 
the day. In this work relation, it was the subcontractor, and not Topbuild’s site
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management, who held an interest in securing an effort bargain from the workers. As I 
noted in chapter 4, the subcontractors organised jobs on other sites all around London. 
They could not then be at the job observing their workers all the time and had to a 
large extent to trust their workers to work to an efficient speed and quality. Below I 
shall use the example of the painting group to illustrate how the indirect day-work 
mechanism operated.
Painters
The painters form perhaps the most disorganised and composite group in the building 
trade, not excepting the labourers. The chief explanation of this is found in the 
character of their work, for the class includes many kinds of operatives, from the 
‘brush-hand’ who has picked up a certain knack, and who may be anything (or nothing) 
from a sailor to a waiter or a scene-shifiter; or from the mere hanger-on, supported by 
his wife’s earnings when he has no painting job on hand, to a highly skilled decorator, 
who, constant to the craft of which he is master, would consider it an indignity to be 
ranked with the industrial gadabouts who call themselves his fellow craftsmen. (Booth, 
1895:79)
I joined the painters at the beginnings of the ‘Year 2’ work at Keyworker House 2, to 
decorate the external face of the building. I had been a participant observer with the 
labourers and in the site office previous to this time and, after my first day with the 
painters, I wrote:
It was very hot today and I found the work quite tiring, but the day just flew by, it 
seemed like half a day. In a way it was a short day, as we didn’t start until about 8 am 
and were off the scaffold by 3 pm. Bony said, ‘officially’ we finish at 4. We started 
later and finished earlier than both the labourers and the chippies. (Fieldnotes)
The painters’ official work hours were from 7.30 until 4. Every morning we would 
begin to organise our tools and materials at 8. By 9.45 we were walking off the 
scaffold to go to the shop to buy our breakfasts. At 10.30 we went back out to the 
scaffold. At 12.45 we would ‘down tools’ for our lunch, and at 1.30 we would go 
back to work. The painters’ informal work-times were always regular, and Jimmy, the 
painting foreman, did not like these to be broken. However, finishing times in the 
afternoon tended to vary, and the afternoon was always a leisurely affair because 
bodily energy and concentration were depleted during the morning. Most commonly 
we went to ‘put our tools away’ between 3 and 3.30, but often it was earlier than this. 
Even if we were told not to leave work before 3.30, we would almost always ‘down 
tools’ at around 2.30 and stand around chatting and moaning that we wanted to ‘get 
o ff  home.
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Work times were imposed by the painting subcontractor, Ernie Coat, and not 
by the almost invisible site management. The painters took their breaks in their own 
private area, and management rarely came out of the office onto the scaffold to where 
the painters worked. Occasionally Jamin would walk around the scaffold but he 
generally left everybody to undertake the work unsupervised. However, the faster the 
work was completed, the more profit Ernie Coat would accrue, but he could not 
monitor ‘his’ painters all the time. He could only make ‘random’ spot-checks 
otherwise he had to put his trust in Jimmy, the painting foreman, to get the work done. 
Jimmy, like Danny, faced the same battles with time and energy as all the manual 
workers, as did all of Ernie’s other painting foremen. In their battle with time and 
energy, the painters on all the various sites where Ernie had contracts would collude 
with one another as to Ernie’s whereabouts via their mobile phones. Spot checks were 
therefore, never completely random.
The inter-site collusion was carefully crafted. Many of Ernie’s painters had 
worked for him for a long time, and as a result, they developed a kind of informal 
routine activities theory of his daily and weekly movements (c.f. Felson, 1986). Their 
theory construction was partly the consequence of their tightly entwined local 
networks, because they not only worked together but also lived in the same 
geographic areas, frequenting a small number of pubs there. Ernie utilised these 
networks to inexpensively and efficiently recruit trusted labour (see chapter 4), but the 
networks also acted to conspire against him.
During tea and lunch breaks Jimmy’s phone would ring. It would be 
information from one of the other sites as to Ernie’s whereabouts. Usually, one of the 
Tads’ would also have some information to share, as they had also spoken on the 
telephone that day to their painter friends. This enabled Ernie’s movements to be 
specifically pinpointed, and, if Jimmy concluded from the information that there was 
small chance of Ernie visiting Keyworker House that day, the painters would leave 
work early, but never before 2 .30.1 am sure Ernie was aware of the on-going cat and 
mice game but the power of performance out-stripped actuality (see Goffrnan, 1955; 
1959; and chapter 7). Furthermore, Ernie’s paternalist reciprocal relations with his 
workers (see chapter 9) also functioned to glue them into an effort bargain in that they 
almost never left work before 2.30, even when Ernie went on one of his numerous 
holidays to Spain.
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The painters always fulfilled their informal work hours because of then- 
reciprocal relationships with Ernie Coat and the possible violence of dismissal. 
During work-time, moreover, Jimmy made sure that ample work was done, and, if the 
painters did not ‘pull their weight’, he became angry and threatened dismissal. For 
example, one of the painters, Frank, was regularly threatened with dismissal because 
of his inexperience and low skill, which meant he completed less work within the 
specified times than the better skilled painters. This pressurised Jimmy who thought 
that Frank could ‘give the game away’ and expose the time banditry. The situation 
lead to the ill-treatment of Frank by most of the other painters (see chapter 8). He was 
made a scapegoat for almost any problem that arose, and he was eventually sacked.
Snake in the Grass
To commit acts of time banditry (and other informal work activities that will be 
discussed in the following chapters), the work groups had to trust one another not to 
let the team down. Work-group trust was vigorously maintained and enforced through 
demonisation of the informer, or, the ‘grass’, who held a very low status amongst the 
men, almost akin to the devil. As Matza (1964) argues with reference to delinquent 
boys in North America, group collectivity and demonisation of the ‘grass’ is enforced 
rigidly amongst the group precisely because they cannot trust one another. Similar 
processes were at play at Keyworker House. Group rules and collectivity were rigidly 
enforced because often there were few group rules due to the ephemeral nature of 
building work practices (see chapter 8).
Bristles clearly expressed the builders’ disdain for the grass, and the function 
of such disdain:
Certain people in the tea-room if they had a chance of dropping other people in it, I’m 
sure they would. Why don’t they? ‘Cos your life wouldn’t be worth shit in the building 
if you grassed. I’m easy going and laid back but if someone grassed me up, well, that’s 
a different story. Grasses are just not acceptable. I mean they [the labourers] still talk 
about that 60-year-old bloody labourer they worked with at Curtain Street. I think he’s 
67, he’s as strong as an ox and no bigger than a matchstick, honestly, but they call him 
a grass. In respect of, he’s gone to work one day and saw the previous bloke not doing 
anything, he’s most probably told the site agent [manager] that he’s no good, he’s not 
pulling his weight. Now that’s something you just can’t do. We are different on the 
buildings in the respect we are free spirits. We can go a lot of places but that name will 
follow you, because I have met many people from 20 years ago, people still come up to 
me on a building site and like, ‘oh how you doing’. You have to watch the seeds you 
lay.
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‘Grasses are just not acceptable’. The work groups had to ‘keep things quiet’ because 
they were breaking formal rules. Any group that performs informal practices will 
necessarily attempt to control its members to maintain the flow of information within 
that network (see chapters 9 and 10). Work groups must hide their informal activities, 
and their impression management techniques should be authentic. If not, the game 
breaks down and clan relations with subcontractors and/or management fracture (see 
chapter 7).
Through these cultural attitudes, the builders were able to expel from the site
those whom they did not trust or did not like (see also Foster, 1969). Aidan
illuminated this point:
[Phil] he’s one of those fellows who doesn’t understand why people don’t get on with 
him. He tried to make himself out to be Danny’s best mate, which was a lie anyway. 
Danny tolerated him, kind of showing a front all the time. [Phil] he was telling me I 
wasn’t doing this properly, I wasn’t doing that properly. He’s one of those fellows sort 
of, he’s gonna get me off this site as fucking soon as possible, fuckin’ grass me up, 
which was no reason for. Course you notice it in the [workgroup] camp, no one sort of 
got on with him. He jacked [left the job] in the end anyway... Look at it this way, your 
working day, don’t get me wrong, but I’m more with you during the day than I am with 
my girlfriend. I see her two or three times during the week. I ain’t being funny but you 
got to get on with everyone... I hate that when someone new comes on board saying 
this and that. I was working with him [Phil] for about a week and he was always 
looking down to me saying, sort of telling me what to do. Until that Saturday morning 
come and I just blew up [became aggressive] on top of the scaffold. He was a fuckin 
funny fucker he was, oh Jesus, cranky as fuck.
Careers and Attitudes
Both the painting and the labouring group were involved in collective acts of time 
banditry. Through my observation of the working times of the other trade groups, it 
was evident, with the exception of site management and surveyors, that everyone stole 
time. It might be assumed that the reason for such banditry was because the builders 
did not enjoy their work and would attempt to do anything to avoid it. However, this 
would be incorrect.
Work Attitudes
In an ethnographic account of the lifestyles of builders in a working-class tavern in 
North America, LeMasters points out that in Terkel’s (1972) Working, ‘one of the 
persons who enjoyed his work most was a stone mason’ (1975: 199). In fact the 
mason was one of only four workers, out of over two hundred interviewed, who
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expressed such an enjoyment. Builders, including those at Keyworker House, enjoy 
their work. Bill for instance, was a work enthusiast:
I love being an electrician. As I say I’ve always liked working and I get job 
satisfaction. All weekends I work at people’s houses. I do my own private work and 
you see it, the finished product. It’s just job satisfaction when you know you’ve gone in 
there, you’ve explained what you’re gonna do and they either like it or they don’t like 
it, but you know there’s a finished article.
Gerry, a painter, also ‘loved’ his work:
Oh, I love it, I really love it. I wouldn’t rather do anything than be a decorator. Some 
jobs are just beautiful... My brush is like a wand, the wall is my canvass and together 
we can make beauty.
Bapu said the same:
Some people like drinking, well, he’s an alcoholic. I like working, I’m a workaholic. I 
like to be the workaholic, I love the work. A lot of time I work the weekend as well. So 
I built a staircase, I made it myself. And the window as well, new window, I made it 
myself, you know what I mean? ... Some don’t like to do the skilled work or the hard 
work, but I like it here, love it. Still I love it. I’m never tired it’s true. I never get bored.
I never have day off. Only an emergency, then I can take the day off. Otherwise I come 
in working everyday without fail. Work is important you know.
Bill, Gerry and Bapu, all expressed enjoyment in making something; in producing a 
‘finished article’. Because the tradesmen could see the product of their labour, most of 
them expressed enjoyment and pride in their work, but it was not just making 
something they enjoyed. Take, for instance, Jamin, talking about his work as a 
carpenter:
I do enjoy the actual work, and what I like about it is I’ve been doing it a long time 
now and I don’t have any difficulties with it. I know really what’s what and I can get 
on with it literally with my eyes closed, you know, no hassle, not having to look after 
anybody or make sure they’re doing it right, do my work, go home. Peace of mind 
basically, no paperwork involved, no nothing... On the tools it’s no problem, don’t have 
to think about nothing, just get yourself to work, do your work, done. And I’m the type 
of person that likes to do a good day’s work, you know, I hate people telling me that 
this is not enough work. If anybody was to ever tell me that right, I’d walk off...
If there is one good thing that I can say about the building game, which I have 
enjoyed, is the freedom, the freedom and the change of environment, change of jobs. 
I’ve been here a year and a half and it’s the longest I’ve been on a building site and I 
don’t like it man. I’m not fussed do you know what I mean, it’s a living, and it’s decent 
money so I can’t complain really. The freedom, it’s one of the few bonuses. You’re 
usually left to get on with it and you can move around and get to see new places and 
new faces. I must have worked in every single part of London in my time. I mean 
looking at it, I can’t hate it because I wouldn’t be in it. I suppose everybody moans 
about what they do.
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Careers
The foreman role is the first step on the career ladder for builders who work for 
contractors and subcontractors. Builders often become foremen on small jobs where 
they work with people from within their own social networks. In these situations they 
only hold a fragile and negotiated authority, but they organise the flow of work and 
materials, and they communicate with subcontractors, managers, and clients. As 
shown below, most of the builders were happy to perform this kind of role on small 
jobs, but they expressed an aversion to it on large jobs. Such attitudes, and the 
instability of building work, manufactured a situation where one who is foreman 
today may not be a foreman tomorrow.
Rising above the foreman ranks is problematic for the majority of builders. 
Site managers usually emerge from the carpentry trade, and occasionally from 
bricklaying. Site management positions are therefore blocked to the majority of 
tradesmen and labourers. Site managers must also be able to read, write, operate 
computers and communicate with a multitude of parties, tasks that would be highly 
problematic for a number of workers, including the majority of migrant workers from 
agrarian areas for instance. Furthermore, not all building companies employ site 
management. Official statistics are misleading (see chapter 1), but the building 
industry seems to be characterised by a large number of small firms that are likely to 
be administered only by an owner, his wife and a trusted foreman who is out and 
about on site. In these firms there are simply no career ladders to climb.
Not being able to ascend the ranks was secondary to not wanting to ascend
them. Foremen had to be trusted in particular ways by the management, but they spent
the majority of their day working physically with their ‘blokes’ and not in ‘the office’.
They had therefore, to show allegiance and gain respect from their workers whilst
simultaneously appeasing their subcontractor and site management. However,
employing foremen as ‘time-police’ was rather a paradoxical exercise because they
were subject to similar time and physical pressures as everyone else on the tools (see
below). Jamin explained these problems:
I don’t really like doing the foreman stuff, I don’t really like doing it at all. It’s too 
much hassle man, too much hassle. You’ve got to try and get the blokes to do as much 
work as you can, which puts you on the bad side of them. I’m not really that type of 
person to shout and scream. I mean I’m quite happy if I’ve got like 4 decent blokes 
who don’t need to be told to hurry up and all that, then I’m quite happy. When you start 
getting big jobs and loads of chippies, it pisses me off. You’ve got to try and keep them 
in the office happy, and you’ve got to try and keep your governor happy, all three of
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them, so you’re in the middle, whipping boy in the middle. So no, I don’t really enjoy 
it. I would much rather earn £5 a day less and come to work and get my tools out, take 
my time, do my work and go home. Prefer to do that and get less money... I always 
seem to get hooked into this fucking foreman crap, really get hooked into it. I mean I 
sat my governor down one day and said, look I don’t want to fucking do it, just leave 
me alone. And he was all right for a couple of days, but the bloke who he put instead of 
me was fucking having a hard time. So then he said, ‘look please, it’s not working out, 
can you come back and do this and that, you’re good at it, help me out’... Maybe I’m 
just too loyal sometimes you know. I should have put my foot down and said, fuck you 
man, I just want to go on the tools, now leave me alone, but it doesn’t work like that. 
[See chapter 9].
It was partly the problem of being set down in the middle of the lines of command 
that made the foreman’s job so problematic. His was the ‘marginal man’s’ position 
outlined by Wray where: ‘The poor fellow is in the middle, of course, in the sense that 
a person may be the middle one of three in a bed; he gets it from both sides!’ (1949: 
301).
All the foremen I interviewed told me their work life depended upon who were
working for them. In particular, a high turnover of men made their jobs difficult,
again highlighting the importance of trust in the building industry. As Danny, the
labour foreman, told me:
Not a problem being the gangerman [foreman] here really, a decent group of blokes 
you work with and it’s no problem. It’s different when you’re on a big job and it’s a 
high turnover of men, new fish coming in, and it would be totally different. Not on this 
firm, it’s no problem. Yeah, no high turnover like some.
It was for these reasons that many did not wish to ascend the building ranks. I was 
never told that they did not want to become part of the management because it was 
not ‘men’s’ work, or that it was seen as a job of the enemy (c.f. Collinson, 1992). 
They simply did not want the extra responsibility of becoming the ‘whipping boy in 
the middle’. Furthermore, many, like the general foreman cited above, expressed a 
desire to remain ‘on the tools’ because they wanted to be ‘left alone’ and ‘take their 
time’, retaining their independence. For foremen, time was no longer their own; they 
could no longer be the unrushed master of their work task. They were obliged 
continually to respond to others’ demands and time was taken out of their hands.
The question remains as to why the builders wanted to be left alone. Throughout this 
chapter I have alluded to the problems they encountered with time and corporal 
energy. In the next chapter I examine the structures of time and energy and describe 
how they impinged upon the builders’ workday and culture.
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Chapter 7 
Doing Time
... when the workers arrived in the morning they wished it was breakfast-time. When 
they resumed work after breakfast they wished it was dinner-time. After dinner they 
wished it was one o’clock on Saturday. (Tressell, 1914: 92)
Working on the line changed the way you experienced time altogether. The minutes 
and hours went very slowly, but the days passed very quickly once they were over, and 
the weeks rushed by. Some days were even slower than others, and everyone agreed 
whether the morning was fast or slow, and whether the afternoon was faster or slower 
than the morning. We joked about how we were wishing our lives away, wishing it was 
‘going home time’ or Friday afternoon. (Cavendish, 1982: 112)
During Ruth Cavendish’s participation on the production line of an electrical 
components factory, she became acutely aware of the problematic nature of work­
time. Indeed, a review of work-place literature demonstrates that researchers who 
participate in and experience manual work often notice and theorise the structure of 
work-time that their subjects take for granted.
Unlike Cavendish’s factory workers, most of the builders enjoyed their work. 
It might be paradoxical then, that the builders were involved in acts of time banditry 
at all. Prior to my fieldwork I experienced informal activities, including time banditry 
and pilferage, on almost all other building sites. The activities were commonly 
accounted for by anti-management/boss vocabularies of motive; infused with speech 
concerning the boss/managers’ wealth and/or disrespect, or, that it was only fair to rob 
time or materials from the company because the company was exploiting and 
disrespecting the builders. This led me to believe that informal actions were 
associated with some kind of deeply embedded class-based conflict of interests 
resulting from the capitalist work process. However, at Keyworker House, informal 
actions were not really accounted for at all. Jokes or simply wry smiles accompanied 
time deviance and pilfering. These meta-accounts seemed to indicate that the builders 
were conscious they had deviated from formal rules because the accounts were social 
mechanisms communicated to repair rule infractions (c.f. Garfinkel, 1967). Meta­
accounts, and ‘meta-language’ are also associated with informal trading networks 
(Henry, 1978; Mars, 1982), and can be viewed as an ambiguous and marginal form of 
communication that is framed and occurs, by and on the edges of, interactive ritual 
(see below and chapter 10).
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Many commonly used indicators of industrial conflict were absent at Keyworker 
House. Institutionalised conflicts in the forms of strikes or stoppages were non­
existent, as were unions or stewards to represent that conflict. This was partly because 
unionisation had been pushed to the sidelines in the building industry through 
casualisation, self-employment and Thatcherism (see chapter 1). Yet, informal 
measures of conflict, including high absenteeism or high quitting rates, were not 
present either. I witnessed only one act of industrial sabotage, which was targeted at 
Pete, the general foreman, by a transient painter group to bring him ‘back down to 
earth’ when he got ‘too big for his boots’1.
The builders’ workplace autonomy, and the managers’ respect for the builders, 
kept conflict to a minimum. However, if, as was shown, the builders were highly 
autonomous, indulged in their informal cultures, satisfied with their work, and in the 
majority possessed positive attitudes towards site management, why did work 
deviance occur at all? The answer, I think, lay in their desire to ‘take time’.
The organisational and subjective problems encountered by time structures are 
the focus of this chapter. Although the builders, and perhaps everyone, dwelt 
subjectively in ‘multiple-times’ (c.f. Adam, 1990), for conceptual clarity I have 
divided time into 6 main types: cyclical, progressive, metronomic, commodified and 
subjective.
Temporal Selves
As the seventeenth century moves on the image of clock-work extends, until, with
Newton, it has engrossed the universe. (Thompson, [1967] 1993: 352)
Formal time schedules subjectively and organisationally guided the builders’ 
everyday action, yet the schedules did not concretely delineate that action. Whilst 
mortal and metronomic time are imposed, concrete and shared, they are also 
subjectively negotiated.
Throughout the workday the builders talked about time. Time-talk was as 
common as topics concerning beer/pub, football, the work and, women: ‘Is it nearly
1 This was a surreptitious act o f  sabotage. The painting group left an up-turned can o f  black oil-based paint on a 
board situated on the scaffold. When one o f the labourers tidied the scaffold and moved the can, the paint splashed 
down the masonry and windows o f Keyworker House 1. The painters were disillusioned with the general 
foreman’s talk about how he was going to become a site manager and ascend the Topbuild management hierarchy, 
and they came to dislike him, seeing him as undeserving o f his position. Because they were on ‘price work’, they 
essentially ‘ran rings’ around him and undertook sub-standard work. Topbuild’s management refused to pay the 
painters’ subcontractor and heated arguments ensued between Topbuild and the subcontractor, which were on­
going when I left the field. Following this episode Topbuild returned to contracting only Ernie Coat for painting 
works.
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breakfast yet?’, ‘It’s bloody draggin' today innit?’, ‘Christ, it’s gone fast this 
morning’, ‘Only another two days ‘till Friday’, ‘Do you reckon we’ll get away early 
today?’. Such comments were omnipresent, and battles with time appeared to be at 
the forefront of the builders’ minds.
One Friday morning when I was working with the painters, we were drinking tea and 
getting changed into our ‘whites’ for the day ahead. Everyone was sanguine, and 
saying things like, ‘thank fuck it’s Friday today’, ‘best day of the working week 
today’. I commented, depressingly, that the problem was that we would have to come 
back to work and start all over again on Monday. Perry replied, ‘as long as I get the 
weekend in between I don’t mind’. He appeared to have adjusted his thinking to the 
time-cycle.
One of the painters, Gerry, expressed his view of work-time and explained
how he had subjectively adjusted to it:
We always seem to be away nice and early. On some sites you’ll be fuckin' about until 
twenty to five, I can’t hack that, it flies by on here. Everything’s in sections, just think 
about sections, units of time. There’s only so many units in the day, three main units: 
morning till breakfast, breakfast till lunch, then just the afternoon. I think of it all in 
sections; first, second and third section...
There’s so many ways of killing time, you become an expert at it, so many ways: 
ah, let’s go and get the steps, go and get some paint. After so many years of fuckin’ 
working then you know how to deal with it. You’re just going on for years so what is 
the rush? Time is only made by man isn’t it? Years ago they used to have time to do 
that work, why the rush? What’s coming, a fuckin’ comet or something? Man stresses, 
he does, doesn’t he? And it’s man-made things, generated by man. You have to get 
money to be in a house and so on, blah, blah, blah. They don’t want to give you the 
keys for the big world out there, you can’t get at it. It’s not a decent reward is it? It’s 
like we’re just above the sea, you’re sinking while you’re swimming, you’re never 
fuckin’ going for it. The next thing I look around and I’m 67 and so on. Isn’t it strange 
that we wish time away when we don’t have enough time to do all the things in the 
world? It’s very fuckin’ strange because when you’re on your deathbed you’ll be 
wishing your way back again. I’ll wish I was back 25 years on that scaffold and it’s 25 
past eight.... Monday, Friday, back to Monday, long day, everything just comes back 
round. That is life, it’s a strange and wonderful thing. It’s continuous, it will never end, 
continuous, nothing ends... Well this is what I think anyway.
It’s like we’re all in a routine, course we are aren’t we? We’re often thinking 
ahead, it’s very hard to join the moment of time, just go with it and flow with it. 
There’s something special about taking the day as it is. Most of the time we’re jumping 
behind or jumping forward, and we wind our own heads up. We really do overload, it’s 
madness. If not, we’re chasing fuckin’ shadows, we really are, and we’re being used. 
We’re not even actually chasing them, we think we’re chasing them but in actual fact 
we’re being used. Just part of the fuckin’ machinery. But I’ve had some of the greatest 
times, the most hilarious times, by going to work with the right crowd. You’d hate 
yourself if you had the day off, because what it was is an understanding with the crowd. 
But that’s what makes work worth doing. It makes the world of difference to work with
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good blokes and have a laugh. But there’s some devious bastards out there. What’s the 
point of that? We got to work together, let’s get along together.
Gerry’s careful theory of work-time demonstrated how he got through the day by 
utilising time-markers, or ‘sections’ as he called them. He also ‘killed time’ by 
varying his work; leaving his work-space to go and get steps and paint so as to break 
up the day. He also expressed an almost Buddhist view of time as ‘continuous’, and, 
although he saw all people as ‘part of the machinery’, he viewed working with the 
‘right crowd’ as ‘some of the greatest times’.
In talking about the pros and cons of being a builder, Jamin expressed a
similar view in relation to being ‘part of the machinery’:
The insecurity [of the building trade] is the downside of it really, definitely. But the 
freedom is the upside, do you know what I mean? That’s what I like about it. But then 
again you see you’re not progressing anywhere, you’re just like a machine going on 
and on and on.
As mentioned in the last chapter, most builders learn their trade and carry on their life
in that trade. They do not progress through a career because there is little career
structure to follow. In this sense, time to the builder who remains a builder can be
conceptualised as a form of cyclic time because each day, week, year, and decade,
comes back around. The work simply becomes easier to do in terms of their
accumulated knowledge; they have to think about it less and less. Alternatively, it
becomes physically harder for them as they age. Many builders in their twilight years
turn to entrepreneurial private work, or maintenance work. However, for labourers
this is not a realistic option, they simply carry on labouring (see chapter 10), and some
of the labourers at Keyworker House were in the seventh decade of their lives. Linear
progression for them was almost non-existent. Their lifetime was not flagged by
career progression or even an end-point of retirement: life was work, work was life. If
they were ‘fit’ enough, they carried on the cycle of work until their bodies
deteriorated. As Danny, the labour foreman, said, for example: ‘Depends on being
healthy. If I was healthy I’d carry on [working after retirement] for a while but there’s
still a few years yet’. Mike Fixit expressed a similar outlook:
I might [consider being the tea boy] if I’m coming up to 6 months or a year until I 
retire. Then yeah, I might think differently about it. I don’t know really, I might do it. I 
got 16 years until that but I can’t see myself retiring at 65. Most people in the building 
don’t retire until they’re about 70. If I’m fit I’ll carry on, probably. I can’t sit around all 
day with her in doors.
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During my years working as a painter I was acutely aware of the cyclical nature of 
time and I found it impossible to psychologically adjust to. I would stand at work on a 
Monday and despair that I would be doing that same thing for the rest of my life. 
Beynon noticed something similar to this in his study of Ford production line workers, 
where he describes the ‘sheer audacious madness of a system based upon men 
wishing their lives away.’ (1973: 1100).
Cyclical time was a problem for me, and incomprehensible to Beynon, yet the 
builders were somehow able to deal with and adapt to it to a large extent. 
Conceptually, most builders work within metronomic-cyclical time. For example, 
both Jamin and Gerry enjoyed their work but they thought themselves to be ‘part of 
the machinery’, ‘not progressing anywhere... like a machine going on and on’. And 
as Gerry revealed, the flow of the cycle was structured by man-made time, or what 
might be termed the timetable (c.f. Foucault, 1977; Thrift, 1990). The builders used a 
machine metaphor to account for their work lives (c.f. Adam, 1990), and they (and I) 
felt, literally, part of a relentless metronomic cycle. Work was, for most, Monday 
morning until Saturday afternoon, and took place within formally tabled hours to 
metronomic beat. However, as described in the last chapter, the builders did not 
adhere to the formal timetable; they worked to their own informal times, routines and 
rhythms.
Rhythms
When someone is in control of their own work task they have a mastery over their 
approach and the time in which they do it. Task-mastery implies ‘taking time’ and, 
many of the builders enjoyed taking their time. However, whilst builders often work 
alone in a workspace, they may also work side-by-side with their trade colleagues. In 
these circumstances, the time taken to do a task was not ‘my time’, but ‘our time’.
‘Our time’ is ‘chosen’ by the group rather than synthetically imposed by 
authority or timetables. An example of ‘my time’ and ‘our time’ occurred when I first 
began work with the painters. I was a little out of practice, and during the first week 
was shadowed by Jimmy, the painting foreman, who kept a close watch on me, much 
to my disdain. His gaze pressured me to work fast and rush. But when he could see I 
was knowledgeable, quite fast and accurate at my job, he left me alone to do the work 
by myself, in my own time, which I much preferred. Approximately two weeks into 
the work, Jimmy instructed me to begin glossing the prepared external windows,
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working alongside Perry and Bony. At first I struggled to keep up with them, and my 
work was a little messy. But after a day or two I began to ‘get my eye in’, and ‘get 
into a rhythm’. My hand-eye co-ordination was improving and I began to fathom the 
most efficient way to apply the paint to the large sash windows; to start in a particular 
area, and move the window sashes up and down in the most efficient order so as to 
cover the total frame with paint, and I soon caught up with their speed. Bony was 
officially retired, indicating that he must have been over the age of 65. He also had 
back problems that made it difficult for him to bend down to paint the lower parts of 
the windows. Perry was 34 years old and fit. I assume he had slowed down to Bony’s 
speed because they were working at a synchronic pace.
The more frames I glossed, the faster I completed the task. I was not 
consciously aware of this, or even trying to work faster by this point. My bodily 
actions were almost automatic, caught up in a rhythm, but somehow subconsciously 
improving on speed and accuracy. I found I could work at a faster rate than my two 
colleagues, but I knew from past experience that it was always a good idea to work 
just slightly slower than the fastest man. Working even slightly faster than the man 
next to you can develop into race and I did not want to race, I would rather take my- 
time. Perry, Bony and I, fell into a group speed and rhythm. In Jimmy’s words, 
‘you’re all flying through those windows’. I found I had time to stop, smoke a 
cigarette and chat to the passing labourers and carpenters between each completed 
window. I also found that I enjoyed the work. Painters commonly say they like 
glossing; a shiny end product is achieved. However, the learning process and the 
rhythm itself also made the work anodyne and quite rewarding. It was satisfying to be 
the un-rushed master of one’s task.
Routines
Richard Sennett (1998) usefully discusses work routine. He cites Diderot:
In his Paradox of Acting, Diderot sought to explain how the actor or actress gradually 
plumbs the depths of a part by repeating the lines again and again. And these same 
virtues of repetition he expected to find in industrial labour... [Using an example of a 
papermaking factory] Diderot believed -  again by analogy to the arts -  that its routines 
were in constant evolution, as workers learned how to manipulate and alter each stage 
of the labour process. More largely, the ‘rhythm’ of work means that by repeating a 
particular operation, we find how to speed up and slow down, make variations, play 
with materials, develop new practices -  just as a musician leams how to manage time 
in performing a piece of music. Thanks to repetition and rhythm, the worker can 
achieve, Diderot said, ‘the unity of mind and hand’ in labour... he believed that
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through mastering routine and its rhythms, people both take control and calm down, 
(pp. 34 - 35)
Sennett moves on to look at Adam Smith’s description of a pin factory in which
Smith argues that where a task is broken down into small parts, workers lose control
and become bored and apathetic. Sennett concludes from this that routine is
destructive, that Diderot’s idea is false, because the worker, unlike the actor, has no
control over his work where his time is commodified:
The industrial worker thus knows nothing of the self-possession and mobile 
expressiveness of the actor who has memorised a thousand lines; Diderot’s comparison 
of actor and worker is false, because the worker does not control his or her work. The 
pin-maker becomes a ‘stupid and ignorant’ creature in the course of the division of 
labour; the repetitive nature of his work has pacified him. For these reasons, industrial 
routine threatens to diminish human character in its very depths, (p. 37)
Sennett then takes from Adam (1990), Marx’s comparison of Smith’s pin factory with
the German system of Tagwerk, where:
... a labourer was paid by the day; in that practice, the worker could adapt to the 
conditions of his or her environment, working differently on days when it rained than 
on clear days, or organizing tasks to take account of the delivery of supplies; there was 
rhythm to such work, because the worker was in control, (p. 39)
It might be considered that the builders’ work mirrored Diderot’s actor and Marx’s 
Tagwerk, even in twenty-first century capitalism, where labour is divided on an 
intensely global scale, and the machine is dominant part of daily life. In this respect, 
building work was markedly different from pin-making or factory work.
In the last chapter, the painter in Bristles’ description was only ‘one above the 
food chain’ in building cultures’ trade status rankings. The builder colloquialism, ‘if 
you can piss, you can paint’, highlights this. Painting is arguably the least skilled of 
the building trades. Yet, jobs such as glossing are really quite enjoyable; there is a 
rhythm to the work, a honed skill and a tangible finished product. From this it may be 
inferred that all other building trades are at least as enjoyable, and probably more so, 
and the interview data reflected this. Like Diderot’s actor, the painter masters his 
routine through rhythmic repetition. However, painters do not perform rhythmical 
mastery in their own-time, but within group/our-time, which is situated further within 
commodified time. And, for the day-worker, time is not money. Imposed time is 
rather something to be played with, to be twisted and turned not only in real tabled 
work-time, but also within subjective time.
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During the glossing work, Bony, Perry and I worked side by side in a line, 
sharing the same section of scaffold. Despite working next to one another, we talked 
little. There were the usual time requests, occasional jokes, comments, and profanities 
when elbows were banged or splinters forced in to the skin of our hands, but that was 
about all. However, when we stopped to smoke cigarettes in between glossing the 
windows, we did talk (or at least Perry and I did, Bony rarely said anything at any 
time). We did not want to engage in conversation when we were caught-up in our 
rhythm. Personally, I was at once concentrating and, at the same time, not painting 
windows at all; I was somewhere else, wandering around in my subjective space, 
thinking about this chapter and daydreaming. Daydreaming is a form of psychological 
escape from the constraints of time (c.f. Cohen and Taylor, 1972) in all its forms. It 
releases the dreamer out from cyclical or linear time into somewhere else . As Cohen 
and Taylor (1976) argue, attempts to escape everyday reality form a substantial 
element of human culture, and the subjective effects of daydreaming may be 
compared to contrived and mediated dreams that take the form of entertainment in 
stories.
In an ethnography of truck drivers in North America, Blake (1974) noticed the
positive effects of work rhythms. Although trucks are big, powerful and masculinised
machines, the experiential aspects of truck driving appear remarkably similar to that
of the painter and the builder in general. Blake writes:
In so many situations, intense concentration is required to accomplish a task at hand 
and this may result in a new kind of experience. A point is reached at which the subtle 
and complex intricacies of the task begin to ‘come naturally’. At the same time, the 
task is such that a continual adjustment to the situation is necessary so that intensity of 
concentration varies intermittently over time. This continual readjustment, too, ‘comes 
naturally’ and a situational rhythm emerges in which the person becomes one among a 
number of elements co-existing and co-acting in the situation. Mere concentration (that 
is, ‘surface attention,’ see Walker and Guest, 1952: 13-14) is required of a number of 
occupations (including factory work), but situational rhythm is required of only a few 
(including truck driving).
While in the state of situational rhythm the individual is capable either of 
reflection on totally different situations or of total situational immersion; the later 
meaning that he ‘lets himself go’, he gets ‘high’. The situation of total immersion 
engenders a feeling of situational power that is real to the extent that it reflects the fact 
of temporal, immediate control. (1974; 206-207. Italics original)
2 1 first consciously learnt this whilst working as a farm labourer. The work was so hard, dull and monotonous that 
I forced m yself to project into the future and imagine almost fairytale-like scenarios. Without doing this, the 12- 
hour work-day was like psychological torture, utterly unbearable. However, I probably firstly unconsciously learnt 
this at school, and in consideration o f the cultural similarities between builders and ‘anti-school’ subcultures (see 
chapter 8), it might be useful to consider how time is applied in schools and its relationship to educational under­
achievement.
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The situation described above is what Clayberg (1949) term’s ‘steriogenesis’, where 
mind, body and motion combine with a tool or machine to produce rhythmical 
mastery of the task. This turns work into play and thereby makes manual work an 
enjoyable task, and, it explains part of the reason why the builders expressed 
enjoyment in their work.
Situational work rhythms also provide a clue as to why foremen did not enjoy 
their responsibilities and expressed a desire to return to ‘the tools’. Foremen must 
move around the total workspace under other people’s orders. In any work the 
foreman attempts to do, it is likely that he will be ‘pulled o ff  it to organise his men or 
answer to the demands of management. This upsets personal rhythm and smashes 
mastery. The foreman becomes an effect of others’ demands, and such demands are 
set within a commodified time frame. The completion date of a build sets synthetic 
time limits which management must try to adhere to, but almost never achieve (see 
Bresnan, 1990), and the association of time with money, prompts many requests for 
‘hurry up’ (see below).
Subjecting Time
Anyone who has ever been in a hurry and had to wait three minutes at a London 
underground station for the next tube train will be aware of the vast contradictions 
between clock time and subjective time. One passing minute can seem like tens of 
minutes. The philosophical colloquialism, ‘time flies when you’re having fim’, 
illustrates the antonym of tube station time, and further reveals that time is a 
negotiable subjective entity. Even seemingly inevitable biological/mortal time can be 
subjectively negotiated, most commonly in the form of religious belief (see Adam, 
2004).
Like tube station time, boring work, or work where one is unable to develop a 
rhythm, can ‘drag out’ subjective time immeasurably, and, whilst some building work 
is rhythmical and enjoyable, some of it is not. None of the builders expressed 
dissatisfaction about their work because it was physically hard, dangerous or dirty, in 
fact they commonly embraced such tasks. Dissatisfaction was expressed when the 
work became boring; when time dragged. The worker, like the foreman, was not 
always permitted to ‘harmoniously interact’ with his task due to the demands of the 
work process. This was particularly so for the labourers. As Michael told me:
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Yeah, the time goes when you’re busy. I’d rather be kept busy. The busier I am the 
better I like it. I don’t like to be hanging about, a day will be like two days umm. That’s 
what I don’t like, but that’s the way it goes innit, that’s the way it is.
As mentioned in chapter 6, the labourers enjoyed fast-paced hard work. Shovelling a 
mound of sand into a wheelbarrow or ‘gunning’ and digging holes, was enjoyable, 
despite (or possibly because of) it being physically tough. During these tasks, for 
which the labourers possessed a rare amount of autonomy and an end product of sorts, 
work-rhythms were established and, the rhythms had an effect upon subjective time, 
making the work more enjoyable.
Time Markers
Shovelling sand had an end-point: one knows where to begin and when they are going
to finish. In these situations, the labourers could plan at which rate to work, when to
stop for a break, and progression through the task could be tangibly perceived. As
Trick, talking about how he liked his mechanical and electrical job, illustrated:
I enjoy doing anything where you’ve got all your tools and all the gear you want in one 
area. Like doing those showers, you’re carcassing out [removing all of the old 
mechanical material from the area] a whole wall of pipe-work and you’re being left 
alone. As long as you know what you’re doing, and what they want... Yeah it’s good, 
you enjoy it ‘cos you look back on the day and you think yeah, you know in yourself 
what you want to get done. It doesn’t matter if it’s cutting a hedge and you want to get 
a quarter of a mile of it cut back that day, or paint half of a building, you know where 
you should be and what you want to do. So with the showers, you carcass one out, get 
on with the job and you say, yeah, I enjoyed that, good.
Unfortunately for the labourers, unlike the tradesmen, they were not left alone in one
place for much of the time. Consequently, they could not comprehend the tasks they
would undertake within a specified time-frame, and thus they could not always set
themselves task and time markers. A labourer may begin a task only to be ‘pulled o ff
it through the demands of ‘hurry up’, or conflicting orders. As Aidan explained:
Well an example is yesterday. We’re short on labour and all this business yeah. Now 
Pete and James wanted me to do one job yeah, Steve wanted me to do another job, and 
Danny wanted me to do another job. I knew what I was gonna do, which I started, 
sweep all the roof off yeah, knowing the day before that I was gonna do that. But by the 
time I’d got up there, things had changed. So I was pushed onto another job. Pete 
wanted me to go check all the work we’d done for him last week, and then the lightning 
conductor blokes come down and said the holes wasn’t big enough. And now it’s only 
me and Danny [to do all the work]. So they are all rushing and all this business. I mean 
a little bit of organisation you know what I mean? That's what I don’t like about it, 
organisation yeah, I like planned.
150
Part of Aidan’s problem was that there were not enough labourers on site to do all of 
the ‘hurry up’ work. It was not that that Aidan wanted to shirk work, but he was given 
conflicting orders from different areas of authority, which was a common scenario for 
the labourers because their work was general and almost everybody was their boss.
Disturbance of personal and group rhythms upset psychological mechanisms 
for subjectively dealing with time. However, defence mechanisms existed to manage 
the upsets. One way, as indicated in chapter 6, was to steal time, to prise back 
timetabled time and transform it into personal time. The term ‘break-time’ literally 
reflects this. I never enjoyed my participant observation so much as when I took my 
break-times when working as a labourer. It was time to physically rest and take ‘time­
out’ of imposed orders and time frames. Even the managers acknowledged this if they 
entered the labourers’ canteen during break-times: ‘Sorry lads, have your lunch first, 
but could you go up on the roof and get all the old roof tiles down when you’re done’. 
The managers would always be ‘sorry’ for making demands in break-times.
Having the Crack
Task mastery, taking breaks, and stealing time left the remainder of work-time to be
negotiated and dealt subjectively with. Another mechanism for dealing with time was
to break up the day by ‘having the crack’. In talking about why he liked to work as a
labourer, Aidan spoke about this in some detail:
I do like it [labouring] yeah. I like meeting people, getting to know them, having the 
crack with them you know. I’ve known Patrick [a fellow labourer] now, well, a long 
time. I used to have great fun with him, having the banter like. They lie to me and I tell 
them lies. Make big stories up, you know what I mean (laughs)? Getting people to 
believe you and all this business. And you think in your mind you know, where Patrick 
came out the other day and said he went for fish and chips that night and the fish was 
so fresh it ate all his chips (laughing). All things like that you know...
I’d say to Patrick, ‘cos he knows my dad see, oh I saw so and so in the pub last 
night. All these different names and all this business, pick on people you know. Oh I 
met him last night and he was asking me, ‘oh what are you drinking’. It’s all lies like. 
And then telling him white lies, having the crack like. I was telling him me and Danny 
were working Saturday afternoon and all day Sunday, like £70 a shift, and all this 
business (laughing). Having a good laugh in the morning, I think it sets the day up. You 
go in there and get some long faces and all that, but there’s always one of us out the 
group that’ll come out with something interesting or something funny. Or we pick on 
someone just for the sake of it, ‘Poor old Paul’s over there and all this business, fat 
bastard this, fat bastard that’. But he’s not there with us is he, but he’s sort of made a 
joke of you know... That’s why I like winding them up, you can always see them 
thinking, now is he winding me up. Things like that, like mind games, having the crack, 
no offence to anyone.
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Almost all the builders expressed enjoyment in ‘the crack’. They liked their work
because they ‘had a laugh’, and, jokes, lies, piss-takes, and ‘wind-ups’ were a central
aspect of their work culture. The form and content of the crack was integral to Anglo
working-class cultures in general, and the builders’ reminded me of the antics of the
Tads’ described by Willis (1977) in both the school and the factory; what Willis
describes as ‘shop-floor culture’ (see also chapter 8). The crack served to break up
monotonous dragging-time, but it also framed a kind of cultural adhesive amongst the
culturally diverse builders. Mike Fixit:
On a building site everybody’s lumped together the same. We’re all there, we all know 
what building work is like, we all know it’s hard sometimes and we all know its easy 
sometimes. And the blokes, they, it’s a special group of men that work on building 
sites, they’re like their own sort of family. You get the odd one or two that are a bit 
loud and this that and the other, but they don’t really last long on a building site 
because everyone’s there for the easy life; get the job done, go home. With small firms 
you can get to know everyone and have a laugh and a crack. Even with the 
management, you can get to know them, have a laugh with them.
The content of the crack was frequently framed by a masculine discourse that formed 
a major constituent of the builders’ cultural adhesive, which also had consequences 
beyond breaking-up time (see chapter 8). The crack is common in the literature of the 
workplace and embedded in culture in general. At Keyworker House it released 
workers from dull and dragging time through breaching reality and/or by 
manufacturing excitement (Matza, 1964) through linguistic jousting tournaments (see 
below and chapter 8). Huizinga (1938) argues that tournaments, play and games are a 
source of play in which excitement transports players into another subjective world, 
into a higher order of consciousness. And, as Lyng (1990) comments, excitement 
suspends reflexive consciousness, separating Mead’s ‘I’ and ‘me’. Excited individuals 
are thus released from normative sociality and metronomic temporality, and 
intersubjective ‘dragging-time’ is relinquished.
Roy’s (1960) participant observation of factory workers graphically illustrates 
the function of the crack. Roy found that the monotonous workday led him into a 
battle with time that was eased by developing a ‘game of work’. This involved setting 
personal targets and sequences in the work process, much like that described as 
‘sections’ by Gerry. Like the builders, Roy’s work group eased the battle through 
taking informal time-out and by joking and messing around, and, without ‘the talking, 
fun, and fooling which provided a solution to the elemental problem of ‘psychological 
survival’ (p. 155), ‘Monotony was joined by his twin brother, Fatigue’ (p. 158). Roy
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demonstrates that bodily fatigue is to a large extent socially constructed, whereby 
having the crack not only released workers from the constraints of dragging-time, but 
also subjectively provided corporal energy with which to do manual work.
Drug Use
Drug use was common amongst at the Keyworker House builders, and almost all of 
the men stimulated their physical energy with the use of caffeine and nicotine. One of 
the older labourers, Patrick, would follow his morning cup of tea and cigarette by 
sucking a large pile of snuff up into his black-coloured nostril. It was also common to 
visit a pub, particularly on Friday and Monday lunch-times, and, as I mentioned in 
chapter 5, alcohol consumption is almost institutionalised within Anglo cultural 
groups on building sites. Alcohol is a psychoactive depressant that numbs minds and, 
like excitement, it suspends reflexive consciousness. It has also become historically 
tied up with the ideals of ‘strength’ which are entwined in masculine discourse (see 
chapter 8); for the builders, to drink was to be a man.
It was not only legitimate drugs that were used throughout the workday. Along 
the scaffold one could literally smell the use of illegal drugs. The common character 
of illegal drug use amongst builders was illustrated by the statistic that painters, 
scaffolders and roofers are more likely to die through drug misuse than any other 
occupational group (OPCS, 1995). This may bear more relation to the social 
backgrounds of these trades than the content of their work tasks (see chapters 5 and 
9), but it came as no surprise. The majority of painters I met at Keyworker House 
regularly used drugs in and out of work. As Gerry explained:
I love to smoke [cannabis] at work. I’ve been doing this [work] for 25 years, and when
I’m doing it I’m not thinking about silly things like work, I’m just stoned and playing
little mind games with myself. The day just flies by.
Not thinking about the work in hand helps time to pass quicker. The hallucinogenic 
properties of cannabis may help to stimulate vivid daydreaming and thus assist the 
user’s release from dragging-time. Gerry also used amphetamine, cocaine and ecstasy 
(MDMA) at work. He was not alone. Another of the painters, Frank, religiously 
boosted his day through with amphetamine (see chapter 8).
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Doing Nothing
Labouring work can be dangerous, boring, tiring and dirty. Yet, all of the labourers, 
including me, much preferred to do something rather than nothing. It was however, 
common to have days and hours where there was little to do; where the labourers had 
to ‘scratch around’ to find work tasks. In addition, the nature of labouring sometimes 
actually necessitated a slow pace. This was partly because the work was physically 
tiring, but also because the labourers were forced to try not to ‘snooker’ themselves 
and run out of things to do. Labourers reacted to the demands of others; if  holes were 
to be dug, materials transported, or mess cleaned up, they were ordered to do it. But 
materials and plant did not always need transporting, holes were not required 
everyday, and, sometimes, there was not much mess created by the trades. If a 
labourer was required to dig a hole for the afternoon therefore, he would make sure 
that he timed it correctly so it took him the whole afternoon to complete. If he were to 
finish the task early, he may have to begin another task, which could possibly take 
him too much time in terms of his working hours that afternoon. Alternatively, if there 
was nothing for the labourers to do on a particular day, they would have to ‘make- 
work’, that is, perform the actions of work without actually doing any.
A rigidly enforced rule exists for labourers on building sites, and that is to not 
be seen to be sitting down. In this sense their time was not theirs, but was owned by 
their employers (c.f. Thompson [1967] 1993). If labourers could sit down during 
slow-times they would not face the problem of ‘a day will be like two days umm’. 
Filling time and making-work are thus part of the labourers’ skill because those that 
rush to get everything done might find themselves out of a job.
One method of evading time ownership problems or having to make-work, 
was for the labourers to group together and have the crack. Almost every afternoon 
leading up to four o’clock, the labourers would group around the skips at the back of 
Keyworker House. Doing this always incited piss-take comments from the other 
trades, commonly, ‘How much they paying you to hold that fence up?’. However, 
Danny was not always so jocular when he found them ‘holding fences up’ or ‘leaning 
on shovels’, but he could not sack, or even really reprimand, the whole labour team 
for doing nothing. If he was in a ‘cranky’ mood and expressed dissatisfaction towards 
their malingering, he was met with an onslaught of excuses and disdain, and it would 
have been very problematic for him to sack all his Tads’ at once. Their group 
collectivity shielded management power through distributing managers’ reactions to
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work deviance amongst the numbers of the group. Here, the builders’ not only 
negotiated time through the excitement of having the crack, but their numbers also 
formed a kind of worker power through, what may be termed, creating a situation of 
safety in numbers.
Make- Work
Doing nothing slows down subjective time, and doing nothing is not an option for 
labourers for most of the time because they must ‘make-work’. Goffman (1959) 
considers make-work a performance of standards of decorum exchanged between 
workers and bosses. To not make-work within the gaze of the boss would be 
considered disrespectful, thereby breaking the rules of the work-game. As an example 
of this, Goffman quotes from Archibald’s (1947) study of a shipyard, which is worth 
reproducing in full:
It was amusing to watch the sudden transformation whenever word got round that the 
foreman was on the hull or in the shop or that a front-office superintendent was coming 
by. Quartermen and leadermen would rush to their groups of workers and stir them to 
obvious activity. ‘Don’t let him catch you sitting down’ was the universal admonition, 
and where no work existed a pipe was busily bent and threaded, or a bolt which was 
already firmly in place was subjected to further and unnecessary tightening. This was 
the formal tribute invariably attending a visitation by the boss, and its conventions were 
as familiar to both sides as those surrounding a five star general’s inspection. To have 
neglected any detail of the false and empty show would have been interpreted as a 
mark of singular disrespect. (Archibald, K, 1947: 159; reproduced from Goffman, 
1959: 112)
Make-work for the labourers at Keyworker House usually took the form of finding a 
broom and endlessly sweeping-up dust and cigarette buts. The term ‘endlessly’ comes 
into play here. Make-work involves no sense of a beginning, middle or end; there are 
no time markers, nor is there a finished product. In my experience, and, as intimated 
in the words of Michael above, make-work slows down time almost to a stop. It also 
all but completely drains physical energy and forces ‘clock-watching’ which, as all 
manual workers are aware, functions to drag-out subjective time.
Games
The only situation in which make-work shortened subjective time was when it was 
not imposed by having nothing to do, but was chosen by the worker. In choosing to do 
make-work, builders enter into a game with work authority. Burawoy (1979) argues 
that informal games workers play with their superiors are related to attempts to relieve
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tedium, create a sense of accomplishment, and to undermine management objectives. 
The game, he argues, is embedded in working-class culture. He points out however, 
that by taking part in the game, workers inadvertently submit to and create the very 
system of oppression that they were attempting to resist. Put simply, playing games 
with work authority cannot release workers from the oppression inherent in capitalism 
because the very act of going to work to play these games supports the system rather 
than smashes it.
Burro woy’s notion that workers were battling with the work process as a 
source of oppression may have been a product of his neo-Marxist perspective, or 
simply an aspect of factory work in a (Western) bygone time. Collective political 
anguish for the majority of the builders on the site centred upon the ‘invasion’ of 
Britain by new migrant groups rather than upon the capitalist system itself (see 
chapter 9). They viewed themselves proudly as hard working providers for their 
families, and not as the down-trodden slaves of capitalism. Collinson (1992) focuses 
on this point through the screen of Foucault. He viewed the factory workers on the 
shop-floor as compensating for their dull, meaningless, highly controlled working 
lives through reverence of masculine notions of breadwinner and provider. Collinson 
argues that the factory workers laboured so they could have leisure in the family unit 
where they were the boss, and thus they drew a sharp divide between home and work 
(see also Cockbum, 1983). In contradistinction to this, the builders talked about how 
they enjoyed the freedom of being on the tools, and saw their wives as a problematic 
source of control over their lives. To them, work and the pub offered more freedom 
and autonomy than the home (see chapter 8). This was not to say that the builders, 
like Sennett and Cobb’s (1972) socially mobile North American working-class, did 
not account for and claw meaning from their working lives in terms of sacrifice for 
their families. Families were central to their lives (see chapters 5 and 8), and were 
given by many as a reason for going to work. However, if the builders did not feel 
controlled at work, why did they take part in the game? Again, the answer lies in the 
structure of work-time. Games at work are a source of the manufacture of excitement; 
a means of combating dragging-time. Consequently, when the builders chose to do 
make-work, it was when they were bored and/or listless, or when they grouped 
together for the crack because of that boredom and listlessness.
Non-imposed make-work in this context was a game, and games are by their 
very nature, fun, and fun transforms dragging-time. As Goffman (1959) comments,
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make-work is a performance of etiquette, and the performance is more salient than 
actuality. These encounters are thus caught-up in a kind of ‘surface acting’ surrealism 
whereby each party performs their part in the encounter whilst logically being aware 
they are ‘blagging’ one another. Managers know the worker is merely performing, 
and the worker knows that the manager knows, but each party is entwined in the ritual 
of surface performance rather than actuality. Goffman (1955) demonstrates that such 
performances are sacred, and consequently, for a manager to accuse a worker of mere 
performance would be to contravene ritual etiquette by discrediting the worker’s 
honesty. This could open up a panoply of often aggressive excuses and interchanges 
in which the manager risked ‘losing face’, thereby relinquishing respect, breaking the 
indulgency pattern and stiffening reciprocal elasticity.
The examples cited in the last chapter concerning ‘going to the bank/shop’ can 
also be seen as false performances. Building knowledge has not been monopolised by 
management systems. As a result, task performance cannot be accounted and, builders 
can therefore exploit the knowledge lacunae to toy with management authority. For 
example, when I participated in the site office there was an occasion when Danny 
could not be contacted via his two-way radio. He later appeared in the office and 
excused himself saying that he had ‘gone to the bank’. The managers accepted his 
excuse and gave him his orders but, when he left, Steve and Jamin laughed and joked 
about the performance. Steve said, ‘gone to the bank my arse, he’s been to the fuckin 
pub’. It was pure performance they had taken part in. If Danny said he had gone to the 
pub, it would have invited an onslaught of abuse and reprimand from the managers. 
However, by Danny offering an excuse and playing the game, the managers had no 
need to become involved in an encounter where they would have to admonish or 
discredit him and run the risk of ‘loosing face’.
Contrived make-work and excuse performances, being false in themselves, 
were a game of play-acting. Workers felt they had out-witted managers, and, out­
witting someone is integral to most games. The performances were a source of play, 
fun and excitement, tied integrally with the structure of work-time in particular, and 
social life in general.
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Time, Money and Bureaucracy
Officer Time
The managers worked longer hours than the trades and labourers and were the only 
group that did not steal time. Part of the reason was simply that their physical energy 
was not depleted during the workday in quite the same way as the manual workers. 
For those on the tools, break-time was for sitting down and resting, whereas the 
management sat down all day, or could sit down whenever they wanted. It was also 
rare for higher management to over-see the site managers, leaving them to work in 
their own time. Furthermore, the managers’ work consisted mostly of talking, and as 
shown in chapter 3, the content of that talk commonly took the form of the crack. 
Managers worked alongside one another everyday, and thus negotiated an explicit 
rule system between them, that is, they knew exactly what they could and could not 
say to one another, and, because the rules were negotiated, they could say almost 
anything within the realms of masculine discourse. The crack therefore flourished 
unbounded in the office, and the managers also had constant refreshment of their 
messing around by the numerous different people that came in and out of the office. 
Managers’ subjective time was therefore very different from that of those on the tools.
Part of the intensity of office interaction meant that Steve, project manager, 
and Kevin, the quantity surveyor, would remain in the office to do bureaucratic work 
after the troops had all gone home. They turned this into a competition and competed 
to see who could hold the record for staying at work the latest. Kevin was winning the 
game when I left Keyworker House by staying until 10 p.m. one night. As Steve 
commented:
I do enjoy it, but it’s just so much work to do now. It’s just unbelievable. I try to do it 
to 100 percent quality so that everything is done at the end of the week as you’ve seen. 
But that’s what’s drives me mad about these office set-ups. I’m as bad as the rest of 
them, I scream, shout, and rant and rave, have a bloody laugh and a ball, but it isn’t 
actually that productive, very unproductive. Even down there in that office [Keyworker 
House 2], you know, me and Paul are pulling our hair out at the moment because it’s 
all very loud. It’s a smaller office and you can’t concentrate, you do need them plugs in 
your ears [see chapter 3]. It’s a fuck up, it really is, never again, in all honesty I’d rather 
have all little offices partitioned off, because what happens is, to my own sort of a 
detrimental effect, I end up taking it home... But I must thrive on it I suppose. I mean, 
you never see stress do you? You don’t realise what’s going on in your body, not until 
you fucking have a heart attack... I work hard because I don’t like things getting on top 
of me, all the bloody paper-work and that. But I think I deal with it quite well, I don’t 
really let it build up, but that means staying late. I get the hump with it when jobs really 
back up, but I never let them really, really back up.
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Time and Money
The managers were fiercely driven by time pressure. Much of their job was to attempt 
to guide the build towards its completion date. They had failed to do this in the project 
I studied, partly because ‘extras’ kept being added to the work, and partly due to 
problems with ‘unforseens’ and late arrival of materials and subcontract groups. 
Being behind time pressured them to enforce ‘hurry up’ on various occasions, and, 
‘hurry up’ gave them something to do almost constantly. Unlike the trades, the 
managers therefore rarely had to make-work. Despite this, during the close of Year 1 
works leading up to Christmas, there was little for the managers to do. But to deal 
with this, they were in the position to play numerous games of squash with one 
another and the consultants, and they could simply sit down and talk when they 
wanted. Dragging-time was therefore different for management, but commodified 
linear time drove their workday and affected them and the build in negative ways. As 
Steve told me:
What pisses me off is speed. The quality goes. You know, everything’s rush, rush, rush, 
get the scaffold out, get the scaffold down. I know you have to have an element of that 
because otherwise things would start to cost a fortune. But I don’t like it, it’s constant 
pressure, monitoring things, how long things are taking, pushing things, getting more 
labour, getting more work out of them [workers], it don’t stop you know. When the 
scaffold’s come down there’s a lot less pressure on. It’s generally scaffolding and 
groundworks that’s the main rush. When you’re in the ground it’s got to get out the 
ground, you got to get the building up. I hate brickies, they’re laying bricks like fucking 
lunatics, and it’s going up so quick and you can miss window openings. And if you’re 
not on the ball and you’re fucking farting around with your [site] diary and your 
paperwork in the office, there’s no fucking window where you want it. And the 
foreman say, ‘well fuck me, I didn’t know’. And yet somehow the blame ends up back 
with the site manager, ‘well you didn’t fucking go out there and tell him’, you know. 
But it is the speed, and they’re there to earn money...
A lot of people want a price and that’s it. The chippies we’re in control of, we just 
have to kick their arse every now and then. But it’s when you get people on price and 
they’re up your arse saying, ‘this ain’t done, that ain’t done’. You got to be well 
organised, well prepared for people to come and do their job and let them get in, make 
their money and get out. It would be nice to have them all on a day work, but as long as 
you knew you were getting a decent day’s work out of them. Yeah, that’s one thing I 
don’t like, is the crash bang wallop of it all, and with that, obviously quality goes... It’s 
hard to get quality because this [Keyworker House] is making the best of a bad job in 
the first place. It’s bodging, we’re just tinkering with everything, rather than doing it 
properly we’re doing everything on the cheap. It’s not our fault, we’ve only got money 
to do it on the cheap so we have to do it on the cheap.
As mentioned in the last chapter, undertaking work directly under the market 
mechanism turns time into money and forces high speed work; tradesmen work with 
pound signs in their minds. Speed is dictated by money, or, as Thompson put it:
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Puritanism, in its marriage of convenience with industrial capitalism, was the agent 
which converted people to new valuations of time; which taught children even in their 
infancy to improve each shiny hour; and which saturated peoples’ minds with the 
equation, time is money. ([1967] 1993: 401)
Insufficient time and money force building jobs to be poor in quality, and this has 
knock-on effects down the line to the tradesmen. Whilst tradesmen enjoy their work, 
they do not enjoy being rushed or having to ‘bump’ jobs, that is, to undertake work to 
an inferior standard. As was shown in the last chapter, negative attitudes towards 
management occurred if they attempted to strictly impose formal time schedules, as 
one of the site managers had attempted to do with the carpenters. Overarching time 
and money pressures reduced work satisfaction. It negated the tradesmen’s sense of 
pride in making something and, thereby de-motivated them. Stew, one of the painters, 
expressed this:
I enjoy standing back and looking at the finished product. That does me well, but then 
again, it’s like I say, it’s jobs like this that I can’t deal with, where there’s not too much 
quality, just slap it up... Its things like that that annoy me, that I don’t like with the job.
All this untidy stuff, it’s rubbish. I don’t really like it at all.
Like Stew, Bill derided the effects of commodified time pressures:
All they worry about is getting in and getting out quick. Honesty’s gone out the 
window. It’s all, (sighs) there’s no honesty because everyone’s there to make as much 
money as they can for doing as little as possible. That wasn’t the building game years 
ago. A tradesman would do the job properly, all right he might have had time, he might 
have had a good price but not no more... It’s not quality, it’s quantity. You know, we 
was always taught to use metal conduit, and when you do a job it stays, it’s there for 
life, but now it’s ‘oh sling a bit of cable under the floor, sling a bit of plastic conduit up 
the wall’. To me, the way I was brought up and the way I was taught compared to now, 
it’s basically, I think it’s just cheap and nasty. We used to have inspectors come along 
behind us and check our work, and if it weren’t right they’d make us do it again till we 
got it right. But now I mean, who comes along and checks the work now? Yeah, me, 
but half the time it’s just covered up quickly because they’re [contractors] in a rush to 
get the painters in to finish it. They don’t care, just cover it up... I think personally, 
looking at it from the electrical side of it, the quality of work has died in the building 
game. It’s like everything else, nothing’s made to last now. It’s a plastic world.
Bill pointed out that the tradesmen from the past would have more time to undertake 
their work. His admonition may have been partly the result of his viewing the past 
through ‘golden spectacles’. However, the processes he described go hand in hand 
with Thompson’s ([1967] 1993) and Thrift’s (1990) analysis of the standardisation 
and intensification of time across the process of modernity. Even one hundred years 
ago, Tressell’s (1914) house painters were aware of the changing nature of time and 
the ensuing fall in the quality of work. And, as Mike Donaldson (1996) argues, time
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continues to intensify in present-modemity; speeding the work process and social life 
in general.
Design and Rhythms
Usually architects and consultants design buildings. These professional groups, in
association with clients, design buildings with profit, aesthetic, personal ego and use
in mind. Consideration for those who physically construct, maintain and repair
buildings may be the last thing on their minds. Procuring contracts, client satisfaction
and the end product are their main concerns, not the messy procedures that occur
during and after the build. Design with disregard for those who put the design into
practice can make a builder’s workday problematic, and this too has knock-on effects
for the quality of work in that it hinders the development of the tradesmen’s’
situational rhythms. Trick voiced these problems:
I’m amazed at the people up in high places who fucking bluff it, you wouldn’t believe 
it. We was over in North London and we was refurbing an area. I was taking down 
these emergency lights, and of course as soon as we hit the [main electrical] circuit, 
[the electricity went off and] it’s gone into the emergency light mode. I’ve took down 
lights that are glowing with no cable on them, obviously because they’re working off 
the battery inside. [Emergency lights are] only like a ruddy torch, nothing technical. 
And one of these designers has walked up and he’s said, ‘that’s amazing, how’s that 
doing that’? Because I thought he is who he is, I thought of course he knows, I thought 
he was joking, I really did. But he wasn’t. He didn’t understand how an emergency 
light worked! I would love to sit down, maybe in a little groups with the designer and 
talk about the design, like they do in the Japanese car plants. It’s crazy [some of the 
ways they design things], all that time and money. You work on something and you’ve 
got no access to the pipes, no space to work in, and then people get pissed off with the 
job. There’s nothing worse than getting pissed off with your job because nothing gets 
done does it? You lose interest, you throw it in and just think, oh fuck it, I can’t be 
arsed, do you know what I mean, that lot up there are taking the piss or whatever.
Conflict, Co-operation and Recreation in the Labour Process
In this and the preceding chapter I have attempted to sketch the various forms of 
‘frontiers of control’ extant at Keyworker House. To tell this story I compared 
Keyworker House to data from studies of the factory and the coal mine. I argued that 
forms of ‘internal work control’ and builder culture bore more resemblance to the 
miner than the factory worker. Almost every study of the highly rationalised factory 
presents workers as dissatisfied with their work, distrustful of managers, lacking in 
motivation and quite rebellious (an exception is Edwards and Scullion, 1982). These 
studies variously argue that the causes were poor management, high levels of arbitrary 
control, working-class consciousness and boredom.
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The builders mostly drew satisfaction from their work, yet just like factory 
workers, they participated in resistant/deviant actions. However, the builders were not 
resisting management control or pulled by capitalism’s dialectic, but they resisted 
infringements on their subjective time, or, actively negotiated and reconstructed 
structural temporal impositions. Work and play were therefore, not dichotomous 
events, but simultaneous activities. Resistance and recreation arose when formal 
impositions obstructed play-work.
On the ideal-typical factory production line, synthetic time, to a large extent, 
imprisons spontaneous play. Firstly, workers must work at the speed of the line, 
which destroys task mastery and imposes a metronomic synthetic rhythm upon 
bodies, which are, as Adam (1990) argues, partly cyclical in their biological 
construction. Secondly, work on a production line has no start, beginning or end and, 
therefore, bears no time-markers. Thirdly, there can be no sense of a finished product 
because of the vast division and fragmentation of tasks on the line. And fourthly, 
bureaucratic administration and atomisation of workers on production lines inhibits 
worker interaction and the crack that facilitate human mechanisms of subjectively 
escaping dragging-time. There can be little wonder that factory workers presented in 
much of the literature are so disaffected, dissatisfied and unhappy with their jobs. 
Despite nature’s time and human mortality, time is something to be played with, and 
subjectively taken hold of and enjoyed. Imposing synthetic tabled-time onto people’s 
lives ostensibly squashes life itself.
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Chapter 8
Men, Boys and Builders
This chapter describes how being men impinged upon the builders’ everyday self­
presentation, social interaction and workplace culture. I begin by examining ‘builder 
masculinity’, and then turn more generally to the historical backdrop of working-class 
masculinities. Class-based masculine styles have mixed, merged and become objects 
of reflection in contemporary society, yet their basis lay in the social exigencies of the 
past. Furthermore, builders continue to lead distinctively working-class lives where 
class-bound masculinity remains a pragmatic cultural resource for negotiating the 
peculiarities of day-to-day life.
Capturing Masculinity
All the builders in this study were men. Women comprise only 2 percent of the 
manual building trades and 6 percent of professional and managerial levels (Greed, 
2000). The building industry is a gendered organisation (Acker, 1992), and masculine 
forms were central to the builders’ identities. Heterosexuality, strength and the related 
roles of protector and provider framed the builders’ self-conceptions and relations. 
For them, to be heterosexual and physically strong was to be a man.
Throughout the thesis I described how builder interaction frequently took the 
form of humour and piss-takes. During initial encounters with and between the 
builders, and during group encounters where piss-takes occurred, I was struck by 
something expressed in the builders’ non-verbal demeanour that was specifically 
masculine. This demeanour was seen as a form of masculine posturing which both 
veiled and expressed a certain bellicosity. It was performed through tough rigid 
stances; loud, deep voices; constant profanities; and in confrontational and aggressive 
attitudes to anyone that tried to ‘push them around’ or ‘take the piss’ too far. Their 
culture was similar to the working-class ‘bikers’ described by Willis in which ‘the 
touchstones of this world were manliness, roughness and directness of interpersonal 
conflict’ (1978:13).
Day-to-day interaction at Keyworker House was not a constant round of 
messing around, banter and piss-taking. Much of the time the builders were simply 
quiet. They regularly worked alone in spaces bounded off from one another; were
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separated by distance and/or the noise of building work; and/or were caught up in 
rhythms and day-dreaming. Even break-times were often quiet, the men simply 
recuperated, read newspapers and dozed. However, during quiet times, few social, 
normative or moral signals were conveyed. Quiet times simply signified that it was 
acceptable to be quiet. But, loud, boisterous and masculine times projected messages 
outlining normative frameworks in non-quiet times. Masculine-saturated encounters 
therefore influenced the builders’ social world to a larger extent than their actual 
proportion of daily events.
Multiple Selves
The performance of masculinity was not a blanket action expressed across all social 
situations but was contingent upon specific contexts. For instance, interaction on a 
one-to-one basis took different forms from group interactions, and was contingent on 
how familiar the actors were with one another. However, two building work contexts 
will be considered in this chapter, reflecting the performance of two analytical types 
o f ‘builder self*.
Representations of builders are projected into, and from, public discourse via mass- 
produced media, and these media projected two prevailing discursive images of 
builders: Firstly, the image of builder as honest tradesman; and secondly, the builder 
as macho ‘tough guy’. Television programmes and advertisements commonly invert 
builder masculinity and sexuality; feminising builders to shock the audience into mild 
amusement (see fig. 9.0). These public images, or stereotypes, of tough macho 
builders, reflect building site reality to some extent but also reflect back into the 
building industry itself, thereby reinforcing the image by having an effect upon 
builders (c.f. Wicks, 2002).
Not all media projections conjure up images of the builder ‘tough guy’, but 
those that do commonly focus on groups of men on building sites. These are a 
representation of the ‘site-self i.e. the builder amongst builders on the set of a 
building site. Media also project images of the ‘tradesman self, which is tied to the 
idea of the privately employed builder who works alone or in a small band 
constructing and repairing people’s houses. The two images diverge from one 
another, and, as with all generalised representations, they over-simplify reality.
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Fig. 8.0: Gender-inverting Advertisement attached to the Scaffold during the 
Refurbishment of Liberty’s Department Store in Central London
LIBERTY
When dealing with clients, tradesmen tend to project themselves as professional, 
honest and agreeable. Private work for clients is a form of service work, and as C 
Wright Mills (1951) argues, service workers must prostitute their selves to please 
clients. Builders have a licence to enter back stage into the most sacred spaces of 
other people’s private worlds. Their workplace is everyone else’s home and they must 
be aware of, and have respect for this, if they are to impress and placate clients in 
order to make a living. However, when builders interact in groups on building sites 
they tend not to appease anyone.
Keyworker House was home to 776 people, yet for the builders it was a place 
of work amongst the company of men; it was a building site. The tradesmen and 
labourers rarely had to deal directly or intensively with clients because this was the 
managers’ role. In doing this, managers switched their actions between dealing with 
the builders and the many clients, and their face-work was noticeably altered in these 
varied settings. However, interaction between the builders, whether manual or non- 
manual workers, was commonly saturated by class-based masculine discourse.
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Familiar Strangers
London building sites are culturally plural and characterised by ephemeralism. This 
restricts detailed biographical and interactive knowledge, and sustains a particular 
interactive order. Interaction at Keyworker house, especially across trade groups, was 
quite superficial and perfunctory. Even within trade groups, detailed knowledge of 
one another was not always forthcoming. As Bristles mentioned: ‘Nobody on this site 
knows me really, they might think they do, but no one knows anything about me’.
Group interaction centred on what the men knew they had in common; what 
they could typically predict of one another. What everybody knew was that everyone 
else was male, a builder, working-class, and expressed himself as heterosexual. In this 
plural and interactively quite superficial environment, masculinity functioned as a 
collective cultural scaffold or, an interactive resource, which united the men around 
particular issues and actions. My fieldnotes are filled with examples of masculine 
interactive performances. In Chapter 6 I mentioned the strength and speed contests 
that occurred during group-work and I alluded to the frequency of masculine- 
saturated humour and piss-takes, and the stubborn independence of the builders. 
Keyworker House was also a home to many nurses who were mostly women, and 
consequently there was ample opportunity for expressions of heterosexuality through 
women-talk and lechery in which the nurses and cleaners were ‘objects’ of ‘red- 
blooded’ conversation.
Below I provide a short example of an encounter between Perry, a painter, and 
Bapu, a carpenter. I cite this in particular because Bapu was a practising and 
committed Hindu, the carpenter team elder, and one of the most congenial people one 
could meet. He may not be considered a masculine actor in an Anglo-Western sense, 
but building sites can be rough, tough and aggressive places, and Bapu had worked on 
them in London for over 30 years. Similar to the other first generation Kutchis, he had 
adapted to this world.
Bapu regularly entered the painter’s canteen to ask if  he could take one of the 
‘dirty papers’. This was the Sport, a soft pornographic daily ‘newspaper’. The 
carpenters, being religious and living in tight-knit pious communities, were too shy or 
ashamed to buy these publications, but they did enjoy the titillation provided (or at 
least they made out they did). The canteens of the trade and labour groups were 
littered with copies of semi-pornographic newspapers. The Sport, the Star and the Sun 
being particular favourites. Only Danny’s reading of the broad-sheet Irish Times
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bucked this trend. During my participant observation, the Sun ran a week-long series 
of photographs of semi-naked women standing in building sites, wearing hard-hats, 
and handling building tools. Such publications were almost badges of working-class 
masculinity, celebrating men, sport and naked bodies.
One day, Perry and I discovered Bapu alone in the painter’s canteen. Perry 
said in a straight-faced, but perhaps jocular fashion:
What are you doing in here you thieving old bastard? Oh the fuckin’ Sport] Shouldn’t 
you be praying or something, not playing with yourself? Go buy your own paper you 
dirty old bastard. Keep coming in here and nicking our stuff, I’ll phone immigration 
and get you deported if you ain’t careful. (Fieldnotes)
Bapu stood up straight, inflated his body size, looked Perry seriously in the eye and 
replied in a possibly threatening tone: ‘You wanna go to hospital you bastard’? Perry 
gave no reply.
The event provided one amongst many occurrences of the expression of 
heterosexuality, bellicosity, piss-take sarcasm, racism, and the frequent impossibility 
of being unable to detect whether the builders were joking or not. Piss-take jokes were 
regularly harsh and insulting, yet, because of their possible jocularity, they were not 
usually perceived as insults per se (see chapter 9). Collinson and Hearn aptly sum this 
up in their analysis of informal shop-floor culture which they saw as, ‘aggressive, 
sexist and derogatory, humorous yet insulting, playful but degrading’ (1996: 68). I 
will return to informal work culture below.
Embodied Selves
The physical body underpins the performance of gender, both by and for us (Shilling, 
1993; Connell, 1995; Bourdieu, 2001). Bodies form the backdrop for the signification 
of gender and are the material reality onto which gender constructs are inscribed. 
From birth an array of social categorisations and interactions are etched onto bodies. 
Individuals are named and decorated in gendered ways instantly by the association of 
physical body-shape with social gender. Bourdieu (2001) argues that social meaning 
is inscribed onto bodies through the screen of the binary oppositions ‘male’ and 
‘female’. Into these are inserted a series of sub-oppositions: -  active/passive, 
hard/soft, strong/weak, big/small, etc. The oppositions compose a discursive symbolic 
hierarchy that frame human conceptions of the world, one another and themselves; 
drawing individuals toward gendered status and repelling them from inferiorizing
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stigma. It is in these oppositions that genders are drawn, maintained and inscribed 
onto bodies.
Fig. 8.1: Health and Safety Notice in the Painters’ Storeroom at Keyworker House 1
S a f e t y  L a w  4*!r
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Bodies are a site of self-expression. Public bodily styles are therefore tied to social 
processes, and social processes tied into bodily styles. As Connell (1995) argues, 
bodies are not merely landscapes onto which the social is inscribed, but they enable, 
constrain and impinge upon one’s self-concept. In this sense, body shape permits and 
restrains the possibilities of human action and culture. Bodies and social processes are 
intimate partners.
Size Matters
Corporal strength is a valued aspect of the cultures of men not only in terms of its 
practical uses but also as a source of wider discursive status. Body size and strength 
are part of what it is to be a working-class man. In schools, being physically strong 
can elevate a boy’s status and self-confidence. Research into school children’s fear of 
victimisation illustrates this. Goodey (1997) demonstrates that young boys believe 
they will be less fearful on the street when their bodies reach a certain size. She shows 
that when their bodies grow and mature they do indeed become less fearful, less 
emotive, more masculine. In the building trade, strength can equate to money and 
status. For instance, a perceived weakling may not get a job as a labourer, and because 
of this, one who perceives himself as a weakling may not even attempt to get a job as 
a labourer. This featured in Jamin’s reasons for entering the building trade, where his 
ability to ‘graft’ was challenged by a friend (see chapter 5). Indeed, statistics from 
Sweden indicate that male building workers were on average, taller and stronger than 
Swedish men in general (Olofsson, 1994; from Clarke et al, 1999).
All building trades are based in handicraft production. Modem machinery 
such as mechanical plant and electric hand-tools have been developed to assist 
physical movements, but much of the builder’s working day still relies on dextrous 
strength. A builder’s body is thus central to his life-projects and self-concept, not 
merely in terms of gender status or as a site of pleasure, but as his capital. Builders 
exchange bodily labour for livelihood where sweat is swapped for wages, and this was 
ingrained in the builders’ discourse (c.f. Willis, 1977). Take for example, Paul one of 
the site managers, who reflected on his recent change of career from general builder 
to site manager:
You can’t really term it [site management] as earning your money. I always think to 
earn your money you’ve got to work hard for it. I don’t consider this to be work, I don’t 
know if that makes any kind of sense but I think work, I would relate it to physical 
work you know. This is just the lighter end isn’t it, really. You really get paid
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extortionately for doing no real work, but you’re paid for your knowledge aren’t you.
It’s a strange thing to say, but using your brain isn’t really working, I think.
Bodies and work were intimately connected, but manual building work was not solely 
corporal. Even the low status trades of painting and labouring require substantial skill 
and knowledge (see chapters 6 and 7).
Bodies were also capitalised upon as a source of interactive power. Talk of 
size, strength and toughness were common, as can be evidenced in much of the 
interview data presented throughout this thesis. For example, when I first went to the 
pub on a Friday evening with the members of what was mostly site management, I 
noticed the sheer size of the men and how they deployed this as a power resource. 
After drinking large quantities of alcohol, we moved to another bar where we literally 
took over one section of it. We created a ‘rough presence’ (Willis, 1977) by barging 
onto the pool table, being loud and boisterous, and using sheer strength and numbers 
to deflect any likely criticism from the surrounding social audience (see also Edley 
and Wetherell, 1997). Talk of size, strength and toughness was common amongst the 
builders, who would often remark on what a big guy such and such a person was. It 
was as if  being big conferred status onto a person; someone who was somehow more 
distinguished than a small person.
Formal Vacuity and Ephemeralism
In the building game you get blokes from all walks of life, I bet you half of them have 
seen the inside of prison walls. Because on the building site there’s no questions asked. 
You walk on a building site, ‘looking for labour mate? ‘Yeah, start tomorrow’. They 
don’t ask about your background, they don’t ask for your CV. There’s no 
discrimination on a building site. If you can do the work, fair enough. It’s not like you 
go into an office job where they want to know your background, want references and 
all that. (Mike Fixit, maintenance man)
[In the building trade] you’re moving around, you’re meeting new people everyday 
right, new crowd everyday. Sometimes you’re with a wrong crowd, sometimes you’re 
with a good crowd. (Vin, carpenter)
The informal, almost non-modem, nature of employment and work organisation of 
building had an impact on the builders’ everyday practices. For example, ephemeral 
characters that nobody really knew, and probably never could get to know, formed a 
significant ingredient to interaction. Some trades only worked on the project for a 
short duration (see fig. 2.1. chapter 2), and sequentialism necessitated that different 
trades did not integrate to a large extent. For instance, the scaffolders worked solely
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with one another because they worked different hours and in different physical spaces 
to the other builders. Interaction between the scaffolders and others was fleeting; 
passing one another in a corridor, or merely spotting each other across opposite ends 
of the building. Even within trades, some individuals came onto the site for only a 
short duration. These might be the low skilled that were soon dismissed, or those that 
did not ‘fit in’ and were informally driven out, or, the peripheral workers who joined 
the teams only for a short duration, like the Spaniard and Russian employed for only a 
few weeks by Paddy McMurray to do the ‘hurry up’ work.
Trade separation and superficial interaction facilitated myth-making with 
respect to some trades. Aidan, a labourer, told me how most scaffolders were good 
drinkers and even better fighters, tough men revered for their strength and daring; and 
Bristles, a painter, described bricklayers as ‘bulldogs’ who were not to be messed 
with. Physical and social distances facilitated caricatured images, which in turn 
framed interaction; if people did not really know one another, they could not trust one 
another in particular ways. Again, Bristles aptly summed this up: ‘People on the 
building sites, they’re all friends, they’re all enemies, they trust everyone and they 
trust no one’.
To trust everyone but no one was a pragmatic attitude to adopt because it was
common occurrence for tools, materials and the builders’ personal possessions to be
stolen at the Keyworker House build. Below, I provide an example:
One Friday morning when I was working with the painters, Emie Coat was away on 
holiday and he entrusted Jimmy, his foreman, to hand out the wages. Jimmy gave 
Frank two wage-packets - the extra one for Frank to hand to his painter friend Stew, 
that lunchtime. At breakfast-time Frank realised that Stew’s wages had gone missing 
from his coat-pocket. The painters - Jimmy, Perry, Gerry, Bony and I - all searched the 
scaffold and canteen area but could not find the wages. Frank thought Jimmy might not 
have given him the wages in the first place and they proceeded to have a protracted and 
aggressive argument in which Jimmy threatened to take a hammer to Frank’s head in 
response to being accused of not handing over the wages.
The wages became our focal point for the day. Privately, Gerry told me he thought 
someone must have stolen them and he offered a theory as to who it was. He said Frank 
was foolish to leave them unattended in the canteen, especially considering they were 
someone else’s wages, because, ‘you just don’t know who anyone really is in the 
building’. We both agreed that whoever took them was low: ‘You just don’t take a 
man’s wages’ Gerry said. ‘It’s a bit fuckin’ rough’ I replied. Gerry told me stories of 
similar incidents that occurred on other building sites that he worked on in the past. 
Some of the other painters began, behind one another’s backs, to accuse one another 
and Frank, of committing the offence. Frank protested his innocence saying he would 
have to give his own wages to Stew anyway, which he did. However, this was 
problematic because Frank’s wages were less than Stew’s as he had missed a day from 
work in the last week and he earned less than Stew. Soon after the event Stew phoned 
up from Keyworker House 1. He had gone on strike until he received the outstanding
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cash and said he was going to call the police. For this he was vilified by everybody, 
particularly because he wanted to call the police in. ‘What the fuck’s it got to do with 
them?’ Bony said.
The following Monday the wages saga continued to circulate. Two of the 
labourers, Michael and Aidan, told me that ‘something stinks’ about it all. They also 
told Frank to stick to his story and Took after number one’. They said one of the other 
labourers had his expensive penknife stolen from their tea-room the week before. They 
thought one of the asphalters took it but could not be sure. Aidan reminded me of a 
similar incident that occurred just before Christmas when his mobile phone was stolen 
from the labourers’ tea-room. Michael said, ‘You have to watch out for this kind of 
thing on the buildings’, to which Aidan replied, ‘you expect it on big sites but not on 
here where we all know each other’. Will arrived and told a story about the time Danny 
lost his wages and everyone had a collection for him. Danny ended up with more 
money than was in his original wage packet, but Danny was popular and long serving 
at Topbuild, Frank was neither of these.
All of the builders found this event morally reprehensible and each of them censured 
the theft. However, no one could be blamed for the misdemeanour because it was 
possible that anyone could have committed the act. Yet, it was common to blame 
transitory outsiders for the theft of personal possessions. Of course, it may not have 
been outsiders who committed the infractions but they were logical and safe targets 
for accusation and scapegoating. Transitory ‘outsiders’ held few ties to Topbuild’s 
parochial networks, and were thus free from personal ties, network morality, and the 
social pressure of the ‘core’ work-groups. It made more sense to everybody that 
outsiders were not to be trusted (see chapter 10)
Real Money
The stolen wage packet contained cash, which itself contributed towards the theft in
the form of simple opportunity (see Felson, 1994). Subcontractors were often forced
to pay some their workers in cash. For example, Emie Coat paid Frank in cash, ‘off
the books’, because Frank was working on a false CIS card, claiming non-working
single-parent benefits and not paying any tax. Similarly Gerry had no fixed address
and thus no bank account to pay a cheque into. In addition, the payment of ‘subs’
(small cash payments in lieu of wages, usually supplied on a Monday, after weekly
wages had been ‘blown’ at the weekend) during the working week further reinforced
the necessity for cash payments.
It is possible to exchange wage cheques for cash in certain pubs and (more
recently) shops in London, but the builders preferred cash. Danny explained why:
Oh [check-cashing pubs] they were rough and ready places all right yea. Those 
publicans were supposed to declare all the checks but they didn’t declare it at all. So
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it’s been all stopped now, most of them anyhow. There’s a big pub, McGovern's in 
Kilbum, they used to do it. You’d give them your cheque, have a bite to eat and they’d 
charge you 4 or 5 percent. But you’d spend maybe £20, four percent for the check and 
40 pound for the drink, pure con job.
DT: I t’s all right with Paddy though, he pays everyone in cash doesn ’t he?
Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah (in under-the-breath whispered tone), well no not 
everybody, some have cards, CIS cards, not everybody, it’s up to yourself.
Emie Coat, the painting subcontractor, and Paddy McMurray, the labour
subcontractor, paid in cash because their employees preferred it that way, and good
employees were worth looking after (see chapter 9). Some employees were operating
a tax dodge and could only be paid in cash. It was salient then, to consider social
reaction to the wage theft mentioned above. No one wanted to call the police because
it might attract attention to illicit employment practices (and perhaps more things that
I did not know about)1. These practices erected a barrier to the infusion of formal law
and its agents, and in this respect, Jimmy’s threat to take a hammer to Frank’s head
was an example of what the law rested upon between the builders. Their law was
parochial, summary and corporal.
Cash payments and the rough edges of the building industry also generated
problems for subcontractors themselves. Emie Coat:
I’ve always paid cash, which I’m going off of doing now. I’m trying to get most people 
paid by direct payment into the bank. Basically because a [subcontractor and] good 
friend of mine got done in Enfield, in broad daylight. Come out the bank, had his 
briefcase taken, which was even locked to his wrist, but they had bolt cutters and they 
smacked him across the head with them. He landed up five days in hospital and he’s 
still not back at work even now. So when that happened I thought to myself, it’s time I 
got back to 2003 and started paying people either by cheque or through the bank, which 
a lot of them won’t like but they’ll get used to it.
Contracting Violence
Commonly no formal employment contract exists between building workers and 
subcontractors. I never saw or signed any kind of contract for the work I did at 
Keyworker House because wage rates and hours of work were agreed verbally, by a 
‘gentleman’s agreement’. Consequently, both worker and subcontractor relied on each 
other’s morality to loyally honour the agreement.
1 Henry (1986) suggests that most organisations tend to invoke formal law only as a last resort. However, for 
organisations where illicit practices are involved, seemingly it would be even less likely for formal law to be called 
upon to mediate disputes.
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Durkheim ([1893] 1960) maintained that contracts were framed and honoured by
some kind of collective morality. If they were not, he argued, they would rarely be
fulfilled in large, socially differentiated societies. During my participation with
Topbuild, verbal contracts between workers and subcontractors were always
honoured. This was partly due to the long-term nature of the employment
relationships and the ensuing construction of (moral) reciprocity and networks (see
chapter 9), yet contracts and the moral rules surrounding them were also maintained
by an underlying threat of violence. Mickey T provided an example:
Before I was subbying I got an old van like, and I’d charge the whole gang to pick 
them up in Cricklewood, take them out to London airport and bring them back in the 
evenings. I’d pay them out their wages on a Friday as well. And one week they didn’t 
get paid so they all came at me with picks (laughs), the whole lot of em with fuckin’ 
picks (laughs lots)... I has a word with them, says it weren’t my fault, I was only the 
fuckin’ driver like. So I drove them all down to the agent’s offices and they took their 
picks in with them and confronted one of the directors. ‘Oh, oh, a mistake’ he says. He 
went straight down to the bank with these rake [lots of] of blokes following behind him 
with picks and paid them out of his own fuckin’ pocket (laughs). (Fieldnotes).
If subcontractors do not pay and are naive enough to remain in their offices, the 
collective bellicose power of working men is utilised to enforce the contract. Even in 
my own short building career I have twice gone armed with a knife to collect my 
wages.
Collective bellicosity and informal contracts could also be deployed against
workers. For example, I asked Ernie Coat if he paid employees that turned up for
work but who were ‘toshers’2 not skilled enough to do the work:
Well, no I don’t actually. I pay them for the day they’ve done, but if they’re sacked the 
next day by lunchtime they won’t get paid for that half-day, because obviously they’re 
no good. If they’re sacked after the first day I normally pay them until tea-time or 
something, but they don’t get paid for the whole day.
DT: And do you ever have any problems with them wanting that money?
I’ve never had any problem no, no, never in all the years that I’ve been doing it, I’ve 
never had any problems. Well, they haven’t got a lot of choice really. There’s a lot 
more blokes on site than what there are the person who’s sacked. I mean the blokes 
who are on site have been with me for some time, so I’d have plenty of people to call 
on shall we say.
2 London painters frequently use this term to describe their low-skilled colleagues. Interestingly its original usage 
was to describe the men who unblocked London’s sewers in the 19th century; a trade o f  very low-status.
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Loyalty to a subcontractor was not the only source of collective bellicose power.
Similar to the relationships between clients, consultants, contractors and
subcontractors described in the following chapter, loyalty could be bought. Aidan:
It’s not so long ago now, like the old subbies. What they used to do is they knew some 
labourers out of work. If they wanted someone turned over and all this business, they’d 
give them a day’s money for it. They might get about ten of them for it, £50 each, 
smashed his pub up, ‘the landlord upset me’, things like that you know.
Even Mr Jaggers, a middle-class building consultant and a man of the law, was
acutely aware of the foundations of social order in the building industry:
Some site managers, what they are doing is they’re bullying people. You never get 
results out of bullying people. What happens is that you’ll always come up against 
another bully. I worked on a job years ago, there was this bricklaying company that had 
a terrible reputation. And what happened is that the site manager kept goading them... 
He’d got them to take down their work and all sorts of things. One day two labourers 
came on the job, new labourers, and they were working with this brick company, yes. 
And the site manager came up to them and had a go at them. They beat hell out of him, 
put him in hospital. That’s what happens.
The social organisation of building employment rests partly upon reciprocity and 
partly on the underlying threat of violence ensuing from the informal, non­
contractual, physical, and non-discriminatory nature of the building industry. These 
ingredients facilitated a tough atmosphere amongst the builders and resulted in a 
performance of bellicose styles, styles which were a source of power, and which 
possessed a utility in terms of maintaining agreements. Reciprocity and violence are 
partners; one implies the other (Mauss, [1954] 1970; see chapter 9), and reciprocity 
and bellicosity echo archaic forms of work organisation.
Trouble and Trust
The performance and posturing of ‘strength’ and ‘toughness’ symbolically expressed 
a form of power, and these displays were at once instrumental and counter-productive. 
Spawned by what was a fear of violence, both real and symbolic, masculine styles 
provoked a fear o f violence which thereby provoked masculine styles as a response.
Anderson (1999) describes the street culture of young black men in inner-city 
Philadelphia. He cites Majors and Billson who argue, with reference to black men’s 
‘cool pose’, ‘If he lifts his protective shield, he risks appearing timid... This is the 
facade that provides security in an insecure world... to advertise the black male’s 
willingness to resort to violence to resolve interpersonal conflict’ (1992: 28-29).
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Anderson also cites Mann (1986), arguing that cultural forms arise to protect oneself 
in situations and areas where formal law is blocked. On the streets of Philadelphia, 
legal technologies had broken down, leaving a formal-legal vacuum in which a ‘code 
of the street’ emerged; a cultural form to protect one’s self from attack, be it real or 
symbolic.
It can be seen that Fig 9.0 (above) not only plays the audience by inverting
builder masculinity, but this is reinforced by images of black masculinity and
sexuality. Inner-city black culture is highly somatic and masculine, and it infuses
London’s inner-city youth cultures as a source of symbolic capital on the street where
‘good’ is ‘bad’ and ‘bad’ is ‘good’. London’s youth meld white working-class and
Caribbean (predominately Jamaican) cultures, evidenced in their accents, style and
swagger. Gilroy describes this culture:
It is neither a class nor, of course, a racially homogenous grouping. Its identity is a 
product of immediate local circumstance but is apprehended through a syncretic culture 
for which the history of the African diaspora supplies the decisive symbolic core (1990: 
279-278)3.
Only some of the builders, for example, Jamin, Vin and Will, performed a ‘black 
pose’ (despite not strictly being black), yet almost all of the builders performed a 
bellicose interactive style. Many had grown up in inner-city areas where crime and 
violence were a regular part of daily life (see chapter 5), and thus for the ‘bad boys’ 
for instance, bellicose styles were a pragmatic adaptation to their homes and 
neighbourhoods. Take for example, Frank, talking about where he grew up and still 
lived:
It all depends how rough you want to make it. Like there’s one lot of flats wanting to 
fight you, the other lot wouldn’t back down, it was quite rough. It’s like tit for tat, you 
know what I mean. It’s just like fighting every single night; more than anything else 
with people who you know. I still see some of them but they’re all settled down now or 
in prison. You try to avoid them, or not really them ones but the next generation, you 
try to avoid them because they’re the ones who are the real troublemakers. They’re the 
ones who’re going out and getting crack-cocaine, getting stoned, getting killed, so you 
try to avoid it. Plenty of the old junkies down in the Cally [Caledonian Road in North 
London] anyway. I was one of the fortunate ones, I wanted to do something with life, 
but I still haven’t found what I want to do.
3 14 years have elapsed since the publication o f Gilroy’s article. Presently it is difficult to view mainstream black 
culture as anti-capitalist in consideration o f hip-hop’s cultural dominance and its obsession with ‘riches and 
bitches’. I would argue that black cultures’ immersion into inner-city youth cultures o f all races emerges through 
its materialism and somatic street power. In addition, syncretic culture does not necessarily counter racism. Will, 
for example, performed a black pose but was generally anti-black and shared a good relationship with Jamin all at 
the same time. Such are the complexities o f racism (see chapter 9).
176
Frank grew up in ‘the Cally’ where different groups of young men attempted to assert 
their power over public spaces by battling with one another. In such dangerous and 
legally sterile environments, the approach one takes to deal with problems and 
conflicts is necessarily parochial and summary. Frank stated that he was one of the 
lucky ones because he was not a crack or heroin addict. He was however, a regular 
user of amphetamine and cocaine. He was also decorated in home-made tattoos, 
created with his friend ‘down the flats’ when they were younger and would test one 
another to see who could bear the pain of the needle for the longest period. Again, this 
reflected the centrality of bodies as a central resource of pleasure, mastery, strength 
(c.f. Blackman, 1997) and display.
One of Paddy McMurray’s employees, Will, who worked alongside Mike 
Fixit as a maintenance man, was one of the youngest builders at 21 years old. He was 
energetic, entrepreneurial and voluble. He also bore a scar that ran over a foot long 
from the centre of the back of his neck past his throat. It looked as if somebody had 
tried to cut his head off. He told me in conversation (he never agreed to be 
interviewed) that he was walking home three years previously near to the housing 
estate where he lived in Clapham, South London, when he glanced at a young man 
whom he did not recognise. The stranger confronted him saying he knew him from 
somewhere. Will thought this was possible because he was ‘very mouthy’ when he 
was younger, but he told the stranger to ‘fuck o ff  and carried on walking home. A 
moment later Will thought the stranger punched him and so he gave chase. However, 
he soon saw blood pumping out from his neck. Will had been stabbed and slashed 
with a Stanley knife.
Will still had problems with his blood pressure and the attack affected some of
his mental processing. He had difficulties with reading, writing and some problems
with his mental well-being:
That fucked me up, fucked me up. I was mad after that. I tell ya man, never ever will I 
back down from anything after that. You back down, you get fucked. Not any more 
boy, not any more. Even my mates, if someone starts on them I’m there like a fuckin’ 
psycho... I’m a fuckin’ mad man, I don’t give a shit anymore. (Fieldnotes)
The attack left Will sick and unable to work for some time. During his recovery he 
began to get into trouble with the police. He was already known to the police from his 
youth when he and his friends would go out ‘queer bashing’ and robbing. He made 
many enemies during this time and said that most of his friends were in prison and/or
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had moved onto using hard drugs. However, Will still liked to spend time out on the 
streets with his friends ‘where the action was’ but it got to a point where he could not 
do anything without getting ‘harassed’ by the police or street enemies. He was known 
to the police and entwined in a social control net (Cohen, 1985), and his antics had 
strained life at home with his parents. Eventually Will’s father, a first generation Irish 
labourer, asked his friend, Danny, if he could get Will a ‘start’ (a job), keep an eye on 
him and thus keep him out of trouble. Danny obliged, and Will became a popular 
character at Keyworker House, despite being in constant trouble from the tenants 
committee for his loud profanities.
Whilst bellicosity and ‘rough’ backgrounds were a fact of life for many of the
builders, not everybody had or made trouble in their lives (see chapter 5). However,
the statistic that painters are more likely to be victims of homicide than any other
occupational group (OPCS, 1995) provides further evidence for the circularity of
builder masculine bellicosity. Furthermore, staying out of trouble can be troublesome
itself amongst groups of men/boys, as Pete, one of the two general foremen, noted:
I’ve never gone out and intentionally had a fight, I’ve never been like that. I’d rather 
love someone than fight them... As I grew up I hung around with a few lads, and the 
older you get you just go on building sites and rummage around and that don’t you, as 
kids. Then they started smashing the place up and nicking everything, and then it’s 
gone to cars. I thought I’m not interested in this, but then no fucker wants to know you. 
I’ve never ever broken into any car, even as a kid when people have walked past 
somewhere at night and nicked a bike out of a garden or something. I didn’t want to do 
it but I’m there you know, and I just didn’t want to be around with that. I’ve not for one 
minute even thought about breaking into anyone’s car... I didn’t, as a child, have a lot 
of friends really. There’s been my best mate I live with now. He’s been the same, he’s 
never broken into anyone’s cars or beaten anyone up, he’s never wanted to do that. And 
we sort of grew up together, which is not a bad thing.
Some of the builders brought a tough culture with them to the building site. Others did 
not, but were acutely aware that amongst working-class men and boys, tough 
masculinity was the norm, and not to take part in the antics of the lads could result in 
‘no fucker wants to know you’. The social pressure to be strong, risk-taking and 
masculine may outweigh the pressure to conform formally in male group contexts.
Cultural Transmission
Frank, in talking about his eldest son also called Frank, highlighted some of the 
processes whereby the use, or threat, of violence as a power resource was passed
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down the generations. It was through these processes and day-to-day reality that
violence and masculine culture intertwined:
I don’t want him to be scared to go out on the street, to be scared that someone is gonna 
come along and do him if that’s what its going to be like. Anybody hits him, hit them 
back! I don’t care if you bite them or hit them with a lump of wood, you hurt them... 
What can you do? Kids fight but I’m not gonna stand for people bullying them... They 
get in trouble [at school], and [my wife] Trace will explain that his dad said if he gets 
any trouble he’s told him to hit them. I don’t care. There’s no way I’m letting him get 
bullied at school. Because if you don’t stick up for yourself you’ll go to secondary 
school and get bullied even fucking more. If he wins, fine, and if he gets beat, he gets 
beat. But if he gets beat he knows he can go back because he knows that he can use 
something, he will not get in trouble by me. If he has a fight with somebody in school 
and he gets beat, I say to him, don’t let them walk all over you, if they walk all over 
you they’ll keep on picking on you...
Me and my mate Dave, we got picked on at school. Until Dave thought, ‘right 
that’s it I’ve had enough’. He didn’t want to fight them right, they chased both of us 
and he fought with one and then they all jumped on top of him and beat him up 
severely. So, he thought, ‘right I’m not going to have this’. He got them one by one. He 
done the whole lot of them yeah, but then when they were all together they started 
again. He grabbed hold of the leader in the metal room and put his hand in a fucking 
vice, got a hacksaw and started hacking his fucking arm off. He goes, ‘do you want me 
to do this every time you start’? They backed off and got nicked soon after and put 
away [in prison] anyway. I got done over as well, they kept on doing it, they kept on 
coming after me all the time. I’d had enough, I got a lump of wood and battered fuck 
out of them. They left me alone after that... I didn’t feel proud of myself fucking doing 
it. I don’t like fighting, I’d rather just live my life but I’m not going to let my son go 
through what we went through. There’s no way I’m going to let him get done and just 
walk away. If he does then they’re making him do this and that for them, jump for 
them... Because they see people backing down then they think they rule, like rule your 
life know what I mean.
What Frank describes above is the lore amongst boys at tough schools and on the 
streets. Frank was little concerned with his son’s achievements in the formal world of 
the school. His was a pragmatic reaction to the circumstances he was in. He feared his 
son would live life in fear of violence and be constantly pushed around, and his fear 
of his son’s fear led him to instil a bellicose culture into him. Urban survival and 
masculine pride would take precedence over remote formal educational examinations 
and middle-class achievement status (c.f. Miller, 1958). In my experience these 
parental instructions are common amongst the working-classes. The ability to work 
hard, fight hard, drink hard and screw hard is central to working-class masculinity. 
Perhaps only the minority ‘formal apprentices’ (see chapter 5) experienced a different 
life to Frank’s, perhaps not. Hobbs (1994) argues that violence is a ‘cultural 
expectation’ of working-class men; a normal part of growing up, and later, its use or 
threat is central in the construction and maintenance of their identities.
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Violence is part of the scaffold that that working men’s self-concepts and
social action. The public culture of the builders was in certain contexts the symbolic
display of the threat of violence. Symbolised violence was a reservoir of power, and:
Power of any kind must be clothed in effective means of displaying it... Thus the most 
objective form of naked power, i.e., physical coercion, is often neither objective nor 
naked but rather functions as a display for persuading the audience; it is often a means 
of communication not merely a means of action. (Goffinan, 1959: 234).
Common violence in the lives of many of the builders provoked a willingness to be 
violent, or at least to present oneself as bellicose. To deal with the threat of violence, 
men fight fire with fire and combat the problem with violence. Doing this however, 
adds further fuel to the fire and maintains bellicosity. Fortunately actual physical 
violence does not often manifest itself (outside of war) and I never witnessed any 
actual physical violence at Keyworker House. However, the infrequency of violent 
manifestations is a paradoxical function of violent omnipresence: violence prevents 
violence (Hobbs, 1995) and guides social order.
Law, Custom and Violence
Masculine expressions necessarily build upon the foundations of the past. Parental 
cultural transmission integrates the past and the present both explicitly and implicitly.
it
The massive homicide rates of 17 century England bear witness to the inefficiency 
of legal technologies and subsequent bellicosity of the past. For example, Rock’s 
(1983) analysis of crime and control in late 17th and early 18th century England 
outlines how much of the country was disconnected from a central coherent legal 
apparatus. Even dense urban areas of London, ‘constituted a mosaic of discrete and 
bounded areas’ (1983: 207). Law was ambiguous and negotiated where the powerful 
were commonly immune to legal sanction, and agents of the law were often 
perpetrators of the crimes. Rock argues that ‘such variation had the consequence of 
confusing the borders between morality and immorality, between legality and 
illegality’ (1983: 216). At best, the law was distant, parochially negotiated and 
ambiguous, offering little abstract or real protection from victimisation. Furthermore, 
the emerging legal technologies of this period began to shift from concern with injury 
to creating crimes against ‘things’ i.e. property (Thompson, [1975] 1990). People had 
to protect themselves from one another, and to do this, cultural forms emerged with 
specific codes of moral conduct and justice. The symbolism of the duel remains in the
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contemporary imagination as one such method of organic summary justice. In 
addition to the weakness of formal control in 17th century England, Thompson (1993) 
argues that mass education in the 18th and 19th centuries did little to erase informal 
plebeian custom. Cultural wisdom was passed through the apprenticeship system and 
in the marketplace during a period of ‘free-time’ between paternalism and factory 
discipline.
Builders have never been bound by factory discipline and rarely by 
paternalism, and most of them subjectively by-passed formal education (see chapter 
5). Like the plebeian’s, the builders’ law was not written but informally enacted 
within the exigencies of their everyday lives. Their law was composed of archaic 
custom enforced by ‘sanctions of force, ridicule, shame and intimidation’ (Thompson, 
1993: 9), quite separate from modem legal technologies. Furthermore, as the 
historian, Stone (1977) argues, pre-modernity was a very ‘cool’ and unfriendly, 
characterised by suspicion and hostility4, similar in this respect to the ‘cool pose’ of 
inner-city black men. In pre-modemity, social order rested largely on violent strength 
and the ordination of God, but through history strength mutated into a revered, almost 
sacred, social symbol co-opted by men. Strength begs respect in both collective 
discourse and daily interaction, and its brother, violence, therefore forms a backdrop 
to social action, order and power.
Masculine values are expressed overtly in countless social forms. The mass 
produced media are saturated with stories of masculine heroes utilising corporal 
strength and violence to overcome adversity5. For those with little access to ‘over­
ground’ values, who may feel the ‘hidden injuries of class’6 that devalue their mental 
ability, strength as a form of power is both instrumental and a source of symbolic 
status (c.f. Collinson, 1992). Marsh (1978) argues that ‘aggro’, an extreme form of 
bellicose posturing, is a socially evolved mechanism that prevents actual violence. 
Working-class men have co-opted the forms of ‘aggro’ as implicit in their self- 
expression, but for middle-class men, status can be achieved through art, money, 
science, generosity or piety. These status values, in my judgement, bear little 
relationship to what it is to be masculine. However, for those with negligible access to
4 From Pahl, 1984.
5 The content o f almost any film that stars Sylvester Stallone for instance, portrays the oppressed physically and 
corporally battling his oppressor.
6 Sennett and Cobb (1972) view the injuries as a result o f the working-class being part o f a non-descript mass. I 
would add that the symbolic injuries are also composed from the devaluation o f  working men’s humanity, in 
particular their intellectual abilities.
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these values, masculinity supplies a reservoir of status embedded in collective 
discourse.
Class Variation
Middle-class expressions of masculinity have diverged from the symbolic expressions
of strength and violence that are cloaked in the strut of the working-classes. The
construction of the idea of the gentleman clearly illustrates a middle-class alternative
masculinity. Dominant groups distinguish themselves from the ruled through creating
mythical distinctions (Mason, 1970). Leaders of archaic societies maintained rule
through divinity, which later became replaced with evolutionary-based mythopiesis
concerning the abilities of those ‘bom to lead’. Training sons in leadership difference
disciplined them to gentlemanly conduct, and the growing numbers of middle-class
professionals in the 17th and 18th centuries became trained in the courtly culture of
the aristocracy, reinforced by the structure of the career (Elias, 1983; Newton, 1996;
McKinlay, 2002), and polarised class masculinities emerged7. A more recent example
of these processes was the clientalist-feudal system in mid-20th century Rwanda:
It was essential for the Tutsi [rulers] to be always self-controlled and polite; only vulgar 
people like the Hutu lost their temper and showed emotion. The whole social system 
revolved on the superiority of the Tutsi, who were regarded by the Hutu as different 
from themselves not only physically but morally. They were believed by both Hutu and 
Tutsi (writes Maquet) to be ‘intelligent, capable of command, refined, courageous and 
cruel’, while the Hutu were thought by both groups to be ‘hardworking, not very 
clever, extrovert, irascible, unmannerly, obedient, and physically strong’. (Mason, 
1970: 14)
Mason may as well have been describing generalised cultural differences between the 
English middle and working classes (excepting perhaps ‘obedience’), or between 
white British colonists and black colonised (see Blum, 2004).
The notion of gentleman arising from feudal leadership forms manufactured 
‘difference’ and removed the utility and necessity of bellicose interaction. The 
gentleman did not need to prove or posture his power because it was underpinned by 
his social, economic and political position, and dramatised through myths and 
discursive structure. For the mass however, their power was summary and interactive, 
and perhaps one of their few weapons in struggles against the powerful in early 
modernity (see Thompson, [1975] 1990). Furthermore, dual-class (or race) masculine
7 See also Foucault (1976) for a description o f the construction o f class-based sexulaities in the same period.
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oppositions enacted a process whereby each team’s culture reinforced and solidified 
definitions of the other, framing cultural development within an antagonistic circular 
process.
Gender Variation
Historical class and race variations in masculine expression, and concomitant 
hegemony of the powerful, might help to illuminate to gender variations. Like the 
taken-for-granted nature of management and middlemen described in chapter 6, 
masculinity is hegemonic (Connell, 1995) in that many women (historically) may 
have little objection to ‘false reciprocity’ between them and their male partners, and in 
wider social relations in general (Hakim, 1991). Clues to the making of hegemonic 
masculinity can be found in the past.
Godelier (1999) describes the actions of men’s violent domination of women 
of the Baruya in New Guinea. Like an archaic ruling elite, the men were motivated to 
dominance by fear of women’s power, and they justified their dominance through a 
sacred ideology dramatised by their possession of sacred secrets and objects. Later in 
history, men symbolically justified their dominance through their ability to protect 
and provide. Analogous to the construction of the gentlemen leaders, men’s ability to 
protect and provide was/is legitimised through evolutionary and scientific 
mythopiesis. Thus men are naturally stronger, bigger, more assertive, less emotional 
and more practical. Again, antagonistic identity framing formed a process which 
polarised identities through binary signification. The ideology of man as provider and 
protectorate makes him indispensable; like god he can never be reciprocated for his 
life-giving position. However, God can punish as well as provide. Hegemony rests 
upon violence in its final instance (see also chapters 6 and 9).
Webs of Meaning
Maleness, it can be seen, is an eminently relational notion, constructed in front of and
for other men and against femininity, it is a kind of fear of the female, firstly in oneself.
(Bourdieu, 2001: 53)
The power of violence spun a web of meaning within collective discourse. Cultural 
forms from the past crystallised in the present through processes of generational 
transmission and their continuing utility in everyday encounters (c.f. Berger and 
Luckman, 1966). Symbolised violence became guided and amplified by positioning
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within the field of signified referents, which further dramatised its symbolic power. 
Just as archaic gift exchange functioned to prevent violence (Mauss, [1954] 1970), 
masculine posturing functioned as a mechanism to collectively get things done and to 
dominate without recourse to actual violence (Marsh, 1977). Working-class 
masculinity further crystallised through its opposition to femininity and middle-class
Q #
masculinities, and through fear of actual and symbolised violence . Interactions and 
intra-actions usher feelings of low self-esteem and stigma to those who descend a 
symbolic hierarchy, and part of the persuasive power of symbolised violence rests 
upon its ability to provoke descent in the symbolic hierarchy (see below). 
Furthermore, the idea of strength, in addition to being a real source of interactive 
power, became conflated with a whole series of other sub-oppositions related to 
masculine gender. Thus, ‘independence’ and ‘strength’ occupy similar positions on 
the masculine binary apogee, drawn in relation to the ‘feminine’ signifiers ‘weak’ and 
‘dependent’. It is these meanings that frame everyday reflective action.
Group Work
Amongst groups of men working along side one another, the group itself has a 
tendency to become more than the sum of its parts because group rules emerge in 
group situations. Chapter 7 highlighted how ‘the crack’ was a means of 
manufacturing excitement. The content of the crack was regularly based on masculine 
linguistic jousting, or what the builders called ‘piss-taking’. Analogous to the piss- 
take is ‘sounding’; a means through which young men elevate their status in the group 
by challenging the masculine status of others (Matza, 1964). In this sense, naming 
another as a ‘gay sissy’ presents the speaker as dominant-heterosexual and challenges 
the listener to prove somehow that he, like the speaker, is not the subordinate gender 
of ‘gay and sissy’. A tactic to deflect the challenge is for the listener to find 
ambiguities, or lacuna, in the speaker’s biography and behaviour, and return the 
challenge (see also Willis, 1978). Piss-takes can only function within a discursive 
constellation that valorises tough masculinity and stigmatises other subordinate 
genders and sexualities. The outcome of piss-taking is to make linguistic challenges 
appear as normative guides, thereby refreshing discourse day-to-day and moment-to-
8 1 mean this as a separate notion to Bourdieu’s ‘symbolic violence’ because symbolised violence involves 
conscious intentionality.
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moment, making it seem contextually real and all important (see also Goffman, 1963). 
This has unintended consequences in terms of both race (see chapter 9) and gender.
Matza (1964) writes that male group members suffer ‘status anxiety’ that
cannot be talked about or shared amongst the group as this would become ridiculed,
and ridicule functions as a way for other group members to overcome their own
anxieties. This results in ‘group pluralistic ignorance’ (from Dollard, 1937) whereby
each member believes the piss-taking assaults to be real despite the fact that they
sometimes or often privately disbelieve the meanings. These processes were at work
at Keyworker House. Amongst the builders, piss-takes/sounding revolved around
jibes at one another’s badges of identity, in particular their masculine identity. During
the piss-take each opponent attempted to out-manoeuvre the other by finding general
status weaknesses in one another’s identity and symbolically drawing these out as to
descend the opponent in a symbolic hierarchy9. The processes restricted group
interaction to guarded and superficial levels. Stew expressed how this could operate:
It was like this guy I worked with, I told him too much. It doesn’t do good to be so 
open, it’s the wrong thing to do. I should be working him out, but why I’m doing all the 
talking he’s working me out. Anyone can pretend to be someone they are not, the way I 
am is that I am genuine, but a lot of people are not and they take advantage of that.
Stew’s sincerity was not recommended because it opened him up to gossip, 
exploitation and piss-takes. He learned not to be so expressive and interact at a more 
superficial, and perhaps, publicly more masculine level. By interacting this way the 
builders reproduced the masculine discourse that they may have privately disbelieved. 
The processes manufactured pluralistic ignorance whereby guarded social 
performances provoked guarded social performances that established contextual 
norms.
As evidenced from the interview data, the men tended to be open and, I think, 
honest towards a ‘trusted’ individual when in a one-to-one situation. It was the 
presence of company and distrust that restricted interaction to the superficial or 
overtly masculine and the piss-take and/or the ‘crack’ were both cause and effect of 
this. In addition, the situation of company elicited the telling of extraordinary 
masculine stories that also served to refresh discourse and form guidelines for action. 
The stories concerned sexual conquests, violent battles, and extreme drink and drug- 
taking (which were possibly apocryphal. See Patrick, 1973). They were exciting to
9 This was reminiscent of, although a less structured form to, ‘playing the dozens’ that occurs in black street 
culture (Majors and Billson, 1992) and which eventually developed into the musical forms o f  rap and hip-hop.
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listen to and emphasised the masculinity of the teller. However, they framed 
normative boundaries for listeners and served to force the teller into substantiating 
their authenticity when or if they encountered similar situations. For example, one 
who says that he usually drinks 20 pints of lager in an evening, or always fights his 
aggressors, will be forced to do that when in the company of men, or ‘lose face’ 
(Goffman, 1955).
There were more tactics other than simple returning of jibes during piss-take
encounters. Bristles once strolled into the site office announcing ‘I’m a raving
homosexual’. His was a method of seizing and playing-up linguistic self-presentations
which provoked laughter from the social audience and paradoxically conveyed the
speaker’s solid masculine confidence. However, there were also limits to the piss-take
ritual. A piss-take too far could result in people becoming ‘pissed o ff or in the
perpetrator looking foolish and discrediting himself as a result. As Aidan mentioned:
I don’t go overboard with people, I wouldn’t go overboard with people, cos you can. 
When you’re young yeah, like you can see young Will, he’s young but he gets a bit 
bolshie, he thinks he knows life yeah, but he hasn’t. I mean we was like it that age. I 
can see that. It’s no good me saying, you stupid cunt why don’t you shut up. You gotta 
say to yourself, I was like that, and I was. Just laugh at it, you got to laugh at it.
Matza argued that when juveniles grew older and moved away from the street-group 
into work and relationships with women, they also moved away from the trappings of 
group pluralistic ignorance. However, whilst this may be the case to an extent, and 
was illustrated by Aidan’s account of Will, what Matza neglected to say was that in 
moving into working-class jobs the juveniles would end up in other masculine groups 
where similar processes took place (c.f. Willis, 1977). In this sense, ‘boys will be 
boys’ and continue to do the same sorts of things as juveniles. However, 
delinquencies in relation to the building industry occur in space controlled by the 
groups themselves, the workplace, and not in the street or school where formal law 
resides. Consequently, men no longer get into trouble for doing the same things as 
boys’ and it is therefore possible that they do not grow out of ‘status deviancies’ at all, 
but merely do these undetected10.
10 Not always undetected, men obviously spend time in the public world. The high levels o f violence that occur 
when men meet in the night-time economies o f British town centres, or at football matches for example, can be 
seen as status deviancies o f this kind.
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Families
The notions of strength, independence and the related role of provider and protector, 
crystallise around the family (Collinson and Hearn, 1994; Connell, 1995; Sasson- 
Levey, 2002). Sennett and Cobb (1972) argue that working-class men subjectively 
negotiate their working lives as a sacrifice for the sacred nature of the family; they 
worked so their children would have better opportunities than themselves. This was 
also the case for many of the builders, as Jamin told me:
I know a lot of guys who fucking don’t give a shit about their kids and leave it to the 
missus to bring them up, down the pub every Friday and Saturday night, I’m not really 
one for that at all. I want to be at home with the kids; sit down, watch a film, have a 
laugh with them, go out play football, teach them. Help them along in life, know what I 
mean? When I look at my kids I see myself. Sometimes how they behave, things they 
do and say, and what they’re scared of and what they’re not scared of, it brings me 
back to when I was young. I don’t want them to make the same mistakes. And the only 
way you can do that is by spending time with them, even if you just sit there of an 
evening and watch a film and have a laugh with them. They leam from that you know. 
Now maybe because my dad never done that with me, he was just too busy working 
and all that. I never went to football with my dad or went to the pictures with him, 
never man. I mean he was good to us, he wasn’t bad or anything, but he was never, we 
were never close in that kind of way you know, not like I am with my son. And I love 
all that, I love sort of like helping him along in life and making sure he don’t trip-up 
where I tripped up.
DT: Would you be happy if your kids went into the building trade?
No, you’re fucking joking, not as manual labourers, be it chippies, plumbers, no way, 
no way man... I do push them at least to do some sort of job where you’ve got job 
security you know... Why fucking get dirty when you can sit in an office, you know 
what I mean? I definitely sort of push them into doing some sort of office work, or not 
necessarily office work but something better than this. I mean when I say not in the 
building game I wouldn’t mind them being an architect, surveyor, or something like 
that. I mean when I wake up in a morning and I’m the first cunt at the train station, you 
must know that. We get up early, we get dirty, we’re fucking fools man... I don’t want 
my kids doing that.
Many of the builders were working to make their children’s’ lives better than their
own. In this respect the role of provider was a salient form of ‘external’ work control.
However, as Donaldson (1991) argues, masculine notions of provider are also largely
tied to pragmatics in that working-class men, on average, are able to earn more money
than their wives. Stew was aware of this:
At the moment [my partner] she’s extremely frustrated. She wants to get out but she’s 
trapped with the two kids, one of them’s only two years old. I’ve give her the option to 
get out at weekends, go do something, or during the week, go to college leam 
something... I mean painting and decorating, I showed her a few basics and there was 
one day I’d come home and she’s stripped the front room, she’d smashed the fireplace 
up, knocked all the cupboards down, done everything the way it should have been 
done. She put the render in there, plastered it up, she was bang-on with it, everything
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yeah... She turned round to me one day and said ‘why don’t you not work and I’ll go 
out and work’. I says to her, well, that’s because if we do that you’ll be lucky to earn 
£180 a week, if that. At the end of the day it’s impractical, you ain’t gonna earn much 
money unless you go out and leam a trade... I’ve worked with women painters, better 
than I was, quicker an all, outshone me by far...
Stew’s account of being the provider was not cloaked within masculine discourse, but 
was accounted as a pragmatic response to the economy and society in which he lived. 
However, the intersection of structural economy and discursive masculinity set a 
dynamic that reinforced itself. Furthermore, the role of provider is conflated, via 
discursive notions of masculine strength, with the role of protector. Fathers who have, 
and are socially guided to have gendered strength, are those elected to protect the 
family in patriarchal societies. As Frank mentioned, ‘I would not let anybody harm 
them kids, nobody, I’d go to prison first, seriously’. Discursive notions of protection 
encourage men to work and to fight in wars, men who are not necessarily psychically 
integrated into a nation, but they risk their lives in war via discursive notions of 
protectorate of the family (Sasson-Levey, 2002) and of one another (Kier, 1999).
Working-class masculinity and informal culture have been objectified as a 
social problem for centuries. This appears perennially in writings of the past in the 
guise of the mob and rabble; and in the present as: delinquency (in criminology), 
worker intransigence (in industrial relations), naughty boys (in education studies), and 
as exploitative patriarchs (in gender studies). These foci might be a product of middle- 
class fear and constructed through the intelligentsia’s own oppositional middle-class 
difference. However, it is the very same ‘problem’ culture that motivates men to fight 
and die in wars, and to undertake dangerous work in peace time. In these contexts 
informal masculine culture is not deemed a problem at all.
Attitudes to Women
Talk about wives, girlfriends, mothers and sisters was quite different to talk about 
women in general. Women in public worlds were described as ineluctable slags and 
women in private-worlds as impudent nags. I mentioned above that tabloid badges of 
masculinity generally portrayed women as sexual objects. The builders similarly 
objectified female strangers in the public world in this way. The builders’ terms 
including ‘slag’ and ‘bitch’ used to describe public women were perhaps symbolic 
put-downs to counter ‘public women’s’ autonomous sexual power, for in the public 
world dependency is more opaque and masculine power less substantial.
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Published sociological literature frequently portrays working men as those 
who, because they are belittled at work, compensate by having power at home 
(Cockbum, 1982; Collinson, 1993; Massey, 1994). Perhaps builders were a different 
case to printers, miners or factory workers because they were relatively autonomous 
at work. Yet for the builders, wives were talked about at work as problematic sources 
of control, and the pub and workplace as affording more freedom than the home. As 
Stew mentioned:
There’s only one thing I can’t really deal with at the moment and that’s me missus. She 
moans about such trivial shit. If she could step into my head for 5 minutes she’d soon 
shut up... She moans about me going for a drink with Frank ‘cos we always end up 
langers [drunk]... as I say it’s enough to turn you to the bottle (laughs).
I did not observe actual home lives during my fieldwork, I only heard about them, but 
empirically wives are sources of control and conformity. Whilst men possess corporal 
power over women, women and the family unit have power over men through the 
morally integrative power of the network, and as Durkheim ([1993] 1960) argued, 
social integration is a salient source of collective conscience and thus conformity (see 
also Hirschi, 1969). I asked Bristles’ what his third and longest-standing wife had that 
the others did not:
Well, she’s truthful and honest, and she knows how to look after her man. When I go 
home and I’ve had a hard day she’ll say, ‘right kids come over here, leave your dad 
alone, he’s having a nice quiet cup of tea. Here’s a cigarette, ashtray, chill-out, I’ll run 
you a bath’. And she puts up with some shit from me... Now if there is one thing she 
needs to know, it’s where I am. As long as I tell her, she’s great like that, she don’t care 
where I am. If I said I was in a brothel, she’d say ‘where?’, I’d say France, she’d say, 
‘okay, what time you coming home?’. And then she knows, you know what I mean.
Escape Roots
Talk concerning how wives applied control could function as an expression and 
escape from masculine pluralistic ignorance and group pressure. For instance, saying 
one cannot go to the pub because the ‘old lady’ will not let him, releases him from 
piss-takes for not going to the pub. The actions of Danny went someway to 
corroborate this. Without fail, when Shane was not in the site office, Danny would 
enter and phone his wife to see how she was or to discuss some family business. His 
sentimental actions were inconsistent, although not incompatible, with his talk about 
‘the old lady’ as a source of control. Thus despite the builders’ publicly expressing 
attitudes about their wives as impudent nags, actions like Danny’s contravened this to 
an extent; wives were thus both ‘nags’ and companions. However, using wives as an
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escape route from masculine plural ignorance could back-fire. Some of the builders 
severely ‘took the piss’ out of Mike Fixit for his regularly not going on drink-ups 
because he said he had to go home to the ‘old lady’. Mike was subject to a barrage of 
disdain for not leaving his disabled wife at home to look after their alcoholic son.
Thoughts on Violence and Hegemony
The construction of class and race-based masculinity solidified those masculinities 
because of social-structural blockages to other resources of status and power, and 
physical strength became a valuable and tangible source of working-class social and 
symbolic capital. The valorisation of ‘strength’, bravery and daring are discursive 
values that we all share (Matza, 1964). For manual workers however, poor access to 
other sources of status perpetuate that valorisation. Furthermore, formal national 
culture was frequently by-passed in the school and on the street where it had little 
day-to-day utility, and archaic cultural tradition became informally passed-on in the 
workplace (see chapter 5) and the family. This informal culture provided an effective 
cultural tool-kit for negotiating everyday life where formal-legal vacuity necessitated 
the expression of tough masculinity.
Some groups have access to more/better resources of violence than others, and 
naked violence often evokes counter-violence. Through history, dominant groups 
engaged in mythopiesis to legitimate their rule and symbolically dramatise their 
violence. Dramatised violence was a ‘serious theatre, with its multifarious and 
persuasive scenes’ (Foucault, 1977: 113), and as Foucault argued, all discipline is 
anchored by violence, violence that makes disciplinary power pervasive. Theatres of 
violence are reproduced from moment to moment by the existence of managers and 
work processes, men and masculine action, and the state and its armoury of police, 
prisons and armies. Foucault argued that corporal power was superseded by the 
disciplinary power of knowledge, yet he saw that modernity was shaped like an 
archipelago, with small islands of the past anchoring the discipline of the present. 
Social order is therefore partly predicated on a ‘deep structure’ of the violence of 
economy and polity. If this is the case, gender structures might also be predicated 
upon the violence of the body.
Symbolic performances of the dominant and their institutions radiate power. 
This power may not have inculcated minds, as Foucault ([1975] 1991) suggested, but 
it commonly functions to skew reciprocity, and consent to this skew may be termed
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hegemony. In the following chapter I analyse reciprocity, its skew, and subsequent 
hegemony. I focus on trust, the performance of reciprocity and gift exchange that 
characterised the builders’ social networks. I then move on to look at the relationships 
between economy, social networks and social structures.
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Chapter 9
Networks, Economy and Social Structures
The builders’ formed social networks that sought to cushion themselves from 
structural impositions upon their lives which were largely independent from their own 
control (chapter 4). However, these social networks patterned the builders’ lives by 
contributing to the formation of class and race dynamics and structures. In addition, it 
was not only the manual workers who enacted and sustained informal social 
networks, but relationships between subcontractors, contractors and clients were also 
bound by network associations, and, these too contributed to the formation of wider 
social structures.
Reciprocity, Trust and Social Control
The operation of informal social networks was guided by norms of reciprocity, gift 
exchange and trust. Gifts and debts create trusts and trust is predictability. When 
somebody or something is trusted, it is because there is a probability that it will 
perform as we would wish. For example, we may trust our mother or spouse to 
care for us if we are ill but we may not trust them to help us in a street fight. 
Alternatively, a best friend or brother may be trusted to help us in a street fight but 
may not be trusted to look after us if we are ill. We trust them both in different 
ways, and we trust them because we think we can predict them. As Gambetta 
(1988) argues, trust is a way of coping with the limits of foresight that exist 
between people. However, trust is not formed in information alone but is also tied 
to gift exchange.
Trust can be enforced by one’s membership in a network and maintained 
by the ‘norm of reciprocity’ (Gouldner, 1960). Reciprocity is fuelled by the 
exchange of gifts, gifts which are not necessarily material but can take the guise of 
information, favours, or even trust itself. Gifts are what Mauss ([1954] 1970) 
called prestations. Giving a gift establishes a debt that requires a counter-gift. 
Counter-gifts do not involve an exact return of goods or services in a rigid 
temporal framework like formal economic exchange systems, but return is elastic, 
situated and moral. Gouldner comments: ‘The norm, in this respect, is a kind of 
plastic filler, capable of being poured into the shifting crevices of social structures,
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and serving as a kind of all purpose moral cement’ (1960: 175). Gift giving 
involves and reinforces human relationships, and as Sahlins observed, ‘If friends 
make gifts, gifts make friends’ ([1972] 2002: 186).
Reciprocal gift exchange is a collective method evolved to limit the 
consequences of egoism, which seems to be why it has evolved as a common, 
universal norm; it is a collectively beneficial way of doing things together. The 
exchange of gifts and favours binds individuals through the elasticity of 
reciprocation, operating like Durkheim’s ([1893] 1960) conception of moral 
solidarity where prestations are part of the fabric of social life. The norm of 
reciprocity, then, manufactures network members who are perceived as 
trustworthy, that is, predictable, because failure to abide by the norm, and I would 
add, other network morality, will result in exclusion from the network, violence 
and/or stigmatisation (see chapters 7 and 8).
Social integration and control rest upon membership to particular groups. 
For example, new recruits who are part of an employment network will experience 
social pressure extant in the network’s collective mores i.e. to be a member of a 
network one should adhere to its rules or expect exclusion, stigmatisation or 
sanction. As Hirschi (1969) argues, individual’s involvement in, and commitment 
to, the groups in which they are embedded promote conformity. The network 
thereby reinforces the trust mechanism by enhancing the predictability of 
member’s actions through the informal social control radiated within the network. 
Furthermore, information that accrues in a network will likely remain within it. A 
propos, network groups, whilst circulating information to their members, may also 
act to conceal information from those outside (see Grieko, 1987). The system of 
trust and debt can thus act to conceal illegitimate activities from outsiders. Portes 
(1995) suggests that within subcontracted work in ethnic enclave areas in North 
America, regulatory measures to protect workers are hidden from regulatory 
governance because the groups seek to keep things to themselves without invoking 
formal law. This was also found to be the case at Topbuild. For example, part of 
the intensive job information new recruits received through their informal 
networks enabled some to work for their subcontractors whilst simultaneously 
claiming State benefits. Only trusted and informal links with a subcontractor would 
enable them to do this, (see chapter 8 and below).
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Informal reciprocal exchange binds all manner of social groups - families, 
neighbourhood communities, friendship and work groups. Even in rigid formalised 
bureaucracies, informal networks have been shown to operate (Dalton, 1959; 
McGuire, 2000), indicating that formal and informal processes are often 
intertwined. I expand on this further below, but it should be noted that network 
reciprocity is a social, moral, political and economic relationship. The family for 
instance is an affective social group but it is also a source of status, employment, 
housing, goods, services and money, and it thus serves economic, political and 
social functions in contemporary society (c.f. Pahl, 1984).
Caveat
The norm of reciprocity does not operate in all contexts. The relationships at 
Topbuild were set predominately in masculine networks and framed by archaic 
rules of conduct. Reciprocation only occurs within networks embedded in 
reasonably egalitarian power relationships because power functions to negate one’s 
responsibility to reciprocate. For example, reciprocity between men and women in 
‘traditional’ marriage relationships has a tendency to disintegrate (see chapter 8). 
Within a patriarchal order, the power of husbands over wives may negate men’s 
duty to reciprocate within the family setting. Slavery is another prime example of 
non-reciprocal exchange, as are employment relationships which skew the norm 
through the power and violence of dismissal (see chapter 6). For instance, informal 
reciprocal relations bound the building tradesmen to their subcontract bosses, yet 
these relations were characterised by false reciprocity because the subcontractors 
took more than they returned. In effect, services were given by the tradesmen but 
only small monetary payment was given back by the subcontractor. Power 
therefore skews the norm of reciprocity. As Gambetta (1988) remarked, co­
operation is not contingent solely on trust, but can be enforced by coercion, and, I 
would add, hegemonic consent (see chapter 8).
Non-reciprocal situations commonly provoke resistance from participants 
and abhorrence from knowledgeable observers. Because of possible sanctions, 
such reactions may not be publicly proclaimed but privately held, but breaking the 
norm of reciprocity is commonly felt to be unjust exploitation or domination. The 
commonality of moral censure towards non-reciprocal situations illustrates further 
that reciprocity exists as a fundamental social norm.
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Contacts and Contracts
The building subcontract system bears similarities to the oyabun-kobun, or, Tabour- 
boss’ system present in Japanese industrialism (see Bennett and Ishino, 1963). This 
system, with its roots in feudal Japan, functions as a distinct undercurrent in Japan’s 
modem economy. Wedded to a system of privileges and duties based upon strict 
paternalism and reciprocal relations, the labour-bosses supply peripheral subcontract 
labour to large companies and contractors, and are trusted by employers because of 
long-term business relationships and notions of feudal honour. Employees are tied 
into the system by explicit reciprocal duties whereby bosses train workers and pay 
them when they are sick or out of work. Workers reciprocate by remaining loyal to 
the boss and are thus trusted to carry out the work competently.
British-based building subcontractors do not take the role of hegemonic father 
towards their employees, but, because no formal contracts exist between them, 
subcontractors relate to their workers, in part, via informal reciprocal mechanisms. 
For instance, Emie Coat employed as an apprentice the 16-year-old son of one of his 
most skilled workers, Gerry. Ernie’s interest in doing this was partly to bind the Gerry 
to the business. Subcontractor reciprocation only occurred for more permanent, 
reliable and exceptional workers, the subcontractor’s ‘core’ employees. The form of 
these relationships were illustrated by Bill, the long-time and hardworking foreman of 
Spark’s M and E:
The governor is a real first class governor to work for. I mean he can be an old bastard, 
but I’ve had things where he’ll go and pay for my holiday, or come Christmas he’s 
popped £1000 in an envelope, you know little things. One day I phoned up and he says, 
‘what’s the matter with you? You sound like you’ve got the hump’. I said, fucking 
fridge-freezer’s just packed up’ and I’d just been out and bought all the food. Next day 
there’s a £500 fridge-freezer delivered to the door. That’s why I suppose over the years 
I’ve gained his respect and he’s got my respect. He’s been a decent fella and a sort of 
loyal fella to work for. I get me company car, don’t pay no petrol, company phone, I 
give him the phone bills. I don’t go begging to him but if I need anything it’s always 
there, it’s set out for me.
Subcontractor reciprocation maintained respect and promoted loyal relationships that 
reinforced trust. These informal employment relationships were wedged in a 
sociological bygone time, or alternatively, in an aspect of human behaviour that 
labour-process theory has been blind to. The relationships looked conceptually non­
modem, displaying the feudal notions of nepotism, ascription, reciprocity and loyalty.
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Traps and Springboards
The more one relies upon a fixed network group, the more one becomes anchored into 
that network; choices and contacts become increasingly limited to that sphere of 
contact, and contingent work possibilities become fewer and fewer. Granovetter 
(1973) describes how ‘weak ties’ are more beneficial for employment advancement 
than ‘strong ties’. This is because one will tend to receive broader and more varied 
information through ‘weak tie’ linkages, information that lay outside the reach of 
smaller ‘strong tie’ networks (see also Grabher, 1993)1. In migrant communities 
where family networks tend to be strong and contact with other ethnic groups is 
limited (due in part to the network itself), ‘weak ties’ will be fewer in number and 
therefore occupational advancement restricted. Thus networks, while having 
important economic functions in terms of getting jobs, housing, goods and services 
(see chapter 4 and 10), also functioned to restrict economic opportunities. Networks 
are necessarily finite, if they were not they would not affect employment chances in 
the first place (c.f. Granovetter, 1974)2. This is how clusters of individuals 
inadvertently reproduce social structures when performing in-group reciprocity (see 
below and chapter 10).
Strong ties can also restrict occupational movements because of the binding
and elastic nature of favours and loyalty. Jamin provided an illustration:
I know him [subcontractor boss] from school see, he’s all right, he’s a mate of mine. I 
mean it works both ways, I’m tolerant with him and he’s tolerant with me. I don’t take 
the piss just because he’s a mate of mine, and he doesn’t really take the piss with me, 
well he does but I don’t mind. At the end of the day I get my money.
DT: What do you mean he takes the piss?
Well you know, I don’t get paid every Friday, it’s not a great, it’s not a big thing. 
Sometimes I get paid Monday or Wednesday, or sometimes I get two weeks together. 
But they do look after me, they’re all right, I can’t complain.
Jamin did not complain to his subcontract boss even when he was not paid on time 
because a friendship and community relationship bound him. This reciprocity was 
expressed as ‘I’m tolerant with him and he’s tolerant with me’. His actions at 
Keyworker House provided further evidence of the binding nature of his network. On 
many occasions Steve, the project manager, asked if Jamin would ‘come on the
1 This is subject to some debate. See Pahl, 2000.
2 Studies such as Milligram’s ([1967] 1989) small world problem are purely artificial in that it no one is asking the 
recipient for a favour, just delivering a message to him/her, rather like an informal-ambiguous postal service.
196
books’, and work directly for Topbuild as a general foreman instead of being 
subcontracted by Turner’s. This would have provided Jamin with the possibility of 
promotion to site management and removed him from the costs of subcontract 
casualisation. Jamin frequently said he would think about this but never seized the 
opportunity, largely because he perceived that he owed loyalty to his boss because he 
was his ‘mate’. The opportunity for Jamin to leave his parochial employment network 
was rejected because Jamin’s work networks crosscut his family and neighbourhood 
networks. Again, this was a situation where work and home life crosscut each other, 
where social and economic categories become false dichotomies (see chapter 10).
Such examples illustrate how loyalty to a subcontractor was a two-way 
process. Despite having no formal responsibility to their workers, and occupying the 
powerful end of the reciprocal relationship (which as aforementioned, skews 
reciprocity), subcontractors often gave more than just a job to their employees, 
primarily because they could not constantly monitor them. Valuable employees’ 
loyalty towards their subcontractor was thus bought. In this sense, money could 
mediate and replace other forms of prestation by symbolising reciprocation.
Trusting their workers was not the only reason for subcontractor reciprocity. 
Being a member of a network also immersed subcontractors into the moral world of 
network obligations. For example, the plastering subcontractor, Luke Screed, 
unusually paid his Seychellian workers sick and holiday pay. Luke’s morality, 
coupled with the mores of the small and quite pious Seychelles community, 
necessitated that he did this. The labour subcontractor, Paddy McMurray, did not pay 
sick or holiday pay but did pay for his employees’ funerals if they died in poverty 
(which many did). In this case, Paddy was obviously not buying trust from his dead 
employee but was enacting and enforcing the morality of his network group. His 
moral involvement in the surrounding local community acted upon him to do his 
‘duty’ as an employer. He may not have been subject to overt community pressure but 
his self was grounded in that community and their morality were his morality.
Networks can act as both a trap and a springboard. For example, a builder may 
undertake work to the private home of a company director of a multinational firm. 
The builder may be honest, reliable, able, adaptive, and his work exceptional. The 
company director may come to like and trust the builder, but it would be more 
beneficial to keep the builder in his place as a builder rather than offer him a job as
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manager of the company. The director may offer a managerial position to someone he 
did not even know but who was linked to him via his family or business contacts. In 
doing this, the director maintains reciprocity with his family or business contact and 
keeps a good builder. At Topbuild, the general Foreman, Pete, was not employed 
because of his foreman skills (see chapter 6). Pete was not a tradesman nor had he 
served a long time working in the building industry, but he was ascribed his position 
through his local community relationship in Kent with James, one of the site 
managers. Where James worked, Pete followed. Danny, the long-serving labour 
foreman, was much more experienced and suited to the general foreman’s role but he 
remained Pete’s subordinate. Pete’s particular position within a network relation acted 
as a nepotistic network springboard and propelled him to his rank of general foreman, 
and later to the position of junior site manager.
Competition and Embeddedness
Ernie Coat, Paddy McMurray and Mickey T had subcontracted skill and labour to 
Topbuild for 30 years or more. The fact that these long-term relationships continued 
to operate within a competitive market was surprising given that new subcontracting 
entrepreneurs, especially new migrant groups, could under-cut existing 
subcontractor’s prices. In a sense, the long-term relationships echo of a partnering 
system long before management theorists envisaged the idea (see also Lorenz, 1988), 
but there were practical and structural reasons for these relationships.
However, contractors always face a stark decision when selecting 
subcontractors: should they choose the cheapest quote; a subcontractor whom they 
trust to carry out the work to a required standard; or a subcontractor to whom they 
owe a favour? Eccles (1981b) indicates that in almost all countries there is actually a 
stability of relationships between many contractors and subcontractors over time. He 
terms these relationships ‘quasifirms’, and demonstrates that contractors in only 20 
percent of cases used competitive bidding because they preferred to employ 
subcontractors whom they knew and trusted. Yet, it was not simply trust that framed 
the contractors’ decisions at the Keyworker House build.
Undercutting and Contacts
Granovetter (1985) doubts the validity of the concept ‘quasifirm’, arguing that 
economic relations between separate firms are frequently lodged in long-term
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relations which build social control or trust, into economic relationships. He argues 
that economic relations are not characterised by ‘economic man’ and free markets, but 
by interdependent ‘Durkheimian-man’ and embedded markets.
Rivals can always undercut subcontractors. This was an integral feature of the 
volatility of the building industry (see chapter 1). For example, Ernie Coat’s painters 
would not work for less money than they thought they could earn elsewhere, but a 
group of Russian migrant painters may, and do, work for half of this wage. The two 
Russian painters sacked by Ernie Coat (see chapter 4) were reported to be working for 
£50 per day, while some of Ernie’s painters earned almost double this wage (see 
chapter 10). The builders were aware of migrant wage-undercutting processes and it 
provided a backdrop for a certain amount of racism (see below). A Russian diaspora 
subcontractor could for example, tender for works at a lower price than a 
subcontractor representing a more ingrained cultural group. Further, a newly formed 
subcontractor might not take a high percentage cut from the wages of his workers in 
the first instance, or may even operate a ‘loss-leader’ so as to build initial 
relationships. To maintain lucrative positions therefore, subcontractors needed to 
develop good relationships with contractors and/or assure that their work was 
exceptional.
Despite the possibility of cheaper prices offered by subcontract groups, and
resultant price undercutting, the threat of rival subcontractors was not ever-present.
This was in part the result of the finite functioning of business information networks
because only a select group of subcontractors’ were in the position to bid for work. As
Jamin explained, in discussing the history of Turner’s:
Turner’s, I was with them when they started the company. What it was, me, my 
governor [subcontractor], all of us [Kutchis], were all working for a firm called Woods. 
My governor, he was the first one to work for them, the first Indian on that firm. They 
were all English people and he was doing well with them. Then he bought me in there,
2 of us, and then 3, and then 4, and then we started getting a bit of a posse together. 
And he [Mr Woods] liked the way we operate, liked the way we worked: regular, no 
hangovers, no days off, on time. 4 became 5, 10, 20. In the end there was about 25 
Indians working for Woods. My governor became foreman, so every time Woods 
needed a chippy, he’d get them, he knew loads of chippies see. Things were going all 
right and my governor had a little bit of an idea. He says, ‘I’d like to try and do my own 
thing with Topbuild’. He was just making a few enquiries and his dad knew a few 
people. His dad had a firm as well, he knew one of the top blokes in Topbuild and it 
just so happened that Woods were doing work for Topbuild at the time. My governor, 
he was sort of connecting with Topbuild, he wasn’t really trying to take the work away 
from the bloke but he was just trying to start his own thing. But the governor from 
Woods must have got wind of it because he sacked him. But by this time my governor 
had sown the seeds, spoken to the right people. But Woods just fucked him off, and he
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was loyal to that bloke, he’d got him some of the jobs and run the jobs for him. He was 
loyal, and the bloke just [said], ‘out’, ruthless fucker. So my governor says ‘right okay, 
if that’s the way you want it’. So he started his own company. At the start there was 3 
of them [subcontract bosses of Turner’s], they took on 1 or 2 chippies, then 3 or 4, and 
all these chippies were taken from Woods, so they were white-washed. I mean they’re 
still surviving now, just, but my governor took the chippies away and they came and 
worked for him. Turner’s have been going for about 5 years now. I’ve worked for them 
for nearly all of that time.
Although social networks have an impact on the structural opportunities that 
individuals and groups confront, those in higher, more lucrative business positions 
were also presented with opportunities via their networks. The father of ‘the 
governor’ of Turner’s Carpentry was linked to ‘the right people’ in the Topbuild 
management hierarchy. Without these links it would have been difficult for him to 
acquire the information necessary to bid for work. Furthermore, the rates that Turner’s 
charged for their carpenters were slightly less than other carpentry subcontractors. 
Turner’s were willing to take less of a percentage cut from their workers’ wages so 
that they could, at least initially, undercut their rivals. The youngest carpenter, Vin, 
explained how racial mechanisms and cheap labour functioned together in the 
subcontract system:
If I come into Indian company, they don’t ask for papers [qualifications], as long as 
you know the work they’ll employ you. But if I go to a big company with white people, 
normally they will ask for not just what you know, they would want to see papers as 
well. With Indians it’s all right, as long as you know them they will take you on and 
employ you. It’s because they will be paying less. If you want more money, then 
obviously you have to go to someone else with papers and you can get what sort of 
money you want. Generally, like all the Indians I’ve worked with it’s less money than 
any other company. For example, if you go to a white person’s company, or I’m not 
talking generally Indians, I’m talking, you know Singhs [Punjabi Indians], they 
generally pay more, but not as good as white people - they pay the top wages. Indians, 
it’s as I say, they are known for trying to get the cheapest labour that they can.
Quite how Punjabi carpenters formed such embedded relationships in the building 
industry was outside the scope of my case study. However, they are famed in the 
building industry for their skills. They also carry a highly masculine culture more akin 
to that of the white English working-class than of the Hindu Kutchis. Through their 
embeddedness they were able to charge higher prices for their work and pay higher 
wages than the Kutchi group, but still not as much as white English groups.
Migrant Labour and Work Power
In the old days, 50s and 60s, no stop in rain, work away. Those days are all gone, for 
the best.. .Oh it’s much easier now, of course, much easier. (Danny, labour foreman)
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Many of the labourers said that the building trade had become easier and softer over
the past 50 years. They told stories about working in rain and snow and eating their
lunch in damp, unheated and squalid huts. They suggested that ‘youngsters’ did not
know how easy they had got it these days. Times, they said, had changed. Certainly
health and safety legislation since the 1970s enforced rules that make building sites
safer places to work and stipulate warm and dry domestic areas to rest in. However, a
cursory look recent migrant groups such as Eastern Europeans, highlights that they
still work in the rain at a faster pace and for a smaller wage than more established
groups. As one of the labourers, Aidan, mentioned:
My brother is a subby, does groundwork, underpinning, drains, paving and all this 
business. He employs Bosnians because they’re cheap and they’ll work like donkeys.
He employed one for £25 a day and he’s out there in the rain breaking his fuckin’ back. 
Poor fuckers some of them.
Eastern Europeans, being recent migrants to Britain, had little informal work power 
because they had not secured relationships embedded in the industry. This situation 
was similar to that of the Irish 50 years ago, but, as time passed, Irish contractors and 
subcontractors secured a virtual monopoly over groundwork and, because of this, 
their power over the work process increased. The Irish bought and sweated their way 
into a niche in English economy. As Bristles, who was second generation Irish, 
illustrated:
Years ago it was hard, there was loads and loads of gangermen and they all seemed to 
be Irish for some reason. They all seemed to be six foot four and that’s just from one 
side of their shoulder to the other! Why invent shovels when they had hands the size of 
them anyway? I worked for a firm called McHannon’s. The dad came over with a 
shovel and a pick, started digging away. Well, their premises now, this was only like 40 
years ago, their business now it’s actually been floated on the stock market. Worth well 
over one hundred million, and this was just through dad starting off digging holes. 
Same as Murphy’s [large groundwork contractor] really, he’s no different, no different 
at all. But it’s changed round slightly now, it’s more like the Kosovans and the 
Russians and people like that, they’re the ones doing the hard graft now. It’s funny how 
things change round. I suppose in 10 years it’ll be them running it and then maybe 
we’ll have an influx of Chinese, seeing as, well, we haven’t got that many countries left 
to come over here.
There was a dynamic at play in building subcontracting whereby new groups offered 
cheap and hardworking labour in order to get a foothold in the industry. By and large, 
this could be done only in times of labour shortage (as the Irish had done in the 
1950s) or through membership of the relevant network groups. The dynamic may 
remove more entrenched groups by competitive undercutting or the groups may exist
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side-by-side. But as time goes by, and subcontractor groups come to solidify their 
relations with contractors, prices and wages appear to rise. Also, as new groups make 
more contacts in the industry, workers have more choice concerning which 
subcontractors to work for. Migrant worker networks, contacts and, therefore, power, 
consequently increase over time and the workers will no longer ‘break their balls’ in 
the rain.
Competition and Racism
Racism is a very complex and emotive phenomenon, and while it is certainly a social 
problem, it is not the problematic of this thesis. For these reasons I provide only a 
cursory analysis, but, as I argued in the last chapter, inferiorizing processes take 
similar form with regard to class, race and gender (although, with respect to class and 
gender, inferiorization has never resulted in genocide). However, as I revealed above, 
racial discrimination in the building industry was largely the result of economic and 
network processes, and not symbolic domination processes, although these probably 
formed an ingredient to network positions.
Blum (2002) provides a clear and well-reasoned analysis and definition of 
racism. He argues that racism can be defined as ‘inferiorization’ and/or ‘antipathy’, on 
a personal, social or institutional level, towards a group of people on the basis of their 
ethnicity. Casting groups as inferior on the basis of ‘race’ is a historical construction 
formed to justify exploitation (see chapter 8). Blum cites Allport ([1954] 1988) 
arguing, that whilst everyone makes prejudicial judgements, racism is the power to 
enforce and sustain prejudice. Social life is perceived through the screen of shared 
social typifications (Berger and Luckman, [1966] 1991), and generalised pre­
judgement is part of how people order and comprehend the world around them. 
Individuals make prejudicial typifications about all kinds of social groups, usually 
related to gender, class and race indicators. Inferiorizing typifications about an ethnic 
group manufactures antipathy, and, the creation of antipathy frames all kinds of 
exclusionary and exploitative actions.
Competition and Accounts
The builders were aware that recent migrant groups offered cheaper labour than more 
ingrained groups, and many perceived this as a threat to their livelihoods. Stew, a 
painter, spoke for many of the men when he said, ‘Without being racist, you’ve got all
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these people coming over and working for peanuts, they’re just fucking up the [wage]
rates, and as time goes on it’s just getting worse and worse’. The subcontract dynamic
therefore, provided some of the builders with a tension and means through which to
express racist attitudes. It was common parlance to blame recent migrant groups for
falling wage rates as opposed to blaming the capitalist market, because ethnic groups
represented an easily identifiable scapegoat (c.f. Hall et al, 1978; Solomos and Back,
1996; Bowling, 1999; Foster, 1999). These views were fuelled by broader antipathy
towards new migrant groups projected by mass produced media, particularly the right-
wing tabloid press. Economic tensions were also accompanied by additional views of
recent migrants as dangerous and low skilled. As Bill commented:
I got Kosovans or whatever coming up to me [looking for work] and I have to tell them 
to go away, you know, not nasty but I said no, no work. And they’ll work for £10 a day 
if you give them a chance ‘cos they’re desperate for money. But then comes in the 
health and safety. They can’t talk English and yet Topbuild - all building sites are the 
same yeah, really strict on health and safety, you must have your boots, your papers 
[qualifications], your [hard] hat. But they have blokes walking about who can’t even 
talk English. So if you say to them, ‘mind your head there’s a brick coming down’, 
they don’t know what you’re talking about. They’re dangerous, simple as that.
Both Bill and Stew were white English and, in terms of their racial affiliations, were a
dominant group. However, their racism was not elicited by the skin colour or a
colonial history of others because their words were directed at white Eastern
European groups. Furthermore, it was not only the white English that expressed such
attitudes. Take for example, Naz, an Indian carpenter:
In another 10 years I can see a shortage of building trades, unless of course the 
Europeans coming in and taking over. But they got problems, like Topbuild was doing 
a job in Hackney and there was Albanian and Romanian. Somebody tells me to tell 
them to do job but they can’t understand so I have to go and show them, I might as well 
do it myself while I’m showing them. But most of them, they have picked up tools and 
just started building, some of them are fast picking it up you know, pick it up quickly 
as they go along... I mean you pay an Indian labourer for £50 [per day] because he’s 
got a house, wife and children, he can’t survive on less. But you get an Albanian or 
Romanian or whatever, he’s living with 3 people in one room, he can do £20 a day and 
he wouldn’t argue about it. Plus the physical fitness is different, they can work harder 
than the Asians because they’ve got more height or body weight... It’s a two-way 
story. If I was a boss then I’ll help them because they are hard workers. If I was 
employed by a company then I’d say, fucking hell they’re not giving me a chance to 
get my [pay] rise because the boss can get two of them for [the price of] one of me.
Builders sell their labour in the marketplace in a tangible and direct fashion. Wage 
rates are negotiated at the start of each new job and new jobs are started frequently 
(see chapter 1). Furthermore, because builders are non-unionised and possess very 
few working rights, they can be instantly exchanged for cheaper labour at bosses’
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discretion. As shown above, this occurs infrequently because of the finite functioning
of information networks, but, the shadow of cheaper and harder working labour
represents an ever-present threat. Naz alluded to the ‘Europeans’ ‘picking it up as they
went along’ i.e. they were not formally trained. This was a common jibe concerning
new migrant groups, yet the majority of the builders had learnt their trades informally,
including the carpenters (see chapter 5). The Kutchis were thus as racist in this respect
as the other (white) groups. However, as Blum (2002) argues, racism is more morally
reprehensible and socially damaging when projected by the historically dominant
upon the historically subordinate. The complexities of racism rain down here. For
example, it would be debatable as to whether the Kutchis were more or less
historically inferiorized than the Eastern Europeans. In the Kutchis’ present position
in London’s building industry they were certainly more dominant than the Eastern
Europeans, although subject to everyday racism themselves. I asked Jamin if he had
experienced racism in the building trade:
Oh yes, of course I have yeah, but nothing major, just day to day thing, nothing too, I 
can have a laugh about it so it’s never, it’s never bothered me. And the thing that comes 
into it again is on a building site you’re only 6 months here and then you move on. So 
you know, it’s not nothing that really goes on and on and on and on. But I’ve never had 
any serious problems, not at all. Because as I say I was brought up here and I generally 
get on with most people, so no I can’t really say that I have any problems. I mean you 
get it here and there but how seriously you take it is up to you, you know, you can 
brush it off or you can go into a raging fit which is pointless really. I just tend to ignore 
it. Some people take it seriously, some people don’t, I don’t take it seriously. Works 
both ways doesn’t it, I give back as good as I get really. At the end of the day they’re 
just strangers really, they’re not really part of my life so why should I take it seriously, 
what’s the point? If I take it bloody seriously I’d be fighting every day, you know what 
I mean? And generally in London it’s not too bad, it’s all right... any dangers out there 
are as dangerous for you as it is for me.
I asked all the carpenters who agreed to be interviewed if they had experienced racism
in the building industry, and all of them told me they had experienced very little.
Bapu was more representative of their accounts than Jamin:
No, no, no. I haven’t [experienced racism], I tell you the truth, never even any little 
argument in 30 years. If somebody’s trouble I straight away give up, ‘sorry my friend, 
my fault’, I give up, I don’t want any trouble. I never had any problem about racials, 
never. Never with me because I’m straightforward man, never trouble.
The carpenters’ accounts were peculiar considering that racism in the form of words 
and piss-takes was an everyday occurrence (see chapter 8), and Bapu’s statement, ‘If 
somebody’s trouble I straight away give up’, was not quite the case as I observed him 
challenge a racist piss-take (see also chapter 8). Piss-taking between the builders
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centred most commonly around symbolic jibes to one another’s trade status, football 
team, masculinity and/or racial category. However, piss-takes were generally 
presented as harmless fun; as a form of game-play. Racism expressed in this form 
enabled the carpenters to laugh along and account for it simply as a joke. As Jamin 
said, ‘If I take it bloody seriously I’d be fighting every day’, indicating that he had 
little choice but to account for it as a joke.
Bill’s racial-flavoured piss-takes were particularly venomous but he did not 
consider himself racist:
I’m not racist, you hear me take the piss out of Jamin and you hear me fucking run him 
down sort of like, but I’m not a racist as such. I won’t knock em. I won’t say anything 
about them because they work hard. Where else can you get a packet of fags in the 
middle of the night? I don’t knock em, they’re working people, it don’t matter what 
race you are or whatever... Just because you’re black you’re second class citizens, that 
is totally wrong, totally wrong.
Bill’s account that ‘I’m not racist as such’ appeared to reflect reality to an extent. In 
chapter 6 I described how Bill ‘stuck up’ and ‘stuck his neck out’ for Jimmy J, the 
electrician, who was threatened with the sack for being found asleep at work. Jimmy 
was first generation Caribbean and black, and, in this sense, Bill’s racist piss-takes 
may have been simply piss-takes, the product of ignorance rather than antipathy. 
However, piss-takes are by their very nature inferiorizing, and I personally found 
Bill’s piss-takes very offensive but, the carpenters for instance, did not express 
offence (at least publicly) about Bill’s actions. However, as Blum notes: ‘Acts that 
make use of racist sentiments, jokes, symbols or images, even if the person 
performing the act is not motivated by antipathy or an inferiorizing attitude, may be 
labelled racist’ (2004: 14). Bill’s piss-takes took the form of wild generalisations 
concerning the carpenters’ ‘Asianness’, and were embedded in the harsh piss-take 
culture of the builders, and further within a racialised historical discourse. Whilst the 
piss-take was commonly framed as a joke, expressing it promulgated status 
boundaries, and institutionalised racist discourse. This discourse manufactured a kind 
of ‘pluralistic ignorance’ (Matza, 1964) whereby it became normal and natural to 
express such attitudes. Bill and others therefore, propagated racist discourse through 
their ignorance, but essentially Bill was both racist and not racist; racist in one context 
and not in another.
As the examples highlighted above, illustrated that everyday racism at 
Keyworker House was not usually expressed as hate (excepting one of the site
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managers -  see chapter 6), and the fact that Jamin was the general foreman bore 
testament to this (Bobby, the trainee quantity surveyor was also Asian). Only one of 
the carpenters, Mehl, said he faced real problems with a racist boss, and this had 
occurred early on in his career, and, like Jamin, Mehl’s solution was to leave the job. 
In this sense, racism in the building industry may not be quite so severe as in more 
permanent occupations where the employees become stuck into a single job, are 
reliant on references to get other jobs, or desire promotion through a hierarchy. In the 
building trade they could simply exit the problematic situation and try to find work 
somewhere else, and perhaps, amongst trade groups of their own race.
Piss-takes directed towards the carpenters usually took the flavour of their
having ‘just got off the boat’, their ‘Asianness’, or concerned their (illusory) lack of
skill and poor quality tools. For the Irish labourers, comments generally related to
their mental skills; a racism embedded in English culture, frequently in the form of
jokes, which even today are considered publicly legitimate. Unfortunately I never
asked the Irish how they felt about this because all my interviews with them were
rather stunted and awkward (perhaps partly as a result of their experiences of racism
in England). However, the Irish may be seen as having historically been more
frequently the recipients of racism than the Kutchis. For example, Indians were not
enslaved by the British quite like the Irish were (Blum, 2002), and, in addition, when
in East Africa, the Kutchis were a middle class who dominated and exploited the
native population (Ghai and Ghai, 1970). Perhaps in relation to this, the Kutchis did
not feel themselves to be a subordinated group. As Naz mentioned:
I’ve been in this county since 1969, all right I got a couple of smacks from skinheads, 
apart from that I had more arguments and fights, literally fist-fights, with Asians or 
Gujaratis, than anyone. I’ve never had a fight with Blacks, with Pakistanis, or Whites, 
apart from my home village people, you know [where I fought with Pakistanis].
Shared Experience
Although acquaintances find it peculiar, I barely heard the Irish expressing racism. 
Many years spent working at the bottom end of the building status structure and 
having to work and share canteen spaces with all kinds of other races appeared to 
have erected boundaries to what the Irish expressed. At Keyworker House their tea­
room was shared with the plasterers, who were mostly black and from the Seychelles, 
and the plaster subcontractor was a well-respected man who shared a similar Christian 
religion with the Irish. The labourers would talk about what a pious and generous man
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he was. The labourers also migrated to London at much the same time as Caribbean 
groups and they have traditionally lived along side one another, and were both 
inferiorized by the host population. The title of John Lyden’s autobiography, Rotten: 
No Irish, No Blacks, No Dogs clearly illustrates this.
It may have been the historical and multi-cultural composition of London and 
its building workers that muffled hate-racism at Keyworker House. Certainly I have 
heard much worse on other London building sites. Also, the carpenters and the 
labourers worked on Topbuild jobs for many years, as had many of the other 
tradesmen. The trade groups were all accustomed to working on the same building 
sites and thus familiar with one another. It may be assumed, then, that normality kept 
racial tension to a minimum. Furthermore, the trade groups were so tightly stratified 
by race that they were not actually encroaching on one another’s jobs. Yet as shown 
above, racism did occur, but some men were more racist than others, and some were 
racist in one context and not in another.
Fear and Racism
Racism did not grow solely from the operation of the subcontract system. Attitudes
were bought to the workplace pre-existing in parochial cultures and present reality.
Some of the economically deprived white English builders competed with recent
migrants over access to social housing, women, and for power on the street. Take
Frank, a painter, for instance:
I grew up in York Way in the Cally before it got all done up, before all the refugees 
moved in. At least we had a load of pals round there, now it’s all gone... Five years 
now I’ve been on the housing list. They [social security office] keep telling me they 
ain’t got no information, blah, blah, blah. I just want to settle down, get a flat. If I was a 
fuckin’ refugee I’d get a flat straight away, but if you start mentioning refugees, you’re 
racialist, you know what I mean... Around the Cally the majority [of residents] are 
white, you get a lot of refugees round there selling fags and that, but when I go down to 
the market round Holloway you look around and you think its completely different. Up 
there (whispers) are untold blacks you know what I mean? You could say it was 
Nigeria or Africa because that’s what it looks like at the end of the day. We’re like the 
refugees up there... The black birds [women] are nice man but its just the geezers, they 
go round thinking they got a chip on their shoulder, going round cussing people. And 
like if you got a crowd you gotta walk around them, if you bump into them they’re 
gonna cause an argument and all that. They got their little community and we’re meant 
to have ours you know, but up there it’s just like no go area for some people. I don’t 
know, it’s just fucking stupid, everyone’s got to live together... The only thing I ain’t 
going to do though is let my daughters go with blacks. And that’s not being racialist 
because I’m not. At the end of the day there’s enough white blokes out there... I tell 
you the best black bloke you can get right is a dead one (laughs) even though I’ve got 
black friends, you know what I mean?
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DT: Yeah, well they ’re all right though aren’t they?
Well yeah, but when they’re like in a group, right, let’s say I went out with them yeah, 
and they met up with all their mates and they’re all black. What are they going to be 
like to you at the end of the day, like all their pals saying, ‘what’s the white boy here 
for blah, blah, blah’. Even though these two, Billy and like Si [Frank’s black friends], 
they will do anything for me, always look out for my family and my brothers and 
everything else. But at the end of the day they can turn.
Frank alluded to his perceived disadvantage of obtaining social housing in 
competition with ‘refugees’. However, his words also highlighted a reflexive racism; 
that for expressing his opinion he would be branded a racist (c.f. Jencks, 1992). 
Furthermore, Frank’s black friends would ‘do anything’ for him, but like an animal 
they could ‘turn’, especially when part of a ‘pack’ on the streets. As Mason (1970) 
argues, dehumanising ‘other’ races permits the possibilities of ill treatment, so whilst 
Frank’s racism was context-bound in terms of his having black friends, he also 
expressed to me that they were almost inhuman. His words bore frightening 
similarities to the National Front member, who in 1975 shot dead a West Indian man, 
afterwards telling the police, ‘Niggers mean nothing to me. It was like killing a dog’ 
(quoted in Bowling, 1999).
Frank’s fear of, and competition with, ethnic groups, were transformed into 
racist attitudinal accounts that he bought into the workplace. The nature of workplace 
divides and competition for jobs nourished the persistence of racist attitudes in 
general, and, historical discourse permitted them in the first place. The various ethnic 
groups were competing over finite resources, most commonly jobs, housing and 
women, and within the competition, ingrained groups formed teams whose 
membership was signified by their ethnicity. The teams attempted to devalue their 
opponents in a dangerous symbolic game in which inferiorizing linguistic jibes were 
directed at the opposing teams, and, as Mason (1970) and Bowling (1999) argue, 
negative symbolism forms a backdrop to violent racism, ill-treatment and genocide.
Race and Networks
Part of the reason for recent migrant groups working harder and for less money than 
more ingrained groups was not primarily because of racism but their network position 
i.e. they did not have the necessary contacts to gain strong footholds into employment. 
In this sense, racial discrimination was predominantly structural, and not symbolic.
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Recent migrant groups earned less, worked harder and had even less stable jobs than 
builders in general, but, paradoxically, the groups were creating part of this structure 
for themselves by willingly submitting to it, albeit being forced to do so by a dearth of 
options and structural disadvantage. They worked for less money in worse conditions 
than more ingrained groups because that money and those conditions were 
subjectively positive to them, especially, as Naz pointed out, where large family units 
pull/pool together to make a living. Carving a niche in London’s economy took 
precedence over challenging how that economy functioned, but, rather than blaming 
the economy for low or falling wage rates, the various ethic groups blamed one 
another.
Racism was also fuelled by network processes that created the very concrete 
ethnic enclaves in London in general and on the building site in particular (see chapter 
4). Divides make distance, and distance makes typifications that make divides. Racial 
divides maintain themselves through preventing the flow of accurate information 
across the divides, and insubstantial information fuels generalised typifications. As 
Blum (2002) argues, viewing a specific group as ‘Other’, leads to an accentuation of 
that group’s difference from other groups and an accentuation of homogeneity within 
that group. Divides also restricted gift exchange between groups, preventing the 
formation of multi-racial networks and thus restricting the development of trust across 
racial divides. In this sense, symbolic racism and economic discrimination were 
intertwined (see chapter 10)
Gift Economies
The more ingrained ethnic groups were able to charge higher rates for their work 
despite their members being unwilling to work as hard as the less well-established 
ethnic groups. The outcome was that Topbuild participated in a construction market 
that was conceptually distinct from the dominant economism and Thatcherite 
conceptions of free markets. The guiding invisible hand of the economy was only 
‘invisible’ because of its informal nature, and the construction industry marketplace 
was itself quite the opposite of ideal-types of modem capitalism. It was in fact 
ascriptive and pre-industrial.
New subcontractors must undercut their rivals and accumulate enough profit 
to maintain relationships with incumbents of contractor management. Like social 
networks in general, the linkages were maintained by supplying and withholding
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information, giving favours, making debts and creating trust. As Granovetter (1974 
and 1985) argued, social networks operate in all sections of the job market and 
function between separate companies. In this sense, there is no reason to think that 
network relationships would not exist between the management, bosses and 
subcontractors of separate building teams.
Doing Business
Anti-trust cases -  related to cartel forming, monopolies, price fixing, bid-rigging, and 
other anti-competitive practices -  have a measure of irony in that business normally 
espouses free and open competition yet can be seen to manipulate markets under 
certain conditions... In general there is an assumption that corporations tend to enhance 
predictability in turbulent and insecure environments by engaging in networks to 
interfere in the working of a freely competitive environment. (Punch, 1996: 95)
It would certainly seem that such factors as personnel acquaintance, goodwill or 
favours owed, often come into play in the setting up of the construction team. (Higgin 
and Jessop, 1965: 30)
Punch (1996) convincingly argues that business organisation is criminogenic, echoing 
the earlier sentiments of Sutherland (1949) who viewed North American capitalism as 
founded upon illicit practices. Punch describes how the competitive market provides 
numerous opportunities, motivations and rationalisations to facilitate illicit business 
practices. He demonstrates how managers manage impressions of themselves and 
their businesses as formal, respectable and legal, yet ‘back stage’ they tend to do 
business informally and often illegally, justifying their activities through the language 
of business (see also Dalton, 1959; Granovetter, 1992). This trait was also the case at 
Topbuild.
Before beginning my fieldwork I read Topbuild’s company reports and public 
relations material. Topbuild presented itself as a modem constmction company that 
undertook highly complex and intricate works to a high standard for the private and 
public sector. They were members of the ‘Considerate Contractors Scheme’ and 
stated that they used only the highest quality materials and professional 
subcontractors and tradesmen. After reading this I was quite concerned that Topbuild 
would be an unusual example of a building contractor because I had never previously 
worked for or even heard of such a professional and considerate contractor. However, 
a short duration of fieldwork revealed clearly that Topbuild was representative of the 
building contractors I had experienced in the past, and their company information was
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a piece of impression-management. What was surprising is that they had allowed me 
to do the research at all.
It is rare to work for a building company where rumours of ‘back-handers’ and 
‘brown paper bags’ do not commonly circulate. Clinard and Yeager (1980) reinforce 
this view, finding the building industry to be one of three main business crime 
‘recidivists’. This, I would argue, is the result of the ‘criminogenic’ properties of 
fierce competition and market uncertainty characteristic of the building industry.
You Scratch My Back, I ’ll Scratch Yours
Topbuild were reluctantly forced to subcontract Spark’s M and E because Spark’s and
Assured Consultants shared a pre-existing network relation which obscured the day-
to-day running of the job (see chapter 3). However, the contractual arrangement,
under the auspices of a partnering agreement, stipulated that the consultant, in
association with the contractor, could select which subcontractors to employ. Because
Assured Consultants occupied the powerful end of the business relationship, they had
veto in choosing subcontractors, and the bosses of Spark’s and Assured were ‘friends’
i.e. they shared a network relation. Bill highlighted how this relationship operated:
You scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours. I mean he [Mr Sparks] does all right. I did him 
a favour this morning. I’ve been to the house of the boss of Topbuild putting sockets in. 
Tomorrow I’ve got to go to another place to put cookers and fucking hobs in. This 
weekend where am I? Working at his [Mr Assured’s] house, putting in a new bathroom 
and new showers and whatever. It’s all for nothing, oh I get paid but my governor don’t 
get paid for it. But my governor isn’t doing it for nothing though. He knows he’s got 
something coming on the end of it... My boss is Assured’s boss’s best mate. They’re 
all the same guys, all the ones that over the years they all go for their monthly meals 
and their big meeting up in their lodge or whatever it is. That’s how Topbuild gets on 
so well with Assured Consultants and Opportune Housing, because they’re all mates at 
the top of the ladder. Everyone’s getting their 10 pence worth out of it, except us. I 
can’t ask anyone for anything. Well I can, but when you do, you think fuck me you’re 
tied to them or whatever. But that’s just life in the building [industry].
The skills of a subcontractor’s employee are a useful and valuable form of gift. It 
might be assumed that anyone involved in higher management in the building 
industry would own a well-maintained house. As mentioned above, gifts serve as a 
network adhesive, elastically binding the members into a reciprocal relationship. And, 
I witnessed many gifts being exchanged between the building parties during my 
fieldwork. For example, four site managers, two surveyors and myself, drank 
champagne and cocktails in expensive Central London bars, had our entry paid to a 
night-club and were given free food in a restaurant afterwards, paid for entirely by
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Turner’s Carpentry. During the time leading up to Christmas, the site office literally 
overflowed with alcoholic gifts that were given by subcontractors to site management 
and surveyors. At this time I was observing the site office and I was also presented 
with gifts. Luke Screed offered me an expensive bottle of malt whisky saying, ‘I may 
need you to do something for me one day’. Even small-time subcontractors practised 
this tradition. Mickey T only subcontracted himself and three employees to Topbuild, 
but he told me how he had acquired a drinks list from 11 site managers. He was 
required to give each quantity surveyor and site manager a bottle of what they 
stipulated on the list and an additional bottle of wine. Failure to do so may have 
fractured Mickey’s relations with the management: debts must be paid and the 
network maintained.
The existence of formal drinks lists illuminated how gift exchange was 
virtually institutionalised in the subcontract system Note that these were gifts that I 
actually observed being exchanged. There may have been numerous others that I 
could not have seen because they were shielded from me. Whilst I never witnessed 
any money passing between the managers and subcontractors, I was told by numerous 
tradesmen and labourers that they had seen ‘brown paper bags’ change hands. The site 
management also talked about ‘other’ site managers who took bribes and booked in 
‘dead men’, and there was frequent talk about one of the contract directors ‘doing 
deals’ with various subcontractors and clients. The term, ‘booking in dead men’ is a 
building colloquialism describing collusion between site management and 
subcontractors who employ labour that does not actually exist (see also Dalton, 1959). 
Such stories at the Keyworker House build might have been based on rumour but, 
because so many people talked about ‘back-handers’ and ‘brown paper bags’, it leads 
one to suppose the assumed normality of such practices , and the existence 
colloquialisms highlighted their historical frequency4.
Pre-industrial Forms
Mauss (1954) argued that in primitive societies, gifts were exchanged to create 
relationships that functioned to prevent violence from neighbouring clans and
3 See Shibutani’s (1966) analysis o f rumour. He describes how pre-existing expectations guide sense-making when 
other sources o f news are either not forthcoming or are not consistent with expectations.
4 In the 17th century, the clerk o f works on the building o f Saint Paul’s cathedral in the City o f London was 
reported to have possessed huge wealth beyond his means. This was discovered only when he died and it was later 
found that he was ‘booking in dead men’ and excess materials.
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individuals. In the client-contractor-subcontractor complex, gifts were exchanged to 
shield against the violence of the market, that is, to create lucrative business relations 
and prevent their severance. In the competitive world of contracting, subcontracting 
and consultancy, members attempted to engineer the network by supplying gifts and 
creating reciprocity. Reciprocity may be contrived to some extent in all forms of 
social network, and as was shown above, these mechanisms lead to the creation of 
particular social, ethnic and geographical enclaves. In client-contractor-subcontractor 
relations, social networks functioned to create ‘business enclaves’ which confirmed 
contractual relationships and bound business alliances. The alliances restricted the 
flow of information within the network, thereby providing a barrier to competition. 
They also contributed towards the formation of ethnic trade enclaves by restricting 
entry into the construction market of non-embedded recent migrant groups.
The operation of social networks highlighted why many of the contractor- 
subcontractor relationships at Topbuild had been in existence for such long periods of 
time, despite constant competition from new subcontract groups. The mechanisms 
also provided a clue as to why it was that Topbuild had been undertaking work for the 
same housing associations and state departments for many years, and, may further 
illustrate why Topbuild had recently been bought-out by a larger building contractor, 
despite running at a loss and having not lost many of its higher management staff or 
company name. Topbuild and its managers were wedged into particular relationships 
that would be lucrative to the new parent-company. These relations were embedded in 
loyalty, nepotism, hospitality and trust, and therefore opened the way for corrupting 
and illegitimate practices (c.f. Punch’s analysis of the BCCI, and chapter 10).
The client-contractor-subcontractor organisational system can be conceptualised as 
pre-industrial, almost feudal in its form. Nepotism and ascription were facilitated and 
accompanied by withholding information within finite networks and doing business 
informally. In the following chapter I describe how the builders themselves made a 
living. They not only earned an income by working for Topbuild, but they were 
involved in an informal economy in which they supplemented their incomes. Just as 
the client-contractor-subcontractor complex was characterised by informal social 
action set against the backdrop of a competitive and unstable market, the builders also 
did business informally so as to cushion against the possible insecurities of the 
market.
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Chapter 10 
Making a Living
The builders made a living by selling their labour in the formal marketplace but this 
was largely supplemented by selling and trading labour, goods and favours in an 
informal marketplace. I use the term informal rather than ‘hidden’, ‘underground’, or 
‘black’, because this economy was neither hidden nor underground, but was overt, 
above the surface and took place in the light of day.
Formal economic action is any utilitarian activity that is overtly monitored, 
registered, and accounted for by governance systems. Informal economic activity is 
any utilitarian action, purposeful or not, that goes unchecked by formal accounting 
systems. The term ‘utilitarian’ is meant here in a broad sense in that the activity will 
be of direct or indirect social, political or economic benefit to the actors involved. It is 
the relationships between the formal economy, the informal economy, and urban 
modernity and capitalism, that will be the focus of this chapter.
Formal Economy
Going home to her [my partner] after work with a couple of screaming kids. I deal with 
it the best I can, but it’s just knowing that I got to get up the next morning and do it all 
over again. By the time I get my wages, go home, pay the rent, give her some money 
and everything else, I’m back to square one again, fuckin’ absolutely brassic 
[penniless]... All this fuckin’ labouring, painting and decorating, they are just shit 
wages. (Stew)
Writing about builders’ income en masse is problematic because as a class of workers 
their income varies substantially: some are affluent, yet equally some live on the 
breadline. A building consultant earns a higher wage than a labourer, and one labourer 
may earn a higher wage than another. Builders’ wages also fluctuate temporally, by 
employer, the state of the housing market and wider economic fluctuations. Wages 
depend upon the relationships between worker and subcontractor, the builder’s work 
experience, the type of job he is working on, whether this is price-work or day-work, 
the racial origins of the builder, and of course by his trade. Even wealthy contractors 
and subcontractors experience uncertain economic lives. As Ernie Coat described in 
chapter 4, and as can be evidenced from the numbers of building companies that go 
bankrupt every year (see chapter 1), the building trade is economically unstable even
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for large, well organised and experienced contractors and subcontractors, and, this is 
why they form business enclaves.
The majority of the builders at Keyworker House were not wealthy 
entrepreneurs, and all the trade teams were paid by the day rather than undertaking 
price-work where ‘big money’ could be earned. Price-work involves working at a fast 
rate for long hours and, many of the men, particularly the older and less skilled, were 
not able or willing to work at these speeds. Further, price-work is commonly more 
unstable than day works. ‘Price-work psychos’ as Steve termed them, tend to move 
from job-to-job in search of the ‘big money’. As I described in chapters 6 and 7, the 
work rate at Keyworker House was quite slow because the builders ‘took their time’ 
for an easier but smaller and more regular wage than could be earned undertaking 
price-work.
Wage Rates
Topbuild directly employed managers and surveyors who received job perks that
many employees in intense capitalist societies take for granted: sick pay, holiday
entitlements, works pensions, regular wage raises and career prospects. In 2003
Surveyors and site managers could earn incomes of anything between £25,000 to
£60,000 per year. For the builders ‘on the tools’ however, all of whom were
technically self-employed, wage payments were far less and they received none of the
formal fringe benefits of the directly employed. However, individuals such as Bill, a
highly skilled and trusted mechanical and electrical foreman, earned a relatively high
wage and was awarded informal benefits by his subcontractor in the form of holiday
money, telephone calls, a van, and various other ‘favours’. I did not know Bill’s exact
wage, I never asked him. Bristles provided an illustration of why:
There’s only one dying question in a man’s heart on the buildings and this is the 
question that will go on now until building work finishes forever. It’s how much you 
earning? That is the only question they need to ask, but obviously don’t ask... Why? 
'Cos they all earn different money that’s why. No one talks about their wages on the 
buildings, or if they do, they’re a liar. Either they want to keep it quiet 'cos they’re 
earning more than the man next to them, or they don’t want to look bloody stupid 'cos 
they’re earning less.
Bill told me that qualified electricians and plumbers expected to be paid 
approximately £470 per 5 day week, net (i.e. after tax has been deducted1). This was
1 None o f the wage rates were quite net because the builders themselves were supposed to pay 2 percent National 
Insurance contributions after tax has been deducted.
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slightly more than the £420 net, laid out by the Royal Institution of Chartered 
Surveyors (2002) in an industry-wide guide to builders wages. The disparity was due 
to the slightly higher wage rates for builders in London. Mechanical and electrical 
workers were the top earners, partly because of a shortage of these skills in 2003. 
Next in line were the carpenters who received a smaller wage than carpenters in 
general because they were a recent migrant group (see chapter 9), and they earned 
approximately £350 per 5-day week (net). Next were the painters and labourers. All 
the labourers received equal wages to one another (as far as I was aware), which were 
£250 per 5-day week (net). The labour foremen received an extra £5 a day, and the 
maintenance men, employed by the labour subcontractor, were the lowest paid at 
£230 per week (net). The painters’ wages varied substantially between them 
depending on their skill and relationship to Ernie Coat. At the bottom of the skill pile 
was Frank, who received just under £230 a week (net), slightly less than a labourer, 
and rates rose substantially according to increases in the particular painter’s talents. 
For instance, Gerry, who was very good at his job, received £320 a week (net).
Managers, Carpenters and mechanical and electrical workers received a
reasonable wage, but most of the painters and all of the labourers earned a small
wage. £250 a week is £12,500 (net) per annum i f  the builder worked for 50 weeks of
the year, which was impossible taking into account illness and enforced public
holidays. Their wage was less than that of most nurses or teachers for instance , who
also received all the fringe benefits associated with being a State employee and, their
wages rose with seniority and age, none of which was open to the builders (see
chapter 6). Fringe benefits are worth a substantial amount of one’s income. Illustrative
of this were the builders’ aversion towards Christmas and bank holidays because
building sites usually close during public holidays and builders do not get paid. Paul,
one of the site managers, talked about the benefits of recently becoming a direct
employee after almost 10 years working on the tools:
[On the tools] it’s an unstable life yeah, very insecure, you never really know what’s 
going on. Say you earn £500 a week and you go on holiday for two weeks, that’s just 
cost you £1,000 worth of income. So it’s a very expensive business to take holidays but 
you’ve got to have holidays haven’t you. Well, I’m 38 now and last Christmas was the 
first time ever I’ve been paid to have a Christmas dinner basically. I’ve always dreaded 
bank holidays but I quite like them now, your whole perspective changes... Actually if 
you multiplied my daily rate [earned on the tools] by 5 times 52, I’m actually £1,000 a
2 Nurses wage rates in 2004 went from a bottom-end entry wage o f £17,060, ascending to £34,920 (gross) for the 
most senior. The carpenters earned £23,750 (gross) i f  they worked for 50 weeks o f the year and regardless o f  
seniority.
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year worse off [being a site manager], but I get five weeks paid holiday, all the bank 
holidays, they pay 5% of my salary into a pension, and I add to it as well. So I’m really 
much better off... It’s also the back-up, you know, working for a big firm, it is just 
secure you know. And with the security you want more things yourself, like I’ve never 
been interested in a nice car but now all of a sudden when you’ve got a stable income, 
you think, yeah I’ll get one. And also when you’ve actually dug a hole for money it’s 
less easy to part with it...
Private Property
Many of the older labourers and painters had bought their houses from local
authorities following the 1980 Housing Act. Others rented local authority or private
houses, or had bought them from the local authority. All the carpenters owned their
own private houses, and some of them owned more than one (see below). However,
for younger builders, trying to buy a property in London at the time of the fieldwork
was quite problematic because of soaring prices in London. In 2003 the average price
of a London property was £262,000 which was beyond the means of the younger
builders. Indeed some of the builders thought that their relative economic position
was getting worse because wages ‘in the building’ had not risen equal to the rising
cost of living since the 1970s, and, as I revealed in the last chapter, recent migrant
groups were commonly blamed for these problems. Naz highlighted the problematic
extent of the relative fall in wages:
I was at Stanstead Airport for two years when they done the new terminal out, I think it 
was 89, 90. I was getting £75 a day then, now I’m getting £95, and the cost of living 
has gone about 100% higher. But I used to travel far remember, 50 mile going, 50 mile 
coming... It doesn’t pay on a building site anymore. Say for instance if I was to marry 
now and have a child, buy a house, my wages wouldn’t even make up the mortgage. So 
it’s not balanced out. Before a builder was reasonable earner but now it’s nowhere 
near... Anybody who has got responsibility; house, children, wife, it’s getting harder 
for them. Very, very hard for them.
Informal Economy
The informal economy encompasses a multitude of activities ranging from the 
circulation of goods originating from illicit activity, such as burgling houses or 
robbing jewellers, to having one’s parents baby-sit for their children or receiving 
‘hand-me-downs’ from one’s siblings (c.f. Pahl, 1984). In a broader sense, the 
informal economy is simple gift exchange, for example, getting a lift in someone’s 
car, or preparing a meal for a visitor. All these actions are economic in that they 
spend, accrue, and/or save money, and informal in that they are not officially
3 Guardianunlimited, 10/11/2003.
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accounted for, yet they constitute part of the total economy and probably a very large 
part. By its very nature, the extent of the informal economy is especially problematic 
to estimate. Mars (1982: 1) cites evidence from self-report surveys between the 1940s 
and 1970s that indicate between 75 and 92 percent of people ‘criminally’ add to their 
incomes. ‘Fiddling’, he concludes, is universal; we all do it. Whilst this may be the 
case, some groups fiddle more than others, and different groups have different 
motivations and opportunities to fiddle. Even within groups, some individuals fiddle 
more than others.
Writers such as Portes et al (1989) distinguish between formal, informal and 
illicit economies, viewing the informal economy as characterised by subcontracting. 
This definition however, would drag the majority of the British building industry into 
the informal category. Portes et al also argue that economic action exists on a 
continuum of legitimacy running from formal activity through informal activity, to 
illicit activity. However, as I have illustrated in almost all the preceding chapters, 
formal and informal activities exist side by side and merge with and within one 
another, and, whether legal or not, all these types go unregistered and thus are 
informal. Prescribed formal rules are guides to social action, they are not concretely 
or rigidly binding. The performance of ‘economic’ action therefore, has a tendency to 
reinterpret prescribed rules resulting in the intertwine of formal and informal 
economic action (see chapter 9). As Harding and Jenkins argue, ‘even the most formal 
contexts are comprehensively penetrated by and implicated in informal social 
relationships’ (1989: 175). Furthermore, informal activity will only become 
consequentially illicit if it is followed by a public reaction (Becker, 1963), or, deemed 
and registered illicit by formal governance systems. Much of the informal economy is 
so taken-for-granted that there is no public reaction, and thus no personal or wider 
social evaluation of the legitimacy of the act (Ditton, 1977a; Foster, 1990). Informal 
economic actions are therefore only illicit because formal law deems them so. The 
distinction between formal and informal economy is thus false, a construct of 
modernity’s nomenclature, knowledge differentiation, and the iatrogenic nature of the 
disciplines (see below).
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Historical Construction
Ditton (1977b) traces the history of ‘perks, pilferage and the fiddle’ back to medieval
England. He describes how game rights, grazing, gleaning and firewood rights
became criminalised during the Acts of Enclosure. He quotes Gonner:
Thus with enclosure, the number of geese owned by the poor are said to have 
decreased: cows were given up; the poor lost food, being deprived of the privilege of 
turf cutting; the commonage in the stables which enabled them to keep pigs and geese 
is theirs no more: and with these went other small advantages such as gleaning, which 
came to be more carefully restricted. (Gonner, 1912: 364. From Ditton, 1977b: 43)
Ditton argues that the creation of the working-class entailed criminalisation of 
reciprocal feudal rights where fiddles became the ambiguous space between perks and 
wages. Owners and bosses seized power over the ambiguities, providing them with 
the discretion to criminalise workers for engaging in informal activities. As 
Thompson argues:
In the seventeenth century labour had been only partly free, but the labourer still 
asserted large claims (sometimes as perquisites) to his own labour’s product. As in the 
eighteenth century, labour became more and more free, so labour’s product came to be 
seen as something totally distinct, the property of landowner or employer, and to be 
defended by the threat of the gallows. ([1975] 1990: 207)
Tellingly, the term ‘perk’ originates from the word ‘perquisite’, denoting ‘a thing 
which has served its primary use and to which a subordinate or employee has a 
customary right’ (OED, 2001); the term’s meaning originating from the Latin to 
‘search diligently for’. The specific nature of perk has changed through history but its 
origin and meaning remain wedged in the past.
Henry (1978) challenges Ditton’s historical account and cites evidence from 
Hall (1952) illustrating that ‘larceny by servant’ and pilfering of timber on large 
‘public’ constructions was recognised as a problem in England as early as the 13th and 
14th centuries. However, modernity was a creeping process, and servants and builders 
were a wage labouring ‘working-class’, before the making of the working-class in 
which the places and products of their labour were not their own property (see chapter 
1). This ostensibly indicates why traditional rights became perceived as problems in 
relation to these groups in early modernity.
Several centuries later, Rude’s (1985) analysis of crime and conviction rates in 
early 19th century England show that pilfering and fiddling were widespread. Most 
crimes of the period, he argues, were ‘survival crimes’, which tended to rise in 
association with economic downturn. In Sussex for instance, 89.2 per cent of people
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convicted of an indictable offence were labourers (presumably, most of whom were 
agricultural proletarians, or unemployed liars) who mostly committed acts of 
‘survival-theft’ in which they stole food, firewood and animals, exactly those offences 
that were basic rights two-hundred years previously. Further, Foucault ([1975] 1991) 
argues that changes in methods of governance characteristic of the modem project 
were largely driven by a requirement to iron-out ‘general illegalities’. General 
illegalities can be viewed under the category of informal economy, that is fiddling, 
gleaning, poaching, pilfering and non-payment of taxes i.e. those convictions which 
Rude documents as the majority of registered offences in the early 19th century. 
Furthermore, Thompson’s analysis of the 1723 Black Act, and its ensuing harsh 
sentences of death, imprisonment, transportation and, impossibly high fines, are a 
further indication of the evolving legal technologies of the period, where: ‘Non­
monetary use rights were being reinforced into capitalist property rights, by the 
mediation of the courts of law’ ([1975] 1990: 244).
The creep of modem legal systems created formality. The written word, 
information technology, bureaucratic rationality and the modem state, manufactured a 
system of governance that constructed the formal (Harding and Jenkins, 1989). If 
informal activity is defined by its opposite, formality, it was the construction of the 
formal that created the informal; the two are inseparably linked. In the 18th century, 
law and custom intersected and rights were parochial and negotiated. Customary right 
was ‘lived through’ and held in place by generational transmission and local
fhreciprocities (Thompson, 1993). In this sense, most 18 century economic activity 
was informal, but, with the transplantation of modem bureaucratic law, traditional 
rights were transformed into crimes. The processes were not a singular case of social 
construction but also marked a shift in relations between the powerful and their 
subjects. Whilst feudal lords occupied the powerful end of relationships with their 
subjects, these were balanced by local ties, dependencies and reciprocities. However, 
modernity’s brother, capitalism, obviated much of the necessity for reciprocity 
between the classes through widespread use of money, and the violence of the market 
and executioner. In this sense, pre-modem rights were an outcome of an indulgency 
system because the populace could not be tightly monitored and governed because 
systems of governance were inefficient and inchoate4. Thus the modem project and its
4 Thompson (1975) describes what happened when indulgency was replaced with disorganised unilateral control 
by the new ruling-class. Agents o f the Whigs stamped on local customs and rituals, to which the foresters fought
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new ruling-class constructed general illegalities in order to govern in a depersonalised
and more efficient manner. As Foucault argued, noting the modem shift:
Each crime will have its law; each criminal his punishment. It will be a visible 
punishment, a punishment that tells all, that explains, justifies itself... The great 
terrifying ritual of the public execution gives way, day after day, street after street, to 
this serious theatre, with its multifarious and persuasive scenes. ([1975] 1991: 113)
Foucault suggested that ‘persuasive scenes’ were inculcated in people’s minds, 
making the law seem normal and natural, wiping out general illegalities. However, the 
evidence that people were convicted for such illegalities, and that almost everyone 
fiddles to some extent, illustrates that modem legal technologies cannot have 
infiltrated the minds of populations quite as Foucault argued. General illegalities were 
never ironed-out, but constmcted, concomitant with private property and the demise 
of noblesse oblige. However, the nature of illegalities did alter over the course of 
modernity, hand in hand with the intensification of capitalism.
Before and during the transitional phases of the ‘making of the working class’ 
(Thompson, 1963), it was common for family units to pool their resources and 
generate income from sources other than paid work (see Pahl, 1984). In chapter 1 I 
described how medieval building guildsmen commonly supplied materials, brewed 
beer, farmed animals and vegetables and opened their houses to the public. Also, 
women and children undertook work as labourers, and women commonly made and 
sold goods door-to-door (Swanson, 1988). The age-old customs of commoners 
provided rights and perquisites from which they farmed, gleaned, hunted and 
collected firewood and building materials as economic additions to their day-to-day 
employments (Thompson, 1993). However, the restriction upon space accompanying 
urban living prevented families from growing food, gleaning and brewing, and, strict 
laws precluded them opening houses to the public. Furthermore, mass deforestation 
and the vast (practical and symbolic) distances to travel out of an urban area like 
London (see Rock, 1983) to rural areas where goods could be gleaned, squeezed out 
archaic forms of making a living (but not in rural areas, see Pahl, 1984). However, the 
continuing necessity of making a living in urban areas facilitated the development of 
new forms of informal economy. These forms were the ‘fiddle’, the ‘bargain’, 
informal trading, and wider forms of prestation. The continuation of archaic custom, 
inefficiency of legal technologies, the whip of the capitalist market, and because
back through bellicosity and sabotage. The event bore similar forms and processes to those that occur in 
workplaces (see chapter 6).
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capitalism is composed of people doing things, the Builders’ informal economy 
flourished almost unbounded, even in a period of intense modernity.
Perks and Fiddles
Working on various building sites in the past, I frequently observed fiddles that were 
accounted for by class-conscious vocabularies of motive. I also argued in chapter 6, 
that little conflict was extant at Keyworker House but, despite this, a plethora of 
fiddles occurred and which were not publicly accounted for at all. Fiddles and 
deviancies were accompanied by jokes, winks and smiles, or were taken-for-granted 
so much that they were not reflected upon at all; merely an expected and normal part 
of everyday life. Jokes, smiles, nudges and winks constituted a ‘meta-language’; an 
ambiguous and marginal symbolism employed to accompany informal actions, its 
comprehension implicit and situated (see chapter 6). Necessarily, informal actions are 
not formalised, and consequently there was little form to their accompanying 
language. Meta-language was to some extent a non-modem symbolic system 
employed to dress non-modem activities, and because it was mostly non-verbal, it 
prevented reflection on the act (see Ditton, 1977a).
An example of the taken-for-granted, or what might be termed, the institutionalised, 
nature of work perks amongst the builders, was the existence of the ‘totters’. I 
unfortunately never got to meet the totters, but discovered a clue to their work on my 
first day as a labourer. Two of the labourers, Pat and Patrick, were removing an old 
roof covering from one of the buildings. Most of the debris were cracked roof tiles, 
smashed-out concrete, msty gutters and copious asphalt. Pat and Patrick sat perched 
on a scaffold with hammers, chisels and crowbars, and threw the debris down onto the 
floor below, which I then shovelled into a wheelbarrow and transported to a skip. Pat 
watched me shovel the waste materials and spotted that some was not waste at all. He 
bellowed at me not to put any lead into the barrow. I asked no questions and followed 
his orders.
Later in the fieldwork, Danny, the labour foreman, and I, were removing 
rubbish from another roof. We filled two ‘bogies’ (carts with 5 wheels) with the 
debris and, into one went copper pipes and lead, into the other, various bricks and 
concrete. Danny and I wheeled the bogie containing the metals down to a room 
situated in a dark and damp area of the basement at Keyworker House 1. Danny said,
222
with a wink and a smile, ‘top-secret, this room yes, top-secret eh, eh’. The room
contained the roof lead that Pat and Patrick warned me not to dump in the skip, and
assorted other metal pipes, copper wires and lead weights removed from old sash
windows. I did not want to arouse suspicion so I asked few questions. However,
during future participation with the labourers, I asked Mickey T and Aidan where the
metal went to, how much money they got for it, and who got the money. Mickey T
told me the totters drove around many building sites in London and paid cash in
exchange for scrap metal (and I presume anything else of value). He said they had not
visited Keyworker House so regularly since most of the work moved inside but they
were ‘two old cockney blokes’ who were probably richer than most builders because
all their income was accrued informally (i.e. they paid no tax). Mickey knew them
since he started ‘working on the buildings’ 50 years previous. I asked Aidan during a
recorded interview if he had seen the totters:
I haven’t seen them yet. I tell you what, they are one clever people they are. Oh, fuck 
me, I mean they can’t even write their names some of them, but see some of them 
vehicles they drive, fuckin’ proper. Good luck to them, you can’t knock em, can ya?
The totters were organised and almost institutionalised fiddlers, and Aidan’s 
comments illustrated moral support for their role. The profits earned from the totters 
were literally a ‘perquisite’: money was made from products that had served their use 
and were diligently searched for. Quite where the income received from the totters 
went, I never found out, certainly it was never shared with me. I once overheard the 
labourers talking about the whereabouts of the cash for ‘the last lot of lead’, which 
they concluded Danny had spent in the pub. It may have been a case of whoever was 
present when the totters arrived, received a share of the cash. I suspected the site 
management knew little about the totters or the ‘top-secret’ room in which the goods 
were stored (I obviously never asked them not wanting to be a ‘grass’) because the 
labourers kept the information within their work-group network. However, the 
managers were aware of other perks that went on, and actively colluded in some of 
them.
The communal kitchens in Keyworker House were refurbished and all the old 
cookers ‘thrown out’. Some of them were originally expensive pieces of machinery 
and remained in good working order. Under orders from Danny, two particularly 
pristine and large cookers were put into the basement of Keyworker House 1. Possibly 
due to the difficulty of concealing such large objects, Danny told the site management
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that they were ‘probably worth a few quid’, and one lunchtime everyone in the 
labourers’ tea-room talked about how they might sell them. Nobody wanted the 
cookers themselves and could not think of anyone else who would. Then Bristles 
made some telephone calls.
Bristles was always ‘ducking and diving’, in part to support his 11 children, 
and because the Child Support Agency was attempting to track him down and force 
him to pay maintenance money to his two ex-wives. Bristles was also an obsessive 
gambler who accrued many debts. The painters would tell stories about him losing his 
whole wage packet in a single Friday evening through playing cards in the pub. He 
would then continue to accumulate debt through borrowing money to carry on 
gambling through the night. Not surprisingly, Bristles had constant monetary 
pressures, made more salient by people ‘knocking on his front door’ in search of their 
cash. He was also a very friendly, funny and confident man, who was a popular 
picaresque character at Keyworker House. He was a ‘talker’ who knew many people, 
and he used his communication skills, and, as one who inhabited many social 
networks, to act as a ‘broker’ (Boissevain, 1974) in the informal economy. In the case 
of the cookers, Bristles found ‘a man’ who wanted to buy them, and for his 
networking services he was given ‘a drink’ (c.f. Mars, 1982) in the form of a £30 fee 
by the management, and, I suspect, also by the man who bought the cookers. Bristles 
profited financially from his brokerage services and in doing so also displayed his 
skills as a broker to the parties involved, and simultaneously strengthened his broker 
position as a man ‘worth knowing’.
I later asked the labourers where the profit from the sale of the cookers had 
gone. I assumed it would be shared out amongst them, but my question was met with 
blank looks and Danny commented: ‘very inquisitive, he’s very inquisitive ah, 
please’. I never asked again. The builders’ reactions to my asking such questions, 
prevented me from asking similar questions in interview situations. Informal activity 
was so taken-for-granted and normal at Keyworker House that I am quite certain that 
if I asked questions about their pilfering and fiddling, the builders’ main reaction 
would have been incredulity at my stupid question.
Pilferage
When we were labouring together, Mickey T would tell graphic stories about his life 
‘back home’. He told me about the methods he and his siblings used to catch salmon
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in the rivers of rural Ireland, and how they would sell them to local hotels. He talked 
about poaching as if it was both normal and highly necessary given his economic 
environment (see chapter 4). When the Irish migrated to urban Britain there were few 
poaching opportunities. However, pilfering work materials is an industrial form of 
poaching, and poaching a modem form of medieval rights.
The builders often talked about their pilfering exploits. Perry, one of the 
painters, liked to describe a frozen food warehouse that he painted where he and 
friends had never eaten so well. Pilfering activities accmed small extra incomes, or 
‘pocket money’, earned for little effort. It is telling that builders feature frequently in 
studies of the informal economy (see Henry, 1978; Mars, 1982; Hobbs, 1988; Foster, 
1990). Building sites are particularly ripe for pilferage, and builders possess all Mars’ 
(1982) ‘structural fiddle factors’, that is, building work is highly facilitative of 
fiddling. This is because builders work back-stage and unmonitored where goods are 
stored, and they have freedom of movement around space. At Keyworker House for 
example, the labourers’ tea-room contained one of Topbuild’s materials storerooms. 
Many of the objects housed within it were easily transportable and of some value. It 
contained much of the new ironmongery, most of the boxes of screws, nails, hinges, 
brackets and glues that the carpenters used, and all the ‘domestic equipment’ 
including cleaning fluids, protective gloves, mops, brooms and bmshes, light bulbs 
and fittings, vacuum and mbbish bags. These were materials that everyone has a use 
for and, because of this, the door to the storeroom was strictly kept locked. However, 
the labourers and carpenters frequently required materials from the storeroom, and 
rather than having continually to ask for the key, it was left in a drawer in the tea­
room where everyone knew where it was. The builders would freely wander in and 
out to get the objects they required.
When I first began participant observation, the storeroom was literally 
overflowing with materials, but in a matter of weeks it looked almost empty. The 
managers realised that far more materials ‘disappeared’ than had been used on the job, 
and they began to store the more expensive and transportable objects in the site office 
where they could ‘keep an eye on them’. I once asked Steve if  pilfering was costed 
into a building job: he told me that it was not but should be.
Little social reaction accompanied pilferage. For example, Danny jocularly 
remarked he did not like the colours of emulsion paints that Ernie Coat had delivered, 
saying: ‘The old lady don’t like any of these colours. When’s Ernie gonna bring some
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nice ones in eh?’ Everyone thought this funny, and Bristles told a story about one of 
his painter friends who pilfered so many materials that he would do a ‘car-boot sale’ 
every month to sell them. In another example of the taken-for-granted nature of 
pilferage, the painters were having tea and Frank was talking about the new flat he 
had just been moved to. He said it ‘stunk’ because the person who previously lived 
there kept 6 cats and never cleaned the flat. He wanted to buy some sugar-soap to 
scrub and disinfect his new dwelling, and with great incredulity, Bony and Jimmy 
said, ‘what do you want to buy some for? Are you fuckin’ mad or something, we’ve 
got loads of it in the store cupboard’. I promptly fetched him some from the store.
The examples above illustrate both the normality of pilfering, and what Ditton 
(1977a) terms the ‘moral career’ of a worker, whereby novices informally learn what 
is and is not acceptable within the moral parameters of the workgroup’s informal 
activity. Moral boundaries were further reinforced by story-telling about past fiddles, 
thereby informing the new recruits that it was natural and normal to fiddle and pilfer. 
At Keyworker House almost any act of materials pilferage was ostensibly ‘fair game’, 
another term echoing past rights entwined in present sensibilities.
Not everyone on building sites fiddle and, certainly, some fiddle more than 
others. I became acutely aware of the powerful nature of dismissal in relation to 
pilfering when I first began my fieldwork. As mentioned above, the storeroom 
adjoining the labourers’ tea-room was full of useful and easily transportable goods. It 
was very tempting, and quite usual, for me to take some of the goods. However, I 
stopped myself, thinking it was not worth jeopardising my research for a few pounds- 
worth of ironmongery and light-bulbs. The losses outweighed the benefits5. However, 
my reasoning altered as time went on because I realised management tended to 
indulge the workers in these actions. I also felt I was doing a full week’s work for half 
a week’s pay and could therefore justify to myself that it would be ‘fair game’ and a 
small risk to engage in pilferage. I had entered an intersubjective moral and 
calculative career, but I still however, calculated that the risk could be large, and 
consequently took many fewer goods than I usually would have if Keyworker House 
were a job and not a research project.
Individuals who feel they really need their job and are fearful of losing it may 
be less inclined to pilfer than long-term workers. Alternatively, those not so tied to
5 See Clarke and Cornish (1986) for what is a useful but rather crude theorisation o f the rational nature o f  
offending opportunities.
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their jobs, such as the young and childless may be more inclined (c.f. Hirschi, 1969). 
Again, long-term employment whilst being cost effective through creating trust, can 
also be expensive through that very same trust and long-termism (see chapters 6 and 
7).
White-collars
Managers actively engaged in their own job-specific fiddles. When observing the site
office I overheard frequent discussions concerning various white-collar fiddles. For
example, Kevin, the quantity surveyor, told a story about when he had been a junior
surveyor, and his senior surveyor would coach him in how to exaggerate his expense
account. Kevin said he had never even thought about this before (and neither,
probably, had Bobby, the trainee quantity surveyor, until Kevin told the stories).
Similarly, Steve spoke about how one of Topbuild’s other contracts’ managers earned
£30-40 per week extra on his salary by fiddling his expense account. Both Kevin and
Steve found this funny and said that whilst they occasionally exaggerated their
expenses, they would not push it as far as some of their colleagues. They did however,
pilfer. When walking out of Keyworker House with a small radiator under his arm,
Steve felt a need to justify his actions:
Every other fucka' gets stuff off here. Rocky Weiler [a fellow contracts’ manager], 
refurbed his whole fuckin’ house with nicked gear from the Tottenham job. This is the 
first thing I’ve taken off this job, seriously, and I need it so I’m having it. (Fieldnotes)
Steve’s account was predicated upon him having worked for Topbuild ‘man and boy’. 
He was promoted into a well-paid and stable job and thus held a strong loyalty to the 
company. However, he required no such justification when he did a ‘favour’ for 
Jamin.
Jamin was removing the chimney breasts from his home, and old bricks and 
concrete were piling up in rubble bags (something else that was regularly pilfered) in 
his garage. He asked if Steve could organise a skip, hoping to get a cheaper price if 
Topbuild booked it. Steve promptly booked the skip but refused payment saying: 
‘Fuck that, let them pay for it. Don’t tell Kevin for fuck’s sake’. Steve, despite 
experiencing a need to justify his own fiddling, felt no dissonance in performing a 
favour for Jamin, a hard working, trusted and reliable general foreman. Steve was 
building and buying reciprocity with Jamin, which would save him time, money and 
effort in the long-term. Dalton (1959) documented similar actions by and between
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managers. He described how the formal reward system in bureaucratic environments 
was too slow and rigid to recompense subordinates who ‘go out of their way’ for a 
manager. Managers therefore award instant informal perks to manufacture ‘elastic 
incentive’ (Dalton, 1959), and formal bureaucracies become characterised by informal 
action. Steve used exactly this tactic in the case above, and in the indulgency pattern 
in general (see chapter 6).
Collusion
I once commented to Mike Fixit that the 40-watt screw-in light bulbs used at 
Keyworker House were difficult to find in my local shops. He replied, ‘you don’t 
want to bloody buy them, we’ve got thousands of ‘em, they’re all behind reception at 
Keyworker House 1’. I said I could hardly go behind reception and take them, and the 
following day a box of 40-watt screw-in light bulbs was to be found on the window­
sill in the labourers’ tea-room. With no comment from Mike, he put them there, I 
presumed for my taking. I guessed I would be indebted to Mike if he ever needed 
something that I could get for him, and his favour somehow brought us into a tighter 
relationship. In addition, he performed this action whilst preventing any 
misdemeanour himself because he did not give me the light-bulbs, he merely moved 
them.
On occasion organised pilferage travelled across the trade group divisions. I 
have experienced this on almost every building site I worked on in the past. Painters 
would get paint and silicones for the electricians, electricians would get electrical 
sockets and smoke alarms for the painters; carpenters would get glue and nails for the 
labourers, and labourers would get cleaning materials for the carpenters. Many 
materials stored on building sites are both large and quite inexpensive; big piles of 
bricks or huge sheets of plywood are of little monetary value and it would take careful 
and co-ordinated planning to remove them. In this sense, tradesmen such as 
bricklayers may be excluded from site-based pilfering networks because they have 
little to offer in the way of exchange. It tended to be small, easily transportable 
materials that were pilfered, reflecting the facilitators of such acts being tied to 
situational opportunity (c.f. Felson, 1994).
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Forced Informality
Some informal activities were directly imposed on the builders by the legal and 
normative structures of modernity. Mickey T for example told me that in the 1950s 
and 60s, building labouring (probably in association with being Irish) was not 
considered a stable enough occupation to secure a mortgage by banks or building 
societies. To buy his first house, Mickey was forced to manufacture false references 
and proof of income to buy a property and conform to capitalist normality. He also 
explained how having to bend the truth to make a living was presently affecting his 
peers. To migrate to England in the 1950s, the Irish had to be a minimum of 16 years 
old. Many wanted/needed to leave Ireland when they were younger than this, and 
therefore had lied about their age. These men were now of retirement age but could 
not receive a State pension until two or three years after they reached 65 years of age.
Many of the Irish labourers also worked ‘off the cards’ i.e. they did not pay 
tax on their earnings. I never got to the bottom of how the system worked. Certainly 
some worked on other people’s CIS cards, which functioned to benefit all parties, and 
was embedded in the reciprocal-favour mechanism. When working on another’s CIS 
card, the person who legally owned the card received a tax rebate every year and the 
user of the card received a job; both parties benefited6. Also, many were claiming a 
State pension, and to formally declare their worked income would reduce that income. 
In addition, many officially retired tradesmen tend to go on ‘doing privates’ (see 
below) or handy-man jobs, but because the labourers were only semi-skilled there was 
little option for them to do this, excluding the occasional jobs they found to build new 
patios or driveways for private clients. Again, informality fuelled informality. If a 
labourer ‘went legit’ and entered formal governance structures half-way through his 
life, suspicion might be aroused as to what he was doing for the first half.
The carpenters were also pushed to informality, but theirs was a slightly 
different story from that of the Irish because many smuggled cash out of East Africa 
during the 1960s and 70s. For their first 5 years living in Britain, they were refused 
social housing and, consequently set up their own informal and networked money and 
mortgage lenders - in fact, a whole ‘internal’ housing economy consisting of race- 
specific buyers, sellers, money lenders, solicitors and estate agents (Desai, 1963;
6 A possibly apocryphal story was circulated at Topbuild and in the building industry in general, that many Irish 
claim under false names to pay tax in Ireland and thus avoid the necessity for a CIS card, thereby saving 
themselves and their subcontractor from paying any tax at all.
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Tambs-Lyche, 1980; Shaw, 1982). Contributing to the formation of ethnic enclaves, 
East African Asians would ‘sponsor’ newly-arrived family and friends by providing a 
home for them until they could afford buy their own. Desai (1963) describes how 
borrowing was informal and non-contractual in order to prevent attention from the 
Inland Revenue (and ostensibly enforced by dense trust networks [Granovetter, 1990] 
and possible violence [see chapter 9]). If a house is purchased informally, the 
occupants would be forced to also sell it informally to avoid detection. In this case 
informal actions feed upon themselves, forcing individuals increasingly down an 
informal path.
Blockages in formal structures provoked informal solutions, particularly by 
groups whose ethnicity and network position negated their ability to negotiate formal 
society. In response, ethic groups utilised their informal network contacts to negotiate 
social life, and in this sense, the formal system facilitated (and defined) the 
development of an informal system. Migrant network groups thus operated like 
Merton’s (1949) collective ‘innovators’, but their informal innovation fed upon itself 
and network members became increasingly bound up in informal action.
Informality and Opportunity
It was not only the labourers who worked on false, or no, CIS cards. Frank for
example, wanted to avoid being registered for work and so paid no tax on his
earnings. He explained how he did this fiddle, and his reasons why:
To get by, you just gotta look for different jobs, like off the cards. I can’t afford to go 
on the cards now I got three kids and a wife, know what I mean? So as long as this 
[job] lasts, just keep it going.... I don’t sign-on [claim job-seekers’ allowance] but I’m 
claiming for my two kids, the wife claims for my daughter and I claim for the others 
separate [i.e. they were ‘officially’ separated]. I don’t mention that I live with her 
because the [Department of] Social [Security] thinks we’ve split up. I’m meant to be 
[living] at my mum’s with the two kids.. .What it is, is that it’s coming up to five years 
now that I’ve been trying to get a flat near the school, but I can’t get one... So I claim 
for single parent benefit. It’s not bad [money] but [my wife] she changes it [the cheque] 
for me and then she spends it. The money I get from Ernie just covers the surface. I 
have to borrow money off my mum, so I’m paying her back, then [my wife] she tells 
me ‘we need this and we need that’, so basically the wages don’t even cover you.
DT: What’s she spend it on then?
Nine out of ten of it is drugs anyway, but what can you do? I do them as well but £15 
on a G [gram of amphetamine], it’s as you know yourself, it’s expensive. With me, at 
least when I get mine, it’s mine. I might give her a bit now and then but apart from that, 
you know I can’t afford it. She starts moaning if she don’t get any [drugs], withdrawal 
symptoms you know what I mean, its no good man (laughs).
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With his own addiction, an addicted wife, three children, and another on the way, 
little chance of being housed by his local authority, and just over £200 per week of 
self-employed casual wages, Frank felt forced to fiddle in order to continue the life to 
which he and his family had become accustomed. Frank was immersed in a world of 
illegal drugs and he had almost become one of the starving addicts he so despised (see 
chapter 8).
Bill was the highest earning tradesmen at Keyworker House but he too faced
financial problems in the past spawned by fluctuations in the economy, and by having
a very large family to support:
I don’t know when it was, about 1980s, the big bang. I’d never been unemployed in me 
life, never. I’ve gone into work a couple of days after Christmas and the bloke [boss] 
phoned me up... and he said, ‘we got no work, I think we’re gonna fold up, it’s all just 
gone tits up’. I said not to worry, I thought I got a good trade I’ll get a job straightaway.
But do ya know what? I couldn’t get a fuckin’ job! So, I went down the social [security 
office], I said, ‘cos I had five kids at the time, I’ve got six now, I said I’m unemployed, 
I’ve got no money. And they looked at me and said ‘oh well, you can only sign on 
income support’ or whatever it was [rather than claim unemployment benefit] because I 
hadn’t paid all me [National] Insurance stamps up. She said ‘stay on it for 13 weeks, all 
your stamps will be brought up to date and you’ll be okay’. I said, oh right thanks very 
much. I stayed on 13 weeks and I know it’s wrong to say this but anyone who fucking 
works and signs on the dole should be fucking strung up. But then I done it! They were 
sending me milk tokens through for the kids and giving me all this money. I did a bit of 
work and kept on it for 13 weeks till all me [National Insurance] stamps were paid up.
The casual, informal and intermittent working lives of builders, coupled with 
supporting large families and a desire for the normality of having somewhere to live, 
formed contingencies motivating them to informal activity. Through being able to 
obtain more than one form of income it became difficult to relinquish that life-style 
especially when opportunities continued to arise. If entry to the building trade was 
highly and effectively regulated, Frank, for example, would only have been able to 
accrue a single source of income -  building or benefits. However, his membership of 
particular network groups enabled him to do both. If informal building work 
opportunities were blocked, he may simply have entered another informal occupation, 
which he had done throughout his life in the form of cab driving. However, if all 
occupations were closed to him and, he and his wife’s lifestyle remained the same, he 
may have been subjectively forced to make a living by more risky and morally 
reprehensible means.
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Robbin ' or Robin Hood?
I got so many tools and have to go so many places. We all do it, you get there and you 
ain’t got the right spanner, you ain’t got the right screwdriver, it’s not gonna work I 
know. Well, you can’t leave them lying around in all the different places, they’re all 
gonna fucking disappear aren’t they? They’re all gonna get nicked or whatever because 
there’s too many people about. (Trick, mechanical and electrical)
Whilst few moral boundaries surrounded pilferage of materials, there was a tacit 
morality concerning pilferage of objects in general. Keyworker House was a home 
and workplace to literally hundreds of people, and the builders were presented with 
multiple opportunities to pilfer when working unobserved in the other people’s 
private spaces. At Keyworker House, pilferage did occur from the building itself. This 
generally consisted of labourers finding useful objects in disused store cupboards. For 
example, I saw Danny, with support from the site management, ‘glean’ some steps, a 
sack-barrow and more than one vacuum cleaner through this method. The 
management then issued him with paper stickers with Topbuild’s logo printed on 
them that he rapidly attached to the newly ‘found’ objects to demarcate their new 
ownership. However, I never observed anything being taken from the private spaces 
of the key workers or administrative staff (c.f. Mars, 1974). I also never witnessed any 
moral censure towards such acts, seemingly because the acts were never committed. 
Moral boundaries had lost visibility, and it was simply taken for granted that to pilfer 
from an individual would be literally ‘out of order’.
Paradoxically however, as I mentioned in chapter 8 in the case of the ‘missing’ 
wage-packet, moral censure towards personalised theft did not prevent actual theft all 
of the time. The wages story illuminated how common it was for things to be stolen 
from the worker’s canteens, and Frank was considered foolish to leave the wages 
unattended. All the painters censured the wage theft subsequent to the act, which 
publicly denoted it as out of their normative order and unacceptable. However, Frank 
was not a popular character amongst the ‘core’ painting group because his lack of 
skill and slow work-pace threatened to expose their time deviance (see chapter 6). 
Consequently he was the everyday subject of unadorned vilification, and used as a 
scapegoat for almost everything. He was symbolically depersonalised by epithets such 
as ‘useless cunt’ and ‘stupid arsehole’ and thereby reduced to a persona analogous to 
inoperative sexual organs. Like the symbolic systems that facilitate difference, 
domination and ill-treatment of particular classes, races and genders (see chapter 8),
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these epithets reduced Frank’s humanity, and symbolically moved him outside of 
normative morality.
Aidan mentioned he had his phone stolen from the labourer’s canteen. This 
provoked a similar social reaction to the above, although stealing a phone was not 
considered nearly so ‘rough’ as taking someone’s wages. In Aidan’s case, there was a 
strong suspicion that the person who took the phone was an ‘outsider’ who was 
present on the day it went missing. Of course, it may not have been the outsider who 
committed the infraction, but he became the secret subject of accusation. Aidan said 
he could not accuse the outsider because of the possibility it could have been anyone 
of us. However, he did say, ‘He’ll get his, don’t you worry’. The phone theft could 
also have been related to depersonalisation, which was further related to continual 
transience where strangers came and went all the time. Transitory ‘outsiders’ had few 
ties to Topbuild’s parochial networks, and were thus free from personal ties, network 
morality, and the social pressure of the ‘core’ work-groups.
In the wage theft, Frank had been depersonalised, which may have contributed to the 
misdemeanour. A related but converse example of personalisation, was the expensive 
plant that Topbuild owned (various drills, disc-cutters, power-boxes and electrical 
saws), which had, in the words of the management, ‘got legs’ and ‘walked’. These 
expressions animated the objects and removed human action from the events, which 
was a consequence of the managers’ ineptitude spawned by the impossibility of 
uncovering offender’s identities. However, to counteract this, Steve implemented a 
strict accounting system whereby any builder who used the plant was to sign for it, 
from which time it became accounted as his property.
Doing Business
Privates
The bricklayer is always a handy man who can do a job for a neighbour, while the 
painter, if there were not so many of his craft, might hope to be constantly in request, 
since ‘painting is a thing all houses want, the same as a man wants trousers’; and the 
‘carpenter’s little bench in his back kitchen’ is frequently found, and, put to other than 
domestic uses, it often becomes a source of income. (Booth, 1895:131)
In addition to working for Topbuild, most of the tradesmen worked for private clients 
at weekends and public holidays. This was a way of raising extra cash and to cushion
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against possible future economic instabilities. Bill told me what he did with the fruits 
of his private work:
I got 6 kids, It’s a fucking nut house. That’s why I’m going to the pub tonight and why 
I get into work so early in the mornings. But they’ve never gone without, I always say 
to her the money’s there if you want it... Anything I do, like private work, I always put 
it away for a rainy day or whatever, not always but I try to just in case we hit a hard 
time.
The rainy day literally has an effect on builders’ earnings because much building 
work cannot be undertaken in the rain (see chapter 1). The instabilities of building 
employment provoked even the well-paid and high-skilled Bill to prepare for a ‘hard 
time’.
‘Doing privates’ was part of the informal economy; unregistered but well
known. It was untaxed income that benefited the builder and, also the private client,
who would be awarded a cheaper price. Informalism in this sense was dyadic, and
thus a social and not individual process. Furthermore, some of the builders told me
they were often cajoled into doing privates at small profits by their network
acquaintances. As Jamin mentioned:
I got my own place to do man but yeah, fuckin’ family and mates and that, can you do 
this, can you to do that, for peanuts you know what I mean? Or nothing even... I mean 
I don’t mind sometimes, depends who it is you know.
Doing privates was not simply an economic action but was indirectly utilitarian in that 
it was framed by and, reinforced, social networks. The action of doing a cheap private 
as a favour, depending on ‘who it is’, accumulated indirect utilities because the 
builder became owed a favour/gift within the elastic mechanisms of network 
reciprocity. Pilferage of building materials intersected with this aspect of the informal 
economy because they were used to do privates, and this made privates more 
profitable for the builder where reduced cash prices might necessarily be charged. In 
these situations, the client is billed for the materials that the builder did not buy and 
the builder thereby claws-back profits on the work. I witnessed Bristles do this, and 
have done it myself in the past (see also Henry, 1978).
Fencing and Dealing
Steve once remarked, ‘You’ve probably noticed this, but you get a lot of nicked gear 
coming across building sites’. Informal economy at Keyworker House was not only
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characterised by fiddling, pilfering and privates, but some of the builders were petty 
entrepreneurs; distributors of stolen goods and contraband.
Illicit goods were sometimes distributed across trade boundaries. Every week 
or two Danny bought smuggled cigarettes for his wife from Bill. Smuggled cigarettes, 
tobacco and illegal drugs exchanged hands on a regular basis. One only had to ask 
someone who was smoking a cannabis cigarette on the scaffold where they could get 
some from and the names of those working on the site that sold it were reeled off. 
Some of the painters regularly exchanged different varieties of illegal drugs with one 
another, where, for example, one man could get ‘good E’s’ and another ‘good coke’.
In chapter 5, Stew talked about his street background and how he led a life of 
crime when he was younger. He had left this career, but he still possessed links with 
the illegal drug underworld of ‘the Cally’, and therefore, continued to ‘sort out’ his 
work mates with amphetamine, ecstasy and cannabis. In a sense, Stew had not really 
left his past because he fell back into it by doing favours for his work mates. Like 
Stew, many individuals do not grow out of crime as statistics appear to indicate. 
Informal economic actions merely become more secretive, less detectable, and less 
public as people grow older, and thus less likely to be registered in crime statistics 
(Foster, 1990).
It was not only Stew who had not quite left his illicit world behind. Will also 
had a street-based past, but was mostly removed from this world through his father’s 
links into legitimate work. However, Will was also a semi-professional fence and 
volubly proud of it. He would buy a multitude of goods from his street acquaintances 
and store them in his lock-up (empty garage space) near to his home in South London. 
Will crosscut a number of different networks, and earned a wage for which he could 
afford to buy goods from the street, which, it can be assumed, were sold to him vastly 
under-price by offenders in search of quick cash (c.f. Jacobs et al, 2003). Everyone 
knew that Will was the man to see if one wanted a car stereo or mobile phone; he 
could almost get these to order. He also sold bicycles, video and digital cameras, and 
cannabis during my fieldwork. His main customers for electronic consumables were 
the site management who possessed a particular thirst for technological goods and the 
spare cash to buy them.
The informal economy at Keyworker House mirrored the formal economy (c.f. 
Hobbs, 1995). For example, at Christmas time, Bristles vended cheap boneless 
turkeys as a seasonal addition to his all-year-round line in pirate DVDs and
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pornographic films. He also told me that ‘privates’ would come his way more 
frequently at Christmas because people wanted to ‘spruce up their front rooms’ (see 
chapter 5). Will was running a profitable line in stolen bicycles (he later told me he 
wished he kept them for the summer-time where he thought he could have obtained a 
higher price). Bristles offered to buy the whole cache at a reduced lump-sum price but 
Will continued to sell them individually at a slightly higher profit than through bulk- 
selling. Christmas was a profitable time for the entrepreneurial builders, and also 
presented ‘bargains’ for their customers (see below).
One of the painters bought an illicit laptop computer into work that Jamin was
interested in buying for his children. Jamin decided he would rather purchase a
desktop and Steve bought the laptop instead. Again, these goods could cross trade and
ethnic divides, and the painter was approached by Bapu, who asked in whispered
tones, if he could get a laptop for his daughter. Will got wind of this trade and he
shared his business acumen:
I could shift those in hours. Laptops boy, they go like hotcakes. Don’t believe you can’t 
shift them quicker. If that was me I’d lose [sell] them all in day. If you hold onto stuff 
you’re not making any money. Get it in and get it out quick, that’s where the money is.
No use hanging on to stuff, specially stuff like laptops. (Fieldnotes)
Despite Will’s astute informal business acumen, he told me how he thought ‘dodgy 
money’ was of much less value than money earned from formal work. He described 
how he and his friends would in the past, steal credit cards to buy goods that they 
exchanged for cash. They would ‘blow’ the cash in a matter of hours, forcing them to 
go out and offend again so as to raise more ‘quick cash’ (c.f. Wright and Decker, 
1994). His wages, he said, meant much more to him than the profits of crime.
Quick cash came and went at a fast rate, and exited the realm of making a 
living, to a realm of making risky excitement in terms of both accumulation and 
consumption. Conspicuous consumption follows morally vacuous quick- 
accumulation, and provides fast ‘party money’ (Shover and Honaker, 1991) and ready 
defence against detection by expelling physical evidence. The experiential seductions 
(Katz, 1988) of quick cash varied from the fiddle. Whilst fiddling can be a game, as 
something to think about when bored and, an informal reward for a long day, it is not 
a particularly exciting pursuit. Fiddles were embedded in archaic informal culture 
representing convention rather than deviation.
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The presence of overt informal trading again illustrated the taken-for-granted 
nature of the informal economy. It was as if the building site emitted a distorted moral 
ambience that permitted such activity. I experienced this moral ambience on other 
building sites in the past, highlighted by ‘outsiders’ entering the sites to sell illicit 
goods. At Keyworker House this was illustrated by a confidence trick that I observed 
through piss-takes directed towards Danny. A group of ‘knackers’ (a derogatory term 
for Irish travellers) approached the labourers purporting to be selling stolen electrical 
goods. Danny bought a TV and video at a very cheap price but was to later discover 
that the goods were old and inoperative. The ‘knackers’ used the distorted moral 
ambience to obtain Danny’s confidence in the authenticity of the informal bargains, 
when in fact he got no bargain at all. Moral ambience also related to the receivers of 
illicit goods never asking where the goods originated. Asking where goods came from 
was secondary to the ‘bargain’ of obtaining them, and thus facilitated the circulation 
of illicit goods by providing a certain motivation for those that stole them in the first 
place. No one wants to know, and therefore, be psychologically linked with, the 
information that their bargain was/is another’s property. This process was analogous 
to no one in formal consumer society wanting to know their bargains are the result of 
exploited and sweated global labour on which the relative global affluence of British 
society is predicated. Morality in this sense is bracketed, or in Cohen’s (2001) terms, 
‘denied’.
Social Position, Bargains and Urban Life
The question remains as to why some individuals traded more than others. One 
explanation lay simply in their network positioning. For example, Will and Stew 
dipped into past networks to obtain illicit goods; they were thus simply in a position 
to trade. Bristles, on the other hand, was a network manipulator, assisted by his 
cordial personality and motivated by an expensive vice. Once situated in a particular 
network position, low-risk opportunities to make pocket money arose. Being known 
to inhabit such a position produced a demand for services. People would ask Will for 
illicit mobile phones and Stew for illicit drugs. Demand from within a network can be 
difficult to refuse because of network elasticity, and the low risks of detection where 
networks keep things to themselves. Goods could be circulated freely within networks 
with ‘no questions asked’, and thus only a small risk that information concerning the 
activities would leak into formal channels where possible formal detection might
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occur. As I argued in the last chapter, networks not only functioned to distribute 
information but also canalised that information.
Networks, figuratively speaking, are linked to an informally negotiated 
morality, based in archaic custom, and distributed by the extant social pressure of the 
network (see chapter 9). However, rather than network morality censuring fiddling, 
pilfering, or the circulation of stolen goods, it actually facilitated these activities. This 
was partly because of the demonisation of the grass, and also, I would argue, the 
omnipresence of violent threat. However, the builders’ networks were set against the 
historical and present backdrop of economically and politically unpredictable lives, 
just as they had been for centuries. This was not to say that it was only builders that 
fiddle, as argued above, almost everyone does it. Yet, whilst everyone may fiddle, not 
everyone is involved in amateur trading using money as its medium, although 
everyone does trade in terms of gift exchange prestations, regardless of their social 
position (see chapter 9). Builders, and the working-classes in general, work in 
producing, fixing, vending, cleaning and transporting material goods. They have 
back-stage access to those goods, whereas the middle-classes do not. Gift exchange 
amongst the middle-classes takes different forms that are often more hidden because 
of their non-physical nature. As Dalton (1959), Granovetter (1974) and Boissevain 
(1974) show, rather than goods, the middle-classes exchange positions and influence, 
and also collude to fix their own social positions and profits (see Granovetter, 1992; 
Punch, 1996; and chapter 9).
The builders (and dockers and waiters [Mars, 1982]) were not employed on formal 
contracts, they worked ‘off the fringe’, and received zero formal fringe benefits. The 
illicit bargains coveted at Keyworker House were thus a kind of socially negotiated 
informal insurance and/or a contemporary method of extracting value from the 
parochial landscape. Most people enjoy ‘a bargain’, whether they ‘need’ the object or 
not. Advertisers and large multinational companies invest substantial sums of money 
to convince potential customers of the bargains obtained if they shop with them 
(Henry, 1978). The bargain smoothes economic life, rather like perquisites of the pre­
industrial era. However, in urban modernity there is literally no space to accrue pre­
industrial forms of insurance, and consequently new forms have been fashioned. 
Obtaining bargains, be it by pilfering, fiddling or informal trading, is, then, a
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culturally archaic source of creative adaptation to intense urban capitalism, much like 
the informal adaptations to metronomic and tabled time discussed in chapter 7.
Theorising Economies
The antecedents of the bargain were wider than calculative utility and adaptive play. 
Circulation of goods, whether pilfered, robbed or fiddled, sustained the structure and 
linkages of informal networks, which were themselves a form of social insurance and 
making a living. Granovetter (1974) argues that network contacts can be worth an 
entire living, and I would add to this, a place to live in (see the example of the Kutchis 
above). Like jobs, it is probably not that housing per se is found through networks, 
but ‘good’ housing (c.f. Young and Willmott, 1957). However, it can be seen that 
networks were economically necessary to obtain jobs, goods, services and housing, 
and therefore, constituted significant ingredient of class, race and gender structures.
Network linkages were forged in part by the very circulation of goods and 
favours, be they licit, illicit, formal or informal. For example, the painter who 
circulated illicit laptop computers also took part in the trade of illegal narcotics within 
the painting group. I got to know him well and had quite certain knowledge that he 
made such a small profit from these transactions that it was, in a purely pecuniary 
sense, not really worth the risk of transporting them to the workplace. However, what 
his actions did utilise were the formation of alliances. They opened the flow of licit 
and illicit information because he became a trusted member of the network; trusted in 
the sense that he was part of a secret and thus could be trusted to hold a secret. This 
opened up the possibility that other bargains would come his way because useful 
information would be released to him. It also forged social ties with both the dealer, 
who he bought the drugs from, and those at work whom he passed them onto. The 
links maintained and created through trading were therefore of a broader utility than 
the actual trades themselves.
Even a seemingly isolated and individual act of work pilferage was far from 
isolated. Pilfering is a social action, undertaken in the shadow of network members 
and informal social insurance. ‘Supportive interchange’ (Hobbs, 1988) frames 
individuals' motivations to fiddle, and in Box’s ([1971] 1981) terms, the network 
provides the vital situational ingredient of being ‘willing’ to deviate in association 
with being (morally) ‘ready’, and (opportunistically) ‘able’. This places doubt upon 
aspects of Hirschi’s (1969) ‘control theory’ of crime, in that he assumes commitment
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to others prevents individuals from offending. In my judgement, it is commitment to 
others that motivates informal economy, and in relation, it is the informal economy 
that motivates commitment to others. Favours, bargains and networks are by their 
very nature informal, and as an extension of this, can often be illicit. Thus ‘crime’, 
rather than being the blighted product of a lack of community, actually forged 
communities through linking people into elastic reciprocal relations, thereby binding 
the community both subjectively and transactionally (c.f. Walklate, 1998).
Network reciprocity also involved duty and loyalty. This was reflected by the
carpenters sending money back to their villages in Kutch, as Naz explained:
We [Kutchis] got together in London to build a massive school, massive. Seven rooms, 
big yard and everything. We’ve done a big hospital, cancer research, and everything in 
it, paid for by private donors, then later the government might give subsidies... I mean 
even the water supply in my village was done by individual donors you know. Then 
you pay like say 10 rupees a month or whatever for the water bills. Well, they don’t 
come in bills, they just - you know it and you go and pay it.
The actions of Naz and the London Kutchis appeared altruistic. However, they held
strong affective ties to their homeland. All of the first generation owned houses in
Kutch and tried to visit them at least annually. It might be expected that their altruism
were given a warm welcome, at least from their relatives that remained in Kutch.
Furthermore, the carpenters’ lives were historically guided by political and economic
events largely out of their own control, which made for insecure lives (see chapter 5).
Consequently, despite poverty, illness and fatal earthquakes, and despite the
carpenters’ increasing Anglicisation, the first generation held strong subjective
attachments to Kutch. Naz explained why:
[With the 1947 partition of India and Pakistan] big, big arguments, court cases 
everything, I mean nobody wants to lose a land which belonged to the grandfather and 
the grandfather’s father... So I bought my own land from a farm, you know, unwanted 
land so the farmer sells it as building blocks... it’s just there for me. Now, if my 
daughter wish to go there, I say, okay, I got enough land so you can build your house...
It’s like the Jewish. There was Israel, then they went away. Then there was no 
Israel. But when Hitler messed them up they wanted a base. So it’s the same you know, 
we got a base. Nobody leaves that.
Affective- Utilitarianism
Amateur trading tends to accrue only small profits, and prices charged in the informal 
economy vary by how much the seller is attached to the buyer i.e. good friends get a 
cheaper price than not so good friends. Henry (1978) argues, that because informal 
trades make such small profits, the utility of the trade is purely affective, and not
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economic at all; trading networks are a social mechanism that makes friends. Henry 
thus views the ‘hidden economy’ an affective system separate from the capitalist 
economy. In relation to this, he argues that the economic language that accompanies 
informal trading does not delineate the trading as economic, but that such language 
are the only frame in which participants can talk about informal trading. However, 
there are a number of problems with Henry’s theory: firstly, not everything pilfered is 
traded, much of it is kept. Secondly, exchange is affective but it is also economic. 
Thirdly, much meta-language surrounding informal action is non-verbal and thus not 
economic at all.
Even small profit is profit, and ‘pocket money’ can make a substantial
difference to an individual with little disposable income. Further, selling goods at a
reduced price to close friends in a dense network has a utility in maintaining the
network. So, whilst amateur trading may accumulate only very small profits, what it
does do is save money and make reciprocity. Constructing alliances and ties through a
gift exchange/trading mechanism can thus be viewed as utilitarian action, albeit an
‘affective-utility’ that cannot be mathematically calculated. As Adam Smith, doyen of
free market economics, noticed in the 18th century:
If your friend lent you money in your distress, ought you lend him some in his? How 
much ought you lend him? When ought you lend him? Now, or tomorrow, or next 
month? And for how long a time? It is evident that no general rule can be laid down, by 
which a precise answer can, in all cases, be given to any of these questions. (From Pahl, 
2000: 55)
The circulation of goods and favours was as a kind of heuristic-affective utilitarian 
insurance. Heuristic in that when performing a favour, one does not calculate exact 
returns; it is taken-for-granted that the favour will be reciprocated; and affective in 
that, favours, gifts and goods make friends, and friends make networks.
Types o f Economy
Primitive societies drew no distinction between social, economic or political realms; 
the peoples possessed no symbolic system to demarcate the differences (Sahlins, 
[1972] 2003). Economic, political and social spheres are a modem constmction, and 
within these, further subdivisions were created. In the economic sphere, a formal 
economy was constructed, and following this, informal, household and illicit sub­
economies. These too are historical inventions. Far from modernity containing an 
increasingly distinct formal economic sphere, household/informal economies continue
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to constitute a large part of that ‘sphere’ (Pahl, 1984). The categorisation of action or 
social spheres as economic, social or political, and within this, informal and formal, 
licit and illicit, is just that - a categorisation.
Formality and informality, licit and illicit, define and construct one another. 
The disciplines, in this case - economics and criminology, reinforce, create and power 
the constructions. For example, friendship is social (moral, emphatic and affective), 
but also economic (gifts, goods and services are exchanged), and political (status and 
power circulate). Friendship is utilitarian and beneficial, but it is also affective and 
emotive. Friendship could be viewed as economic because it provides jobs, homes, 
and goods, but economy could be viewed as predicated upon friendship in that 
markets are made and characterised by cliques, favours and personal relations. 
Friendship and the economy are thus not separate entities but, intimately 
interchangeable. Even in a highly structured and regulated economic arena such as the 
workplace, or the lucrative and highly competitive world of building contracting, 
actors’ motives mix elements of social, political and economic action.
Illicit and licit economies cannot be separated. Economy is crime (Sutherland, 1949) 
and crime is economy (Hobbs, 1988 and 1995). Informal action was not a sub­
economy existing within the construction marketplace; it was how that marketplace 
actually operated. The difference between capitalist economies and informal 
economies was levels of power that negated reciprocal equilibrium (see chapters 6, 8 
and 9), and further, surplus production, reciprocation and gift exchange pre-date 
capitalism (Mauss, 1954; Sahlins, 1972; Godelier, 1999). Consequently I would like 
to re-order Ditton’s phrase that the informal economy is the ‘bastard son of the 
capitalist economy’ (1977a: 168). Quite the contrary, the capitalist economy is the 
bastard of the informal economy.
242
C hapter 11 
C onclusion
Characters make cities and markets. As Marx was at pains to explain, economies are 
not numbers and quantities but collections of people doing things. In a similar vein, 
cities are not made by trade, but by people trading, just as the city’s landscape is made 
by builders making buildings. The builders in this story constructed, maintained and 
performed the economy and the city. They composed the world that composed them.
Throughout the story I emphasised the builders creative and collective adaptation to 
imposing social structures. I analysed the interrelations between history, economy, 
class, race and gender structures, as mediated though the builders’ creative interaction 
with them. Social positions were partly ascribed and markets were collusive and 
cartelised. The feudal forms of ascription, nepotism, honour, duty, loyalty and 
strength, reigned into the present and, the present built on the past, rather than 
superseding it. The builders’ archaic informal cultures smoothed the rougher edges of 
class, race and gender positions through which they attempted to make a living, make 
meaning, make status and security in an insecure and unpredictable world at the lower 
end of the national class structure. Insecurity necessitated that the builders contrived 
and constructed localised and informal social networks, yet, network patterns worked 
back upon them, generating further structures.
The Final Scene
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In this thesis I took four main problematic areas: I provided an account of builders 
and building which was neglected in studies of the workplace to the detriment of 
labour-process theory. Secondly, I analysed formal methods of social control: formal 
economy (markets, jobs, and taxation), time structures, systems of governance and 
concomitant observation mechanisms (bureaucratic management procedures, 
management power, and formal law), and I described the accompanying informal 
cultural adaptations to those structures. I extended this analysis to the formation of 
informal social networks, and the impact of these as sources of information, 
normative rules, and framing life chances and trajectories. I also argued that a vital 
ingredient to the social order of the building site was predicated upon the threat of 
violence, and that this was associated with the masculinity enacted by the builders.
The Death o f Class and Community?
Contemporary British society remains structured by social class. Through the screen 
of historical discourse, agents and structures interact, and class-cultures are recreated 
through the methods people employ to negotiate hierarchical society. Class existed in 
the minds and cultures of the builders, and class-culture had a continuing utility in 
their everyday lives. The working-class may shrink but people will always be required 
to make, clean, sell, transport, repair and build the physical infrastructure of post­
industrial societies. These kinds of work can not be ‘out-sourced’ to other countries 
because the workers perform a ‘service’ within the geography of the host economy.
Increasingly the working-class are recent migrant groups and their offspring, 
who enter or grow up in the host economy at the bottom end of the ‘network pile’ 
within an embedded economy. Guided to the bottom end of the class structure, recent 
migrant groups adopt aspects of the host economy’s class culture as a resource for 
living class life. The working-class will also consist of ‘the lads’ who grow up in the 
host economy and ‘learn to labour’; those bom at the bottom end of the class structure 
whose cultural mechanisms continue to be reproduced because of the structural 
exigencies of class life. Furthermore, whilst class relations have become intensively 
global, they remain paradoxically local. An illustration of this were chain migration 
and ethnic and trade enclaves.
The working classes in general, and builders, working-class women and city 
dwellers in particular, have historically lived risky, uncertain and transitory lives; 
continually on the move in search of work and, working in short-term unstable, often
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non-formalised work environments. Mass nation-bound, long-term factory work was 
a short historical moment, representing only a small section of modem capitalism 
(Pahl, 1984), and, since their inception, the working-class were pushed around by 
forces beyond their control. Mayhew (1861) tirelessly documented the uncertainty of 
working-class lives in London in the 19th century, and Thompson (1963; 1975; 1993) 
describes how being pushed around was a defining feature of their formation; the 
enclosure movement literally made the working-class.
War, want, unemployment, accidents at work and social and political changes 
impinge upon the lives of the less affluent in unpredictable and unforeseeable ways. 
Their adaptation to unforeseeable risks was structured by limited choices, and further, 
by poor access to high capital information and high capital. However, the builder’s 
narratives illustrated that uncertainty was expected and normal. They did not live in a 
world of fractured narratives, unbounded mobilities and ‘weak ties’, but were 
embedded in tight family and neighbourhood networks that not only subsumed their 
private lives but spread into their work lives. Far from living in a post-modem world, 
the builders’ world was almost pre-modem.
Ephemeralism, casualisation and uncertainty formed a structural backdrop for 
the creation of social ties as opposed to wearing them down. The builders drew 
meaning into their lives by reference to their network communities and, most 
saliently, to their families. The family was not only place of security, recuperation, 
and perhaps, power, but it had an important ‘economic’ and normative function. 
Families and communities were of vital necessity in relation to making a living, 
meaning and status. Families and communities were utilised for getting on in intense 
modernity as a source of work, housing, goods, services and favours (see also 
Bummer, 1986; Harris, 1990).
Revolution or Recreation?
In manoeuvring and utilising parochially structured benefits to make life more 
comfortable for themselves, the builders perpetuated class, gender and race structures, 
and the structures divided what could otherwise be a homogenous class. Builders as a 
section of the working-class were not resisting capitalism, quite the contrary, they 
lived from its fruit and took it for granted as a given, immutable aspect of life. In 
monetary-economic terms, they were a ‘global middle-class’, living affluent lives
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relative to their global brothers and sisters. Resonant with their lives was Orwell’s
description of the English middle-class of the 1930’s:
Did they know that they were only puppets dancing when the money pulled the strings? 
You bet they didn’t. And if they did, would they care? They were too busy being bom, 
being married, begetting, working, dying.... The money-code as they interpreted it was 
not merely cynical and hoggish. They had their standards, their inviolable points of 
honour. They ‘kept themselves respectable’ -  kept the aspidistra flying. Besides, they 
were alive. They were bound up in the bundle of life. They begot children, which is 
what the saints and the soul savers never by any chance do. ([1936] 1964: 255. Italics 
original)
Marx assumed the working-class would come together and become conscious of their 
social position. The builders were certainly conscious of their class (c.f. Cannadine, 
1999), and collective within it, regardless of their racial origins or social mobility, yet 
they did not collectivise as a total class, but as localised, internally differentiated, 
gendered and racialised sections within it. Capitalism itself, whilst dividing people 
into competition, also, paradoxically, pulled them together. It was, as Durkheim 
([1893] 1960) argued, that the division of labour forces necessary co-operation; 
people come to rely on one another (see also Pahl, 2000) and make the economy. The 
builders came together in communities and busied themselves with ‘being bom, being 
married, begetting, working, dying’, and they helped one another to do this within 
capitalism, not to overthrow it.
Economy, Networks and Society
Marx also argued that the economy blankets nature, forming a backdrop to social life, 
and Durkheim and Mauss maintained that social life was social exchange. Social and 
productive exchange between people and their environmental infrastructure underpins 
culture. The builders lived within an intense capitalist marketplace dominated by 
hierarchical work organisation and an intense money economy, yet they also 
exchanged information, goods and services within networks of others in an informal 
economy where money and hierarchy played a lesser part. This economy framed their 
alliances, moralities, subjectivties and life-chances.
Mauss ([1954] 1970) described how primitive gift exchange was employed 
primarily to elicit friendly social relations and prevent violence. Gift exchange 
between the builders served a similar but attenuated function as a method and, 
constituent of, maintaining reciprocity. Reciprocity was the social adhesive by which 
communities were maintained because it manufactured social duty and loyalty,
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limited egoism, prevented violence, and contributed to the formation of trust; a trust 
that supplied economic and ontological security. Duty was a form of reciprocity in 
that it implied the ‘repayment’ of ‘debts’ to those individuals or institutions adopting 
the symbolic position of provider, for example, gods, parents, bosses, patrons or 
patriarchs. However, these providers also enforced reciprocal duty through 
symbolised violent power, as, what they provided they could also remove. 
Symbolised violence manufactured false reciprocity, which when unquestionably 
consented to, was hegemonic. Power, in its final instance therefore, rested upon actual 
or symbolised violence, and, power and social distance skewed and distorted 
reciprocity, which, historically permitted exploitation.
Normative frameworks bind those tied into a network, and people manoeuvre 
within social networks for their own benefits. There is more to social life than norms 
(Boissevain, 1974). For example, if everybody had a moral character, there would be 
no such entity as trust because we simply would and could trust everybody (Dasgupta, 
1988). Norms and morality simply guide action; they do not concretely impose it. 
Formal structures are organising guides to social action but, do not concretely 
delineate that action. The builders did not blindly follow formal injunctions, but at 
each stage they informally negotiated them; moving and manoeuvring around 
structures in continual reinterpretation (Giddens, 1984). The builders formed 
communities and cliques as aids to negotiate structural impositions, and they 
culturally and collectively colluded to make life more comfortable for themselves and 
their children. Informal action made their society.
Society can be viewed as a collection of many discrete network groups, and it 
is the history and competition between network groups that frame members’ life 
chances. The builders’ membership within specific networks formed the structural 
backdrop to class and race patterns that further structured the their lives. Networks 
were related to jobs (Granovetter, 1974), migratory patterns (Portes, 1995), housing 
(Young and Willmott, 1957; Desai, 1963) and economic markets (Granovetter, 1985). 
Networks thereby underpinned life chances and trajectories, and consequently it was 
not simply culture that reproduced class and race structures; the men did not only 
learn to labour (Willis, 1977), they were directed to labour by the shape of their 
network groups. For example, where one is housed dictates where they go to school, 
the local culture adopted, and the local networks inhabited, which in turn dictate 
access to jobs, goods, services and housing. This may not be the case for those that
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successfully negotiate formal society. Badges of ability, most prominently, formal 
educational qualifications, might negate the necessity of informal networks by 
permitting entry to other, more formal social milieu, but, the builders did not posses 
formal badges. Most had subjectively bypassed the formal education system, or for 
migrant groups, educational qualifications acquired in other countries were mostly 
worthless in Britain. To negotiate social life, then, the builders utilised what they what 
they had, and, like people have done for hundreds of years, they utilised their friends, 
families, and their bodily strength and skill. For these men, informal contacts and their 
bodies were their symbolic and social capital, and therefore, their lives were 
dependent on these.
I
i
i
I
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